141 Richter, op. cit. p. 157. Wallon, op. cit. i. 346 sqq.
142 Schmidt, op. cit. ii. 212. Richter, op. cit. p. 151.
143 Plato, Leges, vi. 777 sq.
144 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, viii. 11. 6 sq. Idem, Politica, i. 5, p. 1254.
145 Idem, Politica, i. 3, p. 1253 b.
146 Ibid. i. 2, 6, pp. 1252 b, 1255 a. See Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulide, 1400 sq.
The Roman jurists held up slavery as a mitigation of the horrors of war: the capture and preservation of enemies, they said, was its sole and exclusive origin in the past.147 But in Rome as elsewhere, when once established, it contained in itself the germ of extension; all the children of a female slave followed the condition of the mother, according to the principle applicable to the offspring of the lower animals—“Partus sequitur ventrem.” And sooner or later, when these sources proved insufficient to maintain the supply, a regular commerce in slaves was established, which was based on the systematically prosecuted hunting of men in foreign lands.148 To a much smaller extent the slave class was recruited by Roman citizens—by children sold by their fathers, by insolvent debtors, or by criminals condemned to servitude as a punishment for some heinous offence.149 The idea of a Roman becoming the slave of a fellow-citizen was never quite agreeable to the Roman mind. According to an ancient law the debtor, after being made over to the creditor, should be sold abroad or trans Tiberim.150 Subsequently, in 326 B.C., the creditor’s lien was restricted to the goods of his debtor, if the latter was a Roman citizen;151 and during the Pagan Empire the sale of freeborn children by their fathers was prohibited.152 The power, originally unlimited, which the master had over his slave was also, in the course of time, subjected to limitations. We have seen that since the days of Claudius and Antoninus Pius legal check was put on the master’s right of killing his slave.153 The Lex Petronia, A.D. 61, forbade masters to compel their slaves to fight with wild beasts.154 In the time of Nero an official was appointed to hear complaints of the wrongs done by masters to their slaves.155 Antoninus Pius directed that slaves treated with excessive cruelty, who had taken refuge at an altar or imperial image, should be sold; and this provision was extended to cases in which the master had employed a slave in a way degrading to him or beneath his character.156 In public auctions of slaves regard was paid to the claims of relationship,157 and in the interpretation of testaments it was assumed that members of the same family were not to be separated by the division of the succession.158 In those days when Roman slavery had lost its original patriarchal and, to speak with Mommsen,159 “in some measure innocent” character, when the victories of Rome and the increasing slave trade had introduced into the city innumerable slaves, when those simpler habits of life which in early times somewhat mitigated the rigour of the law had changed—the lot of the Roman slave was often extremely hard, and numerous acts of shocking cruelty were committed.160 But we also hear, from the early days of the Empire, that masters who had been cruel to their slaves were pointed at with disgust in all parts of the city, and were hated and loathed.161 And with a fervour which can hardly be surpassed Seneca and other Stoics argued that the slave is a being with human dignity and human rights, born of the same race as ourselves, living the same life, and dying the same death—in short, that our slaves “are also men, and friends, and our fellow-servants.”162 Epictetus even went so far as to condemn altogether the keeping of slaves, a radicalism explicable from the history of his own life. “What you avoid suffering yourself,” he says, “seek not to impose on others. You avoid slavery, for instance; take care not to enslave. For if you can bear to exact slavery from others, you appear to have been yourself a slave.”163 These teachings could not fail to influence both legislation and public sentiment. Imbued with the Stoic philosophy, the jurists of the classical period declared that all men are originally free by the law of Nature, and that slavery is only “an institution of the Law of Nations, by which one man is made the property of another, in opposition to natural right.”164
147 Hunter, Exposition of Roman Law, p. 160 sq. Institutiones, i. 3. 3:—“Slaves are called servi, because generals are wont to sell their captives, and so to preserve (servare), and not to destroy them. They are also called mancipia, because they are taken from the enemy with the strong hand (manu capiuntur).”
148 Mommsen, History of Rome, iii. 305 sq. Wallon, op. cit. ii. 46 sqq. Ingram, op. cit. p. 38.
149 Wallon, op. cit. ii. 18 sqq. Ingram, op. cit. p. 39. Institutiones, i. 12. 3.
150 Mackenzie, Studies in Roman Law, p. 94.
151 Livy, Historiæ Romanæ, viii. 28. Wallon, op. cit. ii. 29, n. 1.
153 Supra, p. 425 sq.
154 Digesta, xlviii. 8. 11. 2.
155 Seneca, De beneficiis, iii. 22. 3.
156 Wallon, op. cit. iii. 57 sq. Ingram, p. 63.
157 Hunter, Exposition of Roman Law, p. 159.
158 Wallon, op. cit. iii. 53.
159 Mommsen, History of Rome, iii. 305.
160 See Lecky, History of Morals, i. 302 sq.
161 Seneca, De clementia, i. 18. 3.
162 Idem, Epistolæ, 47. Idem, De beneficiis, iii. 28. Epictetus, Dissertationes, i. 13. See also the collection of statements referring to slavery made by Holland, Reign of the Stoics, p. 186 sqq.
163 Epictetus, Fragmenta, 42.
164 Institutiones, i. 3. 2.
Considering that Christianity has commonly been represented as almost the sole cause of the mitigation and final abolishment of slavery in Europe, it deserves special notice that the chief improvement in the condition of slaves at Rome took place at so early a period that Christianity could have absolutely no share in it. Nay, for about two hundred years after it was made the official religion of the Empire there was an almost complete pause in the legislation on the subject.165 Under Justinian certain reforms were introduced:—enfranchisement was facilitated in various ways;166 the rights of Roman citizens were granted to emancipated slaves, who had previously occupied an intermediate position between slavery and perfect freedom;167 and though the law still refused to recognise the marriages of slaves, Justinian gave them a legal value after emancipation in establishing rights of succession.168 But the inferior position of the slave was asserted as sternly as ever. He belonged to the “corporeal” property of his master, he was reckoned among things which are tangible by their nature, like land, raiment, gold, and silver.169 The constitution of Antoninus Pius restraining excessive severity on the part of masters was enforced, but the motive for this was not evangelic humanity.170 It is said in the Institutes of Justinian, “This decision is a just one; for it greatly concerns the public weal, that no one be permitted to misuse even his own property.”171
165 Cf. Lecky, History of European Morals, ii. 64.
166 Institutiones, i. 5 sqq.
167 Ibid. i. 5. 3; iii. 7. 4.
168 Ibid. iii. 7 pr.
169 Institutiones, ii. 2. 1.
170 Cf. Milman, History of Latin Christianity, ii. 14.
171 Institutiones, i. 8. 2.
It is curious to note that the inconsistency of slavery with the tenet, “Do to others as you would be done by,” though emphasised by a pagan philosopher, never seems to have occurred to any of the early Christian writers. Christianity recognised slavery from the beginning. The principle that all men are spiritually equal in Christ does not imply that they should be socially equal in the world. Slavery does not prevent anybody from performing the duties incumbent on a Christian, it does not bar the way to heaven, it is an external affair only, nothing but a name. He only is really a slave who commits sin.172 Slavery is of course a burden, but a burden which has been laid upon the back of transgression. Man when created by God was free, and nobody was the slave of another until that just man Noah cursed Ham, his offending son; slavery, then, is a punishment sent by Him who best knows how to proportionate punishment to offence.173 The slave himself ought not to desire to become free,174 nay, if the master offers him freedom he ought not to accept it.175 Not one of the Fathers even hints that slavery is unlawful or improper.176 In the early age martyrs possessed slaves, and so did abbots, bishops, popes, monasteries, and churches;177 Jews and pagans only were prohibited from acquiring Christian slaves.178 So little was the abolition of slavery thought of that a Council at Orleans, in the middle of the sixth century, expressly decreed the perpetuity of servitude among the descendants of slaves.179 On the other hand, the Church showed a zeal to prevent accessions to slavery from capture, but her exertions were restricted to Christian prisoners of war.180 As late as the nineteenth century the right of enslaving captives was defended by Bishop Bouvier.181
172 Gregory Nazianzen, Orationes, xiv. 25 (Migne, Patrologiæ cursus, Ser. Graeca, xxxv. 891 sq.). Idem, Carmina, i. 2. 26. 29 (ibid. xxxvii. 853); i. 2. 33. 133 sqq. (ibid. xxxvii. 937 sq.). St. Chrysostom, In cap. IX. Genes. Homilia XXIX. 7 (ibid. liii. 270). Idem, In Epist. I. ad Cor. Homilia XIX. 5 (ibid. lxi. 158). St. Ambrose, In Epistolam ad Colossenses, 3 (Migne, op. cit. Ser. Lat. xvii. 439).
173 St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, xix. 15 (Migne, op. cit. xli. 643 sq.).
174 St. Ignatius, Epistola ad Polycarpum, 4 (Migne, op. cit. Ser. Graeca, v. 723 sq.). St. Augustine, Ennaratio in Psalmum CXXIV. 7 (Migne, op. cit. xxxvii. 1653).
175 Laurent, Études sur l’histoire de l’humanité, iv. 117.
176 Cf. Babington, Influence of Christianity in Promoting the Abolition of Slavery in Europe, p. 29.
177 Ibid. p. 22. Potgiesser, Commentarii juris Germanici de statu servorum, i. 4. 8, p. 176. Muratori, Dissertazioni sopra le antichità italiane, i. 244.
178 Concilium Toletanum IV. A.D. 633, can. 66 (Labbe-Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio, x. 635). Blakey, Temporal Benefits of Christianity, p. 397. Digby, Mores Catholici, ii. 341. Cibrano, Della schiavitù e del servaggio, i. 272. Rivière, L’Église et l’esclavage, p. 350.
179 Concilium Aurelianense IV. about A.D. 545, can. 32 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. ix. 118 sq.).
180 Concilium Rhemense, about A.D. 630, can. 22 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x. 597). Gratian, Decretum, ii. 12. 2. 13 sqq. Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici, A.D. 1263, ch. 74 vol. xxii. 124. Le Blant, Inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule, ii. 284 sqq. Babington, op. cit. pp. 51 sqq., 94 sq. Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 114.
181 Bouvier, Institutiones philosophicæ, p. 566.
The Apostles reminded slaves of their duties towards their masters and masters of their duties towards their slaves.182 The same was done by Councils and Popes. The Council of Gangra, about the year 324, pronounced its anathema on anyone who should teach a slave to despise his master on pretence of religion;183 and so much importance was attached to this decree that it was inserted in the epitome of canons which Hadrian I. in 773 presented to Charlemagne in Rome.184 But there are also many instances in which masters are recommended to show humanity to their slaves.185 According to Gregory IX. “the slaves who were washed in the fountain of holy baptism should be more liberally treated in consideration of their having received so great a benefit.”186 Slaves who had taken refuge from their masters in churches or monasteries were not to be given up until the master had sworn not to punish the fugitive;187 or they were never given up, but became slaves to the sanctuary.188 The Church, as we have seen, protected the life of the slave by excommunicating for a couple of years masters who killed their slaves.189 She prohibited the sale of Christian slaves to Jews and heathen nations.190 The Council of Chalons, in the middle of the seventh century, ordered that no Christians should be sold outside the kingdom of Clovis, so that they might not get into captivity or become the slaves of Jewish masters;191 and some Anglo-Saxon laws similarly forbade the sale of Christians out of the country, and especially into bondage to heathen, “that those souls perish not that Christ bought with his own life.”192 The clergy sometimes remonstrated against slave markets; but their indignation never reached the trade in heathen slaves,193 nor was the master’s right of selling any of his slaves whenever he pleased called in question at all. The assertion made by many writers that the Church exercised an extremely favourable influence upon slavery194 surely involves a great exaggeration. As late as the thirteenth century the master practically had the power of life and death over his slave.195 Throughout Christendom the purchase and the sale of men, as property transferred from vendor to buyer, was recognised as a legal transaction of the same validity with the sale of other merchandise, land or cattle.196 Slaves had a title to nothing but subsistence and clothes from their masters, all the profits of their labour accruing to the latter; and if a master from indulgence gave his slaves any peculium, or fixed allowance for their subsistence, they had no right of property in what they saved out of that, but all that they accumulated belonged to their master.197 A slave or a freedman was not allowed to bring a criminal charge against a free person, except in the case of a crimen læsæ majestatis,198 and slaves were incapable of being received as witnesses against freemen.199 The old distinction between the marriage of the freeman and the concubinage of the slave was long recognised by the Church: slaves could not marry, but had only a right of contubernium, and their unions did not receive the nuptial benediction of a priest.200 Subsequently, when conjunction between slaves came to be considered a lawful marriage, they were not permitted to marry without the consent of their master, and such as transgressed this rule were punished very severely, sometimes even with death.201
182 Ephesians, vi. 5 sqq. Colossians, iii. 22 sqq.; iv. 1.
183 Concilium Gangrense, about A.D. 324, can. 3 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. ii. 1102, 1106, 1110).
184 ‘Epitome canonum, quam Hadrianus I. Carolo magno obtulit, A.D. DCCLXXIII.’ in Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. xii. 863.
185 Babington, op. cit. p. 58 sqq.
186 Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici, A.D. 1238, ch. 62, vol. xxi. 204.
187 Milman, op. cit. ii. 51. Rivière, op. cit. p. 306. Du Boys, Histoire du droit criminel des peuples modernes, ii. 246, n. 1.
188 ‘Concilium Kingesburiense sub Bertulpho,’ in Wilkins, Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ, i. 181.
190 Concilium Rhemense, about A.D. 630, can. 11 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x. 596). Concilium Liptinense, A.D. 743, can. 3 (ibid. xii. 371). Hefele, Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, i. 218. Idem, History of the Councils of the Church, v. 211.
191 Concilium Cabilonense, about A.D. 650, can. 9 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x. 1191).
192 Laws of Ethelred, v. 2; vi. 9. Laws of Cnut, ii. 3.
193 Hüllmann, Stædtewesen des Mittelalters, i. 80 sq. Loring Brace, Gesta Christi, p. 229. Rivière, op. cit. p. 325.
194 Yanoski, De l’abolition de l’esclavage ancien au moyen age, p. 74 sq. Allard, Les esclaves chrétiens depuis les premiers temps de l’Église, p. 487; &c.
195 Supra, p. 427 sq.
196 Potgiesser, op. cit. ii. 4. 5, p. 429. Milman, op. cit. ii. 16.
197 Potgiesser, op. cit. ii. 10, p. 528 sqq. Du Cange, Glossarium ad scriptores mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis, vi. 451. Robertson, History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V. i. 274.
198 Potgiesser, op. cit. iii. 3. 2, p. 612.
199 Beaumanoir, Coutumes du Beauvoisis, xxxix. 32, vol. ii, 103. Du Cange, op. cit. vi. 452. Potgiesser, op. cit. iii. 3. 1, p. 611.
200 Potgiesser, op. cit. ii. 2. 10 sq., p. 354 sq.
201 Ibid. ii. 2. 12, p. 355 sq.
The gradual disappearance of slavery in Europe during the latter part of the Middle Ages has also commonly been in the main attributed to the influence of the Church.202 But this opinion is hardly supported by facts. It is true that the Church in some degree encouraged the manumission of slaves. Though slavery was considered a perfectly lawful institution, the enfranchisement of a fellow-Christian was deemed a meritorious act, and was sometimes strongly recommended on Christian principles. At the close of the sixth century it was affirmed that, as Christ had come to break the chain of our servitude and restore our primitive liberty, so it was well for us to imitate Him by making free those whom the law of nations had reduced to slavery;203 and the same doctrine was again proclaimed at various times down to the sixteenth century.204 In the Carlovingian period the abbot Smaragdus expressed the opinion that among other good and salutary works each one ought to let slaves go free, considering that not nature but sin had subjected them to their masters.205 In the latter part of the twelfth century the prelates of France, and in particular the Archbishop of Sens, pretended that it was an obligation of conscience to accord liberty to all Christians, relying on a decree of a Council held at Rome by Pope Alexander III.206 And in one of the later compilations of German mediæval law it was said that the Lord Jesus, by his injunction to render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s and unto God the things that are God’s, indicated that no man is the property of another, but that every man belongs to God.207 Slaves were liberated “for God’s love,” or “for the remedy” or “ransom of the soul.”208 In the formularies of manumission given by the monk Marculfus in the seventh century we read, for instance:—“He that releases his slave who is bound to him, may trust that God will recompense him in the next world”;209 “For the remission of my sins, I absolve thee”;210 “For the glory of God’s name and for my eternal retribution,” &c.211 Too much importance, however, has often been attached to these phrases; the most trivial occurrences, such as giving a book to a monastery, are commonly accompanied by similar expressions,212 and it appears from certain formulas that slaves were not only liberated, but also bought and sold, “in the name of God.”213 Nor can we suppose that it was from religious motives only that manumissions were encouraged by the clergy. It has been pointed out that, “as dying persons were frequently inclined to make considerable donations for pious uses, it was more immediately for the interest of churchmen, that people of inferior condition should be rendered capable of acquiring property, and should have the free disposal of what they had acquired.” It also seems that those who obtained their liberty by the influence of the clergy had to reward their benefactors, and that the manumission should for this reason be confirmed by the Church.214 And whilst the Church favoured liberation of the slaves of laymen, she took care to prevent liberation of her own slaves; like a physician she did not herself swallow the medicine which she prescribed to others. She allowed alienation of such slaves only as showed a disposition to run away.215 The Council of Agatho, in 506, considered it unfair to enfranchise the slaves of monasteries, seeing that the monks themselves were daily compelled to labour;216 and, as a matter of fact, the slaves of monasteries were everywhere among the last who were manumitted.217 In the seventh century a Council at Toledo threatened with damnation any bishop who should liberate a slave belonging to the Church, without giving due compensation from his own property, as it was thought impious to inflict a loss on the Church of Christ;218 and according to several ecclesiastical regulations no bishop or priest was allowed to manumit a slave in the patrimony of the Church unless he put in his place two slaves of equal value.219 Nay, the Church was anxious not only to prevent a reduction of her slaves, but to increase their number. She zealously encouraged people to give up themselves and their posterity to be the slaves of churches and monasteries, to enslave their bodies—as some of the charters put it—in order to procure the liberty of their souls.220 And in the middle of the seventh century a Council decreed that the children of incontinent priests should become the slaves of the churches where their fathers officiated.221