Map carried by Colonel LaBalme at the time of his death. Courtesy British Library.
At Vincennes and Kaskaskia he gathered a force to lead against Miamitown, with the ultimate objective being Detroit. Four hundred men were to have joined him at Ouiatenon, but as these reinforcements did not appear, he was obliged to strike at Miamitown on November 3, 1780, with but 103 men, before the news of the expedition reached there. The initial blow was successful as the traders and Indians were taken by surprise and barely had time to flee the village. The Lasselle family was forced to escape by way of the Maumee, and in their haste, their small daughter was drowned. LaBalme’s men fell to plundering the traders’ goods and Indian villages, then retired to Aboite creek, a few miles to the southwest. Beaubien and LaFontaine, whose goods had been destroyed, incited the Indians to attack LaBalme, as the Indians, learning the party was French, were not disposed at first to retaliate. The red men, led by their famous war chief, Little Turtle, in his first major engagement, completely defeated LaBalme’s force, all but a few being either killed or captured. LaBalme himself was killed and his personal papers, along with the news of the victory, were sent to DePeyster at Detroit. Among these papers was the intelligence LaBalme had gathered about Miamitown and its traders. The goods at Beaubiens’ store, which was “kept by Mr. LaFontaine, and old man” was valued at 50,000 livres. Another store, kept by Mr. Mouton, a partner of Beaubien, was also valued at 50,000 livres. These goods were “equally well disposed” to “Mr. Barthelemy [listed in the census of Fort Miami in 1769], Mr. Rivard, Mr. Lorrance, Mr. Gouin of Detroit, Mr. Lascelle [Lasselle?], Mr. Pottevin, Mr. Paillet, Mr. Duplessy, & others ... & an American called George, a partner of Israel [possibly the Jew, Levi, who aided Captain Morris in 1764].”[79]
DePeyster was thoroughly alarmed upon learning of LaBalme’s expedition, and he immediately dispatched the “Rangers” to Miamitown with orders to cover the cannon there, until it was possible to send them to Detroit.[80] Captain Thompson of the “Rangers” reported to DePeyster on March 14, 1781, that he was taking immediate action to alter the old fort. A false rumor that the French of Vincennes were heading for Miamitown, brought the Indians flocking to their villages. Their spirit was very high, and several times they asked Captain Thompson for assistance “to go and destroy Post St. Vincent, as it is the only place that gives them any uneasiness.”[81] Within a year, however, DePeyster reported that the Miamis and other tribes in the area were growing fearful of being too closely allied with the British.[82] It is possible that they had received some information concerning Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown.
The treaty of Paris in 1783, which formally brought to an end the Revolutionary War, transferred the sovereignty of the land south of the Great Lakes to the United States. Actually this transfer made little impression on conditions at Miamitown, for, in truth, the Revolution in the West closed only with the Jay and Greenville treaties. Great Britain, in violation of the treaty of Paris, continued to hold Detroit together with other posts along the southern shore of the Lakes. By this means they maintained effective control of the fur trade of the Northwest, and, thereby, to a great extent, influenced the Indians. Just how much the British officials were responsible for the Indian warfare from 1783 to 1794 is a debatable question. At times the action of the British officials seems to have been a case of the right hand not letting the left hand know what it was doing. Most present-day students of the subject are inclined to acquit the British government of any positive agency in the matter. They point out that the constant warfare injured the fur trade of the area which was in a state of decline during this period anyway.[83] Nor did the Indians need much encouragement to take the warpath, as the ever-increasing tide of immigration coming down the Ohio and across the mountains threatened to engulf them. But the American settler did not reason this way; to him the English government was responsible. Milo Quaife, historian of the Northwest, correctly observes:
The present day scholar, possessing sources of information denied to contemporaries and entire immunity from the gory scalping knife and tomahawk, may consider the subject calmly and philosophically; the American borderer’s opinions were based upon the acts of Great Britain’s agents in America and the visible facts of the situation on the frontier.[84]
A concrete example of the condition of the Indian fur trade and warfare during this period and their connection with the British trader and his government is given in the history of Miamitown between 1783 and 1794. Strong evidence indicates that despite the general decline in the fur trade, the region southwest of Detroit, and Miamitown especially, was extremely important for the British fur trade. In 1790, the British commander at Detroit, Major Smith, wrote to his superiors:
How far the loss of the Miamis Country, to the protection of His Majesty, will effect this Post and its trade, is a matter it would be presumptive in me to comment on. I think it however my duty to observe that it is a considerable mart of Indian Commerce uniting in this place.[85]
A month later Dorchester, Governor of Canada, warned the authorities in London that the loss of Miamitown to the Americans would bring grave hardships to the trade at Detroit.[86] In an earlier document he had estimated that 2000 packs of furs were taken yearly from the Miami region, bringing an income of some 24,000 pounds sterling. This far exceeded any other area south of the Great Lakes, doubling in fact the number of packs taken from the next most important area, that from Detroit north to Lake Huron.[87]
In the heart of the Indian country, Miamitown was also the principal point from which the Indian raiding parties harassed the frontier. Twenty-six war parties left Miamitown in a period of six months during 1786.[88] There is a strong tradition and some evidence to show that a secret society of Miami warriors of necessary courage and cunning met at stated intervals at Miamitown for the purpose of burning a captive and eating his flesh.[89] By its proximity to Detroit, Miamitown remained within the British orbit of trade. The merchants at Miamitown formed a loose association for their mutual benefit called the “Society of the Miamis”.[90] Business was carried on not only with Detroit and other English controlled stations, but also with Vincennes and the Illinois settlements, until Indian warfare and the animosity of the American settlers toward the traders made it virtually impossible to go to the lower Wabash.
Low market prices, bad fur seasons, and almost constant warfare by the Indians threatened to ruin the fur trade in the years immediately following the Revolution. Many of the small companies failed and the larger ones had difficulties. David Gray, a prominent trader at Miamitown, was advised not to come to Detroit, as his creditor, William Robertson, was awaiting Gray’s arrival.[91] The previous year, 1785, the same Gray had been requested to aid in collecting a long-standing debt from two of his fellow villagers, Rivard and LaBerche.[92] Larimier, another trader at Miamitown, failed because he could not meet the claims of his creditors.[93] There was constant danger that the British traders might lose all the export trade of the region to the Spanish at New Orleans. In 1787, the “Society” found it necessary to send “the Grandmaster to Vincennes to keep the trade from going to New Orleans.”[94] The Indians were also an uncertain quantity and at times were hostile even to the traders. Chapeau, a member of the “Society”, was killed by the Indians and George Ironside reluctantly told Gray at Vincennes to send the goods to New Orleans rather than risk shipping them up the Wabash.[95] Gray was repeatedly warned by Ironside to be most cautious on his return trip to Miamitown as he was in danger of losing his life. It is to the credit of the Miamitown traders that they traded only sparingly in liquor with the Indians. Their reasons were not altogether altruistic, however, as the price of liquor was exceptionally high.
The most candid description of the character of the trade at Miamitown has been left to us by Henry Hay, who wrote in his journal of 1790:
... but few skins comes in, and almost every individual (except the engages) is an Indian trader, everyone tries to get what he can either by fowle play or otherwise—that is by traducing one another’s characters and merchandise. For instance by saying such a one has no Blankets another no strowde or is damned bad or he’ll cheat you & so on—in short I cannot term it in a better manner than calling it a Rascally Scrambling Trade &c &c.[96]
Henry Hay, the writer, was an English trader and partisan who sojourned in Miamitown for a period of four months during the winter of 1789-90. His day-by-day account, obviously not intended for publication, gives us a cross section of life at Miamitown in all its aspects, both civilized and savage. Hay seems to have been in the employee of William Robertson, the Detroit merchant, although there is good reason to believe that he was also employed by Major Murray, the English commander at Detroit. Set off against the hard life of a trading post among Indian villages was the characteristic vivacity and gaiety of the French atmosphere prevalent in the town. The daily routine was by no means dull; drinking, dancing, and parties formed a constant round of entertainment in which the visitors gladly take part. Hay and John Kinzie (later the founder of Chicago) played the flute and fiddle for parties and dances, as well as for the ladies alone, and at Mass in the home of one of the oldest residents, Barthelemy. Their religion was an intricate part of the lives of the French inhabitants. During the four months Hay was at Miamitown, Mass was celebrated at Barthelemy’s house by Father Louis Payet, a missionary from Detroit. After playing at Mass on one occasion, Hay wrote, “The French settlers of this place go to prayers of a Sunday, morning and evening, ... the people are collected by the Ringing of three cow bells, which three boys runs about thro’ the village, which makes as much noise as twenty cows would.”[97]
Miamitown in 1790 had certain refinements not to be expected behind its rough exterior. Afternoon coffee and lunch was served in the home of Mrs. Adhemar on numerous occasions. Dinners were given in grand style. For the parties the men and women dressed in their finest apparel. Mr. Adhemar and Mr. DeSeleron made their appearance at a ball wearing very fine fur caps, “adorned with a quantity of Black Ostridge Feathers” and “Cockades made with white tinsell Ribbon, amasingly large.”[98] Less refining was the constant drinking. At different times, Hay and his companions became “infernally drunk”, “very drunk”, and “damned drunk”. One affair was memorable in that none of the men became drunk, “which is mostly the case in this place when they collect together”.[99] Dancing was also a favorite pastime, so much so, that after dancing three nights in succession, Hay found his feet too swollen to continue. It appeared as if dancing was never enjoyed more by anyone than by these French “habitants”. It became almost a passion; when they grew weary of the old steps, new ones were devised. The almost annual springtime flood seems to have been more severe than usual in the year 1790. But not even the flood dampened the gaiety, for before the waters had subsided, the ladies were taken for a row on the river to be serenaded by the flute and fiddle. Not all was fun and frolic, however, as business was transacted regularly by the traders.
In strange contrast to the minuet and “dance ronby” were the wild war dances of the Indians across the river in celebration of a victorious raid on the American settlements.[100] From the French village situated on the St. Joseph river where it meets the St. Mary’s, Hay could easily see these spectacles. Behind the traders’ houses, northward to Spy Run Creek, lived the band of Miamis under LeGris, one of the most prominent and intellectual chiefs of his time. Across the river, in the present Lakeside area of Fort Wayne, was the principal village of the Miamis under Pacan, who in his youth had saved Captain Morris.[101] Frequent discussions were held by the traders with Pacan, LeGris, Blue Jacket, and Little Turtle; LeGris and Little Turtle often ate and stayed at Hay’s house. The three Girty brothers, the terrors of the frontier, visited Miamitown on a number of occasions during Hay’s sojourn. James and George Girty lived only three miles from Miamitown, and came more often than their brother, Simon. It is noteworthy that Hay obligingly wrote a letter for George Girty to Alexander McKee, the British Indian agent, informing McKee that the Miamis had upbraided the Delawares by “telling them that the Ground they occupied now is not theirs and that ... the Delawares answered, they were great fools to fight for lands that was not theirs and consequently would not go to war against the Americans any more.”[102] Girty asked McKee to check the Delaware dissatisfaction.
It is clear that the inhabitants of Miamitown were, for the most part, English partisans. Hay could not venture his “carcass” among the “parcel of renegards” [sic] at Vincennes.[103] When Antoine Lasselle did venture southward and was captured by the Indians who thought him to be sympathetic with the Americans, Major Murray intervened and the people of the village certified that Lasselle was “a good loyalist” and “always for supporting his King”.[104] When Lorraine, an inhabitant of Miamitown for forty years, died and was buried, “the young Volunteers of the place gave him three Vollies ... in Honor to his services rendered to the King of Great Britain.”[105] Evidently the time Lorraine had aided Pontiac’s Indians in capturing the British post at Ouiatenon was forgotten at this late date. Not all of the traders at Miamitown were good loyalists, however. James Abbott is described as being “one of our dis-affected subjects.” He refused to obtain the necessary permit for trading and spoke to the Indians of “Major Murray & Capt. McKee in so disrespectfull a manner that they ... determined to send Strings of Wampum into Detroit immediately to informe them of it.”[106]
On the first of April, 1790, Hay departed for Detroit, “much regretted by every one in the village”.[107] Less than seven months later Miamitown lay in ashes, ravaged by an American army which left 183 of its men dead in the vicinity. There is nothing in Hay’s journal to indicate that the French, English, or Indian occupants of the villages anticipated the blow which was to be dealt them by Harmar’s army, although they were fully aware of the movements which preceded the coming of Harmar. “John Thompson [a prisoner] ... informed me their was great talk of raising men to come against the Ind’s”, wrote Hay on March 24, 1790. “However”, he continued, “General St. Clair who is now at the Big Miami [Cincinnati] with two boat loads of goods, means to call the Indians together at a Council at Post Vincennes—But if the Indians do not come to a settlement with them, they mean to fight them.”[107]
This and other councils were held. St. Clair, governor of the newly created Northwest Territory, following Washington’s instructions, offered peace to the Indians. Antoine Gamelin, a merchant from Vincennes favorably known by the Indians, was sent with the Governor’s overtures to the hostile Indians. The tribes along the Wabash would give Gamelin no answer until he conferred with those at Miamitown. Here, the Indians, as well as the traders, assembled to hear Gamelin’s speech. Their reply was evasive and unsatisfactory, while their true attitude was revealed by the burning of an American prisoner only three days after Gamelin’s departure.[108]
War was now inevitable, and during the five years of bloody conflict that followed, Miamitown was the principal goal of the American forces. As early as 1784, Washington had confided in his future Secretary of War, Henry Knox, that the establishment of a strong post at Miamitown was desirable for the welfare of the new nation in the West.[109] The following year, Washington wrote to Richard Henry Lee for the benefit of the Continental Congress, advocating a strong western policy. In his letter Washington said:
Would it not be worthy of the wisdom and the attention of congress to have the western waters well explored, the navigation of them fully ascertained, and accurately laid down, ... at least as far westerly as the Miamis running into the Ohio [the Great Miami] and Lake Erie [the Maumee] ... for I cannot forbear observing that the Miami village points to an important post for the Union.[110]
St. Clair, while in Philadelphia during 1790, talked to both Secretary of War, Henry Knox and President Washington, and suggested that an American fort be established on the site of Miamitown.[111] Writing to Knox on November 26, 1790, St. Clair again urged that General Harmar in the forthcoming campaign be empowered to carry out this plan, concluding his argument by saying, “we [will] never have peace with the Western Nations until we have a garrison there.”[112] Knox, after conferring with Washington, rejected the idea. In doing so, he wrote to the disappointed St. Clair, the following explanation:
In contemplating the establishment of military posts northwest of the Ohio, to answer the purposes of awing the Indians residing on the Wabash, the west end of Lake Erie, St. Joseph’s, and the Illinois ... and, at the same time, exhibiting a respectable appearance to the British troops at Detroit and Niagara, the Miami village presents itself as superior to any other position. This opinion was given to me by the President in the year 1784, and has several times been held forth by me to Brigadier Harmar. But at the same time, it must be acknowledged that the measure would involve a much larger military establishment than perhaps the value of the object or disposition of the United States would admit, and that it would be so opposed to the inclinations of the Indians generally ... as to bring on inevitably an Indian war of some duration. In addition to which, it is supposed that the British garrison would find themselves so uneasy with such a force impending over them as not only to occasion a considerable reinforcement of their upper posts, but also fomenting ... the opposition of the Indians.[113]
It would appear that the government did not wish to offend Great Britain, a policy which was not too strong perhaps, but one that kept the young republic at peace at a crucial time in her history. The proposed attack on Miamitown had to be under the guise of punishing the Indians. To do this and retire was permissible, but the establishment of an American fort there would have been considered by the British as a dagger pointed at Detroit. Consequently, when Harmar finally moved from Fort Washington with his army of 1,600 men, he had orders to destroy Miamitown and, if possible, its Indian occupants. Harmar himself promised that, in the event of a successful campaign, he would attend to “the villanous traders”.[114] Interestingly the British officials at Detroit and Canada believed that Harmar fully intended to build a fort at Miamitown although they expressed surprise at the “imprudence” of such action. Their spies, such as the Girties and Alexander McKee, kept them well informed of the strength and movement of Harmar’s army. They even noted Harmar’s tendency to be intoxicated.[115]
Forewarned by the British agents of the impending attack, the Indians adopted a “scorched earth” policy. The traders were forced to give their stores of ammunition to the Indians and were aided in fleeing with what goods they could carry. What was not destroyed by the Indians at Miamitown was burned by the Americans (20,000 bushels of corn, among other things). In two major engagements, the first at Hellar’s Corners, eight miles north of Miamitown, and the second, a three-pronged attack within the heart of the village and on the banks of the Maumee and St. Joseph rivers, the Indian forces, under Little Turtle, were victorious.[116] Although their crops and towns were destroyed and the trade ruined, the Indians were elated over their victories, and their frontier raids continued.
Knox now felt that, despite possible British disapproval, the only means of checking the Indians was to establish the fort at Miamitown for which St. Clair had asked. To carry this out, the Secretary of War asked Congress to increase the size of the army. The force contemplated for the intended post was 1,000 to 1,200 men. St. Clair argued that a strong fort at Miamitown “would curb the Wabash Indians, as well as the Ottawas and Chippewas, and all other northern tribes”; that it would “more effectually cover the line of frontier along the Ohio, than by a post any other place whatever (excluding Detroit)”; and “would afford more fully security to the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio.”[117] For an economy-minded Congress, he pointed out that “it would assist in the reduction of the national debt, by holding out security to people to purchase and settle the public lands.”[118]
General Knox still feared English hostility to this move, and he instructed St. Clair to “make such intimations as may remove all such disposition.” These intimations, however, were better to follow, than precede, the possession of the post, unless circumstances dictated otherwise, as it was “not the inclination of the United States to enter into a contest with Great Britain.”[119]
St. Clair never reached Miamitown. Badly trained and inexperienced, his army of 1,400 men suffered one of the most terrible defeats ever inflicted on American forces. Five hundred and thirty-two men fell before Little Turtle’s Indians on the site of Fort Recovery, Ohio. The situation was now critical. The Indians now attacked the frontier with impunity and another defeat might mean the complete alienation of the West from the new union. At this crucial point, General Anthony Wayne, hero of Stony Point in the Revolution, was appointed commander-in-chief of the American army. It is not necessary to give in detail the long months of preparation of Wayne’s “Legion” and the swift campaign which was carried out in the Maumee valley. Wayne cut the Indian forces in two by feinting toward Miamitown, then moving between it and the English Fort Miami at the mouth of the Maumee. Before the various tribes could reorganize fully, the “Legion” turned on the Indian forces to the east. At Fallen Timbers, a short distance from Toledo, on August 20, 1794, Wayne’s army met and defeated the red men. The Indian power in the Northwest was for the time being shattered and Wayne moved down the Maumee to complete his task, the construction, near the site of the old Kiskakon, of a new American stronghold in the Northwest—Fort Wayne.
[1]“Kekionga” is said to mean “blackberry bush”, this plant being considered an emblem of antiquity because it sprang up on the sites of old villages. This theory rests on the statement of Barron, an old French trader of the area. However, the word “Kekionga” is more likely a corruption of Kiskakon. The Kiskakons or “cut tails” were the principal tribe of the Ottawas who lived on the Maumee at a very early time, for which reason this river was sometimes called the “Ottawa”. Archeological American, 1,278; “Relation of Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac, 1718” Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVI, p. 353.
[2]From Little Turtle’s speech at the Treaty of Greenville, quoted in H. S. Knapp’s History of the Maumee Valley, p. 357.
[3]Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, IV, 224 lists the following:
[4]H. S. Knapp, History of the Maumee Valley, pp. 9-10; Justin Winsor, Cartier to Frontenac, p. 224; Elbert J. Benton, “The Wabash Trade Route in the Development of the Old Northwest” John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, XXI, 12.
[5]Pierre Margry, Decouvertes des francais dans L’Amerique Septentrionale II, 98.
[6]Justin Winsor, Cartier to Frontenac, p. 256.
[7]Pierre Margry, op. cit., II, 296; see also, Beverley Bond, Foundations of Ohio, pp. 70-8. Bond holds that the Maumee-Wabash route was the original one intended to be used by LaSalle who then decided to establish his communication by means of the upper Ohio; due to the Iroquois, however, he fell back upon the Maumee-Wabash route as the best means of reaching the Mississippi, but was forced to abandon this also to the Iroquois. Later Cadillac was to adopt LaSalle’s Lake Erie-Maumee-Wabash route.
[8]Logan Esarey, History of Indiana, p. 12.
[9]Elbert J. Benton, op. cit., p. 17.
[10]Otho Winger, The Last of the Miamis, p. 3.
[11]Pierre Margry, op cit., V, 359-62.
[12]Beverley Bond, op. cit., p. 76.
[13]Cadillac Papers, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection, XXXIII, 338.
[14]Charles Slocum, History of the Maumee River Basin, I, 86; H. S. Knapp, op. cit., p. 9; “Forts Miami and Fort Industry”, Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, XII, 120.
[15]New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 676. This French officer was the elder Vincennes, the uncle of Francois Margane, Sieur de Vincennes. The younger Vincennes was the founder of the town of Vincennes on the lower Wabash.
[16]Archives des Colonies, c 11 117, 118, (Paris) Pierre Margry, op. cit., V, 178, 218, 225-8; 239-43; 256-8, 262-7; 271-3; 278; 280-283.
[17]New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, IX, 891.
[18]Archives de la Province Quebec, Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct. 24, 1722.
[19]New York Colonial Documents, IX, 894.
[20]“Céloron Journal” Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 51.
[21]Archives de la Province Quebec, de Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct. 24, 1722.
[22]The Jesuits Relations, ed. by Reuben G. Thwaites, LXIX, p. 189.
[23]Archives de la Province Quebec, de Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct. 24, 1722.
[24]Archives des Colonies, c 11 117, 118.
[25]Letters of Governor Spotswood, II, 296.
[26]Norman Cadwell, The French in the Mississippi Valley, 1740-1750, p. 95.
[27]New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, IX, 894.
[28]Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII, 211. Sieur Darnaud was in all likelihood Nicolas-Marie Renoud Davenne, born 1696, died 1743.
[29]Indiana Historical Society Publications, VII, 72. This post was a new settlement of the English from Carolina apparently on the upper Ohio River.
[30]Ibid., p. 72.
[31]Archives des Colonies, C 11 117, 118.
[32]Archives de Colonies, C 11 117, 118.
[33]Ibid.
[34]Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 175.
[34a]Archives des Colonies, C 11 118.
[35]Norman Caldwell, op. cit., p. 41.
[36]Ibid., p. 31.
[37]Ibid., p. 41.
[38]New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, X, 140.
[39]Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII, 486-7.
[40]New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, X, 150.
[41]The Jesuit Relations, ed. by Reuben G. Thwaites, LXIX, 189.
[42]Norman Caldwell, op. cit., p. 95.
[43]Ibid., p. 95.
[44]The journal kept by Celoron on this expedition may be found in Margry, op. cit., VI, 666 ff.
[45]Jesuit Relations, ed. by R. Thwaites, LXIX, 189.
[46]Ibid., p. 189.
[47]Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, XII, 120.
[48]Mississippi Valley Historical Review, IX, 315.
[49]Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, I, 87.
[50]Charles Slocum, op. cit., p. 99.
[51]Charles Lasselle, “Indian Traders of Indiana”, Indiana Magazine of History, II, Number 1, 4.
[52]A Narrative of Life on the Frontier, Henry Hay’s Journal, ed. by Milo Quaife, p. 261.
[53]See below, pp. [p 79
-80.][54]Marquis de la Jonquiere to Governor Clinton, Aug. 10, 1751, New York Colonial Documents, VI, pp. 731-34.
[55]Mitchell’s map was the best known of contemporary maps of North America. A reproduction of this map may be found in the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection, XXXVI, 52-3.
[56]Beverley Bond, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
[57]For an interesting discussion of the French attempt during the peace negotiations at the end of the war to establish the Maumee and Wabash rivers as the new boundary between the two colonial empires, see Theodore Pease’s article, “Indiana in Contention between France and England” in the Indiana Historical Bulletin, XII.
[58]“Croghan’s Journal”, Early Western Travels, ed. by R. G. Thwaites, I, 122-23.
[59]Jesuit Relations, LXIX, 189.
[60]Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 47.
[61]Ibid., p. 47.
[62]Francis Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac, I, 189.
[63]The Journal of Captain Morris as quoted in his Miscellanies in Prose and Verse has been reprinted in Early Western Travels, I, 301-ff.
[64]Captain Thomas Morris, op. cit., p. 312. This prohibition of the sale of liquor to the Indiana was not always as successful as Capt. Morris thought.
[65]“Croghan’s Journal”, Western Travels, I, 149-150.
[66]For the French philosopher Volney’s description of these French Creoles See Below, [p. 34
.][67]After LaBalme’s raid, a British force was stationed at Fort Miami for four months, See Below, [p. 16
.][68]Illinois Historical XVI, 60.
[69]Indiana Historical Society Publications, II, 435.
[70]Ibid., p. 439-40. The following names are listed: Capuchin, Baptiste Campau, Nicholas Perct, Pierre Barthe, Bergerson, Berthelemy, Dorien, Francois Maisonville, Laurain.
[71]As it turned out the people of Vincennes suffered a great deal for their friendship with the American cause.
[72]Charles Lasselle, loc. cit., p. 4.
[73]Wallace A. Brice, History of Fort Wayne, p. 102.
[74]Charles Lasselle, loc. cit., p. 4.
[75]DePeyster to Haldimand, Nov. 16, 1780, and Haldimand to DePeyster, June 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers relating to Detroit, 1772-84, II, British Museum. After his release from captivity by the Americans, Colonel Hamilton accused Beaubien of treachery for not following Hamilton’s orders during the campaign, cf. Hamilton’s account of the ill fated expedition against Vincennes, Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.
[76]Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 26, 1778. Michigan Pioneer Collections, X, 449.
[77]Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.
[78]Michigan Pioneer Collections, XIX, 699. For LaBalme’s dramatic speeches to the French, see the Illinois Historical Collections, II, p. xci. For other information concerning LaBalme, see the Virginia State Papers, I, p. 380. The complete papers of LaBalme were forwarded to the war ministry in London and together with the map carried by LaBalme at the time of his death are available in the Haldimand Papers, II, 13, British Museum (London).
[79]“LaBalme Papers”, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 578-8.
[80]“Haldimand Papers”, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 582.
[81]Capt. A. Thompson to DePeyster, Mar. 14, 1781, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 589-600.
[82]DePeyster to Haldimand, Apr. 22, 1782, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.
[83]Wayne Steven, “The Northwest Fur Trade” University of Illinois Studies in Social Sciences, XIV, p. 513.
[84]Milo Quaife, op. cit., p. 209.
[85]Major Smith to Dorchester, Oct. 16, 1790, Public Records Office, (Colonial Series) CO-42 73, London.
[86]Dorchester to Grenville, October 17, 1790, Public Records Office, (Colonial Series) CO-42 73.
[87]Dorchester to Grenville, May 31, 1790, Public Records Office, (Colonial Series) CO-42 73.
[88]Leonard Helderman, “Danger on the Wabash, Vincennes letters of 1786-87” Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIV, 459.
[89]Logan Esarey, op. cit., I, 102.
[90]George Sharp to Paul Camelin, June 23, 1786, “Letters from Eighteenth Century Indiana Merchants” (the Lasselle Papers) ed. C.B. Coleman and published in the Indiana Magazine of History, V, 145-146.
[91]George Leith to Gray, Apr. 3, 1786, loc. cit., V, 144-145.
[92]John MacPherson to Gray, March, 1785, loc. cit., V, 142-143.
[93]Ironside to Gray, Apr. 15, 1787, loc. cit., V, 151-152.
[94]Ironside to Gray, Mar. 15, 1787, loc. cit., V, 150.
[95]Ironside to Gray, Feb. 16, 1787, loc. cit., V, 149. George Ironside was a leading trader in the Maumee valley. He was born in 1760 and died in 1830, at Amherstburg. For many years he was in the British Indian service. He was an M. A. of King’s College, Aberdeen and was known, even to the Americans, for his humanity and hospitality.
[96]A Narrative of Life on the Old Frontier, Henry Hay’s Journal from Detroit to the Mississippi River, edited by M. M. Quaife, p. 224.
[97]Ibid., p. 221.
[98]Ibid., p. 241.
[99]Ibid., p. 240.
[100]Ibid., p. 260. Hay gives an interesting description of the “Natt”, the Indian symbol of war, carried about much like the Ancient Roman standards.
[101]above, [p. 23
.][102]Quaife, op. cit., p. 226.
[103]Ibid., p. 245.
[104]Ibid., p. 237.
[105]Ibid., p. 258.
[106]Ibid., p. 245.
[107]Ibid., p. 261.
[108]Indiana Historical Society Publications, VII, 360.
[109]“Gamelin’s Journal”, St. Clair Papers, II, pp. 155-160; American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, P. 37.
[109]St. Clair Papers, ed. Wm. Smith, II, 181.
[110]The Writings of George Washington, ed. Jared Sparks, IX, 80-81.
[111]St. Clair Papers, II, 181.
[112]Ibid., 193.
[113]Knox to St. Clair, Sept. 14, 1790, St. Clair Papers, II, p. 181.
[114]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, p. 104-5.
[115]Dorchester to Grenville, Nov. 10, 1790, including dispatches from A. McKee and others, Public Record Office (Colonial Series) CO-42; 73, London.
[116]For the accounts of the battles see Harmar’s report in ASP, Indian Affairs, I, pp. 104; also the “Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny” in Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, VII, 343-353. The heaviest action took place at Harmar’s ford at the end of Harmar Street. Here the regulars suffered severely while attempting to cross the Maumee in the face of the Indians’ fire.
[117]ASP, Indian Affairs, I, 112.
[118]Ibid., p. 112.
[119]“Knox’s Instructions to St. Clair”, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XXIV, 197-8.