CHAPTER VI.

KANDAHAR—MURDER OF LIEUT. INVERARITY—THE ARMY CONCENTRATED—ADVANCE BY THE VALLEY OF THE TURNUK UPON GHUZNI.

On the morning of the 27th of April we entered the plain in which Kandahar is situated, and encamped about two miles from the city. This plain is well irrigated and tilled. Gardens enclosed by high mud walls, and abounding with a great variety of fruit, are seen on almost every side on approaching the city; and so level is the plain in its vicinity, that nothing could be discerned but a long mud wall with a few domes looking over it. The wall which encloses Kandahar in an oblong figure, (whose perimeter exceeds three miles,) is flanked by numerous circular bastions, and defended by an irregular dry ditch. The curtain is about twenty feet in thickness at the base, and its relief varies from thirty-five to forty feet, according to the depth or shallowness of the ditch. In the parapet are numerous embrasures and loopholes for matchlocks or jingals. I need scarcely annex to this brief description that it is a place of no strength.

The bazaar runs from the Shikarpore gate, by which we entered, across the city, and is intersected at right angles by a similar bazaar from east to west. At the point of intersection is a large dome, which affords a respite from the sun, now becoming intolerably hot. The city was thronged with inhabitants, in every variety of Eastern costume, busily engaged in their various avocations; and notwithstanding their material change of administration which took place yesterday, business seemed to be going on as quietly as if nothing unusual had occurred. From the estimate formed on that occasion, I should say the natives of Kandahar were not very violent politicians.

The women were clad cap-à-pie in a flowing white robe, (not always particularly clean,) in which a piece of netting was inserted over the eyes, to give them an opportunity of seeing what was passing; although it precluded them from what is said, perhaps unjustly, to constitute a source of satisfaction amongst northerly dames—being seen. A neat green or scarlet leather slipper gave some relief to the ghostlike appearance, and generally attracted observation to a pretty foot.

The palace is situated in the southern quarter, and surrounded by a high shot-proof wall, which was garnished by several old guns of curious workmanship: a legend is attached to some of them, which is not likely to be interesting to the world at large.

An abundance of supplies were procured for the army in Kandahar, and the surviving horses of the cavalry brigade (nearly three hundred had died on the march) once more tasted grain: but the relief came too late with many, whose hearts had been broken, and the greater portion never recovered condition.

About a fortnight after our arrival, the Bombay division joined us, consisting of a wing of H.M. 4th Light Dragoons, H.M.'s 2nd and 17th Regiments, two troops of Horse Artillery, 1st Native Cavalry, 19th Native Infantry, and two companies of Foot Artillery; and now, for the first time, the "Army of the Indus" were assembled, though many hundred miles distant from the river in whose name they were baptized.

The Bombay force had suffered less from famine than ourselves, having marched a shorter distance, and been better supplied with grain: two thousand camel loads were dispatched for their use from Shikarpore, to the grief of the Bengal commissariat.

In May, the hot winds set in with much virulence, and the heat in our tents became very oppressive. In spite of every effort on our parts to reduce the temperature by throwing horse-cloths over the canvas, and keeping wet grass, day and night, against the doors, the thermometer stood at 110° during the heat of the day, and did not fall more than twelve degrees at night. The camp, which was now a long standing one, became exceedingly offensive, owing to the number of dead cattle in the vicinity, principally camels; and the swarms of flies that worried us, enabled one to comprehend what that visitation must have amounted to when sent to plague the Egyptians.

The hospital began to fill rapidly. By the middle of May ours held more than one fourth of the regiment to which I belonged. Jaundice, dysentery, and fever were the prevalent complaints; the two latter, far the most fatal. The 13th Light Infantry and Company's European regiment were very severe sufferers, and were ultimately reduced from sickness and death to a very weak state, especially the former, who buried more than an average of a man a day during the two months we halted at Kandahar. The causes of these complaints, independent of heat, were the bad water drank on the march, and the dampness of the soil in the neighbourhood of the city.

The people of the country being apparently better disposed towards us now than at first, the officers of the army strayed occasionally some miles from camp on fishing and shooting excursions, until these amusements were checked by a tragical event, which occurred on the evening of the 28th of May.

Two officers of the 16th Lancers, Lieuts. Wilmer and Inverarity, were returning towards camp on a sporting excursion rather later in the evening than usual. On ascending an eminence, about four miles from camp, (having given their guns to the grooms to carry,) Inverarity preceded his friend, and rode to the top of a rocky hillock, from whence the camp fires were visible. When he reached this spot about twenty Afghan savages rushed upon their unarmed victim, tore him from his horse (as supposed), and inflicted several mortal wounds with their cimiters. Wilmer, following, unconscious of what had occurred, was suddenly attacked by some of the same gang. Providentially he had a thick walking stick in his hand, which he raised in time to parry the first blow made at his head, and, escaping from his assailants, descended the hill, pursued by the assassins. These he soon distanced, and reaching an outpost of irregular horse about a mile from the place, returned with some of the party in search of the banditti. The cowardly villains had absconded, leaving poor Inverarity covered with wounds, but still alive. He spoke but a few words, faintly describing how he had met with the disaster, and begged for some water, which, as soon as it could be procured, he drank, and almost immediately afterwards expired.

In the dead of night the party arrived in camp with his corpse, so gashed and disfigured, that it could scarcely be recognised by his brother-officers, and the following day his remains were interred with the usual military honours in front of the standard guard.

The malice of his murderers rested not even in the grave, for some months after we heard of a gang (who came from the direction of the place where he was murdered) attempting to dig up his body. Having demolished the tomb, they were interrupted in their accursed project by a party of native infantry quartered in Kandahar, and fled to the hills.

Inverarity's remains were afterwards removed from the spot, and interred in the city of Kandahar.

The barbarians who, it is supposed, committed the deed, were subsequently secured by the exertions of Major Mac Laren[28] of the 16th Native Infantry, while storming a small fort near Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Some articles, supposed to have belonged to Inverarity, were found in their possession; but the punctilious judge did not consider them legally identified, and the assassins were liberated, about in sufficient time, it was conjectured, to fall in with another officer, who was murdered between Kandahar and Caubul.

Had the detection and punishment of the murderers been committed to Shah Soojah (as he requested) there is every reason to suppose they would not have escaped so easily, and the business would have afforded his Majesty sincere pleasure.

Rumours of Dost Mahomed's preparations for an obstinate resistance were now reaching us daily; but the envoy frequently expressed his firm conviction that no opposition would be made. Sir John Keane differed in opinion, and refused to leave the Bombay division behind, according to Mr. Mac Naghten's suggestion, unless the envoy could guarantee that Dost Mahomed would surrender.

This was of course out of the question, and it was at length determined that the whole force should advance, except a small garrison for the city. The commissariat exerted themselves to complete their arrangements for the march, and the approaching departure was joyfully welcomed by the army.

A Kafila, with grain from Shikarpore, arrived opportunely in camp previous to our move, under the escort of two regiments and some local horse, despatched from Kandahar to protect this caravan, as news had been received that two chiefs of the powerful Ghilzie tribe were preparing to pounce on the convoy.

It was fortunate that this precaution had been taken; for it was ascertained that a large body of the enemy had made preparations to surprise these necessary supplies on the road, and the fidelity of the merchant who brought up the caravan was somewhat doubted, until the arrival of the reinforcement put treachery out of his power.

In the beginning of June, the force under Brigadier Sale, which had been detached soon after our arrival in pursuit of the Kandahar chiefs, returned. Those princes had fled to Girishk, a fortress about eighty miles distant from Kandahar, and near the Helmund river, but abandoned it on the approach of their pursuers, and fled towards Herat.

Thus ended, in the most undignified manner, the authority of the three Ameers, for the present. It is singular that in such extremities the scheme of a reconciliation with their brother, Dost Mahomed, had not been resorted to, for it would have been unquestionable policy in that monarch to insure the re-establishment of the Kandahar chiefs to them in their principality, in case of the united forces succeeding to repel the British invasion.

It is evident, however, that no such measures could have been preconcerted to oppose our advance, from the non-occupation of the Kojuck and Bolan passes. The Afghans, near Kandahar, informed us that the chiefs distrusted their subjects, and perhaps with cause.

Weak both in mind and authority, these chiefs hovered irresolutely around their capital, but abandoned the power they had usurped when danger accompanied its retention.

On the 27th of June, our camp was struck, and the Cavalry division, with the 1st Brigade of Infantry and head-quarters, preceded.

Next day, came the second Brigade, Shah Soojah and his motley procession, which swelled daily in numbers, with hordes of Afghans, who came to join the Shah and tender their allegiance (as they affirmed), but in reality, no doubt, to watch the progress of events: to remain faithful in case of success, or plunder in case of a reverse.

The Bombay division of Infantry, under Brigadier Willshire, brought up the rear. One regiment of Bengal Native Infantry and the heavy guns were left at Kandahar.

Most of our officers were on the sick list, and on the remainder the duty was severe, consisting principally of guards to protect the baggage, and pickets. The outlying cavalry picket was ordered, by the commander-in-chief, to take post four miles in advance, where, of course, no baggage was allowed, nor even a groom (strictly speaking) to hold your charger. This picket was posted at nightfall, with orders to fall back on the main picket, in case of feeling an enemy. The main picket was usually posted about a mile from camp, consisting of a squadron of cavalry, four companies of infantry, and two six-pounders, from whence a chain of pickets communicated along the front and round the flanks of the army, whence patrols from the rear-guards completed the circuit.

The third day's march brought us to the Turnuk river, which is a clear and shallow mountain stream, running through a valley sown abundantly with barley and Indian corn. The water was excellent, and supplies for our cattle were daily procurable; but numbers continued to die, unable to overcome the debility ensuing from previous overwork and starvation.

The natives of the valley were peaceable agriculturists, who came constantly into our camp, bringing for sale corn, eggs, fowls, and fruit; but the mountains which flanked our march, at a short distance, were amply stocked with marauders. The sickness under which the army had long suffered now began to abate, or at least, to assume a less virulent character; but the appearance of the sufferers was materially altered. Those of previously stout and portly figures were seen walking about in clothes once fitting closely, but now hanging down like empty pudding-bags; and faces, whose rubicundity once emulated the richest hues of Chateau Margaux, now wore a puckered-up, gamboge aspect, which made sympathy no easy matter with those who were prone to laughter.

Many who had never much flesh to spare, were reduced to varieties of angular shapes, which might have been useful to a mathematician when studiously inclined, on the line of march. Such had been the devastating effects of dysentery and fever on most of the community.

The zealous and able managers of the intelligence department had prophesied that we should probably be seriously molested by the tenants of a strong fort in the Ghilzie country, seven marches from Kandahar, called Khelat-i-Ghilzie.

A bribe had been sent to the two principal chiefs of the Ghilzies,[29] accompanied by a letter from Shah Soojah, desiring their assistance. The money was retained, and an insulting answer of defiance returned.

On approaching Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the adjutant-general of cavalry was sent, with a small escort, to reconnoitre the place.

The brigadier commanding the advanced guard of two squadrons of cavalry, two guns, and a small body of infantry, on approaching this memorable place, espied two or three hundred well-armed Ghilzies on an eminence not far from the road.

Having minutely examined their position, the brigadier pronounced it to be remarkably strong, and prudently resolved to await the arrival of the main body of the army, previously to dislodging the party.

Whilst revolving in his mind the most advisable method of attack, unfortunately, the head of the column hove in sight, and the doubtless brilliant result that might have ensued was precluded by the Ghilzies taking to flight.

It was considered fortunate that the enemy knew not their own strength, or that a more rash officer had not been in command on the occasion, who, in attempting to intercept the retreat of the Ghilzies, might have incurred serious responsibility.

Sir John Keane, on his arrival at the encamping ground, was so satisfied with the arrangements, that he is reported even to have instituted a comparison between the gallant colonel and the Duke of Wellington, in his usual energetic and classical mode of expression.

As we had ascended considerably since leaving Kandahar, and were frequently on high tableland, the heat ceased to annoy us so severely as during the three preceding months, and we considered we had overcome by far our most formidable enemy in the relentless sun.

Various and contradictory rumours continued to pour daily into camp. At one time, it was said that Dost Mahomed, at the head of an army of thirty thousand men, with eighty guns, had taken up a strong position near Caubul; at another, that his chiefs and Kuzzilbaches (Persian mercenaries) having deserted him, he had despaired of making any effectual resistance, and fled towards the Hindoo Koosh. Lastly, we were informed that he had detached two of his sons, with chosen men from the army, to garrison the fortress of Ghuzni; but the same evening, perhaps, merchants would travel through our camp, en route for Kandahar, and declare they had left Ghuzni but a few days, and had not seen a single soldier in the place! These reports, when compared with the actual events, are more reconcilable than appears at a first glance.

Small parties continued to arrive daily, and tender their allegiance to Shah Soojah; and we were authentically informed, that the two before-mentioned Ghilzie chiefs, with about five or six thousand horse each, were moving daily on both flanks, parallel with our line of march, and would neglect no opportunity to harass the army. Of the truth of the latter part of the information, we entertained no doubt, provided they could do it with impunity.

About seventy miles from Ghuzni, we quitted the rich valley of the Turnuk river, and crossed an extensive, well-cultivated plain, thickly studded with small mud forts. The inhabitants of this part of the country dare not dwell in open towns or villages, owing to the numerous bands of marauders infesting the neighbouring mountains, who have no mercy on the defenceless villages.

Small, but luxuriant groves of fruit-trees, bending beneath their loads of rosy-cheeked apples, speckled the plain, and formed a pleasing resting-place for the eye, fatigued with the ceaseless range of barren mountains skirting the valley.

On the 20th of July, we reached a small place called Nance, about twelve miles from Ghuzni; and as yet no authentic intelligence had been received of Dost Mahomed's intentions or movements, nor of any steps having been taken to interrupt our progress.

Sir John Keane, however, received news at this place which induced him to order the rear column to close up to us in the evening. The fort was said to be garrisoned by a body of Dost Mahomed's troops; and Ufzul Khan, his second son, was supposed to be near us with four thousand cavalry. As it was probable that Ufzul Khan would effect a junction with the Ghilzie chiefs, and attempt to surprise our camp during the night, the whole army were drawn up in line on their standard guards soon after sunset, and lay under arms during the night.

Nevertheless, nothing certain was known regarding these reports. Major Garden, the quartermaster-general, had ridden to reconnoitre Ghuzni in the evening, and perceived no signs of its being garrisoned.

At daybreak, on the morning of the 21st, our line broke into three columns, the cavalry on the right, the artillery in the centre, and the infantry on the left, and in this order advanced over the plain, at the extremity of which the fortress of Ghuzni is situated.

As we approached, a nephew of Dost Mahomed came to tender his submission to the Shah, and gave information of the fort being occupied by Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, with a garrison of three thousand infantry and a few cavalry; but he expressed a suspicion that they would evacuate the place. This individual complained of having been ill-treated by his uncle; but there appeared little doubt that the gentleman came into camp merely as a spy.

Reports from the advanced parties continued to state that no garrison was to be seen on the ramparts: however, we continued to advance in the same order.

When within about a mile of the walls, a smart fire of matchlocks was suddenly opened on the advanced guard of infantry on our left, from a small village, and from behind some garden walls. The column immediately halted; the 16th Native Infantry were detached to clear the village, in rear of which was a small redoubt, protected by the fire of a bastion of the fort, on which the Afghans fell back.

Two officers,[30] and several men of the 16th Native Infantry, were wounded by the Afghans in the skirmish.

The artillery now swept past us, and took up their position on an elevated post in a village about four hundred yards distant from the nearest bastion of the fort. At the same time the 4th Dragoons were ordered to the rear to protect the baggage, which, it was supposed, was likely to be attacked by a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been descried on the right, moving in that direction.

The remainder of the cavalry-division were drawn up in close column of squadrons, about three quarters of a mile from Ghuzni, and supplied escorts to the reconnoitring parties.

The garrison now opened their fire upon us, which was answered by our artillery from the village, but the guns, which were only six-pounders, were found to have little or no effect on the walls, in consequence of which they were soon withdrawn, having lost two or three horses from the enemy's fire. Sir John Keane, in his despatch, assigns as a reason for this eccentric cannonade, a desire to unmask the enemy's batteries.

About the same time the infantry were also withdrawn, and bivouacked in rear of some gardens, enclosed by mud walls, and about a mile from the fort.

The cavalry entirely escaped his excellency's notice. Early in the day, several troops had been detached with the different reconnoitring officers; but now being of no further use for the present, we were left standing to our horses' heads, and meditating on what kind of service we could be employed while the rest of the army were bivouacked.

At length, the garrison, being unemployed for the present, pitied our forlorn condition, and prepared to provide for our amusement. A monstrous gun from the citadel, carrying a sixty-eight pound shot, was seen to be trained with much assiduity, in our direction, and we awaited in agreeable suspense the result of the process.

Two little tents had been procured by some of the officers, and pitched on the spot where we had dismounted. Some luxurious fellows had been out on a foraging excursion amongst the baggage, and returned laden with a supply of bread, fowl, cold meat, and milk. This collation was being discussed, and a vote of thanks to the industrious foraging party was in the act of passing, when a loud report from the citadel interrupted them, followed by a load of iron hurtling over our heads, and plunging amongst the mass of baggage and camp followers in rear. This was immediately succeeded by another, better directed, which cut the ropes of our neighbours' tent, wounded one of their servants, and killed a trooper of Native Cavalry.

I never saw two tents struck with such admirable alacrity as on this occasion. I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say that in less than two minutes the tents had disappeared, and the spy-glasses of the inmates were directed at the walls to ascertain the cause of this uncourteous interruption.

The senior officer present now ordered the cavalry to mount, and we retreated half a mile to the rear, through the midst of a mass of baggage which our camp followers were hurrying off with incredible despatch, perceiving the probability of their becoming a target for the merciless Golundauze in the fort.

Scarcely had we picketed our horses, when the trumpet called us again to the saddle, and we changed position to the northern front of Ghuzni, on the Caubul road, and about a mile from the nearest bastion. We reached this ground about sunset; but the infantry, who passed by a more circuitous route, round the other side of the fortress, did not arrive in camp many of them till near midnight.

An incessant fire of cannon, matchlocks, and jingals, was kept up during the night on the troops whilst marching, and after their arrival in camp; but the enemy lost a night's rest, and wasted their ammunition to very small purpose. As they had done us very little injury in the daytime, the night fire was not a subject of much apprehension; but all Asiatics have much confidence in great noise and constant firing, without taking pains about its direction and effect; it keeps up their courage by diverting their thoughts.

At daylight the following morning, from the intelligence received, and the observations of reconnoitring parties, we were better enabled to judge of the difficulties opposed.

Ghuzni is situated in a plain, which it commands easily on every side but the north, where a small range of hills run down to within one hundred and fifty yards of the walls. It is built on a low extensive mound, the foot of which is surrounded by a mud rampart, flanked by numerous circular bastions. The curtain of this enceinte varied from thirty-five to forty-five feet in height, and averaged perhaps twenty in thickness, which rendered it shot-proof to our artillery, as our heaviest guns had been left at Candahar to be sent as a present to Prince Kamran of Herat!

The rampart was defended by a deep wet ditch, over which permanent bridges were built at the gates.

The citadel stands on a rock on the central and most elevated part of the mound, commanding the whole of the town, and about two hundred and fifty yards of the hills on the north, and is surrounded by a thick mud rampart, defended by a fausse-braye. The soles of the embrasures and loopholes in the parapet of the latter were not sufficiently depressed to enfilade the approaches to the citadel.

The gates were all blocked with masonry excepting that which leads to Caubul, and this was built of massive wood, strengthened by iron clamps and bars, and defended by the cross fire of two adjacent bastions.

Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, commanded the garrison, which consisted of three thousand infantry and one thousand four hundred cavalry: amongst the former were about one hundred artillerymen, who had deserted or been reduced in the East India Company's artillery.

The heights on one side of the plain were occupied by a body of about three thousand cavalry, commanded by Ufzul Khan; and on the other, a body of infidels, of similar strength, but infantry, were posted to harass our left.

It was also conjectured that the two Ghilzie chiefs who had been hovering on our flanks on the line of march, had joined their forces with those of Ufzul Khan; and these chiefs were reported to be in command of eight or ten thousand horsemen.

The news of Runjeet Singh's death (which occurred on the 27th of June, 1839) having set Dost Mahomed's mind at rest, regarding any serious co-operation on the part of the Sikhs against him, he was now preparing to move down with all the forces he could assemble, and attack us whilst engaged with the siege of Ghuzni.

His eldest son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, had been detached with about five thousand men to the entrance of the Khyber pass, which Colonel Wade was preparing to enter, in company with the Shah Zada Timoor, Shah Soojah's son.

Colonel Wade commanded a few companies of native infantry and some raw levies, and was supported by a Sikh auxiliary brigade.

Before Colonel Wade entered the Khyber Pass, the Afghan force under Mahomed Akbar had been recalled by Dost Mahomed, under the urgent circumstances then pressing upon him; and the Khyber was entrusted to the defence of the wandering tribes of Khyberees who infest those extensive ranges of mountains.

Our own effective force now scarcely amounted to two thousand eight hundred European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and about four thousand sepoys: so much had the army been reduced by sickness, death, and the detachments left to garrison the places we had passed through—viz., Bukkur, Shikarpore, Quetta, and Candahar.

Exclusive of these, of course, were the Shah's troops, whose contingent, in case of an action, would, it was conjectured, be fully employed in watching the numerous Afghan rabble which flocked around Shah Soojah. These had now swelled to a large amount by the daily influx of armed horsemen, who were as likely to be spies and adherents of Dost Mahomed, as friends of Shah Soojah.

At the best, the bare suspicion of treachery from this armed host rendered it necessary to keep a force on the watch, and the contingent must have been used for that purpose in case of a general engagement.

On the morning of the 22nd of July, Sir John Keane and the engineers were actively employed in reconnoitring the fortress.

Captain Thompson, the chief engineer, having completed his observations, and remarked that a communication was kept up by the garrison with the exterior, through the Caubul gateway, gave it as his opinion that apparently the most practicable means of assault were presented by a coup-de-main, in lieu of a regular assault, (for which we were not provided,) and suggested as a method to attain this purpose, that the Caubul gate should be destroyed by bags of powder.

Some officers were in favour of an immediate escalade, but as that method would necessarily involve a greater loss, and might still remain in reserve, in case of the failure of the former and more expeditious method, Sir John Keane resolved on adopting Captain Thompson's suggestion.

During the morning of the 22nd, we were most of us endeavouring to make amends for the two days and nights of almost unremitting vigilance that had been exercised, when the shrill tones of the alarm trumpet rang confusedly from many quarters of the camp, and caused us all to start up and prepare for the saddle. A smart rattling fire of musketry, interrupted by the occasional roar of cannon, was heard, apparently near the foot of the hills, on our left flank, and a hurried report ran along the lines, that Dost Mahomed, with his whole army, had come suddenly upon us.

We were now become too well used to our harness to take long in preparing, and a very few minutes served to show us formed, on our alarm posts.

The Bengal cavalry brigade were immediately dispatched at a round pace towards the scene of action. The ground we passed over was rough and undulating, and in many places covered with crops of high standing corn, which completely intercepted our view; but the nearer rattle of musketry indicated we were not far from the field of strife.

Having ridden over about two miles of country, of the above description, we came upon an open and barren plain, which extended to the foot of the hills, where we descried some of Shah Soojah's contingent, accompanied by two or three guns, closely engaged with a body of two or three thousand Afghans.

On our approach, the Afghans commenced a retreat upon the hills, pressed hard by the Shah's troops, who were unable, however, to bring their guns far up the hill-side.

The cavalry brigade were detached by wings of regiments to the flanks and rear of the heights, in order to intercept the enemy, should the infantry succeed in dislodging them.

The Afghans having ascended to the summit of the hill, took up a hasty order for battle, and awaited their enemies. A deep ravine skirted the base of their position, and its crest was occupied by a party of matchlock-men, thus enfilading the approach by the only practicable ascent. The Shah's troops were not inclined to storm this strong defensible position, but halted behind the ravine, and under cover of rocks and broken ground endeavoured to drive the enemy from the heights by musketry; but the distance between the skirmishing parties, to admit of either fire being very galling, was much too considerable.

We remained watching the skirmish taking place on the heights, in expectation of seeing a reinforcement arrive from camp, which would enable the infantry to dislodge their enemies, and force them into collision with us; but the commander-in-chief refused the application for reinforcements, being resolved to keep the infantry fresh for the work which awaited them on the morrow, and Shah Soojah would not part with any more of his guards. A body of cavalry, as a last resource, endeavoured to mount the hill side, and take the Afghans in reverse, but after ascending a few hundred yards, the rocks and ravines became so numerous that the ascent was quite impracticable, and they reluctantly descended under a harmless salute from the enemy on the summit.

At sunset, the forces were withdrawn to camp, having killed about sixty Afghans, and taken fifty prisoners, with a loss of only a few wounded on the side of the British.

The prisoners being brought into the presence of Shah Soojah, declared they were Ghazees, or Crusaders, bound by a religious vow to take his head, and that the oath of the party would sooner or later be accomplished, although they had not been successful in the present attempt.

"I will, at all events, secure your head now," replied the indignant monarch; and beckoning to his executioner, (who was never far from his master's side, knowing the Shah's predilection for the office,) the speaker's head rapidly disappeared.

The comrades of the decapitated being loth to part with this useful article, showed signs of resistance, when the brave and zealous attendants of his majesty rushed upon the unarmed prisoners, unrestrained by word or gesture of their king, and massacred their victims.

One old man, it is said, escaped to tell his comrades in the mountains the fate of the captives. And this act was perpetrated in the midst of the first Christian army which had set foot in Afghanistan since the creation of the world.

Let it not be supposed that the suppression of the murder lay in the power of the British authorities; there was not, I believe, one British officer present, and the whole merit rests with Shah Soojah; but he was viewed as a mere puppet in our hands, and on us, throughout Asia, will rest the obloquy of this savage massacre. No doubt the Afghans have done as bloody deeds, but it became, therefore, more incumbent to show a better example.

CHAPTER VII.

STORM AND CAPTURE OF GHUZNI—ADVANCE TO MEET DOST MAHOMED—HIS ARMY DESERT HIM, AND HE FLIES TOWARDS THE HINDOO KOOSH.

The plan of operations against Ghuzni having now been arranged, general orders directed the troops to move as quietly as possible from their quarters to the allotted positions. About three in the morning the artillery had occupied the heights near the Caubul gate of the fort, and about three hundred yards from the ramparts. The infantry were drawn up in columns of companies on the road beneath the hills, and to the left rear of the artillery. The cavalry were posted round the fort to intercept the retreat of the garrison and the advance of relief.

The 16th Lancers were on the Caubul road, in the rear of the infantry, as a diversion was expected from the enemy's cavalry in the mountains, in favour of the besieged.

The morning was exceedingly dark, and all around quiet as death; for the garrison, who had hitherto kept up an almost incessant cannonade, seemed to think they had done enough, and were enjoying repose. We began to imagine that they had used up their ammunition in the past vigorous efforts to alarm us, and that the fort had been evacuated.

This oppressive silence was interrupted by the word of command passing down the ranks in a whisper; and the forlorn hope moved to their post near the Caubul gate, to await the result of the engineers' experiment. The bags of powder, amounting to three hundred pounds in weight, were carried by the sappers, supported by a party of European volunteers; and the engineer officers, who placed the powder at the gate, distinctly heard the voices of the Afghan-guard conversing near the gateway. The saucisson was laid, and fired by an officer of the Bengal Engineers.

Suddenly, a broad glare lit up the ramparts, and with a smothered, crushing report, the Caubul gate was shattered into innumerable fragments. In one moment, the face of nature seemed to have awoke in uproar. The rushing and confusion in the city, and on the ramparts, was accompanied by a hasty and random fire from any gun which could be manned, no matter where it was pointed. The whole city, aroused instantaneously from repose, and yet too late, hurried in confused masses to man the walls, ignorant of the disaster which had befallen the gateway. Then burst from the hills the solemn, majestic roar of our artillery; light flashed upon light in uninterrupted succession, and the shell, sped on its mission of death, curved steadily through the lurid atmosphere.

The fort continued a random answer from its guns, and hung out lights from the walls, to discover the locality of their assailants; but this served to direct the fire of our artillery, and the walls were soon cleared of their occupants. The wing of a Native Infantry regiment, posted on the south-eastern front, drew a part of the besieged in that direction, to repel this false attack.

Under cover of the artillery fire, sweeping the parapets, Colonel Dennie, leading four light companies from the 2nd, 13th, 17th, and Company's European Regiment, advanced to storm the Caubul gate, closely followed by Brigadier Sale, in command of the main body of the storming party, consisting of the remainder of those four British regiments.

The enemy opened a smart fire of matchlocks upon the advance, and the gateway was found much obstructed with rubbish and splintered beams from the demolished framework. The postern, turning sharply to the right, and leading to the interior of the place, induced an officer in the passage to suppose it blocked up, in consequence of which, he took upon himself to order a bugler to sound the retreat; but the advanced party having penetrated to the interior, heard, or heeded not, the recal.

Overcoming every obstacle, the gallant Britons rushed, with a loud cheer, through the postern, at whose entrance they were met by a body of Afghan desperadoes, who had thrown themselves devotedly into this passage, resolved to defend it with their lives. Here, the struggle was short, but deadly. Armed with sword and daggers, each Afghan fought and fell, with his face to the enemy; and if a spark of life remained after he had been hurled to the earth, his last act was to direct a sword or pistol against the breast of his hated foe as our men trampled over him in their ownward career. So confined had been the area for combat, that many of the soldiers, being unable to use their weapons at full length in the mêlée, unfixed their bayonets, and used them as daggers; and the broken and blood-stained weapons told with what effect they had been wielded.

The resistance at the entrance having been overcome by the destruction of this desperate band, the cry was, "On—on! to the citadel!"

A panic had now seized and paralysed many of the garrison, for they huddled together in confined spaces, and stood to be slaughtered like sheep, or rushed in frenzy to the walls, and cast themselves from the parapets.

No thought of refuge and opposition in the citadel seemed to have occurred to any, nor had it been sufficiently equipped for defence.

The efforts of the most rational were directed towards an escape outside the walls, by secret outlets; but there, the clear light of morning, and the sabres of the cavalry, left slender hopes of escape.

As daylight brought each minute tracing of the works into view, the gallant British regiment were seen winding up the steep, rocky ascent which led to the citadel, where, with a wild "hurrah!" they burst the gate, mounted the ramparts, and cast loose the gay blazonry of their banners to the wind as it moaned along the shattered battlements of captured Ghuzni.

Scattered parties of the besieged now fled to the tops of the houses, whence, after they had recovered a little from the prevalent panic, a desultory fire was maintained on our soldiery. This useless resistance nullified all attempts to restrain the carnage which ensued, and which the garrison, by not surrendering at once, brought upon themselves. So determined were many to carry war "to the knife," that they would discharge their last pistol at the party advancing to capture them, and then resign themselves, sullenly, to the fate which followed this last act of outrage in the shape of a bullet or a bayonet. Probably, they imagined that no quarter would be granted them; "the quality of mercy" being rarely found "dropping like the gentle dew from heaven" on the rugged surface of Afghanistan.

Possibly, the intelligence of yesterday's massacre of the prisoners by Shah Soojah might have induced them to expect a similar fate in captivity.

A brigade of sepoys which had entered the town and spread on the ramparts, having scoured the buildings, soon cleared them of their defenders, and put an end to all resistance in a few hours, the British regiments being withdrawn to their lines.

Confusion, however, continued to prevail throughout the day, for a herd of about one thousand two hundred horses belonging to the garrison were dashing wildly through the town, driven frantic by wounds or alarm. An officer, with a party of dragoons, was sent into the fort to secure these horses, which now resembled wild beasts more than domestic animals; and it was with much difficulty this roving band were at length secured and led off. Very few horses of much value or of sufficient size and strength for a cavalry remount were selected from these captives. Those, however, which were used for that purpose have mostly proved active and hardy animals, and are considered by many superior to the general run of stud-bred horses in Bengal.

In the course of the day, Hyder Khan, the governor of Ghuzni, was captured, and brought into camp, where Shah Soojah, at the instigation of the commander-in-chief, reluctantly granted him his life, which the Shah no doubt considered forfeited, for bearing arms against a king who had been deposed before, or very shortly after, the delinquent's birth.

Not so fared Woolee Mahomed, (a relative of Dost Mahomed, and standard-bearer of the army,) who defended himself to the last extremity in the cellar, where he had taken refuge, close to his Zenana,[31] which he protested should be entered by none, save over his dead body. He surrendered, ultimately, to two officers on political employ, who ventured to promise that his life should be spared, and was brought before the tyrant Soojah, who immediately ordered him to be executed.

It has been alleged that Woolee Mahomed had proved treacherous to the Shah in some previous intercourse; but no sophistry can prove that Shah Soojah was then a king, when Dost Mahomed sat on the throne, and, with the approbation of his subjects, exercised supreme authority.

Many causes, too numerous to dwell upon, have been assigned for this act of severity, by those desirous to defend Shah Soojah, but none apparently can justify so cold-blooded a murder, when the words of two British officers had been pledged for the safety of the unhappy victim. Surely, blood enough had been shed that day to appease the royal resentment, had it been confined to anything resembling moderate limits.

Amongst the besieged the carnage was found to be considerable. Upwards of seven hundred bodies were interred in the fort, and about two thousand were taken prisoners. It was impossible to ascertain the number of wounded, for many crawled out of their hiding-places, in the city, several days afterwards, and were taken charge of by such of the citizens as had resumed their usual avocations; and in the villages, some distance from Ghuzni, a few days afterwards, I found several, dreadfully scorched and wounded, who admitted they had escaped over the walls, on the morning of the storm, shortly before daylight.

Nearly all the prisoners were liberated, by direction of the commander-in-chief, in the course of the day; for this, there was no alternative, as we had not the means of taking charge of and supporting such a large body of men, in the present state of affairs, and this act of clemency, it was supposed, would produce a beneficial effect in the beginning of the campaign.

Amongst our own troops, the list of killed and wounded amounted to two hundred, but of this number not more than thirty were killed, or died of their wounds. In the list of wounded were nineteen officers, but none of their injuries proved fatal. Some had been wounded by a short barbed arrow or bolt, shot from a cross-bow, which implement the Afghans are tolerably expert in using; but these weapons had been in the hands of the townspeople during the defence. The garrison had been selected from the best of Dost Mahomed's troops, and were about three thousand in number, and universally well equipped and armed.

Among the prisoners were found several Golundauze or Foot Artillery, from Hindustan. One of these declared that, the day preceding the storm, he had suggested to the governor the probability of our attempting to blow in the gate of the fortress, and recommended that a palisade should be thrown across the entrance; but his advice had been disregarded, the gate being considered strong enough to resist any attack.

The place being now in our hands, guards were posted at the gate, and parties patrolled the town to prevent any more plundering, and to collect the prize property.

Eight pieces of cannon, of various calibres, and twenty two jingals, or wall pieces, were taken. Among the ordnance, was our old antagonist of the 21st instant, which was found to carry a sixty-eight pound shot, though assuredly at greater risk to the artillerymen who were rash enough to fire it than to the enemy, for the interior was curiously honeycombed.

Few things of much value were taken except horses, of which about one thousand were picketed in front of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, but owing to the insufficiency of ropes and picketing pegs, the greater part of the horses broke loose during the night, and more than half escaped or were stolen!

The whole of the prize property taken at Ghuzni, when sold, it is said, fetched less than three lakhs of rupees, although the horses, arms, and other articles, when put up for auction, sold for most exorbitant prices, and the amount was realized in a few weeks. Yet an impenetrable veil of mystery encompasses the subject. No officers to the present date have received any part of the treasure; and information, though frequently and publicly solicited, has been equally scarce.

After the capture of the fort, the enemy, who had occupied the adjacent heights, retired, and left us for awhile at rest. Parties of Afghan horsemen arrived daily in camp, from Caubul and its vicinity, to tender their allegiance to Shah Soojah. These people concurred in asserting that Dost Mahomed was still at Caubul, collecting his forces to give us battle, and that his present army amounted to fifteen thousand men and forty guns.

On July 27th, a deputation under Jubbar Khan (brother of Dost Mahomed) arrived at our outposts, and were conducted to head-quarters. They came to inquire what terms would be granted to Dost Mahomed by the British government.

They were answered that Dost Mahomed must surrender himself into our hands, and return with a portion of the army to Hindostan, where a jageer would be allotted him, and a pension of a lakh of rupees annually.

Indignant at the severity of the terms, the Afghan ambassador replied nearly as follows:—

"These proposals are so insulting that I will not even mention them to my brother; for what less could have been offered had you already vanquished him in the field? We have hitherto heard that the English were a just and equitable nation; but on what plea can you found the right of dethroning a monarch, the choice of his country, and placing on the throne yonder deposed puppet whom I spit at?[32] You have taken our stronghold of Ghuzni; you may also, perhaps, overcome the army which my brother has raised to defend himself; but the eyes of all Asia are upon you. Asiatics will judge and appreciate your conduct; and the blood of those innocent men who fall in the contest rests on your own heads. May Allah defend the right!"

I have rarely heard a speech more to the purpose, and never one more difficult to answer.

Jubbar Khan, having made more than half his auditors look uncomfortable, returned to Caubul, after resting a short time at the quarters of his friend, Sir Alexander Burnes, who spoke of him in the highest terms. Jubbar Khan had formerly been ill treated by Dost Mahomed, and been estranged thereby from his brother; but now that adversity loured, forgetting all former differences, he came to tender what service lay in his power, and remained faithful to the last, although through his friend Sir Alexander Burnes, he might, doubtless, have provided well for his own interests. A rare example of disinterestedness, and almost a solitary case, according to all accounts of Afghan character.

Jubbar Khan's escort consisted of about one hundred cavalry, who were nearly all uncommonly fine and powerful-looking fellows, mostly clad in chain armour, and armed with lances and matchlocks, but mounted on horses apparently not up to their weight: these animals, however, are more active and hardy than would be supposed, and are trained to perform long journeys at a shuffling pace of about five miles an hour, and frequently on very short allowances of fodder.

On the morning of the capture of Ghuzni, the Cavalry Brigade turned out about eleven o'clock, in consequence of the approach of a large body of horsemen, which proved to be Hadji Khan, Kauker, with his followers. He had kept some distance in our rear since quitting Kandahar, and now pushed forward to join us, seeing our affairs wore a more favourable aspect. This chief had maintained a correspondence with the political agent since the army had entered Afghanistan, offering to remain with the Kandahar chiefs, and do them all the injury in his power until our arrival! Yet Hadji Khan never actively assisted the army, nor did he restrain his people from committing depredations whilst we were passing through his own hills. He now came forward with a camel load of letters, (an excellent pretext,) asserting that he had been earnestly engaged in collecting and forwarding our communication. His influence might possibly have effected that object, without remaining two or three marches in rear with his whole force. This new addition augmented the Shah's force to so large a body of Afghans, that they were prudently kept at arm's length; for treachery from that camp was now quite as formidable as resistance from the enemy in our front.

On the 30th of July, we advanced from Ghuzni towards the capital, the cavalry brigade preceding as before, accompanied by the first brigade of infantry. Colonel Roberts's brigade followed, next day, with the Shah; and General Willshire's division formed the rear-guard of the army.

At the commencement of the march, we passed through a narrow defile, which would have been an admirable position for Dost Mahomed to hold during the siege of Ghuzni, or to select afterwards to oppose our progress. The summit of this defile was found to be the highest ground we had crossed, being fully 1000 feet above the site of Ghuzni, and that fortress was computed at nearly 8000 feet above the level of the sea.

Having traversed a considerable tract of rocky undulating ground, we entered, on the third day's march, a small but well irrigated valley, where the turf and bright corn fields beneath us, partially shaded by avenues of fruit trees, nourished by the friendly assistance of a mountain stream, whose course they closely and eagerly pursued to the end of the valley, presented a prospect which would anywhere have been admired, but, in these barren regions, it looked like

"That vale enchanting
Where all looks flowery, wild and sweet,
And nought but love is wanting."

Possibly, on reflection, we might have found other wants; but at present it was necessary to dispense with wishes and encounter stern reality.

Several deserters of Dost Mahomed's army joined us here, with intelligence of his being in position about thirty miles from us, at a place called Urghundee, with a force of fifteen thousand men and thirty pieces of cannon; but the deserters suggested that he would probably advance to meet us at Maidan, an open ground, which sloped gradually towards a rivulet lying in our route. On receipt of this news, orders were issued to the rear columns to close immediately to the front, and we marched next morning about ten miles in momentary expectation of encountering some of the enemies' advanced posts. Our pickets were strengthened and carefully disposed along the front; and our men, elated at the prospect of the approaching struggle, burnished their arms and looked keenly to the condition of their chargers and accoutrements. Every heart beat high in the confident anticipation of shortly essaying what might be effected by a small band of resolute and disciplined soldiers against this overwhelming mass of vaunting Afghans, who amounted to more than double our numbers.

Such were the hopes entertained by our army; but, ere mid-day, these brilliant anticipations were given to the winds; for a large body of Afghans arrived at our pickets, bringing accounts that Dost Mahomed's army was breaking up and deserting; and that, in despair, he had abandoned them and his guns at Urghundee, and fled towards Bameean. This news was soon after confirmed by numerous bodies of the ex-king's cavalry arriving in camp to tender their useful submission and services to Shah Soojah, until in the hour of need they might find it more profitable and less dangerous to choose another master.

Major Cureton, with a squadron of the 16th Lancers, one of Native Cavalry, and a few artillerymen, was immediately despatched to take possession of the cannon. Twenty-five pieces were found in position under the brow of a hill, near Urghundee, about twenty-two miles distant from our present encampment.

At the same time, Captain Outram, A.D.C.[33] to the commander-in-chief, with twelve other officers, and about two hundred and fifty Native Cavalry, undertook the pursuit of Dost Mahomed towards the Hindoo Koosh. Hadji Khan, Kaukur, volunteered to act as their guide, and to assist in capturing the late monarch with several hundred of his Afghan retinue; but these rapidly decreased in numbers as they approached Bameean.

The gallant Outram, whose whole life has been a scene of daring exploits, which obtained for him the appropriate designation of Bayard, "Le chevalier sans peur et sans reproche," has sketched, in his "Rough Notes," the details of this expedition, and I shall therefore not presume to trace that ground.

Thus was the object of this singular campaign accomplished, and Shah Soojah, after an exile of thirty years, re-established in his dominions. The feeble resistance offered by Dost Mahomed was a matter of surprise to all the army, considering the character for enterprise, courage, and ability universally assigned him, and which the earlier period of his career fully testified; but he had been many years a king, which may perhaps account for the difficulty. Possessing such strong natural obstacles to the advance as well as maintenance of an invading army, as Afghanistan unquestionably does, he profited by none of them. In the most rugged and formidable defiles, a few marauders only were posted to assail our rear guards and baggage; and even these not always at the suggestion of their prince, but to glut their own appetites for blood and plunder. As we advanced through the inhospitable regions of Lower Afghanistan, the inhabitants generally fled from before us, but often left their standing crops for the maintenance of our cattle. Had these been cut down and carried away to the mountains by the villagers, our horses must all have died, for they endured, even as it happened, starvation enough to destroy half and enfeeble the remainder.

Though many opportunities presented themselves for cutting off our supplies of water, this expedient was only once or twice attempted, and that in so slovenly a manner that a party of twenty or thirty troopers sufficed to restore the water to its channel, unopposed by the enemy. These circumstances amply prove, without entering further into details, that Dost Mahomed had neglected the important opportunities which lay in his grasp, of multiplying our difficulties at the outset. He might assuredly have induced the chiefs of Kandahar (his own brothers) to make common cause against their common invaders, and, in conjunction with the Ghilzie chiefs and Mehrab Khan of Khelat (both of whom, as well as their adherents, showed abundant proofs of their readiness to bear arms against us) dispute the passage of the numerous and difficult passes we were compelled to traverse. This supposition may be fully warranted by the reply which Burnes describes Dost Mahomed to have given on a former occasion to the Kandahar chiefs, when threatened by the Persians. "When the Persians approach, let me know; and as I am now your enemy will I then be your friend."[34]

Such would have appeared the most rational course to pursue; and had he taken these measures and executed them with vigour, there is little doubt that his own army would have remained faithful to him when the prospect appeared favourable, and when an example should be set by other tribes. It is no matter of surprise that an army of lawless tribes should desert a chief whom they deem unable or unwilling to direct their efforts to the best advantage.

The chieftains, whose aggregate force would have been considerable, were allowed to be beaten in detail, or to abandon their position as we advanced. Mehrab Khan, with two thousand brave followers, fell in the defence of his fortress, even after the dethronement of his sovereign. The Kandahar chiefs, with what remained of their army, having lingered to the last moment, were compelled to abandon their city without a struggle. The Ghilzie chiefs were willing enough,[35] as they afterwards proved, to meet their invaders in the field, and their numbers must have been considerable, as more than six thousand were known to be moving on our flanks on the advance to Ghuzni.

Lastly, a garrison of less than three thousand men in a fortress, which, by the modern rules of the art of war, must inevitably fall in a few days, (considering the Gothic tracing of its defences,) was the forlorn bulwark opposed by the monarch himself to the approaches of his capital.

However, this dernier resort, even, was made the least of by his majesty's unaccountable desire to linger near the capital. Had the defile, five miles on the Caubul side of Ghuzni, been selected as a position for his army, they would have been advantageously placed to intercept our advance upon Caubul, and from thence dispositions might have been made for the relief of Ghuzni, or to surprise us by a chupao, or night attack, which mode of warfare has often been successfully practised among the Afghans. What might have been the result of such a manœuvre it is difficult even to conjecture;[36] for in the darkness of night many advantages of discipline are lost, where the enemy is felt before he is seen, and fire is almost as likely to tell upon friend as foe; their habit, it is said, is to attack the rear of camp, where the confused mass of cattle driven from the bazaar into the lines must create no trifling confusion amongst the troops turning out to form on their alarm posts.

The fall of Ghuzni greatly dispirited Dost Mahomed's army;[37] they became distrustful of him, and he of them, and the result was a mutual separation.

Many of his soldiers concurred in stating, that they had assured Dost Mahomed of their faith, and would have abided by him; but when it became known that Jubbar Khan had proceeded to Ghuzni to open a negotiation, they doubted him, and concluded he was about to provide for himself at their expense.

Taking all these circumstances into consideration, this campaign, in an abstract military point of view, has thus far turned out more fortunately, and with less and feebler opposition from the enemy, than the most sanguine of its instigators or conductors could reasonably have anticipated.

Politically, I shall not discuss the subject, because I could never perceive one sound reason for taking the haphazard and unprofitable tour.

On advancing towards the position lately occupied by Dost Mahomed, nearly the whole line of march was flanked by troops of the deposed monarch. Many of them were well mounted, and all well armed, although little uniformity was maintained in dress or weapons.

Some wore steel caps and gauntlets, chain-armour variously wrought, and light, neatly-finished cimeters, which bore a remarkably keen edge, owing to the hardness of the material; others were clad in padded cotton or silk dresses, of every variety of colour, the head being covered by turbans of thick and embroidered Cashmere, or plain white muslin. They carried over their shoulders long matchlocks, inlaid with silver or ivory.

The Kuzzilbashes, or Persian mercenaries, were the only troops amongst whom prevailed any uniformity, and they were generally distinguished by a high, black, sheepskin cap, with a small red cloth top, and a sort of frock dress, generally white, which reached to the knees, opening in four places from the waist. Light deerskin boots, fitting closely to the leg, completed this plain and serviceable costume.

Amongst the cavalry were certainly some of the handsomest and most powerful-looking fellows I ever saw; the complexions of many were fairer than those of some of our own sunburnt veterans; and amongst them, also, were some of the dirtiest, long-bearded, ferocious-looking savages I had hitherto seen: men who would doubtless have taken no small pleasure in carving and dissecting any luckless straggler from our camp whom they might happen to meet singly and unarmed. The descriptions I have read of the Huns and Goths who overran the Roman empire in the fifth century, forcibly occurred to me as I marked their personification on each side of the road, unaltered and unimproved by a lapse of fourteen centuries; while the western emigrants have progressed to a state of civilization and intelligence, having subverted nations and monarchies in their resistless course.

As we surmounted the hill near Urghundee, which is flanked by dark lofty mountains, without a trace of vegetation, the peaks of the Hindoo Koosh were visible, glittering in the morning sun from their snowy summits. The intervening country, to the foot of this mighty barrier of Afghanistan, presented a most unattractive appearance: an undulating, rocky soil, with a few patches of short dry grass, extended apparently a great portion of the way towards their foot.

The guns remained in the same position in which they had been left by Dost Mahomed, on high ground, and were ranged to command a gorge from which our army issued. The ground, in front and rear, was flat and favourable for cavalry, in which his principal strength consisted. All that was requisite for the fray was a little more heart and less distrust.