97. This was done by the council at Constance, A. D. 1415, before which time there were, indeed, several disputes about the matter or form of the cup, in which the wine was contained; but it was never taken away from the common people till then.
98. This hymn is inserted after Sternhold and Hopkin’s version of the Psalms.
99. See Dr. Goodwin’s Christ set forth, § 2. Chap. ii.
100. See Quest. LXXII. Vol. III. page 97, & seq. and Quest. LXXVI, LXXXV, LXXXVII.
101. See Quest. lxxxi. Vol. III. page 268.
102. Voveo.
105. That several of the Fathers practised and pleaded for praying for the dead, is evident from what Cyprian says, Epist. xxxix. concerning the church’s offering sacrifices, by which he means prayers for the martyrs; among whom, he particularly mentions Laurentius and Ignatius, on the yearly return of those days, on which the memorial of their martyrdom was celebrated. And Eusebius, in the life of Constantine, Lib. iv. Cap. lxxi. when speaking concerning the funeral obsequies performed for that monarch, says, that a great number of people, with tears and lamentations poured forth prayers to God for the emperor’s soul. And Gregory Nazianzen prayed for his brother Cæsarius after his death. Vid. Ejusd in Fun. Cæsar, Orat. x. Also Ambrose prayed for the religious emperors, Valentinian and Gratian, and for Theodosius, and for his brother Satyrus. Vid. Ejusd. de obit. Valentin. Theodos. & Satyr. And Augustin speaks of his praying for his mother Monica, after her decease, in Confess. Lib. ix. Cap. xiii. And Epiphanius defends this practice with so much warmth, that he can hardly forbear charging the denial hereof as one of Aerius’s heresies. Vid. Epiphan. hæeres. lxxv. And some Popish writers, when defending their praying for the dead, have, with more malice than reason, charged the Protestants with being Aerians, upon this account.
107. Vid. Grot. in loc.
108. Many suppose that all those Psalms, in which some particular expressions are referred to in the New Testament, as having their accomplishment in Christ, are to be understood as containing a double reference, namely, to David, as denoting his particular case, and to Christ, of whom he was an eminent type. But as for Psalm xxii. there are several expressions in it, not only applied to Christ in the New Testament; but they cannot well be understood of any other but him. In the first verse he uses the same words that were uttered by Christ on the cross, Matt. xxvii. 46. My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? and in ver. 8. he trusted in the Lord that he would deliver him; let him deliver him: This was an expression used by those who mocked and derided him, Matt. xxvii. 41, 45. And what is said in verses 14, 17. All my bones are out of joint; I may tell them, they look and stare upon me; does not seem to be applicable to David, from any thing said concerning him elsewhere; but they are a lively representation of the torment a person endures, when hanging on a cross, as our Saviour did; which has a tendency to disjoint the bones, and cause them to stick out. And when it is said, ver. 16, 18. they pierced my hands and my feet; and they part my garments among them, and cast lots upon my vesture; the former was fulfilled in Christ’s being nailed to the cross, and his side pierced with a spear; and the latter is expressly referred to as fulfilled in the parting of Christ’s garments, and casting lots upon his vesture, Matt. xxvii. 35. as an accomplishment of what was foretold, by the royal prophet in this Psalm. These expressions cannot, in the least, be applied to David, but are to be understood of our Saviour; therefore, we may conclude that those words in ver. 6. I am a worm, &c. are particularly applied to him.
109. What under one aspect is grace, under another is duty.
110. Vide ante vol. I. p. 19. in note.
111. The petition in Luke offered daily, is equivalent to that in Matthew.
112. επιουσιον is found only in this prayer, and rather means necessary.
113. Qu. For Father is designed in its appellative sense, and our as a covenant-plea.
115. See Vol. II Quest. XLV. page 353.
116. See Vol. II. page 376.
117. See Vol. II. page 376, &c.
118. See Vol. I. Quest. xii. p. 471.
119. It has been said, that there cannot be any reason or motive to pray, or make any petition, to an unchangeable God, whose design cannot be altered, and who has fixed all events, without a possibility of any change.
Before any attempt is made to remove this objection, and supposed difficulty, it must be observed, that it equally lies against the foreknowledge of God. For if God certainly foreknows every thing that will take place, then every event is fixed and certain, otherwise it could not be foreknown. “Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world.” He has determined, and passed an unchangeable decree, with respect to all that he will do to eternity. Upon the plan of the objection under consideration, it may be asked, What reason or motive can any one have to ask God to do any thing for him, or any one else, since he infallibly knows from the beginning what he will do, and therefore it is unalterably fixed? Therefore if it be reasonable to pray to an omniscient God, it is equally reasonable to pray to an unchangeable God. For the former necessarily implies the latter. But in order to show that the objection is without foundation, the following things must be observed.
1. If God were not omniscient and unchangeable, and had not foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, he would not be the proper object of worship, and there would be no foundation, reason, or encouragement to make any petition to him.
This, it is presumed, will be evident to any one who will well consider the following observations.
First. If there were no unchangeable, omniscient Being, there would be no God, no proper object of worship. A being who is capable of change, is necessarily imperfect, and may change from bad to worse, and even cease to exist, and therefore could not be trusted. If we could know that such a being has existed, and that he was once wise, and good, and powerful, we could have no evidence that he would continue to be wise or good, or that he is so now, or that he is now disposed to pay any regard to our petitions, or is either willing or able to grant them; or even that he has any existence. What reason of encouragement then can there be to pray to a changeable being? Surely none at all. Therefore, if there be no reason to pray to an unchangeable God, there can be no reason to pray at all.
Secondly. If God be infinitely wise, and good, and omnipotent, supreme and independent; then he certainly is unchangeable, and has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. This has been proved above, or rather is self-evident. But if he be not infinitely wise and good, &c. then he cannot be trusted; he cannot be the object of that trust and confidence which is implied, and even expressed, in praying to him.
Thirdly. The truly pious, benevolent, devout man would not desire, or even dare, to pray to God for any thing, if he were changeable, and disposed to alter his purpose and plan, in order to grant his petitions. Therefore he never does pray to any but an unchangeable God, whose counsel stands forever, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations. He is sensible that he is a very imperfect creature; that his heart, his will, is awfully depraved and sinful; that he knows not what is wisest and best to be done in any one instance; what is best for him, for mankind in general, for the world, or for the universe; what is most for the glory of God, and the greatest general good; and that it would be infinitely undesirable and dreadful to have his own will regarded so as to govern in determining what shall be done for him or any other being, or what shall take place. If it could be left to him to determine in the least instance, he would not dare to do it, but would refer it back to God, and say, “Not my will, but thine be done.” But he could not do this, unless he were certain that the will of God was unchangeably wise and good, and that he had decreed to do what was most for his own glory, and the greatest good of the whole; at the same time infallibly knowing what must take place, in every instance, in order to answer this end; and consequently must have fixed upon the most wise and best plan, foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass. Therefore, whatever be his petitions for himself, or for others, he offers them to God, and asks, on this condition, always either expressed or implied, If it be agreeable to thy will: for otherwise he would not have his petitions granted, if it were possible. And he who asks any thing of God, without making this condition, but sets up his own will, and desires to have it gratified, whether it be for the glory of God, and the greatest good of his kingdom, or not; and would, were it in his power, compel his Maker to grant his petition, and bow the will of God to his own will; he who prays to God with such a disposition, is an impious enemy to God, exercises no true devotion, and cannot be heard; and it is desireable to all the friends of God that he should be rejected. Resignation to the will of God always supposes his will is unchangeably fixed and established, which it could not be, unless he has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.
Thus it appears that if God were changeable, and had not foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, there would be no foundation for religious worship, or reason for praying to him; or that there can be no reason or encouragement for prayer and petition to any but an unchangeable God.—I proceed to observe,
2. There is good reason, and all desirable and possible encouragement, to pray to an unchangeable God, who has from eternity determined what he will do, in every instance, and has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.
This will doubtless be evident, to him who will duly, consider the following particulars.
First. Prayer is as proper, important, and necessary, in order to obtain favour from an unchangeable God, as it could be were he changeable, and had not foreordained any thing.
Means are as necessary in order to obtain the end, as if nothing were fixed and certain. Though it was decreed that Paul and all the men in the ship should get safe to land, when they were in a storm at sea; yet this must be accomplished by means, and unless the sailors had assisted in managing the ship, this event could not take place, and they could not be saved. Prayer is a means of obtaining what God had determined to grant; for he has determined to give it in answer to prayer, and no other way. “Ask, and ye shall receive,” says our Saviour. When God had promised to do many and great things for Israel, he adds, “Thus saith the Lord God, I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel, to do it for them:” [Ezek. xxxvi. 37.] The granting the favours, which God had determined to bestow, was as much suspended on their asking for them, as if there had been nothing determined and fixed about it. There is as much regard had to prayer in granting favours, and the prayer is heard, and God gives them, as really and as much in answer to it, as if there were nothing determined and foreordained respecting them: for the decree includes and fixes the means, as much as the end; the method and way by which events are to take place, as much as those events themselves. The one depends on the other, as much as if there were no decree, and nothing fixed; yea, much more: for the decree fixes the dependence and connexion between the means and the end: whereas if there were no decree, and nothing fixed, there would be no established connexion, but all would be uncertain, and there would be no reason or encouragement to use means, or do any thing to obtain an end.
Surely, then, there is as much reason and encouragement to pray to an unchangeable God, and this is as important and necessary, as if there were nothing fixed by the divine decrees, and much more: yea, the unchangeable purposes of God are the necessary and only proper ground and reason of prayer.
Secondly. Though prayer is not designed to make any change in God, or alter his purpose, which is impossible; yet it is suited and designed to have an effect on the petitioner, and prepare him to receive that for which he prays. And this is a good reason why he should pray. It tends to make the petitioner to feel more and more sensibly his wants, and those of others for whom he prays, and the miserable state in which he and they are: for in prayer these are called up to view, and dwelt upon: and prayer tends to give a sense of the worth and importance of the favours asked. It is also suited to make persons feel, more and more, their own helplessness, and entire dependence on God for the favours for which they petition, of which their praying is an acknowledgment: and therefore tends to enhance them in the eyes of the petitioner, when given in answer to prayer, and make him more sensible of the free, sovereign goodness of God in granting them.[120] In sum, this is suited to keep the existence and character of God in view, and impress a sense of religious truths in general on the mind, and to form the mind to universal obedience, and a conscientious watchfulness and circumspection, in all religious exercises.
Thirdly. It is reasonable, and highly proper and important, and for the honour of God, that the friends of God should express and acknowledge their entire dependence on him, and trust in him, for all they want for themselves and others, and their belief in the power, wisdom and goodness of God; and all this is acknowledged, expressly or implicity, in prayer to God. It is also reasonable and proper that they should express their desire of those things which are needed by themselves or others, and which God alone can give or accomplish: and such desires are expressed in the best way and manner by petitioning for them. And in asking for blessings on others, and praying for their enemies, they express their benevolence, which is an advantage to themselves, and pleasing to God, even though their petitions should have no influence in procuring the favours which they ask. And in praying that God would honour himself, and advance his own kingdom, and accomplish all the great and glorious things which he has promised to do for his own honour, and the good of his people, they do not express any doubts of his fulfilling his promises, but are certain he will grant their petitions; but they hereby express their acquiescence in these things, and their earnest desire that they may be accomplished; and also profess and express their love to God, and friendship to his people and kingdom; and do that which the feelings of a pious, benevolent heart will naturally, and even necessarily, prompt them to do.
We have many examples of such petitions and prayers for those things and events, which the petitioners, antecedent to their prayers, knew would certainly be accomplished. We have a decisive and remarkable instance of this in David, the king of Israel, in the following words: “And now, O Lord God, the word that thou hast spoken concerning thy servant, and concerning his house, establish it for ever, and do as thou hast said. And let thy name be magnified forever, saying, The Lord of hosts is the God over Israel: and let the house of thy servant David be established before thee. For thou, O Lord of hosts, God of Israel, hast revealed to thy servant, saying, I will build thee an house: therefore hath thy servant found in his heart to pray this prayer before thee. And now, O Lord God, thou art that God, and thy words be true, and thou hast promised this goodness unto thy servant. Therefore now let it please thee to bless the house of thy servant, that it may continue forever before thee; for thou, O Lord God, hast spoken it, and with thy blessing let the house of thy servant be blessed forever:” [2 Sam. vii. 25-29.] Here David not only prays God to do that which at the same time he knew and acknowledges God had promised to do; and therefore it was established as firm as the throne of the Almighty, and decreed that it should take place; but he says that this promise of God, making it certain, was the reason, motive, and encouragement to him to make this prayer: “Thou, O Lord, hast revealed to thy servant, saying, I will build thee an house. And now, O Lord God, thou art that God, and thy words be true, and thou hast promised this goodness unto thy servant; THEREFORE HATH THY SERVANT FOUND IN HIS HEART TO PRAY THIS PRAYER BEFORE THEE.” We hence are warranted to assert that it is reasonable and proper to pray for that which God has promised; and that the certainty that it will be accomplished is a motive and encouragement to pray for it. How greatly then do they err, who think that if every event is made certain by God’s decree, there is no reason or encouragement to pray for any thing!
Our Saviour, in the pattern of prayer which he has dictated, directs men to pray that God would bring to pass those events which are already fixed and decreed, and therefore must infallibly take place; “Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name; thy kingdom come, thy will be done,” &c.
Christ himself, in the 17th chapter of John, prays for those whom the Father had given to him, that he would keep them through his own name, and that they might be one, as the Father and Son were one; might be kept from the evil in the world, and be sanctified through the truth; that they might be with him in heaven forever, and behold his glory. At the same time he knew that all this was made certain to them; for he had before said, that all that were given to him should come to him, and he would raise them up at the last day; that he would give unto them eternal life, and not one of them should perish, as none should be able to pluck them out of his hands, or his Father’s. He prays, “Father, glorify thy name;” not because this event was uncertain, but to express his earnest desire of that which he knew was decreed, and could not but take place, and his willingness to give up every thing, even his own life to promote this. Again, Christ prays in the following words: “And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.” The event for which Christ prays in these words was decreed from eternity, and the decree had been long before published, in the 2d and 110th Psalms: “I will declare the decree: The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy foot-stool.” And he had declared the certainty of that for which he here prays, since his incarnation. He had said, that all power in heaven and earth was given unto him; that “the Father had committed all judgment unto the Son; that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father.” St. Paul, when speaking of God, often introduces the following words: “To whom be glory forever, Amen;” which is not to be considered as a mere doxology, by which glory is ascribed to God; but it is rather a wish, or desire, that God may be glorified forever; and the Amen corroborates it: as if he had said, “Let it be so; this is the most ardent desire of my soul, including the sum of all my petitions.” Here then the Apostle utters a desire and petition for that which he knew was decreed, and would take place.
The last words of Christ to his church are, “Surely I come quickly.” Upon which promise the following petition of the church, and of every friend of his, is presented to him: “Amen, even so come Lord Jesus.” Here is a petition, in which all Christians join, praying Christ to do what he has promised; and which therefore was as certain as a declared decree could possibly make it; and the petition is grounded on this promise and decree published by Christ, in which the petitioners express their hearty approbation of the coming of Christ, and earnest desire of this important and happy event. And if it be reasonable thus to pray for an event which is fixed and made certain by an unchangeable decree, and cannot be altered, as in the instance before us; then it is reasonable and proper to pray for any thing or any event which appears to us desirable and important, though we know God is unchangeable, and that all things and every event are fixed by an unalterable decree.
The apostle John says, “And this is the confidence that we have in him, that if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us. And if we know that he heareth us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of him:” [1 John v. 14, 15.] To ask for any thing according to his will, is to ask for those things which it is agreeable to his will to grant; and this is to be known only by what he has revealed. When we ask him to do what he has declared he will do, then we know we ask for that which is according to his will; and consequently that we have our petitions. But it will be asked, What are these things? I answer, that God will glorify himself in all things, and make the brightest display of his perfections and character forever; that he will promote and effect the greatest possible good of the universe; that he will make his church and kingdom perfectly happy and glorious forever; that he will accomplish all his designs and predictions, and fulfil all his promises to his church and people: and cause all things to work for the good of those who love him; and give his holy Spirit to all who ask him. These, I think, must be the things we ask, when we know that we pray for any thing according to the will of God, and consequently know that he heareth us, and that we have the petitions that we desired of him. But in all these instances we ask for that which God has said he will do, that is, has decreed that he will do them. And as it has been said before, if a decree in these instances does not render it unreasonable or improper to pray for their accomplishment; then, if God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, this is not in the least inconsistent with our praying for whatever appears to us desirable and good, and may not be contrary to the will of God to grant. But here it must be observed, that when we ask for any particular things or events which, though it may not be contrary to the will of God to grant, yet he has in no way revealed that it is his will to grant our petitions; when we ask for any such thing, we must do it with an express or implicit reserve—If it be according to the will of God. Otherwise, or if it be not according to his will, we must withdraw our petition, and not desire to have it granted. Resignation to the will of God, whatever it may be, in all such instances, is essential to the pious petitions of a benevolent friend of God. And by thus referring to the will of God, and resigning to that, desiring it may be done in all cases, whatever petitions we may make, we do refer to the decrees of God, by which he has determined what he will do in every particular instance; for his will and his decrees are in this case one and the same, being fixed and unchangeable.
Fourthly. It is not only proper and important that the worshippers of God should express their desires of those things which they want, in praying for them; but were this not true, and were not asking for them the means and way of obtaining them; yet the pious friends of God would esteem it a privilege and enjoyment to be allowed and invited, “by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, to make known their requests unto him.” To them prayer is not a task, from which they would be glad to be excused, but they practise it with pleasure.—They have great support, enjoyment and happiness, in casting their cares upon God, and expressing the desires of their hearts to him. While others restrain prayer before God, and say, “What is the Almighty, that we should serve him? and what profit should we have if we pray unto him?” the benevolent friend of God would pray, were it only for the enjoyment which he has in the exercise; and says in his heart, “I will call upon God as long as I live. And though he is certain that God is unchangeable, and that nothing is done, or will come to pass, which is not foreordained by him, this does not tend to prevent or in the least abate the pleasure and enjoyment he has in making known his requests to God, or his desire constantly to practise it: but this truth gives him support and consolation, and increases his delight in calling upon God, and renders it more desirable and pleasant unto him: yea, were not this a truth, he could not find any reason for making his requests known to him, or any delight in doing it; and would not have any encouragement, or even dare, to ask for any thing, as has been observed and shewn.”
And now this matter is to be left to the judgment of every one who will attend to it. It is hoped that it appears evident, beyond all dispute, from the light in which this subject has been now set, that the doctrine of God’s decreeing whatsoever comes to pass is not only consistent with all the exercises of true piety, but is the proper foundation for this, and is suited to excite and promote these exercises, and that there can be no real piety which is not consistent with this truth.
[Hopkins’s Sermons.]
120. A kind and wise father, who designs to give his child some particular favour, will bring the child to ask for it before he bestows it, and will suspend the gift upon this condition, for the benefit of the child, that what he grants may be a real advantage to him, and a greater than if it were given before the child was better prepared to receive it, by earnestly and humbly asking for it; and that the father may hereby receive a proper acknowledgment from the child, and be treated in a becoming manner. And in this case, the petition of the child is as really regarded, heard and granted, and the child’s application and prayer to the father is as much a means of obtaining the favour, and as proper, important, and necessary, as if the father had not previously determined the whole affair. And when the children of such a father know that this is his way of bestowing favours on them, they will have as proper motives, and as much encouragement, to ask for all they want, as if he had not determined what he would do antecedent to their asking him; yea, much more.
121. See vol. II. 289-290 and vol. III. 72.
122. See Quest. CLII.
123. In our day and country there are some worthy men, who without fear, or scruple, affirm, that God is the author, and cause of sin; which words they soften to avoid the blasphemy, which they contain. We have in a note, I. vol. p. 530, given the sentiments of the late Dr. Williams, on the origination of sin. Being a proficient in the study of the human mind, he has philosophized a little on, but not essentially differed from the representation of the subject, as it is found in the writings of sound protestant divines. As some American writers advocate with considerable address, such divine causality, and publicly affirm it to have been taught by Luther, Calvin, &c. and to have found its place in our standards in the words—“foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;” it is proper to resort to the ipsissima verba of some of the European protestant theologians, as a test of such allegations.
The Westminster divines, no doubt, entertained the same views of sin, which will be found in the following extracts. In their definition of sin, they not obscurely shew, that they did consider it not more a transgression of, than a want of conformity unto, the law. The former is the translation of ανομια in I. John iii. 4. which is rather privatio, defectus, or declinatio than transgressio legis. Also the Greek word αμαρτια, and the Hebrew חטא signify non consecutio scopi. If they viewed sin as a qualitas adventitia, a quiddam non positivum, a simplex privatio, a quiddam actioni inhærens, they could not have viewed it the proper subject of a decree or purpose, but only as foreseen and permitted.
The following quotations are given in the authors’ own words, for the satisfaction of those who may not possess the works from which they are taken.
“Natura peccato corrupta est...—Aversio quædam voluntatis secuta est, ut homo nihil eorum velit aut faciat, quæ Deus vult et præcipit. Item quod nescimus, quid Deus, quid gratia, quid justitia, denique quid ipsum peccatum sit. Hi sunt profecto horribiles DEFECTUS, quos, qui non intelligunt; nec vident, talpa cœciores sunt.” Mart. Lutheri Loc. Com. p. 23.
“Hæc Regula certa et vera est; Deum esse natura bonum, ideo nihil a Deo proficisci, nisi quod bonum est, mors autem est mala, peccatum etiam est malum, &c. Non igitur a Deo proficiscuntur mala hæc, &c. Peccati porro quæ causa sit, si roges, sacræ literæ ostendunt, id ex Sathana esse, cui contra verbum Dei assenserunt nostri parentes, a Deo inobedientes facti, incurrerunt in horribiles pænas. Nam per peccatum illud non solum corpora nostra sic infirmata sunt, ut ex immortalibus mortalia fierent, sed etiam mens depravata est. Amisit enim homo veram Dei notitiam, et voluntas quoque tum admodum est depravata, ut nihil quam malum appetat.” Mart. Lutheri Loci Com. p. 22.
“Eant nunc qui Deum suis vitiis inscribere audent, quia dicimus naturaliter vitiosos esse homines. Opus Dei perperam in sua pollutione scrutantur, quod in integra adhuc et incorrupta Adæ natura requirere debuerant. A carnis ergo nostræ culpa, non a Deo nostra perditio est, quando non alia ratione periimus, nisi quia degeneravimus a prima nostra conditione.”—“Dicimus ergo naturali hominem vitiositate corruptum, sed quæ a natura non fluxerit. A natura fluxisse negamus, ut significemus adventitiam magis esse qualitatem quæ homini acciderit, quam substantialem proprietatem quæ ab initio indita fuerit. Vocamus tamen naturalem, nequis ab unoquoque prava consuetudine comparari putet, quum hæreditario jure universos comprehensos teneat.” Calvini Institut. lib. II. cap. 1. sect. 10, 11.
“Sed cum nihil contingat in mundo, aut contingere possit sine justissima et sapientissima Dei providentia, annon, peccati author et causa dici potest? Absit, quippe qui illud odit, vetat, & punit, ut quod cum summâ ipsius bonitate pugnet.” Bucani Theolog. p. 165.
“Deus non infundit malitiam in volentates malorum, sicut infundit bonitatem in corda piorum, nec impellit aut allicit voluntates ad peccandum; sed tantum malas voluntates, seu peccantes, quales invenit ex corruptione quæ sequuta est aversionem diabolorum et hominum a Deo, movet, ciet, flectit, inclinat, dirigit, sapienter, juste, potenter, ubi, quando, quomodo, et quousque vult, sive mediate, sive immediate, ad objecta vel persequenda, vel fugienda, ut impleant (quibus tale nihil propositum est) quod manus et consilium Domini decrevit. Bucani Theol. p. 153.
“Estne peccatum originis Substantia an accidens?—Non est substantia; esset enim anima vel corpus. Jam vero corpus et anima quoad substantiam, sunt bonæ Dei creaturæ, quæ etiamnum creantur a Deo. Ergo non sunt peccatum. Nec substantialis est proprietas, aut aliquid substantiale in homine: sed est adventitia qualitas, quæ tamen naturalis dicitur, non quod à natura fluxerit (quatenus creata est) sed quia hæreditario jure ut dicitur, suos comprehensos tenet, et in ipsa hominis natura, viribus, et facultatibus naturalibus inhæret, et ipsi homini innata est.”
Bucani Theol. p. 174.
“Estne peccatum aliquid Positivum an Privativum?—Peccatum non est positivum, id est, quiddam subsistens a Deo conditum, nec est simpliciter et pura privatio, sicut mors est privatio vitæ, aut tenebræ sunt privatio lucis; sed est defectus seu destructio rei positivæ, videlicit operis et ordinis divini in subjecto, quod culpam sustinet suæ depravationis, aversionis a Deo, ut ruina in domo, cœcitas et amissio visus in oculis.” Bucani Theol. p. 167.
“Permissio est gubernatio Dei, quâ homines vel diabolos, ad peccandum pronos, a peccato non retrahit, sed gratiæ suæ auxilio negato vel subtracto, in peccata ruere sinit, ita tamen ut ipsorum impetum ad judiciorum suorum executionem flectat, et quæ pessimo ab ipsis concilio suscipiuntur, in fines optimos dirigat.”
Explicatio.
1. Deus in permissione mali culpœ seu peccati, non est otiosus spectator, sed potens, justus, et sapiens judex: Itaque.
(1.) Efficax gratiæ suæ auxilium, sine quo non possunt non peccare in peccatis mortui homines, negat vel subtrahit.
(2.) Homines vel diabolos ad peccandum natura et consuetudine pronos, sæpissimè a peccatis non retrahit, quos tamen facillimè posset retrahere: sed in peccata ruere sinit.
(3.) Peccatum animis ipsorum susceptum, seu peccandi impetum ita moderatur, ut non in quævis objecta eum ferri patiatur, sed flectat et dirigat ad ejus modi objecta, vel homines, quos punire, castigare, vel explorare vult.
(4.) Quæ ab impiis hominibus, vel diabolis, malo fine, perpetrantur, in fines optimos dirigit.
Exempli Gratia.
Si viator aliquis a latrone in via occidatur, homicidium permississe Deus dicitur:
(1.) Quia efficax gratiæ suæ auxilium ei subtraxit vel negavit, sine quo infallibiliter homicidium erat perpetraturus.
(2.) Quia animum latronis, naturâ vel consuetudine ad homicidia pronum, ab homicidio non retraxit; quem tamen facillimè potuisset retrahere: sed in hoc facinus ipsum ruere permisit.
(3.) Quia concilium homicidii perpetrandi, ipsumque latronis impetum ita rexit et flexit, ut non quemvis promiscue hominem voluerit aut potuerit interficere: sed hunc potius, quam alium interfecerit; Unde furori latronis hunc potius viatorem, quam alium hominem objecit: justo quodam judicio: cujus ratio plerumque homines latet.
(4.) Quia, quod malo fine a latrone est perpetratum; forte ad pecuniam acquirendam, quam nequiter dilapidaret, in finem bonam direxit: quia est pœna vel ipsius latronis, vel ejus, qui a latrone est occisus: vel alius etiam finis nobis ignotus.
II. Sunt igitur in peccatis hominum, circa quæ divina occupatur permissio, quatuor imprimis observanda et distinquenda:
(1.) Actio per se, quatenus est actio.
(2.) Vitium actioni inhærens.
(3.) Directio organi mali et actionis vitiosæ in objectum certum.
(4.) Finis directionis, e quo accidit peccato judicii divini ratio; ut per hominum peccata Deus exequatur justa sua judicia: Primum, tertium, et quartum a Deo est, Deumque authorem habet. Est enim omnis actio, quatenus est actio, bona: directio actionis et ipsa bona: denique finis directionis optimus, nempe divini judicii executio. Secundum, in quo peccati consistit ratio, non a Deo, sed a solo est homine: adeoque solus homo peccati, quatenus est peccatum author est. Wendel. Theol. p. 179.
“Hinc firmiter concludimus, cum permissione Dei concurrere quoque efficacem Dei actionem et directionem vitiosi instrumenti in objectum certum, adversus quod judicium suum exercere Deo visum.”
“Orthodoxi nominis osor et insignis caluminator Graverus ad art. 19. Confess. Aug. p. 112, et sequentibus, portentosum dogma, de Deo peccati authore, Ecclesiis nostris non tantum calumniose impingit, sed et 15 argumenta nostris affingit quibus thesin hanc suam: Deus est peccati, quatenus peccatum est, author: probet: imprimis autem ad infame hoc et blasphemum dogma probandum affirmat, a nostris adduci scripturæ loca, quæ modo allegata sunt. Nos vero ut tam effrontibus calumniatoribus; ita omnibus, qui blasphemum istud dogma vel probant; vel profitentur, et defendunt, anathema dicimus, et innocentiæ nostræ vindicem mundi judicem, jamjam ad judicium se accingentem, imploramus.” Wendel. Theol. p. 183.
124. See Quest. LXXVII.
125. See Vol. II. page 94.
126. See a particular account what this sin is; and when a person may certainly conclude that he has not committed it, ante page 318 to 320.
127. As in John only it is repeated, he wrote it only in the Hebrew character, it is presumed, and understood by it “the truth;” the second Amen was exegetical and in the Greek character, for the sake of the unlearned.
128. Vid. Justin Martyr, Apol. ii. pro Christ. who intimates, that when public prayer and giving of thanks was ended, the whole congregation testified their approving of it by saying, Amen; ωᾶς ὄ ωαρωγ λαὸς ὀπευφημεὶ λὲγων αμῆν.
129. Vid. Hieron. in Lib. ii. comment. ad Galat. in Proen. Ad similitudinem cælestis tonitrus reboat, [scil. Ecclesia.] Amen.
130. Vid. Whitby in loc.