242. It is notable that it failed to find a place in the Charter of 1225, which was paid for by the nation at the price of one-fifteenth of moveables.
243. Dr. Stubbs propounds the theory that this re-issue of 1216 represents a compromise whereby the central government, in return for increased taxing powers, allowed to the feudal magnates increased rights of jurisdiction. He gives, however, no reasons for this belief, either in Select Charters, p. 339, or in his Constitutional History, II. 27. It is abundantly clear that the Crown reserved a free hand for itself in taxation, but there seems no evidence to support the other part of the theory, namely, that feudal justice gained new ground against royal justice in 1216 which had not been already gained in 1215.
244. It is unnecessary to invent any special catastrophe to account for the disappearance of John’s seal. Blackstone (Great Charter, xxix.) says, "King John’s great seal having been lost in passing the washes of Lincolnshire."
245. Compare what is said of the negotiations at Runnymede, and the date of John’s Magna Carta, supra, p. 48.
246. Blackstone, Great Charter, xxxiv.
247. Ibid.
248. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 25.
249. See infra under chapter 9.
250. Great Charter, xxxix., and cf. infra, p. 201.
251. The Forest Charter, preserved in the archives of Durham Cathedral, bears this date, and that, in itself, affords some presumption that the Charter of Liberties (undated) to which it forms a supplement was executed at the same time. M. Bémont accepts this date; see his Chartes, xxviii., and authorities there cited. Blackstone, Great Charter, xxxix., gives the probable date as 23rd September. Dr. Stubbs, always catholic in his sympathies, gives both dates, 23rd September in Sel. Charters, 344, and 6th November in Const. Hist., II. 26. This Charter of Liberties of 1217, originally found among the archives of Gloucester Abbey and now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, still bears the impression of two seals—that of Gualo in yellow wax, and that of the Regent in green. See Blackstone, Great Charter, p. xxxv. The existence of the separate Forest Charter was only surmised by Blackstone, Ibid., p. xlii.; but shortly after he wrote, an original of it was found among the archives of Durham Cathedral. For an account of this and of its discovery, see Thomson, Magna Charta, pp. 443-5.
253. Mr. Hubert Hall (Eng. Hist. Rev., IX. 344) takes a different view, however, considering that a reduction of scutages to the old rate of the reign of Henry II. was impossible; he speaks of “the astounding and futile concession in c. 44 of the charter of 1217.” The clause is surely neither astounding nor futile if we regard it as a promise by Henry III. that he would not exact more than 20s. per knight’s fee without consent, and if we further note that it was the practice of his reign to ask such consent from the Commune Concilium for scutages even of a lower rate. A levy of 10s., for example, was granted by a Council in 1221. See Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 33.
254. Prothero, S. de Montfort, 67.
255. See cc. 7, 26, and 38 of 1217. Blackstone (Great Charter, xxvii.) further considers that c. 35 of 1217 contains “more ample provision against unlawful disseisins”; and this opinion of a great lawyer is shared by a distinguished historian. Mr. Prothero (Simon de Montfort, 17 n.), finds that the words of the re-issue “are considerably fuller and clearer than the corresponding declaration in the charter of 1215.” It will be shown, however, infra under chapter 39, that one object of the alteration was to make it clear that holdings of villeins were excluded from the projection of the judicium parium; and that other alterations in the Charter of 1217 (e.g. chapter 16) are carefully drawn with a similar object.
256. C. 47 of 1217.
258. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 32.
259. C. 13 of 1217.
260. C. 15 of 1217.
261. C. 14 of 1217.
262. C. 42 of 1217.
263. Ibid. This seems to imply that all the aggressions since Henry’s reign, had not been on one side. The barons, in obtaining a promise to respect “franchises” acquired since 1189, tacitly admitted that they had been recently encroaching on royal prerogatives. By the Statute of Gloucester and the subsequent quo warranto procedure Edward I. made a partially successful effort to redress the balance.
264. 18 Edward I., also known as Westminster III.
265. 7 Edward I., also known as the Statute de religiosis.
266. See Pollock and Maitland, I. 314.
267. Minor variations are discussed under their appropriate chapters infra. A full list is given by Blackstone, Great Charter, xxxvi.
268. Cf. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 27. “This re-issue presents the Great Charter in its final form.”
269. The terms of these writs are preserved in Rot. Claus., I. 377.
270. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 30. The Annals of Waverley, p. 290, speak of a re-issue of the charters about this date; but this probably results from confusion with what happened a year earlier. See Stubbs, Ibid.
271. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 31.
272. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 32, and authorities there cited.
273. Chronica Majora, III. 76.
274. Dr. Stubbs thinks that in thus avoiding one danger, a greater danger was incurred. "It must be acknowledged that Hubert, in trying to bind the royal conscience, forsook the normal and primitive form of legislative enactment, and opened a claim on the king’s part to legislate by sovereign authority without counsel or consent." (Const. Hist., II. 37.) This seems to exaggerate the importance of an isolated precedent, the circumstances of which were unique. The confirmation was something far apart from an ordinary “legislative enactment.”
275. A few minor alterations, such as the omission of the clause against unlicensed castles (now unnecessary) and some verbal changes need not be mentioned. A list of these is given by Blackstone, Great Charter, l.
276. See Blackstone, Ibid., xlvii. to l.
277. Ibid.
278. One slight exception should be noted. In one point of detail a change had occurred since 1225; the rate of relief payable from a barony had been reduced from £100 to 100 marks. See infra under chapter 2.
279. A bull of Gregory IX., dated 13th April, 1227, confirmed Henry in this declaration that his minority was ended. See Blackstone, Great Charter, li., and Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 39.
280. See Rot. Claus., II. 169, and Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 40, where it is suggested that “the declaration seems merely to have been a contrivance for raising money.” This is not quite accurate. Mr. G. J. Turner, in his introduction to Select Pleas of the Forest, pp. xcix. to cii., gives a full and convincing account of Henry’s procedure and motives. “The king neither repudiated the Charter of the Forest nor annulled the perambulations which had been made in his infancy. He merely corrected them after due inquiry.”
281. Blackstone, Great Charter, 68–9; Stubbs, Sel. Charters, 365–6.
282. The more important among them are enumerated by Coke in his second Institute, p. 1. Further details are given by Blackstone, Great Charter, lii.; Thomson, Magna Charta, 437–446; and in Bémont, Chartes, pp. xxx. to liii.
The Great Charter, alike from its excellences and from its defects, exercised a potent influence on the trend of events throughout the two succeeding reigns. It is hardly too much to say that the failure of Magna Carta to provide adequate machinery for its own enforcement is responsible for the spirit of unrest and for the protracted struggles and civil war which made up the troubled reign of Henry III.; while the difference of attitude assumed by Henry and by his son Edward respectively towards the scheme of reform it embodied explains the fundamental difference between the two reigns—why the former was so full of conflicts and distress, while the latter was so prosperous and progressive. To trace the history of these reigns in detail lies outside the scope of this Historical Introduction. It seems necessary, however, to emphasize such outstanding events as have an obvious and close connection with the Great Charter, and also to outline the policy of Edward, which led ultimately to the triumph of its underlying principles.
The fundamental difference between the reigns of Henry III. and Edward I. lies in this, that while Henry, in spite of numerous nominal confirmations of Magna Carta, never loyally accepted the settlement it contained, Edward, on the contrary, acquiesced in the main provisions of the Great Charter, under many subtle modifications it is true, yet honestly on the whole, and with a sincere intention to carry them into practice.
At the same time, the attitude even of Henry III. towards Magna Carta indicates a distinct advance upon that of his father. It was much that the advisers of John’s infant heir solemnly accepted, on behalf of the Crown, the provisions of the Charter, and strove to enforce them during the minority; and it was even more that Henry, on attaining majority, confirmed the arrangement thus arrived at, freely and on his own initiative, and found himself thereafter unable openly to repudiate the bargain he had made. Yet the settlement of the dissensions between Crown and baronage was still nominal rather than real. In the absence of proper constitutional machinery, the king was merely bound by bonds of parchment which he could break at pleasure. The victory of the friends of liberty proved a hollow one, since unsupported promises count for little in the great struggles fought for national liberties. Even the crude constitutional devices of the Charter of 1215 entirely disappeared from its confirmations; and, in the absence of all sanctions for its enforcement, the Charter became an empty expression of good intentions. If a quarrel arose, no constitutional expedient existed to reconcile the disputants—nothing to obviate a final recourse to the arbitrament of civil war. Thus, part of the blame for the recurring and devastating struggles of the reign of Henry III. must be attributed to the defects of the Great Charter.
The whole interest of the reign indeed lies in the various attempts made to evolve adequate machinery for enforcing the liberties contained in Magna Carta. Experiments of many kinds were tried in the hope of turning theory into practice. The system of government outlined in the Provisions of Oxford of 1258, for example, reproduced the defects of the crude scheme contained in chapter 61 of the Great Charter, and added new defects of its own. It sought to keep the king in the paths of good government by the coercion of a body of his enemies. This baronial committee was not designed to enter into friendly co-operation with Henry in the normal work of government, but rather to supersede entirely his right to exercise certain of the royal prerogatives. No glimmering was yet apparent of the true solution afterwards adopted with success. It was not yet realized that the best way to control the Crown was through the agency of its own ministers, and not by means of a hostile opposition organized for rebellion—that the correct policy was to make it difficult for the king to rule except through regular ministers, and to secure that all such ministers should be men in whom the Commune Concilium reposed confidence and over whom it exercised control.
It is true that Simon de Montfort may have had some vague conception of the real constitutional remedy for the evils of the reign; but his ideals were overruled in 1258 by the more extreme section of the baronial party. Earl Simon indeed had one opportunity of putting his theories into practice. During the brief interval between the battle of Lewes, which made him supreme for the moment, and the battle of Evesham, which ended his career, he enjoyed an unfettered control over the movement of reform; and some authorities find in the provisional scheme of government, by means of which he attempted to realize his political ideals in the closing months of 1264, traces of the true constitutional expedient afterward successfully adopted as a solution of the problem. In one respect, undoubtedly, the Earl of Leicester did influence the development of the English constitution; he furnished the first precedent for a national Parliament, which reflected interests wider than those of the Crown tenants and the free-holders, when he invited representatives of the boroughs to take their places by the side of the representatives of the counties in the national council summoned to meet in January, 1265. His schemes of government, however, were not fated to be realized by him in a permanent form. The utter overthrow of his faction followed his decisive defeat and death at Evesham on 4th August, 1265.
The personal humiliation of Simon de Montfort, however, in reality assured the ultimate triumph of the cause he had made his own. Prince Edward, from the moment of his brilliant victory at Evesham, was not only supreme over his father’s enemies, but henceforth he was supreme also within his father’s councils. He found himself in a position at once to realize some of his most important political ideals; and from the very moment of his victory, he adopted as his own, with some modification, it is true, the main constitutional conceptions of his uncle Earl Simon, who had been his friend and teacher before he became his deadliest enemy.
Edward Plantagenet, alike when acting as the chief adviser of his aged father and after he had succeeded him on the throne, not only accepted the main provisions of the Great Charter,[283] but adopted also, along with them, a new scheme of government which formed their necessary counterpart. To Edward is due the first dim conception of “parliamentary government,” to this extent at least, that the king, as head of the executive government, should take a national council into partnership with him in the work of national administration. His political ideals were the natural result of the experience obtained during the later years of his father’s reign; and he endeavoured to embody in his scheme of government the best parts of the various experiments in which that reign abounded. His policy, although founded on that of his uncle Simon de Montfort, was profoundly modified by his own individual genius. The very fact of the adoption of Earl Simon’s ideals by the heir to the throne entirely altered their chances of success. All such schemes had been foredoomed to failure so long as they merely emanated from an opposition leader however powerful; but their triumph was speedily assured now that they were accepted as a programme of reform by the monarch himself. Henceforth the new political ideals, summed up in the conception of a national Parliament, were to be fostered by the Crown’s active support, not merely thrust upon the monarchy from without.
Under the protection of Edward I.—the last of the four great master-builders of the constitution—the Commune Concilium of the Angevin kings (itself a more developed form of the Curia Regis of the Conqueror and his sons) grew into the English Parliament. This implied no sudden dramatic change, but a long slow process of adjustment, under the guiding hand of Edward.
The main features of his scheme may be briefly summarized: Edward’s conception of his position as a national king achieving national ends, the funds necessary for effecting which ought to be contributed by the nation, naturally led him to devise a system of taxation which would fill the Exchequer while avoiding unnecessary friction with the tax-payer. His problem was to keep his treasury full in the way most convenient to the Crown, and at the same time to reduce to a minimum the discontent and inconvenience felt by the nation at large under the burden. In broadening the basis of taxation, he was led to broaden the basis of Parliament; and thus he advanced from the feudal conception of a Commune Concilium, attended only by Crown tenants, to the nobler ideal of a national Parliament containing representatives of every community and every class in England. The composition of the great council was altered; the principle of representation known for centuries before the Conquest in English local government, now found a home, and, as it proved, a permanent home, in the English Parliament. It was obvious that Parliament, whose composition was thus altered, must meet more frequently than of old. Edward elevated the national council from its ancient position of a mere occasional assembly reserved for special emergencies, to a normal and honoured place in the scheme of government. Henceforth, frequent sessions of parliament became a matter of course.
The powers of this assembly also widened almost automatically, with the widening of its composition. Taxation was its original function, since that was the primary purpose (so the best authorities maintain in spite of some adverse criticism) for which the representatives of the counties and the boroughs had been called to it. Legislation, or the right to veto legislation, was soon added—although at first the new-comers had only a humble share in this. The functions of hearing grievances and of proffering advice had, even in the days of the Conqueror, belonged to such of the great magnates as were able to make their voices heard in the Curia Regis; and similar rights were gradually extended to the humbler members of the augmented assembly. The representatives of counties and of towns retained rights of free discussion even after Parliament had split into two separate Houses. These rights, fortified by command of the purse strings, tended to increase, until they secured for the Commons some measure of control over the executive functions of the king. This parliamentary control varied in extent and effectiveness with the weakness of the king, with his need of money, and with the political situation of the hour.
The new position and powers of Parliament logically involved a corresponding alteration in the position and powers of the smaller but more permanent council or Concilium Ordinarium (the future Privy Council). This had long been increasing in power, in prestige, and in independence, a process quickened by the minority of Henry III. The Council was now strengthened by the support of a powerful Parliament, usually acting in alliance with the leaders of the baronial opposition. The members of the Council were generally recruited from Parliament, and their appointment as king’s ministers and members of the Curia was strongly influenced by the proceedings in the larger assembly.
The Council thus became neutral ground on which the conflicting interests of king and baronage might be discussed and compromised. Wild schemes like that of chapter 61 of Magna Carta or like that typified in the Committee appointed by the Mad Parliament in 1258, were now unnecessary. The king’s own ministers, backed by Parliament, became an adequate means of enforcing the constitutional restraints embodied in royal Charters. The problem was thus, for the time being, solved. A proper sanction had been devised, fit to change royal promises into realities.
To sum up, Edward’s aim of ruling as a national king implied the frequent assembling of a central parliament composed of individuals fitted to act as links between the Crown and the various classes of the English nation whom he expected to contribute to the national Exchequer. It implied also that the national business should be conducted by ministers likely to command the confidence of that parliament.[284] Thus, Edward’s policy dimly foreshadowed some of the most fundamental principles of modern constitutional government—parliament, representation, ministerial responsibility. Edward Plantagenet was, of course, far from realizing the full meaning of these conceptions, and if he had realized it, he would have been most unwilling to accept them; yet he was unconsciously helping forward the cause of constitutional progress.
This temporary solution, during the reign of Edward I., of an ever-recurring problem of government has been viewed in two different aspects. It is sometimes regarded simply as the result of the pressure of events—as a natural phenomenon evolved, subject to natural laws, to meet the needs of the age. By other writers it is attributed to the wisdom and conscious action of King Edward. The two views are perhaps not so inconsistent as they at first sight seem, since great men work in harmony with the spirit of their times, and appear to control events which they only interpret and express. The bargain made at Runnymede between the English monarch and the English nation found its necessary counterpart and sanction, before the close of the thirteenth century, in the conception of a king ruling through responsible ministers and in harmony with a national Parliament. Edward Plantagenet was merely the instrument by whose agency the new conception was for a time partially realized. Yet, he merits the gratitude of posterity for his share in the elaboration of a working scheme of government, which took the place of the clumsy expedients designed as constitutional sanctions by the barons in 1215. He supplied the logical complement of the theories vainly enunciated in John’s Great Charter, thus changing empty expressions of good intentions into accomplished facts. The ultimate triumph of the principles underlying Magna Carta was assured through the constitutional machinery devised by Edward Plantagenet.
283. The best proof of this will be found in a comparison of Magna Carta with the Statute of Marlborough, and the chief statutes of Edward’s reign, notably that of Westminster I.
284. The doctrine that the Commune Concilium should have some voice in the appointment of the Ministers of the Crown had indeed been acted upon on several occasions even in the reign of Henry III. See Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 41.