On the same day, it seemed to leak out, that “the place looked so much stronger than had been anticipated, that perhaps we might not take it this winter;” and it was devoutly hoped that precautionary measures would be taken in time, against “the onslaughts of Generals Rain, Frost, and Snow, no matter how great soever may be head-quarter confidence in the overwhelming efficacy of our opening fire.”^[247]

It was, however, still officially considered that the projected bombardment would shatter the Russian defences, and that the speedy capture of Sevastopol would be the result. This opinion was also shared by many of the Officers of the British army, and every nerve was strained to make the operation a success. On the 10th we broke ground, and began the construction of three batteries. Two, known as Chapman’s and Gordon’s, called after the Engineer Officers in charge, were some 1400 yards from the Redan, and the trench connecting them became eventually the first parallel. Chapman’s battery, 41 guns, was placed on Green Hill, between two ravines that descend into the inner harbour, viz. the valley of the Shadow of Death and the Woronzoff ravine. Gordon’s battery, 26 guns, stood on Mount Woronzoff (also called Frenchman’s Hill), between the Woronzoff and the Docks ravines. On the next hill, between the Docks and the Careenage ravines, the Victoria or Lancaster battery was built, armed with 6 guns (5 of the Lancaster pattern), more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s lines. The French began their siege-works on the 9th, on Mount Rodolph, and placed 53 guns in battery, 1000 yards from the enemy’s fortifications. Thus the Allies had 126 guns in position, not counting the field artillery. The enemy had 118,—64 facing the French, and 54 the British,—besides 223 of lesser calibre.

The Battalion, in common with the other troops stationed before Sevastopol, took their full share in the construction of these batteries, by supplying working parties and covering guards to resist sorties. The operation was new to all ranks, who had received little training in these special duties, the greater part of which had to be performed at night. But any confusion incidental to the circumstances of the case speedily passed away, and from start to finish the men stuck to their work, and did it thoroughly, under a heavy and unreturned fire, that constantly poured upon them from dawn to dark from the Russian lines.

The excellence of the work performed by the Brigade is thus described in a recent publication, already alluded to:—

The following extracts from Colonel Tower’s diary, give, moreover, an idea of the nature of some of the duties discharged by the men, and the conditions under which they were performed:—

In preparation for the bombardment, fixed to commence at 6.30 a.m. on the 17th of October, the troops were held in readiness in their camps to fall in at a moment’s notice, arrangements were made in case the army was ordered to move forward to assault the Russian position, scaling ladders, tools, etc., were collected, and a body of sharpshooters was specially organized. In the First Division, the latter were placed under Captain Goodlake of the Coldstream, whose gallant services soon earned for him the Victoria Cross.^[250] But the first onslaught on Sebastopol failed to produce the results that were expected from it. The Allies found the enemy placed in far other circumstances than had been the case when they first presented themselves before the south side on the 26th of September. At that date the advantages gained by the battle of the Alma had not been entirely dissipated: the Crimean field army, under Menshikoff, was beaten, and was far away from the scene of hostilities, refitting and awaiting reinforcements; the garrison of Sevastopol—composed of a mere medley of details, imperfectly armed, and many of whom could scarcely be called “combatants”—was physically and morally weak; the entrenchments were slight and incomplete; the guns to oppose an attack were light. On the 17th of October a great change had been effected. The forces from Bessarabia were arriving; the Russians had been able to reconnoitre the valley of the Tchernaya, and to threaten our exposed right flank and our base of operations; they spared as many as 25,000 of the regular army to strengthen the garrison of the town; the morale of the latter had been raised; the defences were much improved—they assumed the appearance of genuine fortifications; the armament was greatly increased, and had been rendered formidable.

Nevertheless, the operation was an affair of great importance and magnitude. The Allied fleets took part in it in full force, though it was not possible for them to produce any real effect; for the land defences were out of their reach, and the sea forts were extremely strong. Still all the artillery the invaders could muster, discharged their thunders upon the fortifications which covered the south side of the town and the entrance of the roadstead. The French, subjected to a hotter and closer fire than we, suffered severely, and between ten and eleven in the morning, two explosions having occurred in their batteries, their guns were silenced. The British, on the other hand, were very successful. Directing their fire upon three of the enemy’s works, they inflicted considerable damage on the Flagstaff battery, silenced the Malakoff, and almost demolished the Redan, the salient of which was blown to pieces by the explosion of a powder magazine. The defences of the Karabelnaya were completely paralysed, an immediate assault was expected, and the troops to oppose it being demoralized, fell back in confusion.^[251]

But no attack took place. The French were unable to advance against the lines which had silenced their siege guns. It was too much to ask them to allow us to go on, under cover of their friendly co-operation and support. The enemy, in a word, gained by the Anglo-French alliance, and the common interests were obscured under the pressure of inter-national courtesy. Thus a severe strain was still to weigh down the resources of the two Great Powers of Europe; an insignificant fortress was to baffle their united efforts; their armies were to be destroyed on the upland of the Chersonese by cold and famine; and, while our British Engineers alone could survey with complacency the results of their skill, evidenced by the speedy destruction of the defences around Karabelnaya, the Allies were not one whit nearer the accomplishment of their object than they had been before the bombardment began. Still the Chiefs of the invading forces were sanguine that their fire at last would tell, and would allow them to storm the place together, at points where each had breached the defences opposed to them; but in this expectation they were, as they deserved to be, disappointed. The bombardment was continued on the 18th, and the British batteries alone took part in it—for the French were not ready, and were improving their earthworks after the disaster of the day before,—not, however, against the wreck which we had created by the evening of the 17th, but on renewed and freshly armed defences that were repaired in the night by the ceaseless energy of the garrison, whose labours were undisturbed by any countermove on our part. Again, on the 19th, the united artillery fired on the hostile batteries with complete success on our side, but once more the French guns were silenced. The bootless bombardment continued till the 25th, ever with the same result: the lines covering the Karabelnaya were open to attack, but the forts opposite Mount Rodolph were unsubdued. Thus no advantage was gained, or indeed could be gained, under the rule which the Allies had imposed upon themselves to the benefit of the enemy, who, not slow to perceive the situation, took every advantage therefrom. A great display, therefore, was all that took place, which cost the Russians nearly 4000 men, while the Allies lost less than a fourth part of that number.

As the fire proceeded from day to day, the attention of the First and Second Divisions was directed to their right flank.

The enemy, seen upon this occasion, was again observed by a piquet of the Coldstream on the 20th, among the Inkerman ruins (beyond the Tchernaya), mounting guns. Towards evening he opened fire, and directed his aim upon the camp of the Second Division, until the Sandbag battery, previously mentioned, was constructed, and armed with two 18-pounders. The British fire soon drove away the guns from the ruins, but the 18-pounders had to be removed to a less exposed position.

Nine Officers reached the Crimea and joined the Battalion on the 17th, the first day of the bombardment, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Newton, Cowell, and Halkett (who had left Bulgaria on promotion in July), Lieut.-Colonels Mark Wood, Dudley Carleton, and Lord A. Charles FitzRoy, and Lieutenants Heneage, Hon. W. Amherst, and Greville.

It should be stated here, that, on account of the war, the Regiment received an augmentation, first on the 13th of February, and again a little later. The establishments were as follows:—

Of the twenty companies, twelve were at home and eight at the seat of war, but the latter were strong companies on paper, and the former weak; it was further ordered that the service Battalion was not to bear upon its strength less Officers than were required for 10 companies, the Adjutant not included.^[253] Hence the two mounted Officers who, before the receipt of this order, were posted to companies in the field, were placed upon the 1st Battalion establishment, and nominally belonged to companies at home.

During the first few days of the operations against Sevastopol there were several casualties among the Officers of the Grenadier Guards. On the 16th, Captain Rowley was killed, and, two days later, the same fate overtook Colonel Hood, the gallant Commanding Officer who had greatly distinguished himself by his coolness and intrepidity at the Alma. The losses of the Coldstream at this moment were happily less. It was not till the 20th, that the first man was wounded in the trenches; but next day, Lord Dunkellin was unfortunately captured. Commanding a working party without arms—for at that time the men told off to dig were sent to the front unarmed,—he lost his way in the darkness, and, stumbling upon a piquet which he thought was English, he went forward by himself to ask where he was. As it happened, he found himself within the enemy’s lines, and was taken; his men, however, luckily escaped under cover of the night.^[254]

Prince Menshikoff so far recovered from his defeat on the 20th of September, that he occupied the hills in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie Farm, and took possession of the roads leading therefrom into the valley of the Tchernaya on the 7th of October. He had good reason to be proud of the achievements of the garrison of Sevastopol, and to rejoice at his own singular good fortune. The town was fast growing into a powerful fortress, sufficiently strong to resist any sudden assault, and likely for months to occupy the energies of a far more numerous force than stood before it at that time. He himself was placed in an unassailable position. Secure as regards his communications with the interior of Russia and with Sevastopol, he not only received without difficulty the fresh forces that were hurrying to his assistance; but he also hemmed the invaders into a small corner of an exceedingly inhospitable country, restricted their enterprise, and threatened them with destruction in case a reverse were to happen to them. History, indeed, fails to record any great genius in this Russian General, nor were his troops of that high order to account for the immense advantages he gained at this moment. He was simply fortunate in the Governments and in the leaders of his antagonists, who, unable to combine to carry out any single plan, continually changed their intentions, until a surprise on the north side was converted into a lengthy siege (without investment) of the south side.

The Bessarabian reinforcements began to reach Simferopol early in October, and on the 15th, General Liprandi arrived there. A few days later it was determined to make an attack on our base at Balaklava, with some 25,000 troops (22,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 78 guns) commanded by that Officer. The attack took place on the 25th, a day immortalized in our military history by the bravery of the British cavalry, particularly by the charge of the Light brigade, “one of the most brilliant ever remembered in the annals of war,” though it resulted in the destruction of that corps.^[255]

Balaklava was covered by two defensive lines, the outer and the inner. The outer line, more than two miles in length, running along the Causeway Heights and near the Woronzoff road, had the support of a few small earthworks, “mere scratches with the spade, a donkey might have been ridden into some of them,” armed with only nine 12-pounder guns in all, and occupied by about two battalions of Turks. The inner line, near Kadikeui, was 3000 yards in rear, and was held by the 93rd Regiment, a few invalids, the Marines, and the rest of the Turks. The Russians, advancing in force at dawn on the 25th, brought 30 guns (some of them of heavy calibre) against the earthworks on the Causeway Heights,—which were isolated, entirely unsupported, and commanded by neighbouring ground,—and captured two of them on the right of the line, after a stubborn resistance; a third soon after fell into their hands. They then pushed forward their cavalry, of which four squadrons reconnoitred towards Kadikeui; the latter came within range of the 93rd, drawn up in line, who received them with a volley, and with such determination that they quickly wheeled about and fled to the rear. The rest, a solid column, nearly 3000 strong, supported by 32 guns, moving in somewhat the same direction, came suddenly close to the British Heavy cavalry brigade, who, without the slightest hesitation, charged, and in a few moments routed them, and sent them back in confusion, past the front of the Light brigade. Unfortunately Lord Cardigan did not fall upon the flying mass and complete their discomfiture; so they got away down the valley that lay between the Fediukhine and Causeway heights, both of which were held by the enemy’s infantry and artillery, and took up a position about a mile and a quarter away, behind some Russian guns. And now “some one blundered,” and the Light brigade made their famous charge, over this dangerous ground, flanked on each side by well-posted artillery, straight into the guns and the cavalry at the end of the valley. The story of this gallant deed is well known. The Russian gunners and cavalry were swept away, and forced to retreat before the impetuous onslaught of our weak squadrons, but the brigade was broken, and indeed destroyed. It numbered 670 sabres at the commencement of the action, and at the conclusion its mounted strength was only 195. The enemy was quite unable to cut off the retreat of the remnants of our light horse, as they rode back after their desperate expedition, very few prisoners were taken, and the French, making a spirited and successful charge upon the Fediukhine Heights, prevented the Russians from harassing our men from that quarter, as they emerged from the deadly and unequal conflict.

Heavy firing had been heard in the British camps before Sevastopol at dawn, and, when the serious nature of the attack was perceived, orders were sent to the First and Fourth Divisions to march down to meet the danger. Two of Bosquet’s infantry brigades, as well as the French cavalry, which had by this time reached the seat of war, were also brought to the field of battle. When our troops got to the Sapuné Ridge, and looked on the plain beneath, they saw with breathless interest the first encounter between the contending horsemen.

The subsequent charge of the Light brigade was not so apparent to our infantry:—

Despite the glorious conduct of our troops upon this occasion, we lost a good deal and gained very little. The eastern portion of an unsupported advanced line of redoubts on the Causeway Heights was captured by the weight of numbers, and the outer defences of Balaklava were occupied by the enemy; but his further movements towards Kadikeni were crushed by a handful of our Heavy cavalry, and our Light brigade proved their superiority over him by a useless feat of daring which is unparalleled in warfare.

Thus, though Balaklava was still safe, we were deprived of the use of the Woronzoff road as a means of communication between our base of operations and the upland, and we had only the unmetalled path which led over the Col to rely on. We shall see that this result of the battle of the 25th was a serious one for the British army besieging Sevastopol. There was, indeed, some idea of turning Liprandi out of the Causeway Heights; but had it been definitely formed, the infantry would have descended from the ridge on which they stood by the Woronzoff road, whence the object would have been more easily accomplished. Instead of this, however, they were moved onwards to the Col, and remained during the day covering Balaklava. No forward operation was undertaken, and it was probably considered that we had not sufficient troops to hold the outer line efficiently. So the main road was placidly given up to the enemy, and at nightfall the Guards Brigade and the Fourth Division returned to camp, while the remaining two Highland regiments were left at Balaklava to strengthen the garrison at that important place.^[257]

The vulnerable point on the right flank of the British position has already been adverted to, also the position taken up by the French Corps of observation under General Bosquet. We have seen that this force could not help the Allies to retain possession of the Woronzoff road, nor could it, as we shall see, secure the right of their siege-works from serious attack. The first attempt to disturb this flank was made at noon on the 26th, when a force emerged from Sevastopol, of which 700 men advanced up the Careenage Ravine, while the remainder, 4300 men and four guns, crossed that obstacle, and directed themselves upon Shell Hill, in front of the camp of the Second Division. The former column was met by the sharpshooters of the Guards, under Captain Goodlake, who, drawing up his insignificant detachment behind a ditch that ran across the ravine, held the hostile column in check, and barred its further advance,—even capturing several prisoners,—until, a little later, some men of the Rifles appearing upon the scene, the enemy was driven back.^[258]

The main column, endeavouring to reach Shell Hill, met the outposts of the Second Division, some 250 strong, who, instead of retiring before so superior a force, stubbornly resisted it, and held it at bay, until, outflanked and pressed back by numbers, they retreated slowly and in good order. But the Russians gained nothing, for the divisional artillery, reinforced by a battery of the First Division, had time to come into action, and when the enemy appeared upon the crest of the hill, he was met by the fire of our guns, which speedily repulsed him, and made him retire precipitately to the fortress, pursued by the piquets, and under fire of the Lancaster battery. In this combat, where the Russians acknowledge the loss of 270 men and 80 prisoners, as against 12 killed and 77 wounded on our side, Lieutenant Conolly, of the 49th Regiment, greatly distinguished himself. He was promoted Brevet Major, obtained the Victoria Cross, and a commission in the Coldstream. The Brigade was not employed in this action; they stood in reserve out of musketry fire, and watched the fight, ready for emergencies, but their services were not required.^[259]

This sortie was intended, according to Todleben, to distract our attention from Balaklava; and it may well be that Liprandi, knowing its importance, was under grave apprehension lest the Woronzoff road might be wrested from him. It has also been thought that the Russians were endeavouring to effect a lodgment on Shell Hill, preparatory to the attack they meant soon to deliver on our right flank at Inkerman, and this is very likely. But, if so, they had an inadequate force to accomplish such a purpose, and by this time they had ample experience of the fighting qualities of the British troops, who, man for man, were immensely superior to their own. Indeed we had every need of the sterling bravery of our gallant soldiers, for a great crisis was at hand. The strength of our Crimean army was becoming alarmingly weakened, not only by the wear and tear of active service and losses incurred on the field, but through the unusual amount of sickness that prevailed, and the arduous nature of the campaign in which we had become engaged. In the Coldstream there were 190 more admissions into hospital in October than there had been in September.^[260] On the other hand, the actions of the 25th and 26th increased the confidence of our men when opposed to the enemy. They felt themselves more than a match for him if they could only get leave to be at him; but they little knew how severe the trial would be that awaited them in a very few days.^[261]

On the night of the 28th, many of our camps were alarmed, and believed they were about to be attacked. The outposts watching the plain of Balaklava heard cavalry approaching, and a great deal of firing in the dark took place—the sentries blazing away whenever they saw, or fancied they saw, the phantom horsemen, “who seemed perpetually galloping, but never coming any nearer. Staff Officers kept arriving to know what the commotion was about. Of course I could give them no information.” A regiment of Zouaves and the guns in a French redoubt poured volleys into imaginary columns coming to storm our position. “The Russian drums all along the Fediukhine heights beat to arms; and I sat down quietly on a stone in advance of my sentries, and could hear nothing more, but made up my mind Liprandi intended to give us a benefit in the morning.” When the morning broke the mystery was cleared. It was found that a number of Russian horses had stampeded from their lines, and that no enemy was near. A hundred or more were caught, and served to mount a few of our cavalry, while the remainder scampered back across the plain to their legitimate owners.^[262]

The weary monotony of the siege continued after the sortie of the 26th, the troops being largely employed in the trenches, constructing approaches or batteries, or acting as covering guards, generally under a heavy fire from the fortress in front of them.

The French were sapping up towards the Flagstaff Battery with the greatest energy. They were becoming strong enough to withstand the guns of the garrison, and to retrieve their failure of October 17th-25th. Another bombardment, to be followed by an assault, was contemplated, and the allied Commanders had full confidence that this time, at least, the effect would be decisive. They even agreed to meet on the 5th of November to arrange the details of their projected operation. But neglected opportunities too often rise in judgment against a General in the field. The 5th was the day of Inkerman, and all our plans were completely frustrated.