[595] Thucyd. i, 98. It has already been stated in the preceding chapter, that Themistoklês, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being taken.

[596] For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i, 100; Diodor. xi, 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly borrowed from Ephorus and Kallisthenês, authors of the following century; and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thucydidês. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus, following the latter, gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships; which appears to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydidês, we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships; for so I venture to construe the words of Thucydidês, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold,—Καὶ εἶλον (Ἀθηναῖοι) τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes: “Amounting in all to two hundred: that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred,—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more.” Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii, 21), we may remark that the defeated Phenician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When, therefore, this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory in order to leave strength for a strenuous land-battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only specifics “one hundred Phenician ships with their crews” as having been captured (Diodor. xi, 62). The other hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

[597] About Thasos, see Herodot. vi, 46-48; vii, 118. The position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel’s History of Ragusa we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p. 163. Wien, 1807).

[598] Thucyd. i, 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor xi, 70.

[599] Thucyd. i, 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor, Alexander, had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace, (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.) If this pretence had been true, Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but the statement of Thucydidês shows that it was then an Edonian township.

[600] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galêpsus and Œsymê were among the Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 108).

[601] Thucyd. i, 101. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ.

[602] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

[603] Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

[604] See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Themistoklês communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for whom he afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

[605] Τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια (Thucyd. iii, 61-65).

[606] Thucyd. iii, 62.

[607] See, among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 2, 16).

[608] Diodor. xi, 81; Justin, iii, 6.

[609] Diodor. xi. 54; Strabo, viii, p. 337.

[610] Strabo, viii, pp. 337, 348, 356.

[611] Thucyd. i, 101-128; Diodor. xi, 62.

[612] Herodot. ix. 64.

[613] Thucyd. i, 102; iii, 54; iv, 57.

[614] Thucyd. i, 102. τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B. C.), following Plutarch, recognizes two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B. C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt,—the second in 461 B. C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgment, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanês (Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine of the latter, Lysistrata, wishing to make peace between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services which they had received from the other, might permit herself to say to the Lacedæmonians: “Your envoy, Perikleidas, came to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself a suppliant at the altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth, and the Messenians were pressing you hard: then Kimon with four thousand hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation.” This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14); accordingly, he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydidês acknowledges only one expedition: nor, indeed, does Diodorus (xi, 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now mere silence on the part of Thucydidês, in reference to the events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 461 B. C., with its very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that he knew of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why they invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies: he implies that their presence in Laconia was a new and threatening incident: moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could not have omitted to notice, as an aggravation of this feeling, that, only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon from the brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention,—is highly improbable in itself: inadmissible, except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated. I reject the first expedition into Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

[615] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

[616] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. Ὁ δ’ Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν λόγον, ᾧ μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλὼν μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα, περιϊδεῖν γεγενημένην.

[617] See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi, 3,—about 372 B. C.—a little before the battle of Leuktra.

[618] Diodor. xi, 65; Strabo, viii, p. 372; Pausan. ii, 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B. C.: but as it undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose it to have happened about 463 B. C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, 8.

[619] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17.

[620] Thucyd. i. 103.

[621] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8.

[622] Thucyd. i, 105; Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. Diodor. xi. 78.

[623] Thucyd. i, 109.

[624] Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἅπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων τοῖς ἤδη ἀπειρηκόσι καὶ τοῖς οὔπω δυναμένοις, etc.

The incident mentioned by Thucydidês about the Corinthians, that the old men of their own city were so indignant against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners,—κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων, etc.

[625] Thucyd. i, 106. πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. Compare Diodor. xi, 78, 79,—whose chronology, however, is very misleading.

[626] Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη,—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 69).

[627] Diodor. xii, 81; Justin, iii, 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων πόλεως μείζονα τὸν περίβολον κατεσκεύασαν, τὰς δ’ ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις ἠνάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

[628] Diodor. l. c. It must probably be to the internal affairs of Bœotia, somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklês alludes,—which Aristotle notices in his Rhetoric. iii, 4, 2.

[629] Thucyd. i, 107.

[630] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklês, c. 10. Plutarch represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary successes in Bœotia, which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under no impressions of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover, the peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

[631] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10.

[632] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklês, c. 10; Thucyd. viii, 97. Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklês himself proposed the restoration of Kimon—

Οὕτω τότε πολιτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραὶ, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ θυμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι σύμφερον, ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καίροις.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydidês, in recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B. C., after the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii, 97).

Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. I may remark that the explanatory note of Dr. Arnold on this passage is less instructive than his notes usually are, and even involves, in my judgment, an erroneous supposition as to the meaning. Dr. Arnold says: “It appears that the constitution as now fixed, was at first, in the opinion of Thucydidês, the best that Athens had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklês. But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, and when, and how, did the implied change take place? Τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war, as if this improved constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in the government between the beginning of his history and the end of the war,” etc.

Now I do not think that Dr. Arnold rightly interprets τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον. The phrase appears to me equivalent to τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτον: the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, apply the comparison altogether to the period preceding this event here described, and not to the period following it. “And it was during this period first, in my time at least, that the Athenians most of all behaved like good citizens: for the Many and the Few met each other in a spirit of moderation, and this first brought up the city from its deep existing distress.” No such comparison is intended as Dr. Arnold supposes, between the first moments after this juncture, and the subsequent changes: the comparison is between the political temper of the Athenians at this juncture, and their usual temper as far back as Thucydidês could recollect.

Next, the words εὖ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold in a sense too special and limited,—as denoting merely the new constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced. But it appears to me that the words are of wider import: meaning the general temper of political parties, both reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth: their inclination to relinquish antipathies, to accommodate points of difference, and to coöperate with each other heartily against the enemy, suspending those ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας, ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας (ii, 65) noticed as having been so mischievous before. Of course, any constitutional arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would therefore form a part of what is commended by Thucydidês: but his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the phrase ii, 38. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, etc.

[633] Thucyd. i, 108; Diodor. xi, 81, 82.

[634] Thucyd. i, 108-115; Diodor. xi, 84.

[635] Thucyd. i, 111; Diodor. xi, 85.

[636] Herodot. iii, 160.

[637] Thucyd. i, 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi, 77; xii, 3. The story of Diodorus, in the first of these two passages,—that most of the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favorable capitulation granted by the Persian generals,—is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as by Thucydidês.

[638] Thucyd. i, 103; Diodor. xi, 84.

[639] Thucyd. i, 112.

[640] Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18; Diodor. xi, 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschines (De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 300) and Andokides or the Pseudo-Andokides (De Pace, c. 1), state to have been made by Miltiades, son of Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiades son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiades. But the passages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, 8, p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to Andokides. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognize only two long walls, the northern and the southern wall; whereas, in the time of Thucydidês, there were three long walls: the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus, and a third connecting it with Phalêrum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war: and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of Æschines, who speaks of the two walls as they existed in his time. I concur with the various critics who pronounce the oration ascribed to Andokides to be spurious.

[641] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10, and Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural, that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Elpinikê, sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikê appear to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian biographers: they were employed by one party as a means of calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklês.

[642] Thucyd. i, 112; Diodorus, xii, 13. Diodorus mentions the name of the general Anaxikrates. He affirms farther that Kimon lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thucydidês, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

[643] Herodot. vii, 151; Diodor. xii, 3, 4. Demosthenês (De False Legat. c. 77, p. 428, R: compare De Rhodior. Libert. c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλλουμένην εἰρήνεν. Compare Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187; Isokratês, Panegyr. c. 33, 34, p. 244; Areopagitic. c. 37, pp. 150, 229; Panathenaic, c. 20, p. 360.

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratês is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary; Demosthenês states it as “a day’s course for a horse,”—which is probably larger than the truth.

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire,—the Kyanean rocks at one end, Phasêlis, or the Chelidonian islands—there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places—on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of this Kimonian peace, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is mentioned: among them are several out of the rhetor Aristeidês (Forschungen pp. 140-148).

[644] Thucyd. ii, 14.

[645] Thucyd. viii, 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note 647), I transcribe the passage of Thucydidês. He is speaking of the winter of B. C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making—even some months before that ruin actually took place—to excite active hostile proceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii, 25): it being seen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow at the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the Chians and Erythræans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them to Sparta with persuasions and promises of aid,—ἐπήγετο καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι’ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι, κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, etc. In the next chapter, Thucydidês tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes, for his satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek cities from Athens, and be able to levy the tribute upon them. Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτὸς, εἰ δύναιτο ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προὐθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων ἀποστήσειε διὰ τοὺς φόρους, καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειε.

These passages, strange to say, are considered by Manso and Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, though subject to the Athenian empire, continued, nevertheless, to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me, the passages appear to disprove this very supposition: they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb of time νεωστὶ—“lately.” By that word, Thucydidês expressly intimates that the court of Susa had only recently demanded from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that until recently no such demand had been made upon them. The court of Susa, apprized, doubtless, by Grecian exiles and agents, of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes; to which, doubtless, it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly, the demand was now for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he “became a debtor for them” to the court (ἐπωφείλησε), until he could collect them: which he could not at first do, even then, embarrassed as Athens was,—and which, à fortiori, he could not have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That, nevertheless, these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king’s books each for its appropriate tribute,—the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by Thucydidês, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the rearrangement and remeasurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B. C., after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus’s) time,—καὶ τὰς χώρας σφέων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας ... φόρους ἔταξε ἑκάστοισι, οἳ κατὰ χώρην διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνεος· ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶχον (vi, 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been continuously and regularly paid, down to his own time. But in my judgment this is a mistake: Herodotus speaks, not about the payment, but about the assessment: and these were two very different things, as Thucydidês clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above. The assessment of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king’s books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the payment was not enforced until immediately before 412 B. C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts. He would be told, that these assessments remained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they were realized or not was another question, which the “books” would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydidês appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast—not those in the interior, as we may see by the case of Magnesia given to Themistoklês—paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having “revolted from Persia,” of their “having been liberated from the king,” (οἱ ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες—οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως—ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο, Thucyd. i, 18, 89, 95)?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point,—that between 477 and 412 B. C., no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not recognized by the Greeks as belonging to him,—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii, 56: compare Diodor. iv, 26.

[646] Herodot. vi, 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii, 4).

[647] I conclude, on the whole, in favor of this treaty as an historical fact,—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii, p. 474), as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned the reality of the treaty: and the last-mentioned author, particularly, has examined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. iii, Beylage x, p. 471; Dahlmann, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i, Ueber den Kimonischen Frieden, pp. 1-148). Boëckh admits the treaty as an historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40): “The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace.”

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed, either in the Metrôon or somewhere else in Athens, among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleides), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it: or it might even have been reëngraved, seeing that nearly a century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there was a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it,—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly—an easy task, indeed—the loose, inconsistent, and vainglorious statements of the orators respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedon—and was thus connected with the name of Kimon—is one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses: but we must not forget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is highly probable—xii, 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake, but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B. C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consummated, as we know from Thucydidês: on this point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratês, that the treaty bound the Persian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations (Areopagatic. p. 150; Panathenaic. p. 462).

But though Dahlmann succeeds in discrediting the orators, he tries in vain to show that the treaty is in itself improbable, or inconsistent with any known historical facts. A large portion of his dissertation is employed in this part of the case, and I think quite unsuccessfully. The fact that the Persian satraps are seen at various periods after the treaty lending aid—underhand, yet without taking much pains to disguise it—to Athenian revolted subjects, does not prove that no treaty had been concluded. These satraps would, doubtless, be very glad to infringe the treaty, whenever they thought they could do so with advantage: if any misfortune had happened to Athens from the hands of the Peloponnesians,—for example, if the Athenians had been unwise enough to march their aggregate land-force out of the city to repel the invading Peloponnesians from Attica, and had been totally defeated,—the Persians would, doubtless, have tried to regain Ionia forthwith. So the Lacedæmonians, at a time when they were actually in alliance with Athens, listened to the persuasions of the revolted Thasians, and promised secretly to invade Attica, in order to aid their revolt (Thucyd. i, 103). Because a treaty is very imperfectly observed,—or rather because the parties, without coming to open war, avail themselves of opportunities to evade it and encroach upon its prescriptions,—we are not entitled to deny that it has ever been made (Dahlmann, p. 116).

It seems to me that the objections which have been taken by Dahlmann and others against the historical reality of this treaty, tell for the most part only against the exaggerated importance assigned to it by subsequent orators.

[648] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 21-28.

[649] Plutarch, Aristeidês. c. 25.

[650] Thucyd. i, 112; compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.

[651] Thucyd. i, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους, κατ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες—the same also i, 76-144.

[652] Aristotel. Politic. v, 2, 6. Καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

[653] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 18; also, his comparison between Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in this battle: he had served, thirty-three years before, at the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors, though a person of the first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).

[654] Thucyd. i, 113; Diodor. xii, 6. Platæa appears to have been considered as quite dissevered from Bœotia: it remained in connection with Athens as intimately as before.

[655] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 4.

[656] Thucyd. i, 114; v, 16, Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

[657] Thucyd. i, 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii, 7.

[658] Thucyd. i, 114, 115; ii, 21; Diodor. xii, 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used, means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Göller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydidês had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i, 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydidês against the reality of an event,—in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks: “The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B. C.: and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years’ truce,” (ad ann. 447 B. C.)

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, the expression of Thucydidês means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B. C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B. C.—and the disasters in Bœotia, either in the beginning of 446 B. C., or the close of 447 B. C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does, ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii, p. 478), that the five years’ truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years’ truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.