The Larger Formations are formed by combining in one body a number of the Smaller Formations composed of Units of each Arm, together with the Administrative Units required for their service. The body thus formed is then provided with Head-Quarters, comprising the Commander and his Staff, and other necessary personnel. The numbers of Units and of Lesser Formations grouped together, and their proportion to each other, are dictated by past experience and a forecast of future fighting requirements.
The bodies thus formed constitute what are called the Subordinate Commands of the Army. They are self-contained, and capable of independent existence and action—existence, because they have the necessary Administrative Services to supply their wants; action, because, having considerable strength, and a proper proportion of all Arms, they can fight for a certain time without support from other bodies of troops.
In this chapter will be discussed these Subordinate Commands and the Administrative Services allotted to them. The succeeding chapter will describe their Staff and the composition of their Head-Quarters.
The Division is the basis of the higher organization of Armies in the Field. It may be mainly composed of Infantry or of Cavalry. In the former case it is generally termed simply a Division, in the latter a Cavalry Division. Its Commander is generally a Major-General, and is provided with a Staff, to which the Heads of the Divisional Administrative Services are attached.
Divisions are organized on the following general lines in various armies:
The Infantry Division is formed of two or three Infantry Brigades—that is, of 12, 16, or 18 Battalions. The “two-Brigade” organization, the most common abroad, is inferior to that of the British Army in three Brigades, for the reasons already discussed in the first chapter. The Division is furnished with other Arms to assist the action of the Infantry, and has generally the following:
Cavalry: 1 Regiment, or sometimes only 2 Squadrons.
Artillery: 4 to 12 Batteries, organized in Brigades, and with the Brigades sometimes grouped in Regiments. One or other of these formations has an ammunition column. The larger number of guns is allotted when, as in Germany and England, no Army Corps Artillery exists.
Engineers: A Field Company.
Administrative Services: Ammunition Columns; Supply Columns; Field Ambulances; a Field Post Office.
In some armies the Division has also a light Bridging Train; a Field Hospital; a mobile Remount Depôt; a Finance Office; Chaplains.
The Divisional Head-Quarters comprise, besides the Commander and his Staff, a number of Heads of Administrative Services, a Telegraph Company, or “Communication Unit,” Military Police, and the necessary Transport.
The Cavalry Division is formed of two or three Cavalry Brigades—that is, of 16 to 24 Squadrons, in foreign armies. It has also one Brigade of Horse Artillery of 12 guns, with its ammunition column, and generally some Mounted Engineers and a Telegraph Detachment.
The British Cavalry Division has 4 Brigades or 36 Squadrons; 2 Brigades of Horse Artillery—that is, 4 Batteries, or 24 guns; 4 Field Troops of Engineers; and a Wireless Telegraph Company in four sections. It is obvious that by this organization a Brigade can be furnished with all Units it requires for independent action when detached.
Cavalry Divisions are furnished with the following Administrative Units: A Supply Column; Field Ambulances; Field Post Office.
This word is a somewhat misleading translation of the original French term Corps d’Armée, which means one of the bodies of troops forming an army, whereas the English term (which came through the German Armee Korps) might be supposed to mean a Corps which is an army in itself. It is now generally shortened to Corps.
If the Army is very large, there must be an intermediate link in the chain of Command between its Commander and the Divisions, or there would be too many Subordinate Commanders for the Army Commander to direct effectively. This link is provided in the larger armies of the Continent by the Army Corps, formed of two or more Infantry Divisions. A similar grouping of some of the Cavalry Divisions into Cavalry Corps may be occasionally found in war.
Jomini pointed out (“Art de la Guerre,” Vol. ii., chap, vii.), and Clausewitz (“On War,” Book V., chap, v.) endorsed his view, that, for armies up to 100,000 strong, a Divisional organization was best. This strength represents five or six Divisions, and one or two Cavalry Divisions, which may therefore be considered as the maximum number which an army should comprise, if organized in Divisions only.
The advantages of the Army Corps organization of armies are that the Supreme Command is facilitated by there being fewer Units to direct, and that a few important Commanders can be better selected than a number. This organization also provides a large independent force, under a Senior Commander, available for any special mission. There were periods in the South African War when the temporary employment of several Divisions for a special purpose would have been more effective had they formed a permanent organization like an Army Corps, with its own Commander and Staff. At the same time it is undoubtedly true that, except when unavoidable, the addition of another step in the gradation of Command is undesirable for many reasons. It is wasteful in Staff; it tends to delay the transmission of Orders; and the large strength of the Army Corps gives their Commanders so much importance as to lead to considerable independence in their action, which may weaken the Supreme Command.
In large armies, however, organization by Army Corps is unavoidable. We therefore naturally find the forces of the great military powers of Europe—Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Italy—organized by Army Corps, while the forces of Turkey, Japan, Great Britain, and the smaller nations of Europe are organized by Divisions only. Switzerland is about to comply with this principle by transforming her present Army Corps into Divisions.
An Army Corps is generally composed, after the German model, of two Divisions, in spite of the ruling of Clausewitz that a division of any Unit into two parts is the worst possible. This is admitted by von der Golz in his “Nation in Arms,” and also by von Schellendorf in his “Duties of the General Staff.” Both agree that an Army Corps should have three Divisions, but think that it would be difficult to alter a system so deeply rooted in Germany. This criticism applies also to the bipartite organization of both Cavalry and Infantry Divisions and Brigades, which exists in most Continental armies. The Austrians have therefore adopted a Corps of three Divisions, and the Germans and French think of adding a Reserve Division to the two forming their Army Corps. To have three Divisions would undoubtedly strengthen the Command of the Corps, and, by reducing the number of Corps, facilitate that of the Army.
Besides the Infantry Divisions, there are other troops in an Army Corps—namely, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Administrative Services.
Corps Cavalry.—The French have a Brigade of Corps Cavalry, the Russians a Division. This is probably a better arrangement for providing “protective Cavalry” than to rely only on the few squadrons of Divisional Cavalry, as in Germany and Austria.
Corps Artillery.—German and Russian Army Corps have no Corps Artillery; other armies have two or more Brigades, organized in Regiments.
Heavy Artillery is likely to be allotted to Army Corps or perhaps to Armies, in foreign armies, as it is in England to the Division.
Corps Engineers.—A Company or two, with an Engineer Park of tools and stores, a Bridging Train, and Telegraph Units, form the Corps Engineers.
The Corps Administrative Services comprise in most armies an Ammunition Park, a Supply Park, a Field Bakery, Field Hospitals, and a Remount and Veterinary Depôt.
It has been suggested that the duty of strategic reconnaissance, for which the Cavalry Divisions are organized, might be better performed if these were grouped under one Command; but such a permanent combination of Cavalry Divisions into Corps has only been carried out in Russia, where there is one Cavalry Corps of 2 Divisions (48 squadrons), or 7,000 sabres and 24 guns. The British Cavalry Division, however, of 4 Brigades (36 squadrons and 24 guns) is virtually a Cavalry Corps, except that its internal organization is by Brigades and not by Divisions, and so avoids the evil of bipartite division. An improvised Corps of 2 Divisions has been tried in German manœuvres, and it is expected that in war one or more of them will be formed. They will perhaps be kept in the hands of the Supreme Command for independent action, each Army Commander retaining a Division or two as “Army Cavalry.”
To group 2 or 3 Divisions into a Cavalry Corps under one Command makes it easier and quicker to concentrate them and break through the enemy’s screen, as long as all the Divisions are moving in the same direction, and engaged in the same task. But if they are covering a broad front, and acting on separate objectives, it would be a mistake to group them under one Commander, who must necessarily be acting at some distance. In this case, the independence of the Divisional Commanders will conduce to the quick tactical decisions on which success depends.
It would seem sound not to distribute the whole of a large Cavalry force equally among the Divisions, nor the latter equally among the Armies, but to allot according to the capacity of the Commanders, and the importance of the strategical work they have to accomplish. If this be so, there may be something to be said for the French Divisions of unequal strength, some of 2, some of 3 Brigades. But in the opinion of von Bernhardi, the leading exponent of modern Cavalry views, even the usual Continental Division of 3 Brigades is “much too weak,” seeing that the Brigades are of two Regiments. He strongly advocates a three-Regiment Brigade, which is that of the British Service.
The Military Forces of the Great Powers have now grown so large that a further development of organization has become necessary. They are therefore divided in war into separate Armies. Army, in this new sense, does not mean, as it used to, the whole Force, for which, indeed, some other word than “Army” is urgently needed. An Army is simply the highest Unit in the organization of a great host in the field.
This division into separate Armies, each forming a definite Unit, with its own Commander and Staff, and numbered from right to left, was first seen in the two great wars carried on by Prussia in 1866 and 1870. Each Army had its own Lines of Communication, and moved and fought independently under its Commander, in obedience to general instructions issued at intervals by Moltke, as Chief of the General Staff, on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, the King of Prussia.
This system was followed in Manchuria by the Japanese, who had four, and later five, Armies in the field under one Supreme Command. It is now obligatory on all nations putting several hundred thousand men in the field to organize them in separate Armies. In any future war between France and Germany each Power will probably form five such Armies under one Supreme Commander, or “Generalissimo,” as the French (following Jomini) style him. Each Army will have its own sphere of action and Lines of Communication.
The modern organization by Armies differs from that adopted by Napoleon for the invasion of Russia, and in the German campaign which followed in 1813. It is true that, by forming large detachments to the flanks, he divided his enormous forces into what were practically separate Armies; but the main body in the centre was not only by far the most important, but was under Napoleon’s own command. In fact he commanded one of the Armies himself, while at the same time directing the whole Force. It is now recognized that this arrangement was far from successful, even under Napoleon, and would be impossible for a lesser man. The Supreme Commander must not himself command one of his Armies. If he were to attempt this, the other Armies would become merely large detachments; plans would tend to be based on the movements of the main body; and the operations of the Armies would lose in scope and independence.
The size of Armies must obviously be limited to the number which one man can command. This, according to Clausewitz, should not exceed 120,000 to 150,000. The total strength depends mainly on the number of Subordinate Commands. Napoleon was of opinion that five were enough for one man to command. Clausewitz laid down eight as the maximum.
In the great hosts of modern nations Armies are not organized in peace, and their composition in war is kept secret, but it is certain that they will not consist of less than three, or of more than six Army Corps (or Divisions, where Army Corps are not used), and most probably of four or five, with two or three Cavalry Divisions.
We have thus traced the development of the Higher Commands, or those of all Arms, from the Division to the Army, and will now consider the Administrative Services and Staff allotted to them.
As indicated at the beginning of the second chapter, a number of Administrative Services are required, to provide the Fighting Troops with all they need to keep up their strength and efficiency. An army cannot act without a service of communication for transmission of Orders; it cannot exist without a supply of food and clothing, fight without ammunition, or move without transport to carry these stores. To maintain its discipline there must be Police, and a department of Military Justice. For reasons of morale, the sick and wounded must be collected and tended, and it is also desirable that its letters should pass with regularity to and from home, and that spiritual ministration should be provided.
These points, with the exception of the Medical Services, were as a rule little considered until the close of the eighteenth century, when Carnot devoted much attention to them while organizing the revolutionary armies in France. Napoleon and Wellington improved them considerably, but they were still very inadequate in England till after the Crimean War.
In modern armies a good system of administration is universally felt to be of the greatest importance. Services are therefore organized to meet the administrative requirements of an army in the field, which may be classed under the following heads:
Inter-communication throughout the Force.
Supply of food, ammunition, and other stores.
Transport by rail and road.
Replacing loss in men or horses.
The above bear directly on the fighting; but there are also certain semi-civil services, which cannot well be dispensed with in war. These deal with the following matters:
Guidance as to Law—military, martial, and international.
Finance, Accounts, the provision and issue of Cash.
Clerical work, in connection with Statistics, Records, invaliding sick and wounded, etc.
Postal Service.
Spiritual ministration.
It is not possible to investigate here the various methods adopted in each foreign army to meet these requirements. The system is generally that the Medical Services are managed by their own Heads, the Communication, or Telegraph, Units are provided by the Engineers, and the other Administrative Services are regulated by officials called “Intendants,” who are attached to Divisional and Army Corps Commands, and have entire responsibility for Supply, Remounts, Stores, and Finance. As to Transport, each Army Corps has a “Train Battalion,” a combatant Unit which provides the Infantry, Cavalry, Engineer, and Medical Units (but not those of Artillery) with the wagons, teams, and drivers they require, and furnishes the Transport Columns for carrying supplies.
The personnel of the Medical Services is similarly furnished by the “Army Corps Medical organization,” and the Principal Medical Officers on the Staff of Divisions and Corps administer the Medical Services.
A Director of Medical Services, an Intendant-General, and a Judge-Advocate-General are attached to “General,” as well as to “Army,” Head-Quarters.
As regards the other Services, the Veterinary and Postal Services, and the Chaplains, do not generally form part of any higher Staffs than those of Divisions.
It will be seen that the system is so designed that in the main the business of Administration in detail falls on the Divisional and Army Corps Commands, while the Army Command is left free to concentrate its attention on the enemy.
The principles on which the Administration of an Army in the Field is organized for war as carried on at the present day, can be best understood by a study of the British Administrative Services. The general lines of their organization will be found described in Chapters IX. and X.