In Lorraine, the steady expansion of French over German territory reveals the assimilative capacity of French civilization. France, unable to send forth colonists because of her lack of numbers, nevertheless contains within herself by virtue of superior civilization the ability to absorb the foreigner. Of this, evidence is to be found in the Alsatian’s sympathy for France no less than in the unanimous verdict of impartial foreigners. Belgium’s unhesitating rally to the French cause in the present war was also the spontaneous response to the greater cultural appeal emanating from France. The fact is attested by history since the earliest times, for much of the civilization of Germanic peoples has invariably taken its source in the inspiring ideals of the wonderfully endowed inhabitants of French territory.

Upon this historical basis, the intermediate zone between French and German languages might be converted into a number of buffer-states which, from the Alps to the North Sea, would represent the borderland of the central mountain zone and the northern plain. Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg and Belgium have been weak spots of European diplomacy on account of geographical circumstances. A just appreciation of this fact alone can provide against a continuance of past weakness.

Whatever the result of the present war, boundary rectifications from the easternmost wedge of Switzerland to the head of the Adriatic may be expected. They were the subject of negotiations between Austria and Italy prior to the latter country’s entry into the war in 1915. Austria at that time proposed to cede to Italy a portion of the Trentino or “Süd-Tirol” as it is illogically called by the Germans. The territory which Austria was willing to abandon to prevent Italy from joining the Allies coincided roughly with the extension of Italian language north of the Italian frontier. Italian demands presented then were based, however, upon strategic necessities as well as linguistic considerations. Italy therefore outlined a frontier much nearer to the Adriatic watershed.

The Italian claims may be summarized as follows:[275] From Switzerland the present boundary line is to be maintained to Mount Cevedale, whence it is to strike east to Illmenspitze and thence northeast to Klausen passing through Gargazon. From Klausen the line leads to the south until latitude 46° 30′ is reached, after which it resumes its easterly course, passes through Tofana and reaches the old boundary at about 4 miles northeast of Cortina d’Ampezzo. The population of the last-named district, formerly Ladin, is now Italian. This boundary revision will give political validity to the Italian Alps, a region which is geographically Italian.

Through this line the transfer of the command of the passes to Italy would become an accomplished fact. It would mean that the entrance to the Vintschgau, the valley of the Upper Adige and of the gorge of the Eisack at Klausen with the issue of the Brenner and Pustherthal railways would be controlled by Italy. Moreover the frontier has the merit of being identical with the old bishopric boundary maintained from 1106 A.D. to the Reformation. The flaw, if any, in such an eventual settlement might be found in the fact that the Botzen district, although economically Italian, is Teutonic in speech and feeling. The rest of the population in the Trentino favors annexation to Italy.

The Austrian offer to Italy diverges from the Italian project at Illmenspitze[276] and strikes south, carefully avoiding abandonment of territory of German speech to Italy. In doing this, however, it leaves some of the Italian-speaking northeastern districts of the Noce valley in Austrian territory. All the mountain outlets which open into the Adige valley are retained by Austria. This from the Italian standpoint is inadmissible, as it would leave the southern country exposed to aggression from the north. On the basis of the Austrian census for 1910 the changes in population consequent upon such a boundary revision are as follows:

In case the Italian claim is granted the following changes will result:

A margin of coastland along the eastern Adriatic is mainly Serbian in nationality though Italian in culture. It was once the nest of pirates who terrorized the Adriatic and Mediterranean. We catch historical glimpses of their retreats to the admirable shelters teeming along the coastland which skirts the Dalmatian mountains. The fringe of long islands deployed like a protecting screen enabled their vessels to evade capture. This feature of the region still exercises its influence, for a strong naval power in control of such a base might easily dominate the Mediterranean lane of traffic between east and west. The political fate of the eastern shores of the Adriatic cannot therefore be sundered from their geographical aspect.

The Italians have been exhibited elsewhere in these pages as a vanishing minority throughout this Dalmatian coast. We are in the presence of Serbians, disguised under various appellations, among which the most familiar are Croatians, Slavonians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Montenegrins, Dalmatians and Illyrians. All these elements were susceptible of being strongly knit into a single nationality. The inclusion of a sympathizing, though numerically small, Slovene group could only introduce wholesome competition among them.

Nationalism in this region was awakened by French achievements and influences at the time of its conquest by Napoleon’s armies. The French provinces of Illyria, which included Slovene territory on the north and extended as far south as Montenegro, were converted in 1816 into a kingdom of the same name which survived, up to 1846, as part of the Austrian Empire. The taste of political independence acquired by southern Slavs in that interval of time never lost its savor. Schemes for the formation of an independent Jugoslavia were naturally thrown into sharper relief through the medium of linguistic unity.

Such a south Slavic political entity must necessarily be identified with Serbia. Its extent is admirably defined by geographical, ethnographical and linguistic lines all of which coincide, thereby pointing irrefutably to national unity. The Drave, Morava, Drina and Lim rivers, with the Adriatic Sea, encircle this genuine Serbian area. It comprises the entire system of parallel ranges which form the mountainous rearland of the Adriatic. Because of its arduous character the region was never thoroughly mastered by foreigners. Invaders established themselves in force only along the sections of international highways which cross the land. The rest remained accessible to the Serbian natives only.

The defining of an independent Hungary presents little confusion if approached from the main highway of geography. Agreement between the land and its inhabitants appears to exist here, for the Magyar is, in the first place, a lowlander accustomed to live within the precincts of a fertile plain. He has always shunned the mountain and is rarely to be met above the 600-foot contour. As soon as the hills to the north of the vast field of his birth are attained he disappears, leaving a few officials to represent him. Slovak, Rumanian and Ruthenian hillmen then come upon the scene. On the western side, west of the Raab, the heights drained by the river are peopled by Germans and, in spite of a complex boundary zone, a convenient line of demarcation could be drawn upon the basis of elevation. Southward the old-time utility of the Drave as the dividing line between Croat and Hungarian remains unimpaired to this day. In the east, however, around the confluence of this river with the Danube and towards the Theiss valley the swamp lands have repelled the ease-loving Hungarian as effectively as the mountains to the east and north. The Serb, less particular in his choice of residence, advanced northward as far as the swampy land extends. In this section any physical map contains the data for a territorial division.

With regard to Transylvania, conditions may be summarized as follows: the region is scantily populated, valleys constituting centers of human habitation almost exclusively. The inhabitants are overwhelmingly Rumanians.[277] The dominating Hungarian element inhabits isolated communities in their midst. This separation of the rival peoples is of the utmost interest in boundary revision, for which it provides a reliable geographical basis. Wallis has ingeniously shown[278] that a line separating the majority of Hungarians from Rumanians can be obtained by taking language as a guide and that this is possible because there exists no mixing of peoples in the eastern borderland of Hungarian language. In reality, throughout Hungary the only element that has insinuated itself in the midst of Hungarian, Rumanian or Slav populations is the German. This element is generally absorbed except where present in large numbers. The Magyar, however, has never mingled with his neighbors. One is almost led to seek the reason for his aloofness in his Asiatic origin.

Poland also has its natural place in the European political system. The majority of Poles live in Russian Poland. Out of a total of over 20,000,000 Poles about 12,000,000 are found in the “governments” or administrative districts created by Russia in the sections of Poland within Russia’s boundaries. These districts are ten in number and adjoin each other. Geographically they form a unit—the westernmost appendage of the vast united Russian territory which aggregates between one-sixth or one-seventh of the total land surface of the world. Detachment of this Polish section from Russia and its creation into part of an autonomous Poland is practicable without serious loss to Russian unity. Slavic solidarity would in fact be consolidated if Poland were constituted a sovereign state.

To Germany, however, an autonomous Poland which would encompass the million Poles living in the Kaiser’s empire implies abandonment of a territory which reaches far into the heart of the country. The Polish strip ends less than a hundred miles east of Berlin. The province of Posen, a considerable portion of Silesia, a narrow strip of West Prussia reaching the Baltic west of Danzig and the Masurian Lakes district are peopled by Poles. Furthermore, and this is of capital importance in German eyes, East Prussia which is German by language and tradition, as well as Prussian to the core, would become isolated from the main mass of the German-speaking people. It is improbable that such a cession of territory will take place as long as Germany has the power to prevent it. It need only be remembered that the first partition of Poland was engineered by Frederick the Great merely to join East Prussia to the rest of his kingdom. Against this last fact, however, the imperative necessity for an independent Poland to obtain an outlet on the Baltic will always prevail in anti-German circles.

Nature therefore points to the existence of a real German menace to Polish autonomy. It is needless to minimize the significance of the points at issue. Prussia, the dominant state in the German nation, will never consent to the impairment of her territorial unity by the surrender of her Polish sections. On the other hand the reconstruction of Poland must be complete if the creation of a Balkanic state of affairs west of the Gulf of Danzig is to be avoided. A partial reunion of Polish-speaking groups under an autonomous government would be the prelude to irredentist questions. This however is precisely what an enlightened world is seeking to prevent.

In reality the German nation would be the gainer by the creation of a reunited Polish state. No better barrier to Russia’s westerly advance in Europe could be devised. Conversely Teutonic encroachments on Slavic territory—bound as they inevitably are to be attended by bloodshed—would be effectively arrested. A buffer state between Russia and Germany is the safest guarantee of peace between the two nations. All the inextricable tangles in which Europe has been involved by Polish problems can be unraveled by the restoration of Polish national entity. The problem requires solution for the sake of the peace of the world.

The problems arising along the remaining linguistic boundaries have been exhibited in earlier chapters and require but little mention here. In Schleswig an extension of Denmark’s political frontier as far south as the Danish language prevails would be welcomed as the harbinger of lasting harmony between Danes and Germans. The historical frontier between the Danish duchy and Holstein could be utilized to advantage in this change. In this, as in other cases, the principles of geography, modified by national aspirations and economic needs, must in the last resort be recognized as practical and applicable. Bohemia, which has been shown to be splendidly laid off on a physical map, deserves political independence because it is endowed with geographic individuality. This method of solving the problems which for centuries have burdened Europe with strife would, like the splitting of Austria into national fragments, mark an improvement in the lot of a notable proportion of the population of Europe. New impetus would be granted to the development of national sentiment. Humanity owes much to the free play of this feeling. The claims of world brotherhood have received greater attention through its existence. The energies of submerged nationalities have hitherto been absorbed by the struggle for survival. Relief from this stress will be accompanied by respect for alien rights instead of hatred of the oppressor.

Throughout the nineteenth century, as well as in the beginning of the twentieth, reconstruction of nationalities was effected on a linguistic basis. The part played by language during that period is of tantamount importance to the religious feeling which formerly caused many a destructive war. Practically all the wars of the last hundred years are the outcome of three great constructive movements which led to the unification of Germany and of Italy as well as to the disentanglement of Balkan nationalities. These were outward and visible signs of the progress of democratic ideals. The Congress of Vienna failed to provide Europe with political stability because popular claims were ignored during the deliberations. At present, inhabitants of linguistic areas under alien rule are clamoring for the right to govern themselves. The carrying out of plebiscites under international supervision can often be relied upon to satisfy their aspirations and serve as a guide to frontier rearrangements.

All told, the growing coincidence of linguistic and political boundaries must be regarded as a normal development. It is a form of order evolved out of the chaos characterizing the origin of human institutions. The delimitation of international frontiers is as necessary as the determination of administrative boundaries or city lines. Human organization requires it and there is no reason why it should not be undertaken with fair regard to the wishes and feelings of all affected. For nations, like individuals, are at their best only when they are free, that is to say when the mastery of their destiny is in their own hands.