The impressment policy of the English Government applied to the new American country, was very galling. Under that policy American ships were stopped on the high seas, and seamen taken from them under guise of being British deserters. Many good Americans were forced into British service. The young victim country protested. In 1801 the impressment practice fell off and seemingly was abandoned. (See Elson’s History of the U. S., pages 246 to 252, Vol. 2.) A quotation is given from Elson, page 247, Vol. 2: “This (impressment) practice had fallen into the background during the short season of peace between France and England, that ended in 1803, but with the renewal of the war it had been revived with alarming vigor.”
Whether that “alarming vigor” was due entirely to war exigencies of recruiting its Navy, or whether the British Government designed it as a provocation to the young western Republic, to take the onus of declaring war, under guise of which the coveted floating title to Louisiana could be appropriated, is a matter for deduction, not appearing of record.
At any rate, the impressment practice re-aroused resentment in the young republic, and that resentment found chief expression in the then Southwest, resulting under the leadership of that section and over the opposition of the New England States, or rather of that of the assertive Federalists therein, in a declaration of war against England, on the ground of the degradation of our sovereignty.
It is not the purpose of the writer to discuss the War of 1812, except as its events may relate to his mission, that of correcting falsehood and error in the historical books adopted as textbooks for the school children of America.
The War of 1812 was heralded as a mistake by the Federalists, opponents of the then administration. While the incipient Navy gave a brilliant account of itself, justifying the proud boast that man for man and gun for gun, the U. S. Navy was the equal of anything afloat, for two and a half years the record shows that land events in the main were untoward, climaxed by the capture, and sacking and burning of the public buildings, of the National Capital in August, 1814, and thus the Federal Press offensively took the “I-told-you-so” attitude.
Early in the war the Emperor of Russia extended his good offices as mediator. The United States Government accepted the offer, being earnestly desirous of honorable peace, and having nothing to conceal from neutral investigation. But the English government declined the Russian offer, indicating that it preferred to treat direct. Later as a result of British invitation, a Peace Commission met at Ghent, Belgium.
A separate chapter is devoted to the joint conference at Ghent because therein is shown the subtle, diplomatically concealed, purpose of the then English Government. The record of the proceedings of the conference, in order to be fully understood, should be read in the light of the afterwards revealed fact that, at the same time these negotiations were being conducted, the expedition against Louisiana was secretly planned and dispatched. Things that are puzzling in the making often become clear in the aftermath. And so it is in this case.
The defeat and resultant abdication of Napoleon (April 4, 1814) released England’s European troops for pursuing the American war with greater vigor, and to punish the United States for having declared war at England’s most embarrassing moment. It would not be a violent assumption to say that at least some members of the British Government felt that the time was opportune at last to take Louisiana and thus redress a grievance nurtured since 1803, when Bonaparte snatched that great domain from England’s outstretched hands.
The exact date on which the Louisiana expedition was determined upon is not material. Plain evidence discloses that during the joint peace negotiation its details were arranged and the army sent forward to take New Orleans. We now know that after the capture of Washington by the British and the burning and sacking of the public buildings there (August 24, 1814), the British invading forces, after being later repulsed in an attack upon Baltimore, repaired under orders to Nigril Bay, Jamaica, to await recruits for the expedition against New Orleans. With the time then required for ocean travel, these orders must have been given prior to, or about the time of the meeting of the Peace Commissioners at Ghent, August 4, 1814.
Let us visualize the two groups assembled at Ghent. First, consider the five Americans. They were earnestly desirous of a quick and honorable peace. Their country was riven with dissatisfaction produced by a powerful anti-administration and anti-war party, seemingly in control of the northeastern states, making dire threats, unless hostilities were soon ended.
The American Commissioners were prepared and authorized to forego the questions of impressment and orders in council, which caused the war, and conclude a peace pact on the basis of the status before the war. For a month they had been waiting the coming of the British Commissioners. It is evident there was a purpose on the part of the British Government to delay.
The second group consisted of three suave English Commissioners, who appeared at Ghent, as before stated, August 4th.
These English Commissioners began by making, on behalf of their Government, demands objectionable and humiliating, the discussion of which, often at long distance with the London Government officials, consumed time. Finally the American Commissioners were forced to write to Washington for further instructions.
From “The Diplomacy of the War of 1812,” by Frank A. Updyke, which is a most valuable account of the Peace conference, quotation is given from pages 220 and 221. “It was the unanimous opinion of the American ministers that Great Britain’s policy was to consume as much time as possible before the termination of negotiations, in order that some decided victory might be gained in the war which would make it easier for her to insist upon her demands.”
This quotation is given to show that our ministers recognized the British tactics as sparring for time; but the record does not show that any one of them thought of New Orleans as the objective point of British design.
The records in connection with the negotiations are voluminous, and make very interesting reading. But viewed in the after revealed facts, the truth stands out so clearly that the proceedings of the Peace Conference in English consideration and the secret expedition to capture New Orleans were so closely inter-related that in arriving at the material verity, much material in that conference should be disregarded as intended by the English to delay and becloud, and so matters coming before the Conference referring to Louisiana should only be considered in connection with our mission.
Frank A. Updyke, Ph.D. of Dartmouth College, in his “The Diplomacy of the War of 1812,” quoted from above, has given a condensed, fully annotated, account of the proceedings of the Peace Conference. It is a work, published in 1915, which deserves place as a supplementary textbook in every college and high school. I have made liberal use of Dr. Updyke’s volume, which merits high place for research effort and reference.
The Joint Commission had been in session a little over two months when the first note was struck significant of the British underlying purpose. It was in the communication of the English Government through their ministers to the American Commissioners. The document was dated October 8, 1814. (See American State papers.)
“The first paragraph,” says Updyke (page 269), “attempted to show the illegality of the purchase of Louisiana and the spirit of territorial aggrandisement on the part of the United States which this act manifested.”
It might have been inferred that this attack upon the legality of the title to Louisiana would be followed by a demand of some sort; but no such demand was made. In fact, the treaty as finally adopted, contained no mention of Louisiana.
It is highly pertinent to ask a question as to what was the purpose of this attack upon the title of Louisiana. All such things have a purpose.
In the light of present knowledge that purpose is clear. The great expedition against New Orleans being near completion, it is obvious that the British Government recognized the good diplomatic position before the world, after the capture of Louisiana, of showing a record of fair warning as justification for retention.
The reply of the Americans to the note of October 8th was dated October 13th. (See American State papers.)
Quotation is given from Updyke, page 284:
“While endeavoring to make the reply brief, the American ministers could not refrain from discussing some other topics adverted to by the British in their note. The British ministers had made the charge that the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was illegal, Spain having offered a remonstrance against its cession and the right of France to make it. To this the American note responded that, although the Spanish minister at Washington had made such remonstrance, at that very time orders were given by Spain for the delivery of Louisiana to France. So France was in actual possession of the territory when she disposed of it to the United States.”
Another matter, although not in chronological turn, may be here presented, as showing further the English attitude towards Louisiana. In the course of the note of the Americans to the British, dated November 10, 1814 (see American State papers), Updyke says, page 307: “The American note refused to consent to the British proposal to fix the northwest boundary by the line from the lake of the Woods to the Mississippi unless the boundaries of Louisiana should also be provided for in the settlement.”
The British ministers in referring the note to their Government, said they were unwilling to consent to a discussion of the Louisiana boundary, for their doing so might be taken as a recognition of the right of the United States to the occupation of the territory. (See Updyke, page 310.)
What might be called the Uti Possidetis scheme was embraced in a British note of October 21st (see American State papers). The British proposed the Uti Possidetis principle, as a basis of settlement, under which each side would keep what territory it should be possessed of at the promulgation of peace.
The reason behind this proposal seems now very patent. The adoption of this principle would have enabled England, by indisputable treaty right, to retain Louisiana, which she confidently expected to take.
But the Americans opposed this principle and firmly insisted on a treaty based upon conditions at the beginning of the war.
The English were very insistent and for a time there appeared a new danger that the conference would break up. But, as will appear later, British diplomacy, the most skilful in the world, found a way to accomplish the main objective of the Uti Possidetis; that is to say, the retention of Louisiana after the expected reduction of New Orleans.
While these peace negotiations were simmering at Ghent, the well-planned, secret expedition against New Orleans was completed in detail, and with confident feeling of assurance that, because of its size and veteran fibre, it would be invincible, it was finally put on its way to join the waiting troops at Nigril Bay, Jamaica. Sir Edward Pakenham was appointed Commander of the Expeditionary forces. A. C. Buell, in his “History of Andrew Jackson,” published in 1904, states that Pakenham’s order was dated November 4, 1814, and read according to English war office minute; that General Pakenham “shall proceed to Plymouth and embark there for Louisiana to assume command of the forces operating for the reduction of that province.” Buell cites as authority Bathurst papers; State Paper Office, London.
On the assumption of the correctness of Buell’s citation, the term “Province” as applied to Louisiana, in English official orders, represents the radical difference of viewpoint as to Louisiana at the time between the British Government and the American Union, of which the English termed province was a fair possession from which already one state had been carved. (Louisiana in 1812.)
While the British Expedition was ploughing the seas, unexpected resistance was forming under an American general, who didn’t know what defeat was.
We will now return to the parleys at Ghent. The British continued to insist on the Uti Possidetis as a basis of a Peace Treaty, but proposed that it be “subject to such modifications as mutual convenience may be found to require.” In a letter to the British Commissioners, dated October 18th, Lord Bathurst, quoted by Updyke (page 288), cited several points on which mutual accommodations might be had; but Louisiana was not one of the points. For if it had been there would have seemingly been no use planning and sending out the great expedition for the “reduction of that province.”
From many interesting details touching the Uti Possidetis proposals, the reader is referred to Updyke (“The Diplomacy of the War of 1812”), pages 288 to 319.
Finally, realizing the unshaken adherence of the Americans to the antebellum status, the British gave up the Uti Possidetis demand, and by specific wording obviously sought to protect the Louisiana design.
In the amended proposal of the British (see British to American ministers Nov. 26, 1814), there are two things highly pertinent to the inquiry we are conducting, to establish the real value of the Battle of New Orleans. The first was the provision that peace would not be effective until after ratification by both countries. The second consisted in the proposed wording for the mutual restoration clause as follows: “Belonging to either party, taken by the other.” The effect of this wording in the mutual restoration clause, would have been that all territory belonging to either party, taken by the other, should be returned. But this would not embrace Louisiana, for from the English standpoint, it did not legally belong to the United States.
As to the first point, a quotation is here given from Updyke (page 317): “The amended project returned by the British commissioners provided that the notification for the cessation of the war be issued after ratifications of the treaty should have been exchanged rather than at the time of the signature. This was designed, it was supposed, to give time for the completion of the British plans against New Orleans, the successful outcome of which was never doubted.”
The American ministers, on November 30th, consented to the substitution of the day of exchange of ratifications for that of the signature of the treaty, as the time for cessation of hostilities, and for regulating the period when prizes at sea shall be restored. (See American to British ministers, Nov. 30, 1814.)
This agreement was duly carried into the treaty, as we have heretofore set forth, Article XI, prescribing all details.
The American ministers opposed the proposed words in the mutual restoration clause, “belonging to either party, taken by the other.” They insisted on the words, “taken by either party from the other.” Strong reasons were given by the Americans for their attitude, but the British ministers refused to yield, saying the matter would be referred to their Government (Updyke, pp. 324-325).
The British Government, on December 6th, instructed their Commissioners to insist upon the retention of the words in dispute, and advanced skilful arguments, in which the real purpose was not revealed. For a digest of these arguments, see Updyke, pages 335-336.
To the present day reader, having knowledge of the expedition, which was then on its way to capture New Orleans, the English purpose seems very manifest.
With diplomatic art the British Government sought to make it appear that the disputed words, “belonging to either party and taken by the other,” were founded in the objective relating to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay during the time of the agreed upon reference to a commission to determine the ownership of these Islands.
The Americans, not aware, of course, of the expedition against New Orleans, accepted the viewpoint advanced as to the disputed words, but while rejecting the words, indicated that they would be “willing to admit such a modification as should secure the right of Great Britain from being affected or impaired by yielding possession of the Islands to the United States.” (Updyke, p. 343.)
The British ministers replied, arguing England’s position. That position in effect was, that during the war she had taken these islands, the title to which was in dispute, and that to call upon her to restore them, because they were occupied by the United States at the beginning of the war, would be unjust; that having agreed to a commission to settle the ownership of the islands, she was willing, if need be, to accede to a clause which would especially guard the ultimate right against the prejudice which the American ministers feared might arise from the continued possession by Great Britain. The British ministers admitted the comparatively small value of the territory in question, but claimed that yielding possession of the Islands involved a point of honor on the part of Great Britain, and, if insisted upon, might make the conclusion of peace impossible. (See Updyke, pp. 343-344; report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by British Commissioners to Lord Castlereagh.)
The Americans yielded the point, and thus it appears that the British Government secured the accession of the principle of the great concealed objective on a matter of minor importance. Thus the word “possessions” was admitted into the mutual restoration clause of the peace treaty.
That mutual restoration clause, as adopted, and incorporated in Article 1, of the Treaty of Ghent, reads as follows:
“All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the War, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the Islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away of any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty, or any slaves or other private property; and all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the War, may have fallen into the hands of the officers, of either party shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty until the decision respecting the title to said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this Treaty. No disposition made by this Treaty as to such possession of such islands and territories claimed by both parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.”
The Treaty, from which the clause above is quoted, can of course be found in Washington, but copy may be seen at almost any general public library, in the volume herebefore referred to containing various Treaties of the United States.
The reader, who has been following us in our showing of the various stages of the development of the British design to protect, by diplomacy, the Louisiana expedition, will recognize the significance of the word “possessions.” By reason of that word, the British were in position to maintain, after capturing Louisiana, that it was not subject to return under the mutual restoration clause adopted, not being, under English construction, a legal “possession” of the United States, formal notice of that construction having been given in the treaty negotiations. The subtly accomplished insertion of the word in the treaty represented a triumph of ulterior British diplomatic design over the very able, hard-headed, but open and candid American commissioners, who were entirely in the dark as to the Expedition dispatched to seize Louisiana.
That word was of course not as exclusive of argument as the Uti Possidetis principle first proposed, and insisted upon almost as a sine qua non; nor was it as clear as the wording subsequently urged, “belonging to either party and taken by the other”; but it was all sufficient, backed by the British conviction that Louisiana was not a legal possession of the United States, and supported by the mighty British martial power, then unleashed from European war.
It is obvious to the writer that but for the word “possessions,” or wording of similar import, the treaty would not have been agreed to by the British; in fact, such indication was given by the British ministers at the joint conference December 12th, under the guise of the principle pertaining to the Passamaquoddy Islands.
Any presumption that Great Britain, after planning the great expedition against Louisiana, would have, within a few weeks following the final dispatch of the military forces, signed a peace treaty, recalling those forces from an attained, long-dreamed-of conquest, is a reflection upon the intelligence of the British Government of 1814-15.
With the treaty agreed to, the English Government became anxious about its ratification by President Madison. Significant evidence of this is furnished by Doctor Updyke, in his work from which we have already made a number of quotations. On page 355, Updyke says, “The British ministry had hoped that their last communication would enable the commissioners to close the negotiations for the treaty of peace. They were, however, suspicious of President Madison, and feared he would not sign the treaty. For this reason it was stipulated that the war should not cease until after the exchange of ratifications at Washington. They counted upon having a strong English fleet in the Chesapeake and the Delaware at the time that Baker, the bearer of the British copy of the treaty, should reach Washington; and they also counted upon the disposition of the Eastern states to secede from the Union, as likely to ‘frighten Madison.’ It was suggested that if Madison should refuse to ratify the treaty the British Government should immediately propose to make a separate treaty with the New England States, which it was believed could be accomplished.”
Dr. Updyke gives as authority for the foregoing paragraph: “Liverpool to Castlereagh, December 23, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, IX, 495.”
Lord Liverpool was prime minister and Lord Castlereagh was secretary for foreign affairs.
The digest given of correspondence between these high English Government officials makes it plain that the English Government was anxious for ratification of the Peace Treaty and that they were fearful that Madison would not sign.
As confirmatory of the Liverpool apprehension it may be mentioned that the London Times, December 31, 1814 (see British Museum), said that the ratification by Madison depended upon the outcome of the expedition against New Orleans. The London Times was unfriendly to the Liverpool government, and was also very hostile to the United States. In the circumstances it may fairly be presumed that to allay criticism of the treaty the press was informed of the expected New Orleans coup.
In view of the unanimous action of the American Commissioners in agreeing to the Treaty, it becomes very evident that the British Government anticipated that something would transpire before the Treaty reached Washington that might cause the President to withhold his approval. In the light of present knowledge, that something was the expected British capture of New Orleans. We may well ask the question, as to why the British Government was so anxious for the ratification of the Treaty as to plan to “frighten Madison” and threaten separate peace with New England, thus disrupting the Union, if that Government expected to turn back Louisiana after its anticipated conquest. That question carries its own obvious answer.
Happily for us, and for England as consequences have proved, and for the world, the dilemma in which the English statesmen thought President Madison would be placed, was averted.
While Carroll, with the American copy of the Treaty, and Baker, with the English copy, also having authority to exchange ratification, ploughed the seas, an event was in the making of destiny, which, when brought forth, utterly confounded the carefully laid plans of the Liverpool-Castlereagh Government, and in fact ushered in a new epoch, a new and greater era for the young American Republic—never again to be pointed to as an experiment.
One of the most thrilling incidents in our history is the reception by the country of the news of the Battle of New Orleans. It was theatrically acclaimed, with almost delirious joy, sharply contrasting with the condition of deep discouragement and gloom it suddenly dissipated. Seldom has a victory had more dramatic setting. It is well for us who enjoy the rich blessings of the present, occasionally to read of the trials and tribulations through which our forebears struggled, that they might hand these blessings down to us. “If an old man of perfect memory,” says James Parton, in Chapter 20 of the second volume of the Life of Andrew Jackson, published in 1860, “were asked to name the time when the prospects of this republic were shrouded in deepest gloom, and the largest number of the people despaired of its future, his answer, I think, would be, ‘the first thirty-seven days of the year 1815.’” (Parton makes an error of two days, for the news of the battle of New Orleans reached Washington February 4th.)
“The Capital,” says Parton, “was in ruins” (as a result of its burning by the British the preceding August).
Parton further referred to the Hartford Convention, which on January 5th had closed several weeks of session. This anti-war convention was denounced as treasonable by administrative papers. It had aroused gravest apprehensions of disunion unless peace should at once be made.
In order to convey an idea of the antagonistic spirit prevailing, quotation is here given from the Boston Gazette, of that period: “Is there a Federalist, a patriot in America, who conceives it his duty to shed his blood for Bonaparte, for Madison and Jefferson, and that host of ruffians in Congress, who have set their faces against us for years, and spirited up the brutal part of the populace to destroy us? Not one! Shall we, then, any longer be held in slavery, and driven to desperate poverty by such a graceless faction?”
Parton further quotes many New England editors as saying: “No more taxes from New England, till the administration makes peace.”
Parton further says that the great British expedition, so long mustering in the West Indies, so long delayed, cast a prodigious shadow before it, putting New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore on their guard; but that as the autumn passed without the reappearance of hostile force in the northern waters, the conviction gained ground that something overwhelming was in contemplation against the defenseless south and southwest.
“It so chanced,” continues Parton, “that the 8th of January was the days on which it was first whispered about Washington that the President had received news of the British fleet at the mouth of the Mississippi. From that time the eyes of the country were fixed upon New Orleans—not hopefully.”
“It is not an overstatement of the case,” continues Parton, “to say that there was not one well informed man in the northern states who believed that New Orleans could be successfully defended.”
Again quoting from Parton: “After a week of gossip and foreboding, came news of the gunboat battle, and its disastrous results; also rumors of a great armament hovering on the Atlantic coast. ‘We are a lost country,’ said the Federal papers in doleful concert. ‘A wicked administration has ruined us. New Orleans having fallen an easy prey, the British General will leave a few acclimated black regiments to garrison that city, and bring the Wellington heroes around to the Chesapeake. Baltimore will not be able to resist. Washington will again be overrun, Philadelphia and New York will next be attacked, and who shall say with what results? See to what a pass Jefferson and French democracy have brought a deluded country!’”
All sorts of dire rumors were in circulation, and to add to the gloom that prevailed in Washington and elsewhere, a snow storm of remarkable violence and extent set in on the 23rd of January, and continued for three days. Belated mails straggled in, showing that the American Army was still resisting. “New Orleans is not taken yet,” said the Western members, and the Republican editors. “It is merely a question of time,” replied the Federalists; “the next mail will finish New Orleans and you.”
In the midst of that setting, on February 4th, a horseman came into Washington, bearing glorious news for the Administration forces. He had dispatches from General Jackson, detailing the decisive victory of January 8th.
Washington was wild with delight at the unexpected victory. “That evening,” still quoting from Parton, “the town was blazing with light, and the whole populace was abroad, now thronging about the White House (temporary), cheering the President, then surging around the houses of the Secretaries, and residences of the leading supporters of the war, rending the air with shouts.... The next issue of the National Intelligencer cannot be glanced over to this day without exciting in the mind something of the feeling which is wont to express itself by three times three and one cheer more. The great news was headed, in the Intelligencer’s largest type, ‘Almost Incredible Victory!!!!’”
It was worth a life time to experience the jubilation of that night! It was the sudden restoration of a people’s national self-respect.
The news of the reception of the victory elsewhere was equally as thrilling. It aroused what Parton called the “maddest enthusiasm.” A quotation may be given from the autobiography of Mr. John Binns: “A general illumination was ordered in Philadelphia. Few indeed there were yet there were a few who on that night closed their window shutters and mourned the defeat of the enemies of their country. I had early intelligence of this joyful news, and gladly, by an extra, spread it abroad. I put scene painters to work, and had a transparency painted, which covered nearly the whole front of my house. There had been a heavy snow fall, and there was that evening from nine to twelve inches of snow on the ground. That, however, did not prevent men, women and children from parading the street, and delighting their eyes by looking at the illumination and illuminated transparencies, which made the principal streets of our city as light as day. My transparency represented General Jackson on horseback at the head of his staff, in pursuit of the enemy, with the motto: ‘This day shall ne’er go by, from this day to the ending of the world, but He, in it, shall be remembered.’”
This gives in brief a glimpse of the effect in the country of the news of the victory at New Orleans. How can any American describe it as a needless battle? After the event it might have been deplored by the British as needless, just as any lost battle may be so regarded.
Just ten days after that lone horseman rode into Washington on February 4th, the Treaty reached the Capitol, and under the inspiration of the great victory at New Orleans, it was joyfully and speedily ratified.
As stated in the last chapter, the Peace Treaty was speedily and joyfully ratified. But what if the issue of the battle had been different?
The chronology of the Treaty may here be given:
Signed at Ghent, on the 24th day of December, 1814, by the Peace Commissioners representing the two countries;
Ratified for England by the Prince Regent on December 31st, 1814.
Reached Washington the night of February 14th, 1815;
Sent by President Madison to the Senate February 15th;
Ratification advised by the Senate, February 16th;
Ratified by President Madison February 17th, and ratification exchanged with England’s representative the same day;
Promulgated by President Madison February 18th; thus ending the period of hostilities.
Would the United States Senate have advised ratification, or would the President have ratified, if the British on January 8th, had swept aside that defensive army and had carried into effect the design to capture and occupy Louisiana?
Probably no more grave or serious situation has ever confronted an American President than that which would have been presented. By ratifying the treaty, the President would have satisfied the New England malcontents, who had given veiled threats of disunion. But by the ratification with England in possession of Louisiana, and holding that it was not a legal possession of the United States, the President would have faced a desperate alternative of giving up Louisiana, and the trans-Mississippi territory; or referring it to the issue of a future war, or future negotiations.
It is the belief of the writer that President Madison would have declined to ratify the Treaty, as long as the British remained in occupation of Louisiana; thus prolonging the war with its uncertainties, and taking the risk of the disruption of the Union, through a separate peace with England by the New England States; a proposition which, as we have seen, was in contemplation by the English Government.
All of these questions, so momentous, to the American Union, were happily and gloriously averted by the marvelous defensive victory at New Orleans.
And yet, American historians teach our children that that battle was a needless one!
Oh, ignorance! Oh, prejudice! Oh, pro-English!!
In presenting this case against the school historians, which he feels has already been made, to the satisfaction of any impartial reader, the writer has refrained from using much confirmatory material in order to be as brief as possible. But in the history of Andrew Jackson, written by A. C. Buell, and published in 1904, there occurs illuminating data highly apropos in this connection. It may be remarked that Buell is not a favorite of some historians. Buell was distinctly not pro-English.
In chapter 3 of the second volume of Buell’s history, entitled “British Designs on Louisiana,” the author reiterates a statement before made, that Jackson’s Army of New Orleans saved the Louisiana Purchase, and adds that few people of the millions who were celebrating in 1904 the centenary of the colossal transaction between Napoleon Bonaparte and Thomas Jefferson, realized the significance of these words. Buell later says: “Viewed in the light of its actual influence on the map of North America, and the fortunes of this Republic, it was the most important battle ever fought between Great Britain and the United States.... The real, vast, enduring value of the Battle of New Orleans, lay in the fact that it prevented another war.”
In adducing evidence of the purpose of the English Government against Louisiana, Buell says: “The fleet carried more than an army, the narratives of the subaltern and Capt. Cooke, reputable British officers of 85th and 43rd Light Infantry, respectively, tell us there was on board the fleet ‘a complete civil government staff’ to be installed in place of the State Government of Louisiana at the moment of occupation. One of them, with a spice of humor, informs us that one member of this ‘civil government staff’ was ‘a worthy Colonial official whose confidence in the success of the Expedition led him to resign the comfortable position of Collector of Barbadoes to take the larger and more lucrative post for the (to-be) Crown Colony of Louisiana.”
As other members of the civil government staff Mr. Buell names Honorable Mr. Elwood, Lieut. Governor, transferred from Trinidad, and Mr. Dockstader, transferred from upper Canada; also an Attorney-General, an Admiralty Judge, and a Secretary of the Colony, sent from England direct.
Mr. Buell continues: “Besides his general orders at Plymouth, Pakenham brought with him a proclamation approved by the Home Government or Colonial office. This proclamation was to be published as soon as the British Army should occupy New Orleans. It promised protection to everybody, general amnesty to all previously engaged in hostilities, and proclaimed the sovereignty of England, in behalf of Spain, over all the territory fraudulently conveyed by Bonaparte to the United States. It denied the validity of the secret treaty by which Spain re-ceded Louisiana to France in 1800. It denied Bonaparte’s right to act for France in 1803. And finally it ‘denounced the pretentions of the United States to sovereignty under the alleged purchase from Bonaparte.’ This proclamation was in printed form at British headquarters the night before the battle, and its contents were well known to many British officers. The night after the battle it disappeared. Every copy of it was burned!
“All this evidence was obtained from British prisoners taken in the battle of January 8th. But it lacked one link to make the chain perfect. That was evidence of specific design and fixed policy on the part of the British Government. In the absence of such evidence the cabinet of St. James might, in emergency, declare that the scheme of a ‘crown colony’ and the proclamation itself were the acts of General Pakenham—to be approved if he succeeded or disavowed if he failed. The needed link was supplied long after.”
“The final link in the chain,” says Mr. Buell, “was furnished by General Jackson himself. In the fall of 1875, the author, then a staff correspondent of the Missouri Republican, visited former Governor William Allen, of Ohio, at his farm near Chillicothe. During the visit, which was of three days’ duration, the venerable statesman’s conversation—when not upon agricultural subjects—was mainly of reminiscences of his earlier public life. All was interesting; some of it historically valuable, particularly those parts relating to the British invasion of Louisiana. What Governor Allen said on this subject we reproduce here, exactly as it was printed in 1875.”
Governor Allen’s interview is here given in full:
“Near the end of General Jackson’s second administration and shortly after the admission of Arkansas to the Union, I, being Senator elect from Ohio, went to Washington to take the seat on March 4th.
“General Jackson,—he always preferred to be called General rather than Mr. President, and so we always addressed him by his military title—General Jackson invited me to lunch with him. No sooner were we seated than he said: ‘Mr. Allen, let us take a little drink to the new star in the flag—Arkansas.’ This ceremony being duly observed, the General said: ‘Allen, if there had been disaster instead of victory at New Orleans, there never would have been a state of Arkansas.’”
“This, of course, interested me, and I asked: ‘Why do you say that, General?’
“Then he said, that if Pakenham had taken New Orleans, the British would have claimed and held the whole Louisiana Purchase. But I said: ‘You know, General Jackson, that the treaty of Ghent, which had been signed fifteen days before the battle, provided for restoration of all territory, places and possessions taken by either nation from the other during the war, with certain unimportant exceptions.’
“‘Yes, of course,’ he replied, ‘But the minutes of the conference at Ghent as kept by Mr. Gallatin, represent the British commissioners as declaring in exact words: ‘We do not admit Bonaparte’s construction of the law of nations; and we cannot accept it in relation to any subject matter before us.’
“‘At that moment,’ pursued General Jackson, ‘none of our Commissioners knew what the real meaning of these words was. When they were uttered, the British Commissioners knew that Pakenham’s expedition had been decided on. Our Commissioners did not know it. Now, since I have been Chief Magistrate, I have learned from diplomatic sources of the most unquestionable authority, that the British ministry did not intend the Treaty of Ghent to apply to the Louisiana Purchase at all. The whole corporation of them, from 1803 to 1815—Pitt, the Duke of Portland, Granville, Percival, Lord Liverpool and Castlereagh—denied the legal right of Napoleon to sell Louisiana to us, and they held, therefore, that we had no right to that territory. So you see, Allen, that the words of Mr. Goulburn, on behalf of the British Commissioners, which I have quoted to you from Albert Gallatin’s Minutes of the Conference, had a far deeper significance than our commissioners could perpetrate. Those words were meant to lay the foundation for a claim on the Louisiana Purchase entirely external to the provisions of the Treaty of Ghent. And in that way the British Government was signing a treaty with one hand in front while with the other hand behind its back it was despatching Pakenham’s army to seize the fairest of our possessions.
“‘You can also see, my dear William,’ said the old General, waxing warm (having once or twice more during the luncheon toasted the new star), ‘you can also see what an awful mess such a situation would have been if the British programme had been carried out in full. But Providence willed otherwise. All the tangled web that the cunning of the English Diplomats could weave around our unsuspecting commissioners at Ghent was torn to pieces and soaked with British blood in half an hour at New Orleans by the never-missing rifles of my Tennessee and Kentucky pioneers. And that ended it. British diplomacy could do wonders, but it couldn’t provide against such a contingency as that. The British Commissioners could throw sand in the eyes of ours at Ghent, but they couldn’t help the cold lead that my riflemen sprinkled in the faces of their soldiers at New Orleans. Now, Allen, you have the whole story. Now you know why Arkansas was saved at New Orleans. Let’s take another little one.’”
Thomas E. Watson, at one time United States Senator from Georgia, in a history of Jackson, written after Buell’s history, quotes this interview and comments that it settles the question, and that if the British had captured New Orleans, the United States boundary line would have stopped at the Mississippi.
Captain Henry Garland was one of Jackson’s young officers at New Orleans. In view of the brilliance and stirring eloquence of a speech made by him, which I am about to give, from the same chapter heretofore quoted from Buell, it will be interesting to give a digest of Buell’s description of him: He was born at Nantes, France, his father a merchant of Norfolk, Virginia, residing there as Commercial Agent for American importing houses. He received his education in French schools. Coming to America, he went to Tennessee, and in the War of 1812 volunteered in Coffee’s mounted riflemen, serving with distinction throughout the war.
In the latter part of March, 1815, the officers of the Louisiana militia gave a banquet to those of the Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi troops and the Regulars, on the eve of the disbandment of Jackson’s Army. Captain Garland was selected by his comrades to respond in French on their behalf.
“The guests,” said Buell, “were welcomed on behalf of the Creole hosts and hostesses by Vicar-General, the Most Reverend Abbe Dubourg, Bishop of Louisiana, who made a brief address of welcome, first in English and then in French. In conclusion, the Abbe expressed sorrow that such an awful battle should have been fought and so many souls sent unprepared into the presence of the Creator, two weeks after the Treaty of Peace had been signed on the other side of the Ocean.”
According to Buell, the Abbe’s remarks changed the whole character of Garland’s reply. He spoke in French, which was afterwards translated.
The writer recommends a full reading of this, at points, remarkably eloquent speech, from which some excerpts are here given.
After some introductory remarks, Captain Garland said: “The most reverend prelate, in his otherwise well chosen remarks, suggested that it was a pity that such an awful battle should have been fought after the Treaty was signed across the wide water. I do not agree with him. It needed that battle to make the Treaty good. It made no difference when the Treaty was signed. Without that battle it must have been waste paper.
“The Treaty as written, did not mean anything. It says that the territorial status quo ante bellum shall be observed. But the British Cabinet held ‘’l’arriere pensee’ about that. They never admitted Napoleon’s right to convey Louisiana to us through President Jefferson. They did not mean to include the Louisiana Purchase in the territorial status quo ante bellum!