295 Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hyp., I., 180 ff.

296 Adv. Math., IX., 228.

297 The ten Tropes were evidently suggested by the ten Categories of Aristotle. The five grounded on differences of disposition, place, quantity, relation, and
habits, show at once by their names that they are derived from κεῖσθαι, ποῦ,
ποσόν, πρός τι, and ἔχειν. The Trope of comparative frequency would be suggested by πότε; the disturbing influence of bodies on one another combines ποιεῖν and πάσχειν; the conflict of the special senses belongs, although somewhat more remotely, to ποιόν; and, in order to make up the number ten, οὐσία, which answers to the percipient in general, had to be divided into the two Tropes taken respectively from the differences among animals and among men,—an arrangement that would occur all the more readily as οὐσία included the two notions of Genus and Species, of which the one answers, in this instance, to animals, and the other to men.

298 Zeller, III., b, p. 23.

299 Zeller, op. cit. pp. 29-37.

300 Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hyp., I., 164 and 178; Zeller, op. cit., pp. 37 and 38.

301 Adv. Math., V., 1.

302 ibid., IX., 208.

303 These are the four principles enumerated by Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp., I., 24.

304 Diog. L., X., 9.

305 The materials and, to a certain extent, the ideas of this chapter are chiefly derived from Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. III., Duruy’s Histoire des Romains, Vol. V., Gaston Boissier’s Religion Romaine, and above all from Friedländer’s Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Rom’s, Part III., chapters iv. and vi.

306 Friedländer, Römische Sittengeschichte, III., pp, 483, 681.

307 As a striking instance of the solidarity which now connects all forms of irrationalism, it may be mentioned that Livy’s fables are accepted, in avowed defiance of modern criticism, by the clericalising English students of archaeology in Rome.

308 Using the word in its modern rather than in its ancient sense, so as to include the whole empire outside the city of Rome.

309 Epp., II., i., 20 ff.

310 Carm., I., xi., and III., xxiii.

311 Carm., III., vi., and the Carmen Seculare.

312 Boissier, Religion Romaine, I., p. 336.

313 Friedländer, III., p. 510.

314 See the note on Honestiores and Humiliores appended to the fifth volume of Duruy’s Histoire des Romains.

315 Lucian, Adversus Indoctum.

316 Juvenal, Satt., XVI., 14.

317 Persius, Satt., III., 77.; cf. V., 189.

318 Matth., viii., 9; Luke, vii., 8.

319 Thucydides, II., iv. The other women alluded to are, the wife of Admêtus, who tells Themistocles how he is to proceed in order to conciliate her husband (I., cxxxvi.); Stratonice, the sister whom Perdiccas gives in marriage to Seuthes (II., ci.); and Brauro, the Edonian queen who murders her husband Pittacus (IV., cvii.). The wife and daughter of Hippias the Peisistratid and the sister of Harmodius are mentioned in bk. VI., lv. ff, but they take us back to an earlier period of Greek history than that of which Thucydides treats consecutively; while the names of Helen and Procne, which also occur, belong, of course, to a much remoter past (I., ix., and II., xxix.)

320 It has even been maintained that the condition of the Roman matron was superior to that of the modern Frenchwoman. (Duruy, Histoire des Romains, V., p. 41.)

321 Boissier, Religion Romaine, II. p. 200.

322 Boissier, op. cit., II., pp. 214 ff.

323 Friedländer, Romische Sittengeschichte, I., pp. 441 ff.

324 Lucian, De Mercede Conductis, xxvi.; Friedländer, I., p. 447.

325 Epict., Fragm., 53 Dübner.

326 Juvenal, V., and Lucian, De Mercede Conductis.

327 Friedländer, III., p. 502.

328 Friedländer, ibid.

329 Boissier, op. cit., I., p. 362.

330 Havet, Le Christianisme et ses Origines, II., p. 150.

331 Hor., Satt., I., ix., 67-72.

332 Ibid., I., iv., 142.

333 Opera, ed. Tauchnitz, V., p. 209.

334 Philo, Vita Mos. p. 136, M.; Joseph., Contr. Ap., II., xxxix.; Friedländer, III., p. 583.

335 Ovid., Ars Am., I., 415; Rem. Am., 219; Pers., V., 179; Juv., XIV., 97; Friedländer, loc. cit.

336 Havet, II., p. 328.

337 Friedländer, I., p. 451.

338 Ars Am., I., 76.

339 Friedländer, III., pp. 518, 539 ff, 553 ff.

340 Xenophon, Mem., I., i., 9.

341 Friedländer, III., p. 523.

342 ibid., pp. 524 ff.

343 Friedländer, III., pp. 527 ff.

344 Plutarch, De Defect. Oracul., cap. xlv., p. 434.

345 Lucian, Alexander, 25, 47.

346 According to Friedländer (III., p. 531), this happened between 167 and 169.

347 Friedländer, p. 532.

348 Friedländer, III., p. 533.

349 Ibid., p. 534.

350 For details see Friedländer, loc. cit.

351 Friedländer, pp. 535 ff. This form of superstition still flourishes in great force among at least the lower class of Italians at the present day; and the continual stimulation afforded to it by the public lottery is not the least mischievous consequence of that infamous institution.

352 Aelian, Fragm., 98; Friedländer, p. 494.

353 Friedländer, loc. cit.

354 Friedländer, p. 549.

355 For the whole subject of Aristeides see Friedländer, pp. 496 ff.

356 ‘Et parum sane fuit quod illi honores divinos, omnis aetas, omnis sexus, omnis condicio ac dignitas dedit, nisi quod etiam sacrilegus judicatus est qui ejus imaginem in suo domo non habuit qui per fortunam vel potuit habere vel debuit. Denique hodieque in multis domibus M. Aurelii statuae consistunt inter deos penates. Nec defuerunt homines qui somniis eum multa praedixisse augurantes futura et vera concinnerunt.’—Vita M. Antonini Phil., cap. xviii.

357 Friedländer, p. 513.

358 Friedländer, III., p. 683. Cp. Clifford’s epitaph: ‘I was nothing and was conceived; I loved and did a little work; I am nothing and grieve not.’

359 Comm., IV., 21; XII., 5, 26.

360 Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III., a, p. 798.

361 Quoted by Friedländer, pp. 681 f.

362 Ibid., p. 688.

363 Ibid.

364 Zeller, op. cit., p. 828.

365 See in particular, Satt., II, 149.

366 Friedländer, I., p. 465 f.

367 Duruy, Hist. d. Rom., V., p. 463.

368 III., p. 692.

369 Friedländer, III., p. 701.

370 A mesure que le temps s’avance les traits par lesquels se produit la croyance à une autre vie, d’abord vagues et confus, loin de s’effacer, se prononcent et se précisent. On se fait de la destinée des âmes des idées de plus en plus hautes; on rend aux morts des honneurs de plus en plus grands. En outre, ces idées, ces pratiques s’étendent de plus en plus au grand nombre. Au commencement il semble qu’on ne s’inquiète que du sort des rois et des héros, enfants ou descendants directs des dieux; avec le temps beaucoup d’autres ont part aux mêmes préoccupations, puis tous ou presque tous. La félicité est réservée a qui ressemble aux dieux; c’est une maxime antique qui subsiste immuable. Avec le temps on se fait de la ressemblance avec les dieux ou, ce qui revient au même, de la perfection, des idées qui permettent à tous d’y prétendre.’ Ravaisson, Le Monument de Myrrhine et les bas-reliefs funéraires, 1876, quoted by Duruy, op. cit., p. 463.

371 See Vol. I., p. 68.

372 For references see Friedländer, III., pp. 706 ff.

373 Epod., xvii., 79.

374 Friedländer, pp. 710 f.

375 Sen., Epp., xvi., 5; xcv., 52; xli., 1 and 2.

376 Perhaps, however, Zeller’s contention amounts to no more than that Seneca follows Posidonius in his adoption of the Platonic distinction between reason and passion, which were identified by the older Stoics. But the object of the latter was apparently to save the personality of man, which seemed to be threatened by Plato’s tripartite division of mind; and as Seneca achieves the same result by including the passions in the ἡγεμονικὸν377 the difference between them and him is after all little more than verbal. For the general attitude of Seneca towards religion see Gaston Boissier, Religion Romaine, II., pp. 63-92.

377 Epp., xcii., 1., (Zeller, by mistake refers to Epp., xciv., in Ph. d. Gr., III., a, p. 711.)

378 As ψυχάριον, σωμάτιον, σαρκίδιον.

379 Epict., Fragm., 175; Diss., I., xvi., 1-8; II., xvi., 42; III., xxii., 2; xxiv., 91-94. Zeller, III., a, p. 742.

380 Zeller, p. 745.

381 Friedländer, III., p. 493.

382 Comm., VI., 30.

383 Oratt., VI., p. 203.

384 Diss., II., xxxvi.

385 Ph. d. Gr., III., b, pp. 88 ff.

386 Seneca, Epp., lxiv., 2; cviii., 17.

387 Seneca, De Irâ, III., xxxvi., 1.

388 Seneca, Epp., cviii., 22.

389 For a detailed account of the Neo-Pythagorean school, see Zeller, op. cit., III., b, pp. 79-158, from which the above summary is entirely derived.

390 De Defect. Orac., xvii., p. 419.

391 Diss., I., xv., 2.

392 Plutarch, De Is. et Osir., xxv. and xxvi; De Fac. in Orbe Lun., xxx.

393 Op. et D., 120.

394 Diss., I., xv., 7.

395 Zeller, III., b, pp. 189 ff.

396 De Superstit., viii., p. 169.

397 Metamorph., XI., xxv.

398 Zeller, III., b, pp. 257 ff.

399 For references, see Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil., pp. 467-73.

400 For references, see Zeller, III., b, pp. 148 f.

401 Suidas, quoted by Ritter and Preller, p. 485.

402 Vacherot, Histoire de l’Ecole d’Alexandrie, pp. 214-17; Zeller, III., b, pp. 387 ff. The original authority is Irenaeus.

403 Politicus, p. 270 ff.

404 Legg., X., pp. 896, D ff, 898, C, 904, A.

405 De Isid. et Osir., xlv. f.; De Vir. Moral., iii.; De Anim. Procr., v., 5. Plutarch supposes that the irrational soul in man is derived from the evil world-soul which he regards rather as senseless than as Satanic. It would thus very closely resemble the delirious Demiurgus of Valentinus and the ‘absolut Dumme’ of Eduard v. Hartmann.

406 Diss., III., xxiii.

407 Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III., a, pp. 807 ff.

408 Porph., Vita Plot., cap. iii.

409 Ibid., cap. vii.

410 Ibid., cap. xiii.

411 Not, as is commonly stated, on the model of Plato’s Republic, which would have been a far more difficult enterprise, and one little in accordance with the practical good sense shown on other occasions by Plotinus.

412 Porph., Vita, cap. xii.; Hegel, Gesch. d. Ph., III., p. 34.

413 Porph., Vita, cap. ix.

414 Ibid., xi. Leopardi has taken the incident referred to as the subject of one of his dialogues; Plotinus, the great champion of optimism, being chosen, with bitter irony, to represent the Italian poet’s own pessimistic views of life. The difficulty was to show how the Neo-Platonist philosopher could, consistently with the principles thus fathered on him, still continue to dissuade his pupil from committing suicide. Leopardi voluntarily faces the argumentum ad hominem by which common sense has in all ages summarily disposed of pessimism: ‘Then why don’t you kill yourself?’ (‘Your philosophy or your life,’ so to speak.) The answer is singularly lame. Porphyry is to think of the distress which his death would cause to his friends. He might have replied that if the general misery were so great as Plotinus had maintained, a little more or less affliction would not make any appreciable difference; that, considering the profound selfishness of mankind, an accepted article of faith with pessimism, his friends would in all probability easily resign themselves to his loss; that, at any rate, the suffering inflicted on them would be a mere trifle compared to what he would himself be getting rid of; and that, if the worst came to the worst, they had but to follow his example and ease themselves of all their troubles at a single stroke. A sincere pessimist would probably say: ‘I do not kill myself because I am afraid: and my very fear of death is a conclusive argument in favour of my creed. Nothing proves the deep-rooted necessity of pain more strongly than that we should refuse to profit by so obvious a means of escaping from it as that offered by suicide.’ Of course where pessimism is associated with a belief in metempsychosis, as among the Buddhists, there is the best of reasons for not seeking a violent death, namely, that it would in all probability transfer the suicide to another and inferior grade of existence; whereas, by using the opportunities of self-mortification which this world offers, he might succeed in extinguishing the vital principle for good and all. And Schopenhauer does, in fact, adopt the belief in metempsychosis just so far as is necessary to exclude the desirability of suicide from his philosophy. But the truth is, that while Asiatic pessimism is the logical consequence of a false metaphysical system, the analogous systems of European pessimists are simply an excuse for not pushing their disgust with life to its only rational issue.

415 Porph., Vita, cap. xviii.

416 Porphyry says six, but there must be a mistake somewhere, as Plotinus was fifty-nine when their friendship began, and died in his sixty-sixth year; while Porphyry’s departure for Sicily took place two years before that event, leaving, at most, five years during which their personal intercourse can have lasted, if the other dates are to be trusted.

417 Enn., III., ii. and iii.

418 Plotini Opera recognovit Adolphus Kirchhoff, Lipsiae, 1856, in Teubner’s series of Greek and Latin authors. H. F. Müller, the latest editor of Plotinus, has returned to the original arrangement by Enneads. His edition is accompanied by a very useful German translation, only half of which, however, has as yet appeared. (Berlin, 1878.)

419 Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III., b, p. 472. (Third edition.)

420 Porph., Vita, iv. ff., xxiv. ff.

421 Ibid., cap. x.

422 Ibid.

423 Ibid., cap. xxii.

424 Ibid., capp. i. and ii.

425 Zeller, op. cit., pp. 451 ff.

426 Porph., Vita, cap. xx.

427 A single example will make our meaning clear. Plotinus is trying to prove that there can be no Form without Matter. He first argues that if the notes of a concept can be separated from one another, this proves the presence of Matter, since divisibility is an affection belonging only to it. He then goes on to say, εἰ δὲ πολλὰ ὂν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ ὂντα ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτὰ μορφαὶ αῦτου ὂντα. (Enn., II., iv., 4; Kirchhoff, I., p. 113, I. 7.) The meaning is, that if the notes are inseparable, the unity in which they inhere is related to them as Matter to Form.

428 See the index to Kirchhoff’s edition.

429 For references see Kirchner, Die Philosophie des Plotin, p. 185; Steinhart, Meletemata Plotiniana, pp. 9-23; Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III., b, pp. 430 f.

430 Steinhart, op. cit., pp. 30 ff.; Kirchner, op. cit., pp. 186 ff.

431 Porph., Vita, cap. xv.

432 Enn., I., vi.

433 Meno, 86, A. Compare Vol. I., p. 212.

434 Theaetêtus, 176, A. Phaedo, 67, B ff.

435 Op. cit., p. 427.

436 Enn., IV., vii.

437 Enn., III., i., 3.

438 Enn., III., i.

439 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν. III., i., 4, Kirchh., I., p. 38, l. 22. So utterly incapable is M. Vacherot of placing himself at this point of view, that he actually reads into the words quoted an argument in favour of free-will based on the testimony of consciousness. His version runs as follows:—‘Nous savons et nous croyons fermement par le sentiment de ce qui se passe en nous que les individus (les âmes) vivent, agissent, pensent, d’une vie, d’une action, d’une pensée qui leur est propre.’—Histoire Critique de l’École d’Alexandrie, I., p. 514. So far as our knowledge goes, such an appeal to consciousness is not to be found in any ancient writer.

440 See Legg., 861, A ff. for an attempt to prove that men may properly be punished for actions committed through ignorance of their real good. This passage is one of the grounds used by Teichmüller, in his Literarische Fehden, to establish the rather paradoxical thesis that Aristotle published his Ethics before Plato’s death.

441 III., i., 10.

442 Cap. 4, sub fin.

443 Capp. 6 and 7. Cp. Enn., II., iii.; Zeller, op. cit., pp. 567 ff; Kirchner, Ph. d. Plot., p. 195.

444 Plato, Phaedo, 79, A ff.; Aristot., De An., III., iv., sub fin.

445 Phaedr., 245, C; Legg., 892, A.

446 Adv. Col., ix., 3.

447 Enn., IV., ii., i.

448 Enn., IV., ii., sub fin.; Tim., 35, A.