In Christianity the knowledge of truth became a necessary requirement of salvation. But here, as in the East, the truth which alone was valued was religious truth. All knowledge that was not useful to salvation was, indeed, despised, and science was regarded not only as valueless, but as sinful.160 “The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.”161 If it happened that any one gave himself to letters, or lifted up his mind to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, he passed instantly for a magician or a heretic.162 So also every mental disposition which is essential to scientific research was for centuries stigmatised as offensive to the Almighty; it was a sin to doubt the opinions which had been instilled in childhood before they had been examined, to notice any objection to those opinions, to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it might lead.163 Yet we are told, even by highly respectable writers, that the modern world owes its scientific spirit to the extreme importance which Christianity assigned to the possession of truth, of the truth.164 According to M. Réville, “it was the orthodox intolerance of the Church in the Middle Ages which impressed on Christian society this disposition to seek truth at any price, of which the modern scientific spirit is only the application. The more importance the Church attached to the profession of the truth—to the extent even of considering involuntary error as in the highest degree a damnable crime—so much the more the sentiment of the immense value of this truth arose in the general persuasion, along with a resolve to conquer it wherever it was felt not to be possessed. How otherwise,” M. Réville asks, “can we explain that science was not developed and has not been pursued with constancy, except in the midst of Christian societies?”165 This statement is characteristic of the common tendency to attribute to the influence of the Christian religion almost anything good which may be found among Christian nations. But, surely, the patient and impartial search after hidden truth, for the sake of truth, which constitutes the essence of scientific research, is not congenial to, but the very opposite of, that ready acceptance of a revealed truth for the sake of eternal salvation, which was insisted upon by the Church. And what about that singular love of abstract knowledge which flourished in ancient Athens, where Aristotle declared it a sacred duty to prefer truth to everything else,166 and Socrates sacrificed his life on its altar? It seems that the modern scientific spirit is only a revival and development of a mental disposition which was for ages suppressed by the persecuting tendencies of the Church and the extreme contempt for learning displayed by the barbarian invaders and their descendants. Even when they had settled in the countries which they had conquered, the Teutons would not permit their children to be instructed in any science, for fear lest they should become effeminate and averse from war;167 and long afterwards it was held that a nobleman ought not to know letters, and that to write and read was a shame to gentry.168

The regard for knowledge springs in the first instance from the love of it. As Aristotle said, “all men are by nature desirous of knowledge.”169 But this feeling is not equally strong, nor equally deep, in all. The curiosity of savages, however great it often may be,170 has chiefly reference to objects or events which immediately concern their welfare or appear to them alarming, or to trifles which attract attention on account of their novelty. If their curiosity were more penetrating, they would no longer remain savages; an extended desire of knowledge leads to civilisation. But curiosity or love of knowledge, whether in savage or civilised men, is not resolvable merely into views of utility; as Dr. Brown observed, we feel it without reflecting on the pleasure which we are to enjoy or the pain which we are to suffer.171 When highly developed, it drives men to scientific investigations even though no practical benefits are expected from the results. This devotion to truth for its own sake, pure and disinterested as it is, has a singular tendency to excite regard and admiration in everyone who has come under its influence. From the utilitarian point of view it has been defended on the ground that, on the whole, every truth is in the long run useful and every error harmful, and that we can never exactly tell in advance what benefits may accrue even from a knowledge which is apparently fruitless. But it seems that our love of truth is somewhat apt to mislead our moral judgment. When duly reflecting on the matter, we cannot help making a moral distinction between him who pursues his studies merely from an instinctive craving for knowledge, and him who devotes his life to the search of truth from a conviction that he may thereby promote human welfare.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN’S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING PRIDE—POLITENESS

This feeling, or at least the germ of it, is found already in some of the lower animals. Among “high-life” dogs, says Professor Romanes, “wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of producing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain.” A reproachful word or look from any of his friends made a Skye terrier miserable for a whole day; and another terrier, who when in good humour used to perform various tricks, was never so pleased as when his joke was duly appreciated, whereas “nothing displeased him so much as being laughed at when he did not intend to be ridiculous.”1 Monkeys also, according to Dr. Brehm, are “very sensitive to every kind of treatment they may receive, to love and dislike, to encouraging praise and chilling blame, to pleasant flattery and wounding ridicule, to caresses and chastisement.”2

Among the savage races of men, as among civilised peoples, self-regarding pride is universal, and in many of them it is a very conspicuous trait of character.3 The Veddah of Ceylon, says Mr. Nevill, “is proud in the extreme, and considers himself no man’s inferior. Hence he is keenly sensitive to ridicule, contempt, and even patronage. There is nothing he dreads more than being laughed at as a savage, because he dislikes clothes and cultivation.”4 Australian aborigines are described as “extravagantly proud,”5 as “vain and fond of approbation.”6 In Fiji “anything like a slight deeply offends a native, and is not soon forgotten.”7 The Negroes of Sierra Leone “possess a great share of pride, and are easily affected by an insult: they cannot hear even a harsh expression, or a raised tone of voice, without shewing that they feel it.”8 The Araucanians, inhabiting parts of Chili, “are naturally fond of honourable distinction, and there is nothing they can endure with less patience than contempt or inattention.”9 The North American Indians, says Perrot, “ont généralement touts beaucoup de vaine gloire dans leurs actions bonnes ou mauvaises…. L’ambition est en un mot une des plus fortes passions qui les anime.”10 The Indian of British Columbia, for instance, “watches that he may receive his proper share of honour at festivals; he cannot endure to be ridiculed for even the slightest mistake; he carefully guards all his actions, and looks for due honour to be paid to him by friends, strangers, and subordinates. This peculiarity appears most clearly in great festivals.”11 Thus, in numerous instances, “persons who have been hoarding up property for ten, fifteen, or twenty years (at the same time almost starving themselves for want of clothing), have given it all away to make a show for a few hours, and to be thought of consequence.”12 Speaking of the Eskimo about Behring Strait, Mr. Nelson observes, “As with all savages, the Eskimo are extremely sensitive to ridicule and are very quick to take offence at real or seeming slights.”13 Among the Atkha Aleuts it has happened that men have committed suicide from disappointment at the failure of an undertaking, fearing that they would become the laughing-stock of the village.14 Among many other savages shame or wounded pride is not uncommonly a cause of suicide.15 The Hos of Chota Nagpore have a saying that for a wife who has been reproved by her husband “nothing remains but the water at the bottom of the well”;16 and in New Zealand native women sometimes killed themselves because they had been rebuked for negligence in cooking or for want of care towards a child.17

Like other injuries, an insult not only affects the feelings of the victim, but arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, and is consequently disapproved of as wrong. Among the Maoris, if anybody wantonly tried to hurt another’s feelings, it was immediately repressed, and “such a person was spoken of as having had no parents, or, as having been born (laid) by a bird.”18 In the Malay Archipelago, “among some of the tribes, abusive language cannot with impunity be used even to a slave. Blows are still more intolerable, and considered such grievous affronts, that, by law, the person who receives them is considered justified in putting the offender to death.”19 The natives of the Tonga Islands hold no bad moral habit to be more “ridiculous, depraved, and unjust, than publishing the faults of one’s acquaintances and friends …; and as to downright calumny or false accusation, it appears to them more horrible than deliberate murder does to us: for it is better, they think, to assassinate a man’s person than to attack his reputation.”20 According to the customary laws of the Fantis in West Africa, “where a person has been found guilty of using slanderous words, he is bound to retract his words publicly, in addition to paying a small fine by way of compensation to the aggrieved party. Words imputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime, and all words which sound to the disreputation of a person of whom they are spoken are actionable.”21

Among the Aztecs of ancient Mexico he who wilfully calumniated another, thereby seriously injuring his reputation, was condemned to have his lips cut off, and sometimes his ears also; whilst in Tezcuco the slanderer suffered death.22 In the Chinese penal code a special book is provided for the prevention and punishment of opprobrious and insulting language, as “having naturally a tendency to produce quarrels and affrays.”23 Among Arabs all insulting expressions have their respective fines ascertained in the ḳady’s court.24 It is said in the Talmud:—“Let the honour of thy neighbour be to thee like thine own. Rather be thrown into a fiery furnace than bring any one to public shame.”25

The Roman Law of the Twelve Tables contained provisions against libellers,26 and throughout the whole history of Roman law an attack upon honour or reputation was deemed a serious crime.27 As for wrongful prosecution, which may be regarded as an aggravated form of defamation, the law of the later Empire required that any one bringing a criminal charge should bind himself to suffer in case of failure the penalty that he had endeavoured to call down upon his adversary.28 Among Teutonic peoples defamatory words and libelling were already at an early date punished with a fine.29 The Salic Law decrees that a person who calls a freeborn man a “fox” or a “hare” or a “dirty fellow,” or says that he has thrown away his shield, must pay him three solidi;30 whilst, according to one text of the same law, it cost 188 solidi (or nearly as much as was paid for the murder of a Frankish freeman)31 to call a freeborn woman a witch or a harlot, in case the truth of the charge could not be proved.32 The oldest English laws exacted bót and wíte from persons who attacked others with abusive words.33 In the thirteenth century, in almost every action before an English local court, the plaintiff claimed compensation not only for the “damage,” but also for the “shame” which had been done him.34 We further find that regular actions for defamation were common in the local courts; whereas in later days the ecclesiastical procedure against defamatory speech seems to have been regarded as the usual, if not the only, engine which could be brought to bear upon cases of libel and slander.35 In England, as in Rome, there was a strong feeling that men should not make charges which they could not prove: before the Conquest a person might lose his tongue, or have to redeem it with his full wer, if he brought a false and scandalous accusation; and under Edward I. a statute decreed that if the appellee was acquitted his accuser should lie in prison for a year and pay damages by way of recompense for the imprisonment and infamy which he had brought upon the innocent.36

The condemnation of an insult is greatly influenced by the status of, or the relations between, the parties concerned. Among the Goajiro Indians of Colombia a poor man may be insulted with impunity, when the same treatment to a rich man would cause certain bloodshed.37 In Nias an affront is punished with a fine, which varies according to the rank of the parties.38 The Chinese penal code lays down that a person who is guilty of addressing abusive language to his or her father or mother, or father’s parents, or a wife who rails at her husband’s parents or grandparents, shall be strangled;39 and the same punishment is prescribed for a slave who abuses his master.40 According to the Laws of Manu, a Kshatriya shall be fined one hundred panas for defaming a Brâhmana, a Vaisya shall be fined one hundred and fifty or two hundred panas, and a Sûdra shall suffer corporal punishment; whereas a Brâhmana shall pay only fifty panas for defaming a Kshatriya, twenty-five for defaming a Vaisya, and twelve for defaming a Sûdra.41 In ancient Teutonic law the fines for insulting behaviour were graduated according to the rank of the person offended.42 The starting-point of the Roman law was that an injuria—which was pre-eminently an affront to the dignity of the person—could not be done to a slave as such, only to the master through the medium of his slave;43 and even in later times, in the case of trifling injuries, such as mere verbal insults, the master had no action, unless by leave of the Praetor, or unless the insult were meant for the master himself.44 These and similar variations spring from the same causes as do corresponding variations in the case of other injuries dealt with above. But there are also special reasons why social superiority or inferiority influences moral opinions concerning offences against persons self-regarding pride. The respect due to a man is closely connected with his station, and in the case of defamation the injury suffered by the loss of honour or reputation is naturally proportionate to the esteem in which the offended party is held. At the same time the harmfulness of an insult also depends upon the reputation of the person who offers it. According to the Gotlands Lag, one of the ancient provincial laws of Sweden, a slave can not only be insulted with impunity, but has himself to pay no fine for insulting another person45—obviously because he was too degraded a being to be able to detract from anybody’s honour or good name.