Reasons for the expedition to Suakin—Departure of the Coldstream—Orders to Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham—Position of the enemy—Advance against Hashin—Engagement at Tofrek—Attack on a convoy, escorted by the Coldstream and Royal Marines—Advance to Tamai—Construction of the railway—Attack on T'Hakul—Abrupt end of the campaign—The Coldstream proceed to Alexandria, and thence to Cyprus—Evacuation of the Sudan; how the Mahdi took advantage of it; how the Dongolese were treated—Position taken up south of Wady Halfa—Defeat of the Arabs at Ginnis—Return of the Guards Camel regiment—Return of the Coldstream from Cyprus—Honourable distinctions added to the Colours—Officers of the Regiment in December, 1885.

When the British Government made up their mind, early in February, 1885, to put an end to the devastating tyranny of the dervishes, at all events in Khartum, and sent instructions to the British Commander to that effect, they also consulted him as to whether a strong expedition should be despatched forthwith to Suakin. Under the impression that his instructions to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum were intended really to produce that result, Lord Wolseley gladly accepted the offer that Osman Digna might be dealt with, without further delay. We must refer the reader to the current history of the day to seek the causes of the awakened energy which roused the Government to action at this moment. Very few years have elapsed since 1885, and the events which then took place can scarcely be forgotten. Suffice it to say that the country, justly proud of General Gordon, was roused to indignation when it was realized that, in spite of warnings from the military authorities, the Government had delayed to take proper measures to rescue him and those for whom he was responsible, until the season was too far advanced, and until rescue was impossible. So also, the large and unstinted sums of money, freely lavished upon the tardy expedition that was at last despatched up the Nile, had failed to accomplish the object which the nation had so much at heart. Under all these circumstances, it was clearly judicious to propitiate the popular wrath that began to manifest itself; and how could this be more efficaciously done than by the public announcement that summary punishment was about to be inflicted upon the murderers of the British hero, whose death was so universally deplored? Hence it came about that a railway to Berber was immediately to be commenced; that another expedition to protect it was to be sent to Suakin; and that a still more extravagant expenditure of treasure was to be wasted, now when it was too late, and when the necessary outlay had been curtailed up to the summer of 1884,—that is, as long as there was time to save the garrison of Khartum.

In January and February, 1885, Major-General Lyon Fremantle, in command, as we have seen, at Suakin, since July, 1884, had been reinforced by a squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and a battery of Royal Horse Artillery, brought from Lower Egypt, and amounting to some 2500 men. With these he engaged in defensive operations against Osman Digna, who had again begun to give trouble in the district. Prompt measures were now taken to make them capable of assuming the offensive by raising them to a total of about 13,000 men. The field force, so augmented, was commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham, V.C., K.C.B., under the general orders of Lord Wolseley, who was responsible for all operations against the enemy; and composing it, there was a Guards Brigade, troops of the Line, an Indian contingent, and, lastly, an Australian battalion and battery furnished by the Government of New South Wales. This Colonial corps of fighting men, and that provided by the Dominion of Canada for the service of the boats on the Nile, form a new feature in our military history, which we should be sorry to pass over in silence; for they show the patriotic feelings which urge our brethren over the sea, gallantly to take their share in any struggle in which the interests of our Queen and Empire may be involved.

The following organization was adopted at Suakin: A Cavalry Brigade (Colonel H. P. Ewart, C.B.), two squadrons of the 5th Lancers, and two of the 20th Hussars, and a battalion Mounted infantry (4 companies). Three batteries of artillery (one Royal Horse Artillery), and eventually one battery New South Wales. The 1st or Guards Brigade^[458] (Major-General A. J. Lyon Fremantle), 3rd Grenadiers (Colonel Hon. W. Home), 1st Coldstream (Colonel A. Lambton), and 2nd Scots Guards (Colonel Hon. W. Trefusis). Subsequently, when they arrived, the New South Wales Battalion, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Richardson, were attached to this Brigade. The 2nd Brigade (Major-General Sir J. C. McNeill, V.C., K.C.B.), three battalions of infantry (of the East Surrey, Shropshire, and Berkshire Regiments), and one of Royal Marines. The Indian Brigade (Brigadier-General J. Hudson, C.B.), one regiment of cavalry (9th Bengal), three battalions infantry (15th Sikhs, 17th Bengal, and 28th Bombay), and one company Madras Sappers. Royal Engineers (one Railway and two Field companies, two Telegraph sections, and one Balloon detachment). And four, eventually five, companies of the Commissariat and Transport Corps.

The 1st Coldstream were made up by a draft from the 2nd Battalion to 1 Warrant-officer, 80 Non-commissioned officers, 16 drummers, and 710 privates, out of which a detachment of 50 men was told off to form a Mounted infantry company. Officers were posted as follows:—

The following Officers served on the Staff: Lieutenants Earl of Wiltshire, and Hon. Alan Charteris, Aides-de-camp to Major-General Sir J. McNeill; and Lieutenant Gladstone, Orderly Officer to Major-General Fremantle. The detachment of mounted men was placed under the command of Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg and Lieutenant G. Sutton, but until the ponies were obtained, which did not take place before the 5th of April, these Officers did duty with the Battalion, the former commanding No. 7 Company. It should also be stated that the Brigade furnished upon this occasion a company of Army Signallers, under command of Lieutenant F. Lloyd, Grenadier Guards, composed of 12 men from the 3rd Grenadiers, 12 from the 1st Coldstream, and 6 from the 2nd Scots Guards; the corps was attached to the 3rd Grenadier Guards. Further, a Field Hospital was also formed, of which Surgeons-Major C. Read (Coldstream), Lawrence (Grenadiers), and A. Myers (Scots Guards), and Surgeon G. Robinson (Scots Guards) were the Medical Officers.

The 1st Coldstream left Wellington Barracks shortly after 7 a.m. on the 19th of February, accompanied by a dense and enthusiastic crowd, and, marching to Westminster Stairs, proceeded in two river steamers to Gravesend, where they embarked on board the Manorah. Remaining a few hours at Malta, they were detained a day at Suez, and reached Suakin on the 8th of March. The Battalion then landed without delay, marched about two miles, and encamped in an advanced position to cover the assembly of the troops; they were joined by the 2nd Scots and 3rd Grenadier Guards, who arrived respectively the 9th and 10th. There had been some alarms of a disquieting nature when we reached the seat of war. The Arabs frequently sent forward a few armed men at a time, who, crawling at night past the outposts into the centre of the camp, attacked and stabbed our soldiers and horses in the dark, even in the head-quarter camp or to the rear of it, where at least every one had a right to believe himself to be in safety, and guarded against depredations of the sort. This disagreeable method of warfare was not easy to suppress, and when the enemy was successful in his raid, it produced a “scare,” which was calculated to disturb the equanimity of the troops. The dervishes, in short, were hovering very near us at night, firing into us from the bush (fortunately without much effect), though they seldom made any demonstrations in the daylight. Detachments were sent out as soon as it was dark, to watch all approaches leading to Suakin; but the nuisance only came to an end, when we moved out to attack the enemy, and drove him back from our neighbourhood. Meanwhile the Brigade camp, though it had never been disturbed, was withdrawn somewhat closer to the town on the 16th.

The orders which Sir G. Graham received were dated the 20th of February; and they directed him, in the first place, to destroy the power of Osman Digna, and, secondly, to give assistance and protection to the construction of the railway. The military occupation of the Hadendowa country, lying near the Suakin-Berber route, was to be accomplished; and it was indicated that this would be best done by the Indian troops, while the British portion of the army were to be placed in the hilly region, which is to be found a little beyond Tambuk wells (25 miles from Suakin), to a distance of 60 or 70 miles further on towards Berber. It was also intimated that possibly Berber might not be attacked before the autumn,^[459] and, if so,—

“the railway cannot be pushed much beyond Ariab; and there, all the railway plant and material necessary for the 100 miles between it and Berber should be collected as soon as possible, so that the advance, when the cool weather begins, and Berber is taken, may be made at once.”^[460]

These instructions clearly show the intention of the British Government at this critical moment in their fortunes, when public indignation was rising against them; viz. to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum in the autumn of 1885, now that it was not found possible to achieve that object in the spring of the same year. This was to be effected by the co-operation of two expeditions, under the supreme command of Lord Wolseley,—one under his immediate leadership, concentrating in the province of Dongola, to pass the summer there, and to emerge therefrom when the suitable season came round for field operations; the other, under Sir G. Graham, with the objects (1) to crush Osman Digna, and to clear the country of the enemy, in order that the railway might be made, and (2) to construct that railway at least as far as Ariab (some 145 miles from Suakin), and to place troops for its protection “where the summer heats could be best endured.”^[461]

Sir G. Graham reached Suakin March 12th, and next day the railway was begun.^[462] A few days had to be spent in completing the assembly of the force, and in perfecting the arrangements necessary for their supply. The wells in the neighbourhood were sufficient to provide the camels and horses with water, but as its quality and quantity could not be depended upon for the troops of the expedition, ships fitted with condensing boilers were brought to Suakin, and condensed sea-water was issued in tins for their use, and was transported to the various camps by camels or by railway.

The country near Suakin is a flat sandy plain, intersected by khors, or water courses (quite dry at this season of the year), which, extending westward some ten or twelve miles, is terminated by a line of hills running almost parallel to the sea coast. Near the town, the plain is fairly open for about two or three miles, but afterwards, and especially in the khors and at the foot of the hills, it is covered by thick masses of mimosa thorny scrub, many of which look somewhat like large gooseberry bushes six to eight feet high, and wide in proportion; in many places they are tangled by the prickly pear, and by rank grass and other undergrowth. The enemy was reported to have concentrated his main force of some 7000 men at Tamai, a village about 16 miles away in a south-westerly direction from Suakin. Another thousand or more were at Hashin, eight miles due east of the town, where a valley penetrates into the hills. It was here that the Arabs were supposed to live who troubled our nights. To the north-west is the village of Handub, eleven miles off, also occupied by dervishes; and to this place the railway to Berber would have to run.

It was evidently desirable that our first movement should be directed against Hashin. On the 19th of March, a reconnaissance was undertaken against it, and next day an attack upon the position was made in force; the 2nd Brigade in front, supported on the flanks by the Guards and Indian troops, covered by the cavalry; the horse artillery and a Gardner battery (4 guns) being in rear: altogether a little more than 8000 men. Arrived at a detached group of hills about a mile and a half from Hashin, redoubts were constructed there by the East Surrey Regiment, while the remainder continued to push forward, until the entrance of the valley, previously mentioned, was reached. The 2nd Brigade, supported by the Indian battalions, ascended the southern heights above this valley, and soon drove the enemy therefrom. The Arabs, estimated at 3000 strong, however, were favoured by the dense bush; they seemed to swarm through it, and, hovering round, they dashed into our men with the greatest bravery, whenever an opportunity presented itself. In this way, two squadrons of Indian horse were somewhat severely handled by an almost invisible foe. Meanwhile the Guards were in reserve, formed in square, just under the heights which Sir J. McNeill had taken on our left front, and close to a small rise in the ground on our right front, which we called Bee-hive Hill. The redoubts in rear being complete soon after midday, and garrisoned by the East Surrey, the 2nd and Indian Brigades were ordered to retire, the Guards to cover the movement. The Arabs, owing to the thick cover that concealed them, remained closer to our position than they could otherwise have done, and perceiving our return towards our camp, they opened a hot fire from the bush upon us, principally from Bee-hive Hill, which was returned with steady volleys. This proceeding soon silenced them, though the Brigade lost some men during this short period of the day—1 Officer, Captain Dalison (Scots Guards), and 2 men being killed, and 16 wounded. Our total casualties amounted to 48 Officers and men killed and wounded, and of these the Coldstream numbered 1 man died of wounds, and 8 wounded. The result of the action was that we had no further trouble as far as Hashin was concerned, and thenceforward the enemy’s night raids on our camp ceased.

An advance was now made towards Tamai, the centre of Osman Digna’s resistance, and, on the 22nd of March, Sir J. McNeill was sent forward to establish a post on the road to that place, eight miles off, with one squadron of the 5th Lancers, the Berkshire Regiment, the Marines, a detachment of the Naval brigade (with 4 Gardner guns), three Indian battalions, and the Madras Sappers. On the same day, the Coldstream proceeded towards Hashin, to convoy supplies to the East Surrey Regiment, who were still in the redoubts constructed on the 20th, and met with no misfortune, except that several of our men were struck down by sun apoplexy. On returning home in the afternoon, we saw clouds of dust rising out of the bush in the place where we conceived Sir J. McNeill’s column to be, and wondered whether something unusual had happened there. On returning to camp we heard, at first, exaggerated accounts of what occurred, but it was not long before the real truth was known. The column, finding the bush exceedingly thick and no natural clearings in it, could only advance slowly, and halted some six miles from Suakin. The men then began to construct a zeriba; and, while so employed, they were necessarily scattered, some were unarmed, and a large number of camels blocked the ground. The enemy, lurking unseen in the scrub close by, crept up, and suddenly made a fierce onslaught on the force. Unfortunately, one of the Indian battalions was somewhat unsteady, and, though the Officers worked hard to rally the men, they were rushed, and carried away to the rear. Then followed a battle of short duration which is not easy to describe. The Berkshire—who gained the title of “Royal” for their day’s work—stood manfully up to the Arabs, though half the battalion were collecting brushwood and the other half were at their dinners, and, together with the Marines, the Sikhs, and the remaining Indian battalion, they maintained a hard fight for the space of twenty minutes. They soon, however, gained the mastery, and drove the enemy back with great slaughter. Isolated combats took place at some distance from the zeriba on the road to Suakin, entailing considerable loss, and towards evening the telegraph wire was cut. But news had, before this, been received at head-quarters, to assure Sir G. Graham that the danger was over, and that the attack had entirely failed. The Arabs were computed at 5000 strong, and their losses at 1500 men. Our own casualties were severe; and amounted to 10 Officers and 131 men killed and missing, and to 5 Officers and 150 men wounded: total 296. Added to this, there were 157 native camel drivers killed and missing, and 19 wounded. Total personnel lost, 472 men; besides 501 camels. Among the wounded was Lieutenant Charteris, Coldstream Guards. This action, known as the battle of Tofrek, occasioned more losses on one day than in any other engagement during the whole war in the Sudan.

The Guards Brigade were sent early the following morning to reinforce the zeriba and to bring up supplies and water. Forming a square, and guarding 1200 camels, the march was slow, and took nearly six hours to accomplish. Many of the loads were indifferently packed, and repeatedly fell off; the drivers seemed to have little control over the animals, which were bad movers and difficult to guide. The weather, also, was oppressively hot, and the men suffered a good deal from thirst. Arriving shortly before noon, the force halted for some hours; the Grenadier Guards and the Indian Brigade then returned to Suakin with the wounded and empty camels, leaving the Coldstream and Scots Guards and the rest of the troops behind. The immediate neighbourhood of Tofrek was still covered with hundreds of dead and numerous camels, many of which were hamstrung, and had to be shot. Burial parties were actively at work, but it was not easy to dispose quickly of the mass of dead bodies, both of men and animals, that lay about in large numbers; added to which there was little shade to be had from the broiling sun, and the water ration for every purpose had to be reduced to a minimum. For the next few days, the position in the zeriba was therefore anything but a pleasant one, as may be readily imagined.

On the 24th, the Coldstream and the Marines began cutting a path one hundred paces broad towards Suakin. After some hours' work, they marched, under Colonel Lambton, about halfway to the town, to escort a convoy to Tofrek, consisting of 425 camels and 818 carts, with 8000 gallons of water, which was brought up to that point by Indian troops. The Arabs were still hovering near, and they fired upon the two battalions as they proceeded on their journey, but without inflicting much loss. On their return, however, the fire became somewhat hotter, and was delivered at closer ranges than before, so that Colonel Lambton was obliged to halt several times to return it, and to allow the wounded to be attended to. The square, crowded with carts and camels that would not keep a straight course, offered an excellent mark to the sharpshooters concealed in the bush; but we were able to check this attack by small volleys fired by marksmen at the spots where we saw the enemy’s puffs of smoke appear. This lasted for an hour or more, when at last, to our great satisfaction, some of the most daring of the dervishes made an attempt to charge. They came on in line, guided by flags at each flank, in the most gallant manner, and directed their attack mainly against the left face of the square. But, unable to stand our fire, they were very soon defeated, and most of them were killed, though one or two did actually succeed in getting as far as our bayonets before they fell. After this event they left us alone, and we got back to the zeriba without further trouble. The casualties of the day amounted to 24, of which the Coldstream lost 2 men killed or died of wounds, and 8 wounded; three Officers were wounded, two belonging to the Royal Marines, and Captain Hon. N. Dalrymple, Brigade Major of the Guards Brigade; in addition, 5 native camel-drivers were killed.^[463] Some of the camels lagged behind, their drivers having abandoned them while the fight was going on; others were squeezed out of the square, which was from the beginning too full to hold them, and thus more than a hundred were cut off by the enemy.

Next day, another convoy was taken from Suakin to the zeriba in the same manner, the escorts meeting each other halfway between the two places. This time it was not molested, but the occasion deserves mention, since a captive balloon was then first employed; the latter, attached by a rope to a waggon that moved in the square, enabled a proper look-out to be kept upon the enemy in the bush. On the 26th, however, there was another skirmish, but it was easily repelled with very little loss; and on this day, the Grenadier Guards relieved the Scots Guards at Tofrek, while the Coldstream remained there till the 28th, when they also returned to head-quarters. After the 26th no further difficulty was experienced with the Arabs; they were apparently disheartened, and had retreated from the neighbourhood. A move, therefore, was made to Tamai.

Early on the morning of April 2nd, a force of 8000 men marched through Tofrek to Tesela Hill, near Tamai, where a halt was made for the night.^[464] Next day, the advance was continued, and Osman Digna’s head-quarters were occupied after a very slight resistance. Tamai, like other villages in the country, is a mere collection of straw huts, and it was speedily fired and destroyed, while the enemy made off into the hilly region that lies to the south, where it would have been difficult, and indeed unnecessary, to pursue him. The column therefore returned to Suakin, and the attention of the troops was now directed more particularly to the protection of the railway, which meantime had been progressing. The Battalion lost only two men wounded, on the 3rd of April.

At this time, also, ponies having arrived, the Guards Mounted infantry detachments were formed into two companies (April 5th): the Grenadier and Scots Guards company, under Captain St. John Mildmay, Grenadier Guards; and the Coldstream company, under Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg, to which was attached a half-company, furnished by the Royal Engineers, under Lieutenant Sandbach, R.E. Ten days later, a Camel corps was formed under the command of Major James, Scots Greys, consisting of 400 British and 100 native soldiers, divided into five companies, of which one was composed of Guardsmen (31 men taken from each of the three Battalions), under Lieutenants Neil Menzies, Scots Guards, and G. Wyndham, Coldstream Guards.

The railway, leaving Suakin in a north-westerly direction as far as Handub (11 miles distant), bore round towards the west at this point, and, passing through Otao (20 miles from Suakin) and Tambuk (25 miles), was to continue across the hilly country to Ariab; from thence it was to run to Berber, over a stretch of 100 miles of desert country, which is watered only by the wells of O-Bak, lying nearly halfway between these two places. To cover the construction of the line, a zeriba was made (April 6th) by the Coldstream, the New South Wales Battalion, artillery, etc., between Suakin and Handub, called No. 1 Station. On the 8th, Handub was occupied, the Scots Guards being at No. 1 Station. On the 16th, the latter pushed on to Otao without meeting with any resistance; and when the Coldstream followed on the 18th, the Scots moved to Tambuk, finding no enemy there. On the 24th, a reconnaissance by a portion of the Camel corps was made towards Es-Sibil; and by the 30th the railway was completed as far as Otao. During this time the men were constantly employed in clearing broad roads through the bush; in digging watering-places, which had to be deepened daily as the supply became exhausted; and in protecting the scattered parties of navvies at work on the line. There were not many Arabs about, though few nights passed without some shots being fired into the camp.

About the same period, also, reconnaissances were pushed in various directions to prevent any advance from Tamai, and to clear the neighbouring valleys of the enemy. The most important was one undertaken in the early morning of the 7th of May, against a chief who had collected a force at a place called T'Hakul, lying nearly 20 miles west of Suakin and 10 south of Otao. The Brigade took no part in this operation; but the company belonging to the Camel corps and the two companies of Guards Mounted infantry were present, and forming part of the force at Suakin, they paraded there a little before midnight on the 6th. A small column co-operated from Otao, and in the morning both appeared before the camp of the Arabs and surprised it; the enemy fled at our approach, leaving behind 1100 sheep, goats, and some camels. The columns then returned to Otao and Suakin respectively; the latter, however, on their way home, met parties of the enemy occupying heights within range of which they had to pass; after a few volleys he quickly disappeared. One Officer (of the Camel corps) and two men were wounded, of whom one (a sergeant) belonged to the Coldstream (Mounted infantry).

This was the last operation conducted by Sir G. Graham’s force in the neighbourhood of Suakin. The district had just been pacified and relieved of the presence of the enemy: at this very moment, orders came to evacuate it, and to withdraw the troops therefrom, except a small garrison, which was to be left behind to guard the town.^[465] We must briefly explain how this came about.

The British Government never had much sympathy with the policy of opposing the Mahdi, whose usurpation of power, founded upon rapine, massacre, and slavery, had been dignified into the movement of a people struggling for freedom! This strange opinion upon the upheaval that swamped every vestige of civilization in the Sudan, was doubtless one reason, but perhaps not the only reason, for the vacillating proceedings pursued there, and for the consequent inability to effect, even at great expense, any useful object. Unwilling to face with a firm resolution the questions that required solution in that region, and prevented by public opinion from adopting a policy of non-intervention, the Government did nothing till popular clamour forced them to some action, and then the steps they took, costing many lives and much treasure, could produce no beneficial results. Thus, as we have seen, was the brave intention of taking Khartum, and of restoring order there, published in February; and so also, as soon as possible and upon the very first pretext, was that intention abandoned. An opportunity very soon arose to facilitate this procedure.

There was a dispute in Asia over the frontier between the Russians and Afghans, and, on the 30th of March, news reached London that the former, having agreed to make no forward movement until pending questions had been discussed, advanced and took possession of Panjdeh by force of arms—a place held to be a portion of the territories of the Amir of Afghanistan. For reasons connected with the safety of India, we had espoused the cause of that Prince, and were bound to see that his legitimate claims received proper consideration. It is unnecessary to describe either the Panjdeh incident, or those that led up to this act of aggression. It is sufficient to say that they created much excitement in England, and soon drew public attention from the Sudan. The crisis did not last long, and the dispute was soon settled, but it enabled Government to wash their hands of the whole of the troublesome business connected with Khartum.

This was, therefore, the end of the expedition to the Eastern Sudan, and, as a matter of fact, orders soon arrived to break up the forces assembled there. The Guards Brigade and the New South Wales contingent were the first troops to take their departure. The Coldstream, having marched from the front on the 14th of May, embarked on the 16th in the Deccan, and started next day for Alexandria, where they arrived on the 23rd. The Battalion remained in the harbour, on board ship, until the 9th of June, when they marched to Ramleh, and camped on the beach. They stayed there until the 1st of July, and, together with the Grenadiers, embarked on H.M.S. Orontes, and proceeded on the 2nd to Cyprus. Landing at Limasol on the 5th, they marched to Mount Troödos, and reached that place on the 9th; the Scots Guards followed a few days later, and the whole Brigade remained at Troödos till after the middle of August. Major-General Fremantle stayed behind in Egypt, and Colonel Lambton, being the senior Officer, assumed the command of the Brigade, while that of the Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling, until the 27th, when Colonel Clive, Grenadier Guards, arrived from England as Brigadier-General.

We left the Nile force getting into summer quarters in the province of Dongola, in the spring of the year, and confidently expecting to resume the offensive against Khartum as soon as the great heat should pass away. But on the 13th of April a telegram reached Lord Wolseley, informing him that, in the then condition of Imperial affairs, it was probable the forward movement might have to be abandoned. The announcement that this decision had been taken was made known in England on the 21st, though on the 11th of May the troops were ordered to retire northwards, and to evacuate the Sudan.

Once begun, the evacuation did not take long to accomplish; the enemy offered no opposition, nor did he try to press our retreat. He was wise enough to follow at a respectful distance, occupying the country as we abandoned it. Indeed, ever since the return of the Desert and River columns we experienced no further trouble with the Mahdi, who, relieved of the danger with which he was threatened by the British advance, turned his attention to other matters. He sent a considerable force to the south of Khartum, to put down a rising which began to imperil his authority in Kordofan, and, as soon as he became aware that we were definitely about to withdraw from the province of Dongola and from the vicinity of Suakin, he despatched more of his men to hasten the reduction of Sennar and Kassala, both of which were besieged at that moment. These two places fell in the middle of August.

The operation of withdrawing from the Sudan was extremely distasteful to British Officers. The inhabitants of Dongola had trusted us, and had served us; we had necessarily interfered with their government, disturbed the means at their disposal for taking care of themselves, and prevented them from making terms with the enemy. They had been induced by us to resist the Arabs, to incur their vengeance, and to rely for protection upon the power of England,—a nation who never deserted a friend or turned away from a foe. We were pledged to defend this unfortunate people, or to make some reasonable provision for their future safety, but, in the face of the peremptory orders received from home, any such arrangement was entirely out of the question. Hence it was more than distressing to be forced to abandon these natives to the slavery that was in store for them; and we cannot be astonished that they reproached us bitterly for deserting them in this helpless condition, and for leaving them to the cruel tyranny of the Mahdi. Many appeared anxious to fly from their homes, but they were restrained by the knowledge that, in that case, they must forfeit the whole of their property; while others were unable to procure sufficient transport for their families and effects.^[468]

Nearly 13,000 natives accompanied the retreat, and by the end of June these refugees, the supplies, and most of the troops were north of Dongola. At this moment the Government of Mr. Gladstone came to an end, and Lord Wolseley, who had from the first protested against the precipitate withdrawal of the expedition, was empowered by the new Cabinet to arrest the movement temporarily, until the situation had been considered. It is sad to relate, that the evacuation had been too well executed, and that it was then too late to return or repair the evil that had already been done. By the 21st of July, that portion of the British army destined to remain as a frontier force, for the protection of Egypt, had taken up a position some ninety miles south of Wady Halfa, and there they covered the construction of the Sudan railway, which was completed to Akasheh on the 7th of August. Meanwhile the dervishes did not invade the northern part of Dongola at once, for the Mahdi fell a victim to his own debauchery, and, dying on the 22nd of June, left affairs in the Sudan in an unsettled state.^[470] Until, therefore, his successor, the Khalifa Abdulla, had consolidated his position, no further conquests were possible, and the province was only seized by him in the middle of August. After this, the enemy advanced northwards with the intention of invading Egypt, and he even ventured to lay siege to a British fort on the frontier, in the month of November. In December, however, he was attacked, and forced to retire, by Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, who defeated him at Ginnis on the 30th.

This event ends the war in the Sudan. Long before it took place the Guards Camel regiment had been sent home. Starting from Dongola, where they remained for nearly three months, they marched thence on the 1st of June, and, proceeding mostly by river, they reached Alexandria on the 1st of July, having halted for two hours at Cairo, where they were received by Lord Wolseley and Sir F. Stephenson. At Alexandria, they had the good fortune to meet the Guards Brigade, then on their way to Cyprus. They left Egypt on the 4th, and arrived in London on the 15th. After an inspection by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, the various detachments composing the Camel corps returned to their respective Regiments. The following Brigade Order appeared in London on the 21st:—

The casualties of the Coldstream inflicted by the enemy in the field have already been noted in their proper place; but no mention has been made of those who died of disease during the two expeditions. It appears that sickness was less common in the interior than was the case among the troops stationed on the coast of the Red Sea; and six men only of the Coldstream died of illness during the many months they were employed on the Nile. The Regiment, however, had to deplore the death of Lieutenant G. Sutton and of 13 men of the 1st Battalion who succumbed to the climate of Suakin; while several Officers and 110 men had to be sent to England invalided. Lieutenant Sutton, a young Officer of great merit and of much promise, fell ill a short time before the end of the expedition, and was sent for a short cruise, in the hope that his health might be thereby re-established. He returned, as he thought, better, and resumed duty; but a very few days later he was again obliged to be placed upon the sick-list, and, becoming rapidly worse, he died at sea, May 18th, on his way home, before the steamer reached Suez, to the great sorrow of his brother Officers.

The Guards camp at Mount Troödos was broken up, and the 1st Coldstream marched from that place on the 24th of August, down to Limasol, where they embarked on board the Orontes (26th) in company with the Grenadiers, the Scots Guards being on the Poonah. The Battalion reached Spithead early on the 10th of September, and proceeded next day to London, where they received a hearty welcome from their friends and the public at large.

The following extract of a letter, written by Colonel Lambton soon after his return from the Sudan, to the Officer Commanding the 2nd Battalion, refers to the men belonging to the latter, and temporarily posted to the service Battalion for duty during the war:—

Medals for the Sudan campaign were issued to Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men on the 7th of November; and by General Order, January 10, 1886, it was intimated that Her Majesty the Queen had been graciously pleased to approve of the three Regiments of Foot Guards being permitted to bear the words “Suakin, 1885” upon their Colours. Early in 1883, the record of Marlborough’s battles, which had been somewhat strangely passed over in the past, were also added to the Colours, and the Coldstream then showed the following honourable distinctions, viz. “The Sphinx, superscribed 'Egypt.' Oudenarde. Malplaquet. Dettingen. Lincelles. Talavera. Barrosa. Peninsula. Waterloo. Alma. Inkerman. Sevastopol. Egypt, 1882. Tel el-Kebir. Suakin, 1885.”

In December, 1885, the Regiment stood as follows:—

Colonel.—General Right Hon. Sir Thomas Steele, K.C.B.

Majors—Mounted.—Lieut.-Colonels R. S. Hall; Hon. E. Acheson; Hon. E. Digby; and Hon. H. Corry.

Dismounted.—Lieut.-Colonels R. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen, C.B. (Regimental Adjutant); F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; and R. Pole-Carew (Military Secretary to the Commander-in-chief in India).

Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels J. G. Montgomery; F. Manley; and L. D. MacKinnon; Captains H. Wetherall; V. Dawson; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg (A.D.C. to Lord Lieutenant, Ireland); and A. Codrington (Adjutant); Major Hon. H. Legge; Captains J. Gladstone; D. Dawson (A.D.C. to the Commander of the Forces, Ireland, H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimer); and H. Stopford (lately A.D.C. to the Commander of Forces, Ireland, Sir T. Steele).

Lieutenants.—Hon. A. Henniker-Major (Adjutant); G. V. Boyle; Hon. H. Amherst; H. Surtees (employed with Egyptian Army); W. Corbet (A.D.C. to Major-General Hon. R. Monck); G. P. Bouverie (lately returned from Special Service in Bechuanaland, South Africa); Hon. A. Fortescue (lately returned from Special Service in Bechuanaland, South Africa); B. Gosselin-Lefebre; Hon. R. Winn; P. Lovell; Earl of Wiltshire; Sir C. Miller, Bart.; C. Kindersley; D. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris; H. Shute; E. Wigram; Granville Smith; C. Frederick; G. Wyndham; G. Milligan; C. Holland; Hon. W. Lambton; J. Drummond-Hay; F. Maude; R. Grenfell; F. Ramsden; C. Monck; Hon. V. Spencer; J. Hall; J. Sterling; H. Hawkes; Hon. E. Charteris; G. Taylor; S. Earle; J. Wingfield; Hon. E. Pakenham; Hon. H. Baillie-Hamilton; J. McNeile; R. Skeffington Smyth.

Quartermasters.—W. Webster; and H. Folson.

Solicitor.—R. Broughton, Esq.

The 1st Battalion were on this date quartered at Chelsea barracks (head-quarters and 5 companies), and at St. George’s (3 companies); the 2nd Battalion at the Tower. The writer of this portion of the History of the Coldstream Guards here takes leave of them, and wishing them many a glorious addition to their illustrious records, now bids them, with much regret, farewell.