A desultory war commenced, weak in attack from want of power,^[322] and weak in resistance from lack of ammunition and supplies. Treachery was resorted to by those sent to suppress the revolt. As an instance of one cold-blooded deed, Pangiran Tejudin, the Sultan's son-in-law, of whom one infamous act has already been recorded, persuaded the inhabitants of some of the Tutong villages to submit, under a guarantee that their lives and property would be spared. To ratify the terms, the pangiran took twenty-five men from these villages to the Tutong town, and there they were bound and confined. Then one man from each village was selected, placed bound within a fence, and there at intervals slashed at until all had bled to death. Seven only managed to escape.

In October, 1902, many of the inhabitants of Belait and Tutong, unable to continue the struggle, having sought a refuge in the Trusan and Limbang rivers, and the Sultan being wearied into granting an amnesty on the payment of a heavy fine, those remaining surrendered; their principal chiefs, however, the Datus Kalim and De Gadong, with their people, elected to place themselves under Sarawak rule by also moving into the Limbang.

In January, 1905, the British North Borneo Company, with the sanction of her Majesty's Government, transferred their cession of the Lawas river to the Sarawak Government. The inhabitants of this river are closely allied to those of the Trusan, and, in a lesser degree, to those of the Limbang. It is a beautiful and fertile district, but sparsely inhabited.

If the yearly cession money paid upon the districts that have been acquired by Sarawak during the sovereignty of the present Rajah is taken into consideration, not one of these districts has yet paid its way, and even Limbang, upon which no cession money is paid, showed a deficit of expenditure over revenue in 1906, but the increased trade, of these districts, which in 1906 amounted to just a million dollars in value shows them to be in a flourishing state, and this has added to the general prosperity of the raj.

In 1905, an agreement was made between his Majesty's Government and the Sultan, by which the latter accepted a Resident, by whose counsel the affairs of the State were to be guided, and on January 1, 1906, this agreement came into effect, and the Sultan and his wazirs were practically laid aside, the rule becoming British under the de facto ruler, the Resident.

The reason given for this step was not so much that the iniquitous conditions of affairs at Bruni could no longer be tolerated, but that the country was bankrupt, and therefore something had to be done. There were two alternatives presented, the absorption of Bruni by Sarawak, or the introduction of the same system of government that prevails in the Federated Malay States. The latter was adopted as being, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, likely to be more beneficial to the Sultanate, as well as being a healthy example to the neighbouring protectorates, and it has been expressly stated by the Foreign Secretary that this was done not merely with a view to the future interests of Bruni, but to those of the other British Protectorates in Borneo.^[323] The only pretext that has been advanced for not allowing the natural absorption of Bruni by Sarawak was the supposed animosity the Sultan bore towards the Rajah, though, had it still existed, this might well have been regarded only in the light of a compliment to the latter.

But undue importance has been placed upon the ill-feeling the Sultan had formerly borne to the Rajah, and the fact that a complete reconciliation had taken place long before this time appears to have been ignored. Apart from this, however, the likings and dislikings of an isolated, and now defunct, old tyrant were not quite a sufficient basis upon which to establish a policy antagonistic to the natural fate of Bruni and the pronounced wishes of the people. But, many months before it was proposed to establish a British Residency in Bruni, the Sultan, completely at the end of his resources, had confided to the British Consul his unfortunate situation; had expressed his deep regret for the estrangement between himself and the Rajah, and his desire for a reconciliation, which he begged the Consul would bring about, for he had no one else to turn to for the help he so sorely needed, and which he knew the Rajah would not refuse him.

The Rajah, who had never lost his kindly feeling towards the Bruni rulers, at once visited Bruni, and exchanged visits with the Sultan, which were marked by extreme cordiality and confidence on the part of the latter. But by no method short of a clean sweep of its debased Government and corrupt officials, of whom the Sultan was the most corrupt, could any improvement be effected in the sad condition of Bruni, or in the Sultan's miserable plight, and therefore the Rajah, through the British Consul, offered terms for the transfer of Bruni to his Government, and these were far more generous to the Sultan than those which the Foreign Office, with full knowledge of this offer, subsequently forced the Sultan to accept.

The terms offered by the Rajah were placed before the Sultan by the British Consul, and were well received by him and his family, and they were anxious to accept these at once. They were, however, completely in the power of three of the members of Council,—the Juwatan^[324] Abu Bakar, Orang Kaya Laksamana, and Orang Kaya di Gadong, who had battened on the Sultan by lending him large sums of money on extortionate interest, and who, seeing their way to further affluence, prevented the Sultan accepting the Rajah's offer until he should have assigned to them all the benefits it would convey to him, when he would have been called upon to accept it for their advantage.

All who have read these pages will agree there can be no possible doubt that the Sultan and his ministers had well deserved to have their powers curtailed, even to the extent of absolute deprivation of all control in the affairs of their country, but not a few will naturally wonder why the Foreign Office had not arrived at such an obvious conclusion many years ago. Then the reasons for interference were tenfold more weighty than now. Successive years have seen the Sultanate stripped of its territories, and the capacity of the Sultan and his bureaucracy to do evil lessened in proportion to the loss of population, revenues, and power. Then the British Government would have become possessed of a large territory, nearly as large as England, with a numerous population, and would have had a reasonable prospect before it of establishing a State or Colony which might at this time be as flourishing as any of those in the Malay peninsula; now they have unnecessarily hampered themselves with a miserable bankrupt remnant of a formerly large State, some 3000 square miles in area only, with a total population of not more than 15,000; with no internal resources to develop, and with revenues so slight as to be inconsiderable, an experiment which appears to be proving costly.

To contend that the governmental system of the Federated Malay States would be a good example to Sarawak is to presume a superiority in that system, and to infer that the conditions prevailing in the former and latter States are on a parity. So far there has been no convincing evidence of the superiority of this system in its application to Bruni, though that is not surprising, as the British Resident can hardly be expected to make bricks without straw; and Sarawak, which has the credit of having "the best form of government for a country populated by an Oriental people of various races," would scarcely be wise to exchange the simple methods that have been gradually built up to meet the requirements of her population for an elaborated system, which, however successful it has been in the States for which it was formed, might not be altogether conformable to existing conditions in Sarawak. There is almost as much difference between the populations of the Malay States and Sarawak, as there is between that of the latter and Java or Ceylon, and the same difference exists in regard to Bruni. To argue that a form of government, because it is eminently adapted to the circumstance of one country would necessarily be suitable to another, is to be optimistic, and shows a want either of common sense, or of knowledge of the respective conditions of the countries indicated.

Perhaps the mysterious profession of the Foreign Secretary in regard to the future interests of all the British Protectorates in Borneo, which has been noticed, conceals the real motives, yet to be revealed, for this sudden departure, which red tapeism can hardly explain away, and which has given rise to a political position that is peculiar, whether viewed in the light of expediency or as a matter of sheer justice. The professed motives appear to be scarcely logical, for this fresh policy involved no obvious advantages to the Empire, was displeasing to the natives, and unfair to the interests of Sarawak. But, unfortunately, evidence is not wanting that there are other motives, which are not only illogical but unwarrantable, and it is only by keeping these in view that the policy of the British Government becomes intelligible. It is a policy that has not originated at the Foreign or the Colonial Office, but has been adopted by both "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people"—how, when, and by whom acquired, it would be interesting to learn.

Whether Bruni was governed from Singapore or absorbed by Sarawak was a question of little importance to the public, and should have been one of minor importance to the Foreign Office, for either way its position as a British Protectorate would remain unaffected. No one can assert that it is possible to find a man with greater qualifications as a ruler of natives or with a greater knowledge of Bruni and its people than the Rajah of Sarawak, or one whose counsel would have greater weight with chiefs and people, to whom the task of reforming and regenerating that country might with wisdom have been entrusted. Then comes the question of means, so necessary to the establishment of an effective government. To set up such a government in Bruni, and to maintain it, requires a considerable outlay, and an ever-recurring yearly subsidy. This the Rajah knew, and this he was willing and able to bear, but those "with entire knowledge of place and people" thought differently, with the result that the overflowing Treasury chest of the Federated Malay States has had to be drawn upon,^[325] and within two years yet another burden in the shape of a debt of some £24,000 has been needlessly put upon an already bankrupt State; and still, with a newly-imposed tariff, which is scarcely in harmony with that of the Federated Malay States, or of Sarawak, Bruni is unable to make both ends meet, and has the pleasant prospect before it of having to negotiate a further loan with no security to offer. So much for expediency.

That the Sultan was not averse to Bruni being incorporated with Sarawak has been shown, and the fact must not be overlooked that he was averse to the appointment of a British Resident, and the acceptance of the agreement by himself and his Prime Minister and brother-in-law, the Pangiran Bandahara, was obtained only under pressure, and was granted in opposition to the forcibly expressed wishes of his own immediate relations, of his chiefs, and of his people. He died shortly afterwards, at a great age, though he retained his faculties until the end, and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad-ul-Alam, a minor, who was placed under the regency of his uncle, the Pangiran Bandahara.

That they might pass under the protection of the Rajah and share with his subjects the liberties and privileges the latter have gained, has always been and still is the desire of the people. With the methods of his government they are familiar and in sympathy. They and their chiefs, from the Regent downwards, have petitioned to be so placed. To them the Rajah's name is a household word, and by them he is trusted. When the change came in 1905, many of the principal nobles begged him to become the guardian of their children, to safeguard their inheritance and welfare. His great influence, acquired by an intercourse of half a century, has always been exerted for their benefit, and it is an influence that, together with his knowledge of the people and what is best for them, can scarcely be equalled by ever-changing officials.

Between the populations of Sarawak and Bruni there exists community of origin, and relationship of ideas and customs. Formerly the two countries were one. Then in a corner of that country arose the little independent raj of Sarawak, which gradually expanded up to, around, and beyond Bruni. Now Bruni is but an enclave within Sarawak, and socially, politically, and commercially, as well as geographically, is undoubtedly within the sphere of her influence.

A short description of Brooketon has already been given, showing how the prosperity of that flourishing little settlement is dependent upon the working of its colliery, and that this has been the Rajah's main reason for continuing to work it, though with a recurring annual loss which in the aggregate during the past twenty years has exceeded $800,000; of course exclusive of purchase money and interest thereon. In no one year have the receipts exceeded the expenditure, and the chances of financial improvement appear to be vastly remote; yet, in October, 1906, the Colonial Office decided, presumably "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people," to further hamper this industry by imposing a duty on the coal exported, thereby seriously compromising the welfare of the district by taxing the sole factor in its prosperity.

The levying of such a "harsh and oppressive"^[326] tax, was not only unjust, but distinctly contrary to the terms of the deed under which the Rajah holds his concession. Whilst protesting against the assumption that the Bruni Government has the right to impose such a duty, the Rajah informed the Colonial Office that if it was insisted upon he would be compelled practically to close down the colliery. In the House, Sir Edward Sassoon pointedly asked the Under-Secretary for the Colonies "on what principle such a tax would be imposed upon a nascent industry which is being created at a sacrifice in an impoverished country, while on the other hand his Majesty's Government has recently withdrawn the duty levied on all coal exported from Great Britain." To this question no direct reply was or could have been given, but it was not until a year afterwards that the Colonial Office decided that the tax would not at present be imposed.

The reason given for the imposition of this tax was that all other sources of revenue at Brooketon having been hypothecated to the Rajah, it was therefore necessary to levy export duties. It has already been stated (p. 357) how these revenues had reverted to the Rajah, but it must not be supposed that they had been obtained for little or no consideration. To protect his own interests by guarding against any imposition of harassing taxes, the original lessee of the Brooketon Collieries had leased the revenues of the district from the Sultan for an annual sum, and this rent was subsequently capitalised by the payment of a sum of money equivalent to ten years' rent; thus these revenues passed from the Sultan's hands for ever, and subsequently became vested in the Rajah by purchase. A careful consideration of the deed by which these revenue rights were granted, combined with a competent knowledge of the prerogatives of the Sultan, would leave little doubt in an unprejudiced mind that the imposition of any import or export duties at Brooketon by others than the Rajah would be an infringement of the rights conveyed by that deed. The revenues derived by the Rajah under this deed (and he has not exerted his powers to increase them) represent but a very small return as interest on the purchase money; yet in face of such kindly moderation, we find the Colonial Office attempting to impose a tax on the Rajah's property, which would yield to them more than three times the amount of the legitimate revenue arising from a benevolent enterprise.

Previously to the appointment of a British Resident at Bruni, the Rajah had, as we have noticed, administered the government in the Muara district, with the full approval of the Sultan. In compliance with the Rajah's desire, the Sultan had placed a Malay chief, as his representative, at Brooketon, but even his salary had to be paid by the Rajah. It has already been shown that certain judicial powers have been vested in the Rajah under the revenue concession, in regard to which the then British Consul at Bruni had occasion to write to the Rajah's agent at Labuan in July, 1900, that "the acting High Commissioner for Borneo believes in and acknowledges the right of Sarawak to exercise magisterial powers in Brooketon." Nevertheless, on the appointment of the British Resident at Bruni the Colonial Office called upon the Rajah to withdraw his officials and police from Brooketon, and notified him that the administration of the district would be carried on by the Resident, in the Sultan's name. In a written reply to a question by Sir Edward Sassoon, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies denied that by the deed the Rajah was authorised to maintain a police force in Bruni (sic), but passed over in silence the main point of Sir Edward's question as to the Rajah's powers to adjudicate as well as to impose fines throughout the district of Muara.

In a leading article which appeared in the issue of the Straits Budget (Singapore) of January 10, 1907, the editor attempts to refute the issues raised in the questions put by Sir Edward Sassoon in the House of Commons, and the arguments advanced in an editorial article which appeared in the Standard dealing with the above matters. He writes authoritatively in reply to Sir Edward and "the special pleading" of the Standard, and presumably his article is therefore an inspired one, for his own knowledge of Bornean affairs is restricted to what "the man in the street" can tell him, and his leader displays a deeper insight into the political aspect than can usually be found outside of a Government office. He tells us that: "Bruni wanted better administration. There were three possible ways of obtaining this—the Protectorate might have been transferred to the British North Borneo Company; it might have been handed over to the neighbouring Rajah of Sarawak; or it might have been incorporated in the territories administered by the Colonial Office through the Straits Settlements. Of the three alternatives the Foreign Office chose the last. No doubt Sarawak is an object lesson in administration, but it must not be forgotten that it has been fortunate in having two successive rulers of marked capacity for dealing with native races. It may not always be so fortunate, and perhaps the Foreign Office, having this possibility in view, hesitated to add to the territory of Sarawak. On the other hand, the experience of the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements warranted the handing over of Bruni to the Colonial Office, and we are sure that when consideration is given to the larger interests involved it will have to be admitted, one day, that the Foreign Office took the wiser course. There may come a day when British interests in Borneo will have to be amalgamated and concentrated under one administration; but until then Bruni affairs can be best administered and the interests of the natives safeguarded under the arrangement now in force."

The editor has ignored the fact that the natives of Bruni of all races—and the small population is a very diversified one—desired incorporation in Sarawak, and had petitioned for it; and he has overlooked the fact that such incorporation, whilst saving the Straits Settlements both money and trouble, could in no way have affected the position of Bruni as a British Protectorate, or have interfered with any policy which the Foreign Office may possibly have in view. So far as Sarawak is concerned, "the possibility in view" can mean only one thing: future interference with its independence, arising out of anticipated maladministration by the present Rajah's successor. Such an inuendo is as uncalled for, as it is unjust, however the suggestion may be disguised; and it behoves the Foreign and Colonial Offices to dissociate themselves from such expressions, which unfortunately have derived some colour from their subsequent actions.

That the system of government in vogue in the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements is irreproachable cannot be denied; but at the same time it cannot fairly be contended—in the face of all evidence to the contrary—that it is as well adapted to the requirements of Bruni as is that in vogue in Sarawak, a system which the editor admits "is an object lesson in administration," and which his local contemporary, the Singapore Free Press, has before described as "a government for natives second to none."

What are "the larger interests involved" which appear, in the editor's opinion, to have necessitated the handing over of Bruni, against the wishes of the people, to a government foreign to them? The editor answers the question with a prophecy, which, unless it emanates from his own fertile brain, throws light on the policy of the British Government, and hints at a possible disregard of fair-play and treaties, which has only been made possible by the acceptance of British protection by Sarawak. The British Government as far back as 1863 fully acknowledged the independence of Sarawak under the rule of its white Rajah, and the agreement of 1888, by which the State was placed under British protection, was not intended, nor accepted, as one which would militate against that independence, and such a possibility can scarcely be construed as following in the train of that agreement.