After the review, a complete change of quarters took place in the Brigade: The 1st Grenadiers proceeded to Aldershot, 2nd Grenadiers to Dublin (which was again occupied by the Household troops), 3rd Grenadiers to Wellington barracks, Buckingham Palace, the Magazine, and Kensington; 1st Coldstream to the Tower and St. John’s Wood, 2nd Coldstream to Windsor; 1st Scots Fusilier Guards to Portman Street and St. George’s barracks, 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards to Aldershot. A few days later the Battalions of the Regiment were equalized, in that each was formed of ten companies, instead of twelve and eight, as had been the case during the war; two companies belonging to the 2nd Battalion were therefore transferred to the 1st, and the Officers were posted as follows:—

Where four allies were conducting a war in common, it was only natural that there should be an interchange of medals and of decorations, and this was done with no ungenerous hand. A new medal, more coveted than any other by soldiers and sailors, was established early in 1856, both for Officers and men in the Naval and Military services, who had distinguished themselves before the enemy “for valour.” The distribution of the Victoria Cross did not, however, take place until the 26th of June, 1857, when all the claims for that most conspicuous honour had been fully investigated. The day appointed for the ceremony was observed as a general holiday, and a review was held in Hyde Park before Her Majesty the Queen, who affixed to the breast of each man entitled to it, the bronze cross he had won in the field by his personal bravery. In the Coldstream the recipients of this proud distinction were Majors Goodlake and Conolly, and Privates Strong and Stanlock.^[362] This event, though it took place more than a year after the conclusion of peace, is connected with the Crimean struggle, and may be said to terminate the history of the protracted hostilities that troubled our relations with Russia. Thenceforward the war became a thing of the past, and its memories were merged into or overshadowed by other events which occurred elsewhere.

We have seen how the struggle shaped itself; how disastrously it was directed; and how devotedly our army maintained it, under very adverse and wholly exceptional circumstances. We allied ourselves to a Potentate whose tenure of power was precarious, whose interests were not our interests, and who only wished to adopt a foreign policy of adventure to reconcile his new subjects to his rule. His armies loyally supported ours in the field, and there we happily formed a sincere respect for the brave French troops who fought by our side. But the Government of Paris,—objecting always to transfer the theatre of war to Asia, where the enemy was really vulnerable,—restricted our field of operations to Europe; and as Austria protected the Russians on the Bessarabian frontier, we were forced at a late period of the year to make a descent upon the Crimea. Unhappily we had made no preparations for such an expedition, and had formed no plan for carrying it out; in fact, such an invasion had not seriously entered into our calculations when we declared war against the Tsar.

Thus, we landed fortuitously at a point where the road led to the north side of Sevastopol, but where no harbours near that town, were at hand to form a base of operations. Hence, without a base, we advanced to our objective, and, in due course, and after a successful battle, we arrived before it. But, on reaching this point, the Commander of our allies was indisposed to carry out the plan to which we had committed ourselves. We therefore shifted our forces by a strange flank march to the south side, in the hope that we might there at least be enabled to bring the campaign to a speedy conclusion. Sevastopol was at that time guarded by a small garrison, composed of a medley of indifferent and badly armed troops; it was imperfectly defended towards the land, and in this direction it was an insignificant stronghold. Still, as long as it remained in that state, we hesitated to make any or even the least move against it; we preferred to wait to bring up our siege-train, and to open regular approaches, with the expectation that the town would fall before the cold weather should set in, and put an end to all field operations.

But we had miscalculated. We did not take into account what a patriotic and energetic garrison might achieve during the unexpected respite granted them, nor did we perceive that we were altering, just as winter was approaching, the whole plan of invasion from an expedition of surprise to the more lengthened process of a regular siege. Thus, under the direction of an Engineer Officer of genius, did Sevastopol assume the proportions of a fortress, while the English and the French were looking idly on; and before they could batter down simultaneously the new works in front of each—which they allowed the enemy to construct,—the Russian forces, drawn from the Danubian Principalities, were hurried by forced marches into the Crimea, to the support of the scanty troops that were then to be found there. The very moment we had meant to deliver our final blow, the enemy’s arrangements were complete, and we had to fight the unequal battle of Inkerman. Although we were victorious there against tremendous odds, the result obliged us to spend the winter on the barren and snow-swept plain of the Chersonese.

For this emergency we were entirely unprepared, and an intensely cold season having begun early, our troops, as we have seen, suffered in consequence. We then hung on to our positions before Sevastopol with strong tenacity of purpose, and with a resolution which is above all praise. But we could not resume the siege till the spring of 1855, and it was early in September before the south side fell. Taught by disaster, we then made every arrangement to continue the struggle with the best prospects of success; but the French, having gained the objects they had in view, became inactive; they clamoured for a cessation of hostilities; and thus, to preserve an alliance into which we had permitted ourselves to be drawn, we signed a peace of little value, and so put an end to the war.

The successes gained were not due to the skill of the Government that directed the struggle; they were solely due to that indomitable bravery, discipline, and power of endurance which have ever characterized our soldiers, as well as to the admirable system which made the British regimental Officers and men second to none that existed at that time in the other European armies.

The results of the war were dearly purchased. According to a return presented to Parliament, 390 Officers and 20,425 Noncommissioned officers and men were killed or died of wounds or of disease in the Crimea, and 14,718 men were invalided at the conclusion of the war, bringing the total casualties up to 35,533 of all ranks. But this return omits to include casualties in the Naval brigade and in the Marines (doing duty on land), and in the Commissariat, Transport, and Hospital departments; nor does it seem to give our losses incurred during the disastrous stay in Bulgaria, etc.: so that the figures do not represent the entire losses to which even our Land forces were subjected.^[363] On the other hand, it was computed that the Russians lost as many as half a million men. But this is a surmise, and the facts have never been known. The estimate is probably exaggerated, though it is certain that the enemy’s casualties were exceedingly great; but loss of men is not the greatest calamity that could befall an Empire like Russia.

Two events must be noted here which took place about this time, one of which affected the whole army, and the other the Brigade only. On the death of Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded the Duke of Wellington as Commander-in-Chief in 1852, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was appointed to that high office, and assumed his new functions July 15, 1856—an office which he held without interruption until the 31st of October, 1895, for a space of nearly forty years.

The day before, the following Brigade Order appeared:—

It may be well to explain that, previous to this appointment, orders to the Brigade had been issued by the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting—a Commanding Officer of a Guards Regiment or Battalion, taken by roster—who is always an Officer of the Sovereign’s Household. The effect of the order just quoted, was to place a General Officer in actual command of the Brigade, while the Field Officer in Brigade Waiting was still retained to fulfil the Court duties, he being, as formerly, the direct medium of communication between the Court and the Household Infantry.^[364]