[45] Mr. Gilchrist, in his “Philosophic Etymology,” represents the terminations ath, eth, ad, ed, et, en, an, as conjunctives, equivalent to the sign +, denoting add, or join (see p. 162). In another part of the same work, he considers did to be do doubled, as dedi from the Latin do, which he believes to be the very same word with our do. Repetition, he observes, is a mode of expressing complete action. Hence we have do, do-ed, dede, did, in English. This explanation is ingenious, and furnishes a probable account of the origin of the word did, which he remarks was formerly spelled dede.

[46] 

are obsolete, unless followed by a concessive term. Thus, instead of saying, “Many there be that go in thereat,” we should now say, “Many there are.” For “to whom all hearts be open,” we should now write, “to whom all hearts are open.” We find them, however, used with the conjunctions if and though; thus, “If this be my notion of a great part of that high science, divinity, you will be so civil as to imagine, I lay no mighty stress upon the rest.”—Pope. That this was his notion the author had previously declared; the introductory clause, therefore, is clearly affirmative, and is the same as if he had said, “As this is my notion.” “Although she be abundantly grateful to all her protectors, yet I observe your name most often in her mouth.”—Swift. “The paper, although it be written with spirit, yet would have scarce cleared a shilling.”—Swift. In the two last sentences the meaning is affirmative; nothing conditional or contingent being implied.

In the following examples, it expresses doubt or contingency. “If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down:” i.e. “shouldst be.” “If I be in difficulty, I will ask your aid;” i.e. “If I should be.”

[47] Though the authority of Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift, can be pleaded in favour of wert, as the second person singular of this tense, I am inclined to agree with Lowth, that in conformity to analogy, as well as the practice of the best ancient writers, it would be better to confine wert to the imperfect conditional.

[48] If the expression of time with an attribute “be sufficient to make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it signifies time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in predication, which is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all other parts of speech, and these infinitives never predicating, they cannot be verbs. Again, the essence of a noun consisting in its so subsisting in the understanding, as that it may be the subject of predication, and these infinitives being all capable of so subsisting, they must of necessity be nouns.”—R. Johnson’s Gram. Comment.

[49] The variety of form which this verb assumes, clearly shows that it has proceeded from different sources.

Am is from the Anglo-Saxon eom, and is from the Anglo-Saxon ys or is; and these have been supposed to have come from the Greek εἰμὶ, εἶς.

The derivation of are is doubtful. It may, perhaps, have proceeded directly from er or erum of the Icelandic verb, denoting “to be.” By Mr. Gilchrist it is considered as “the same with the infinitive termination are, ere, ire.” Mr. Webb conjectured, that it might have some relation to the Greek ἔαρ, spring. Both these explanations appear to us somewhat fanciful.

Art is from the Anglo-Saxon eart. “Thou eart,” thou art.

Was is evidently the Anglo-Saxon wæs; and wast, wert, probably from the Franco-Theatisc, warst; and were from the Anglo-Saxon wære, wæron.

Be is from the Anglo-Saxon Ic beo, I am, which, with the Gaelic verb bi, to be, Mr. Webb considered to be derived from βίος, life, as the Latin fui, from φύω, to grow. This conjecture he supports by several pertinent quotations. See Mr. Bosworth’s “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” p. 164.

[50] The words did, hast, hath, has, had, shall, wilt, are evidently, as Wallis observes, contracted for doed, haveth, haves, haved, shall’st, will’st.

[51] This verb is derived from the Saxon magan, posse, the present of which is Ic mæg, and the preterite Ic miht. Hence also Ic mot.

[52] This verb is derived from cunnan, scire, posse, sapere. Hence is derived the verb “to ken,” or “to know;” or more probably, indeed, they were one and the same word: hence also the word cunning. “To ken” is still used in Scotland; and in the expression of Shakspeare, “I ken them from afar,” is erroneously considered by some critics to mean, “I see them.”

[53] This verb is, unquestionably, a derivative from the Saxon ꞅceal, I owe or I ought, and was originally of the same import. I shall denoted “it is my duty,” and was precisely synonymous with debeo in Latin. Chaucer says, “The faith I shall to God;” that is, “the faith I owe to God.” “Thou shalt not kill,” or “thou oughtest not to kill.” In this sense shall is a present tense, and denoted present duty or obligation. But, as all duties and all commands, though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must be future in regard to their execution; so by a natural transition, observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty, came to be a note of future time. I have considered it, however, as a present tense; 1st, because it originally denoted present time; 2dly, because it still retains the form of a present, preserving thus the same analogy to should that can does to could, may to might, will to would; and 3dly, because it is no singular thing to have a verb in the present tense, expressive of future time, commencing from the present moment; for such precisely is the Greek verb μέλλω, futurus sum. Nay, the verb will denotes present inclination, yet in some of its persons, like shall, expresses futurition. I have considered, therefore, the verb shall as a present tense, of which should is the preterperfect.

Johnson’s explanation of the meaning of this verb is so perspicuous, that, as foreigners are apt to mistake its use, I shall here transcribe his words. I shall love: “it will be so that I must love,” “I am resolved to love.” Shall I love? “will it be permitted me to love?” “will it be that I must love?” Thou shalt love: “I command thee to love;” “it is permitted thee to love;” “it will be, that thou must love.” Shalt thou love? “will it be, that thou must love?” “will it be permitted thee to love?” He shall love: “it will be, that he must love;” “it is commanded that he love.” Shall he love? “is it permitted him to love?” The plural persons follow the signification of the singular.

I transcribe also the same author’s explanation of the verb I will. I will come: “I am willing to come,” “I am determined to come.” Thou wilt come: “it must be, that thou must come,” importing necessity; or “it shall be, that thou shalt come,” importing choice. Wilt thou come? “hast thou determined to come?” importing choice. He will come: “he is resolved to come;” or “it must be, that he must come,” importing choice or necessity.

Brightland’s short rule may be of some service in assisting foreigners to distinguish the use of these two verbs. It is this:

In addition to these directions for the use of shall and will, it is to be observed, that, when the second and third persons are represented as the subjects of their own expressions, or their own thoughts, shall foretels, as in the first person, thus, “he says he shall be a loser by this bargain:” “do you suppose you shall go?” “He hoped he should recover,” and “he hoped he would recover,” are expressions of different import. In the former, the two pronouns necessarily refer to the same person; in the latter, they do not.

[54] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb willan, velle, the preterite of which is Ic wold.

[55] The preterite would is frequently employed, like the Latin preterimperfect tense, to denote what is usual or customary. Thus,

where the verbs aiebat, jubebat, insumebat, may be translated, “he would say,” “he would desire,” “he would spend.” Thus also in English,

[56] In Latin the imperfect potential is frequently employed in the same manner to denote present time; thus, irem si vellem, expresses present liberty and inclination. And the same analogy obtains in Latin; for we say, either, tu, si hic sis, aliter sentias, or tu, si hic esses, aliter sentires. In such examples, it is intended to signify either the coexistence of two circumstances, or the one as the immediate consequence of the other. An identity of tense, therefore, best expresses contemporary events.

[57] If it should be said, that the participle may properly be considered as a verb, since it implies an attribute with time, I would ask, whether affirmation, the most important of all circumstances, and without which no communication could take place, should be overlooked in our classification of words agreeably to their import, or the offices which they perform. If the verb and participle be referred to one class, the principal part of speech which has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb, or the word, is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of thought. Surely, if any circumstance can entitle any sort of words to a distinct reference, it is that of affirmation.

If it should be objected that the participle, like the verb, governs a case, I would ask, because lectio, tactio, and many other substantives, are found sometimes joined with an accusative case, were they ever on this account considered as verbs? Besides, if the government of a case be urged as an argument, what becomes of those participles which govern no case? Nay, if the government of a case be deemed the criterion of a verb, what name shall we assign to those verbs which have no regimen at all? If any species of words is to be distinguished from another, the characteristic difference must surely belong, not to part only, but to the whole.

[58] The termination ing is from the Anglo-Saxon ande, ænde, ende, ind, onde, unde, ynde, and corresponds to the termination of the Latin gerunds in andum and endum, expressing continuation, Amandum, Lufiande, Loving.

[59] Here I would be understood to reason on their own principles; for the truth is, that each of these tenses admits a definitive.

[60] See the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, vol. iii.

[61] Dr. Beattie observes, “that the fundamental error of those philosophers who deny the existence of present time is, that they suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we see or touch must of necessity have magnitude,) so neither is the present, or any other instant, wholly unextended.” His argument amounts to this, that as a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted. They are each ideal. But does this prove the author’s position, that philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse. The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to sense, we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as present an extended space. The doctor observes, that sense perceives nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered that not time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious that part of it is past, and part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious that part of it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be extended; and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future must necessarily be included in it. If it should be answered, that this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the most tedious process will still leave something capable of division, I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case must be figure, and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process, therefore, must be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.

[62] When we say, God is good, I would ask Dr. Browne whether the verb be definite or indefinite, whether it denote perfection or imperfection, or have no reference to either. It appears to me that neither of the terms is in his sense applicable; for that the verb denotes simple affirmation with time; or, if applicable, that the tense is, contrary to his opinion, indefinite, the idea of completion or imperfection being entirely excluded.

[63] These phraseologies, as the author last quoted justly observes, are harsh to the ear, and appear exceedingly awkward; but a little attention will suffice to show that they correctly exhibit the ideas implied by the tense which we have at present under consideration.

[64] See Encyc. Brit., Art. Grammar.

[65] I consider that no language, grammatically examined, has more cases, tenses, or moods, than are formed by inflexion. But if any person be inclined to call these forms of expression by the name of imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be consistent, and call “Dost thou love?” an interrogative mood, adopting also the precative, the requisitive, the optative, the hortative, &c., together with the various cases in nouns, and tenses in verbs, which are formed by prepositions and auxiliary verbs: I should only apprehend, that language would fail him to assign them names.

If it should be asked, “Agreeably to your doctrine of the verb, as implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the verbs in the following sentences, Depart instantly, improve your time, forgive us our sins? Will it be said that the verbs in these phrases are assertions?” I should answer that all moods, metaphysically considered, are, in my apprehension, equally indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing but express the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his sensation, his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form, therefore, the expression may assume, it must be resolvable into assertion; and must be considered as expressing, in the person of the speaker, what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth. No one surely will deny, that “thou oughtest not to kill,” “thou shalt not kill,” “thou art forbidden to kill,” are affirmations. And are not these expressions so nearly equivalent to “do not kill,” that in Greek and Latin they are rendered indifferently either by οὐ φονεύσεις, or, μὴ φόνευε; non occides, or ne occidito? If then we say, “kill thou,” will it be contended that, though the prohibition implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command does not? The expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to “thou shalt kill,” “thou art ordered to kill.” Hence ave and jubeo te avere, are deemed expressions of the same import. If the question be examined grammatically, or as a subject of pure grammar, I am inclined to think that where there is no variety of termination, there cannot be established a diversity of mood.

[66] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb Ic most, ego debeo.

[67] It belongs not to my province to inquire, how amarem came to signify I might or could love, or whether it be strictly in the potential or the subjunctive mood. I here take it for granted that amarem does, without an ellipsis, signify, I might, could, would, or should love, implying licet, possum, volo, debeo.—See Johnson’s Comment.

[68] Why this verb forms an exception, it would be easy to explain.

[69] See Webster’s Dissertations, p. 263.

[70] A similar phraseology in the use of the pluperfect indicative for the same tense subjunctive, obtains in Latin, as

[71] The Latins used si in both cases: and though their poets did not attend to this distinction, their prose writers generally observed it, by joining si for quoniam with the indicative mood.

[72] Where R is added, the verb follows also the general rule.

[73] Some have excluded bore as the preterite of this verb. We have sufficient authority, however, for admitting it; thus,

[74] Beholden is obsolescent in this sense.

[75] “So kept the diamond, and the rogue was bit.”—Pope.

“There was lately a young gentleman bit to the bone.”—Tatler.

[76] Brake seems now obsolescent.

[77] Though Johnson has not admitted the regular form of the participle in this verb, I think there is sufficient authority for concurring with Lowth in receiving builded as the participle as well as built, though it be not in such general use.

[78] Chode, which occurs twice in the Bible, is now obsolete.

[79] Lowth has given clomb as the preterite of climb. I can find, however, no authority later than Spenser, and am inclined to think it is now obsolete.

[80] The irregular preterite clad is obsolescent.

[81] I know no example in which the preterite, which analogically would be forwent, is to be found. It may be here remarked that this verb, in violation of analogy, is generally spelled forego, as if it meant “to go before.” This is equally improper as it would be to write forebid, foresake, foreswear, for forbid, forsake, forswear.

[82] Fraught is more properly an adjective than participle.

[83] This verb, Lowth says, when employed as an active verb, “may perhaps, most properly be used in the regular form.” Here the learned author appears to me, if he be not chargeable with error, to have expressed his meaning incorrectly; for it cannot be disputed that the irregular form of this verb is frequently, and with unquestionable propriety, used in an active sense. Thus we say, “the servant hung the scales in the cellar;” and passively, “the scales were hung by the servant.” I should, therefore, rather say that, when this verb denotes suspension, for the purpose of destroying life, the regular form is far preferable. Thus, “the man was hanged,” not “hung.”

[84] The irregular preterite and participle of this verb are employed in sea language; but the latter rarely.

[85] Lowth has given holpen as the participle; it is now obsolescent, if not obsolete. It belonged to the verb to holp, which has been long out of use.

[86] Several grammarians have rejected hid as a participle. It rests, however, on unquestionable authority; but hidden is preferable.

[87] Holden, which was some years ago obsolescent, is now returning into more general use.

[88] Laden, like fraught, may be deemed an adjective.

[89] Priestley, I apprehend, has erred in giving lain as the participle of this verb.

[90] Lien, though not so generally used as lain, is not destitute of unexceptionable authority. I have, therefore, with Johnson and Lowth, given it as the participle. Murray has omitted it.

[91] Some grammarians have rejected lit. It can plead, however, colloquial usage in its favour, and even other authority. “I lit my pipe with the paper.”—Addison.

[92] With Priestley and Lowth, I have given this verb a regular participle; for which, I believe, there is sufficient authority, without adducing the example of Shakspeare. Most other grammarians have rejected it.

[93] Quitted is far more generally used as the preterite than quit.

[94] Priestley has rejected rid, and Murray ridden, as the participle, while Johnson makes rid the preterite of ride. As rid is the present and preterite of another verb, it would, perhaps, be better to dismiss it entirely from the verb to ride, and conjugate, with Priestley, ride, rode, ridden.

[95] Our translators of the Bible have used roast as the perfect participle. In this sense it is almost obsolete. Roast beef retains its ground.

[96] Story, in his Grammar, has most unwarrantably asserted, that the participle of this verb should be shaked. This word is certainly obsolete, and, I apprehend, was never in general use. I have been able to find only one example of shaked as the participle, “A sly and constant knave, not to be shaked.”—Shakspeare. And two as the preterite, “They shaked their heads.”—Psal. cxi. 55. “I shaked my head.”—Steele, Spectator, No. iv.

[97] Of these preterites, the latter is now more generally used. Our translators of the Bible used the former.

[98] A. Murray has rejected sung as the preterite, and L. Murray has rejected sang. Each preterite, however, rests on good authority.

The same observation may be made respecting sank and sunk.

[99] Sitten, though formerly in use, is now obsolescent. Laudable attempts, however, have been made to restore it. “To have sitten on the heads of the apostles.”—Middleton.

“Soon after the termination of this business, the parliament, which had now sitten three years,” &c.—Belsham’s Hist.

“And he would gladly, for the sake of dispatch, have called together the same parliament, which had sitten under his father.”—Hume, vol. vi. p. 199.

Respecting the preterites which have a or u, as slang, or slung, sank, or sunk, it would be better were the former only to be used, as the preterite and participle would thus be discriminated.

[100] Pope has used the regular form of the preterite:

Horsley, with one or two other writers, have employed the regular participle.

[101] Washen seems obsolescent, if not obsolete. The compound unwashen occurs in our translation of the Bible.

[102] Pope, and our translators of the Bible, have used winded as the preterite. The other form, however, is in far more general use.

[103] Wrote, as the participle, is generally disused, and likewise writ. The latter was used as a preterite by Pope, Swift, and other writers of the same period.

[104] Wit is now confined to the phrase to wit, or namely. It is an abbreviation from the Anglo-Saxon verb þiꞇan, to know.

[105] This verb, as an auxiliary, is inflexible; thus we say, “he will go,” and “he wills to go.”

[106] This verb, which signifies “to think,” or “to imagine,” is now obsolete.

[107] This verb is now used as significant of present duty. It was originally the preterite, and the perfect participle of the verb to owe; and is corruptedly used in Scotland still to express a past debt. “Apprehending the occasion, I will add a continuance to that happy motion, and besides give you some tribute of the love and duty I long have ought you.”—Spelman.

It is now used in the present tense only; and, when past duty or obligation is to be signified, we note, as I formerly mentioned, the past time by the preterite sense of the subsequent verb; thus, “I ought to read,” “I ought to have read.” The classical scholar knows that the reverse takes place in Latin. Debeo legere, debui legere. Cicero, however, though very rarely indeed, uses the preterite of the infinitive after the preterite tense of this verb.

Murray has told us, that must and ought have both a present and past signification, and, in proof of this, he adduces the following examples:—“I must own, that I am to blame.” “He must have been mistaken.” “Speaking things which they ought not.” “These ought ye to have done.” This is truly a strange, and, I verily believe, a singular opinion. Its inaccuracy is so manifest, that every reader of discernment must intuitively perceive it. The opinion itself, indeed, is not more surprising, than the ground on which it is maintained by the author. It surely requires but a moderate portion of sagacity to perceive, that the past time, in the second and fourth examples, is not denoted by must and ought, but by the expressions “have been” and “have done.” In Latin, as I have just observed, necessity and duty are expressed as either present, past, or future, the verbs denoting these having the three correspondent tenses; and the object of the necessity or duty is expressed as contemporary, or relatively present. In English, on the contrary, the two verbs must and ought having only the present tense, we are obliged to note the past time by employing the preterite tense of the subsequent verb. Thus, Me ire oportet, “I ought to go,” “I must go.” Me ire oportuit, “I ought to have gone,” “I must have gone.” As well may it be affirmed, that the past time is denoted by ire and not oportuit, as that it is signified by must and not by “have gone.”

In the time of Wallis, the term must, as a preterite tense, was almost obsolete. “Aliquando,” he remarks, “sed rarius in præterito dicitur.” And when it was employed as a preterite, it was followed by the present tense. This verb in German has, I understand, a preterite tense.

[108] Firstly, is used by some writers.

[109] Denominativa terminantur in lic vel lice, ut þeꞃlic virilis, ælic legitimus, ꞃælic marinus, þiꝼlic muliebris, &c. Hanc terminationem hodie mutavimus in like vel ly, ut in godlike vel godly. Hickesii Thes.

The correctness of this explanation has been controverted by Mr. Gilchrist, who contends that, though it may answer in some cases, it will fail “in nine times out of ten.” In the expressions “weekly wages,” “daily labour,” “yearly income,” he observes, that the meaning cannot be, “wages like a week,” “labour like a day,” “income like a year.” He rejects, therefore, this explanation, and considers the termination lic to be the same with lig in the Latin verb ligo, “to tie,” or “join,” and to have the same effect as other conjunctive particles, as “a friendly part,” “a friend’s part,” “yearly produce,” “year’s produce.” Though a copious induction of examples justifies us in refusing our assent to Mr. Gilchrist’s exaggerated statement, that the derivation proposed by Hickes will fail in nine cases out of ten; we candidly acknowledge, that in many instances it is inadmissible; and that Mr. Gilchrist’s suggestion is ingenious, though it will be found, we apprehend, opposed by the same objection as he urges against Hickes’s explanation. Nor does it appear to us, that Mr. Gilchrist’s argument subverts the doctrine generally received. The termination may have been originally what Hickes supposed, and the principle of analogy may, in time, have introduced similar compositions, when this meaning of the termination ceased to be regarded. Thus the term candidly, which we have just now used, was probably introduced, in conformity to analogy, with no reference whatever to the meaning of the termination. It may be here also observed, that the import of this term seems inexplicable on the hypothesis that ly is a mere term of conjunction.

[110] These three adverbs, denoting motion or rest in a place, are frequently employed by us, in imitation of the French, to denote motion to a place in the same sense with the three following adverbs. It would be better, however, were the distinction observed. The French use ici for here and hither, là for there and thither, où for where and whither.

[111] 

This animated little poem will be read with no common pleasure by every admirer of the Scottish muse. In felicity of description the author is not inferior to Burns, while in delicacy of humour he may claim the superiority.

This preposition is supposed by Mr. Gilchrist to be derived from forth, or rather to be a different form of that word. See his “Philosophic Etymology,” a work exhibiting considerable ingenuity and philological knowledge, combined with many fanciful and unphilosophical opinions.

[112] It is possible that the Greek ἀπό, and the Latin ab derived from it, had their origin in אב pater principium, “author,” or “principle of existence.”

[113] The verb, “to twin,” is still used in Scotland for “to part,” or “separate.”

[114] That the Saxon word ægther signified each, is sufficiently evident from a variety of examples; and the adjective either has continued to be used in that sense by reputable writers. Lowth, who, I apprehend, did not advert to its primitive signification, condemns the use of it as equivalent to each; and notwithstanding its original import, I agree with him in thinking, that it is much better to confine its meaning to “one of two.” The reason will be assigned hereafter.