The representations made to the Department of State at Washington by Dr. S. Wells Williams, concerning the General Sherman, and by Consul-General George F. Seward, in the matter of the China, affair, directed the attention of the Government to the opening of Corea to American commerce. The memorial of Mr. Seward, dated October 14, 1868, reviewed the advantages to be gained and the obstacles in the way. The need of protection to American seamen was pointed out, and as Japan had been opened to international relations by American diplomacy, why should not a smaller nation yield to persuasion? American merchants in China having seconded Mr. Seward’s proposal, the State Department took the matter into serious consideration, and, in 1870, resolved to undertake the difficult enterprise.
The servants of the United States who were charged with this delicate mission were, Mr. Frederick F. Low, Minister of the United States to Peking, and Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic squadron. Mr. Low was directed by Secretary Fish to gain all possible knowledge from Peking, and then proceed on the admiral’s flag-ship to the Corean capital. He was to make a treaty of commerce if possible, but his chief aim was to secure provision for the protection of shipwrecked mariners. He was to avoid a conflict of force, unless it could not be avoided without dishonor. “The responsibility of war or peace” was to be left with him and not with the admiral.1
There was at this time, all over the far East, a feeling of uncertainty [404]and alarm among foreigners, and many portentious signs seemed to indicate a general uprising, both in China and Japan, against foreigners. The example of Corea in expelling or beheading the French priests acted as powerful leaven in the minds of the fanatical foreigner-haters in the two countries adjoining. The “mikado-reverencers,” who in Japan had overthrown the “Tycoon” and abolished the dual system of government, made these objects only secondary to the expulsion of all aliens. The cry of “honor the mikado” was joined to the savage yell of the Jo-i (alien-haters), “expel the barbarians.” In China the smothered feelings of murderous animosity were almost ready to burst. The air was filled with alarms, even while the American fleet was preparing 2 for Corea.
Rear-Admiral Rodgers,3 who had taken command, and relieved Admiral Rowan, August 20, 1869, began his preparations with vigor.
In a consultation held at Peking during November, 1870, between the admiral, minister, and consul general, the time for the expedition was fixed for the month of May, 1871. Mr. Seward then left for a visit to India, and Mr. Low despatched, through the Tribunal of Rites at Peking, a letter to the King of Corea. After vast circumlocution, it emerged from the mazes of Chinese court etiquette, and by a special courier reached the regent at Seoul. In this, however, the Chinese were doing a great favor. No answer was received from Seoul before the expedition sailed.
Meanwhile the German minister to Japan (now in Peking), [405]Herr M. Von Brandt, had landed from the Hertha at Fusan, and attempted to hold an interview with the governor of Tong-nai. He was accompanied by the Japanese representatives at Fusan, who politely forwarded his request. A tart lecture to the mikado’s subject for his officiousness, and a rebuff to the Kaiser’s envoy were the only results of his mission. After sauntering about a little, Herr Von Brandt, who arrived June 1, 1878, left June 2d, and the era of commercial relations between the Central European Empire4 and Chō-sen was postponed.
During the year 1870, Bishop Ridel, who had gone back to France, returned to China and prepared to rejoin his converts. Having communicated with them, they awaited his coming with anxiety, and we shall hear of them on board of the flag-ship Colorado.
Mr. Low, having gathered all possible information, public and private, concerning “the semi-barbarous and hostile people” of “the unknown country” which he expected to fail of entering, sailed from Shanghae, May 8th, arriving at Nagasaki, May 12th. On the 13th he wrote to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hamilton Fish. He declared that “Corea is more of a sealed book than Japan was before Commodore Perry’s visit.” Evidently he looked upon the pathway of the duty laid upon him as unusually thorny. The rose if plucked at all would be held in smarting fingers. While granting a faithful servant of the nation the virtue of modesty, one cannot fail to read in his letter more of an expectation to redress wrongs than to conciliate hostility. [406]
The whole spirit of the expedition was not that reflected in the despatches of the State Department, but rather that of the clubs and dinner-tables of Shanghae. The minister went to Corea with his mind made up, and everything he saw confirmed him in his fixed opinion. Of the admiral, it is not unjust to say that the warrior predominated over the peace-maker. He had an eye to the victories of war more than those, not less renowned, of peace. The sword was certainly more congenial to his nature than the pen.
The fleet made rendezvous at Nagasaki, in Kiushiu—that division of Japan whence warlike expeditions to Chō-sen have sailed from the days of Jingu to those of Taikō, and from Taikō to Rodgers. This time, as in the seventh century, the landing was to be made not near the eastern, but on the remote western, coast. The cry was, “On to Seoul.”
The squadron, consisting of the flag-ship Colorado, the corvettes Alaska and Benicia, and the gun-boats Monocacy and Palos, sailed gallantly out of the harbor on May 16th, and, making an easy run, anchored off Ferrières Islands on the 19th, and, after a delay of fogs, Isle Eugenie on the 23d.
In spite of the formidable appearance of our navy, the vessels were of either an antiquated type or of too heavy a draught, their timbers too rotten or not strong enough for shotted broadsides, and their armament defective in breech-loading firearms, while the facilities for landing a force were inadequate. The Palos and Monocacy were the only ships fitted to go up the Han River. The others must remain at the mouth. They were little more than transports. All the naval world in Chinese waters wondered why so wide-awake and practical a people as the Americans should be content with such old-fashioned ships, unworthy of the gallant crews who manned them. However, the fleet and armament were better than the Corean war-junks, or mud-forts armed with jingals. In gallant sailorly recognition of his predecessor, yet with unconscious omen of like failure, the brave Rodgers named the place of anchorage Roze Roads. The French soundings were verified and the superb scenery richly enjoyed. All navigators of the approaches to Seoul are alike unanimous in showering unstinting praise upon their natural beauty. Here for the first time the natives beheld the “flowery” flag of the United States.
Next morning the Palos and four steam-launches were put under the command of Captain Homer C. Blake, to examine the channel beyond Boisée Island. Four days were peaceably spent in this service, [407]a safe return being made on the evening of the 28th. Meanwhile boat parties had landed and been treated in a friendly manner by the people, and the usual curiosity as to brass buttons, blue cloth, and glass bottles displayed. The customary official paper without signature, of interrogations as to who, whence, and why of the comers was displayed, and the answers, “Americans,” “Friendly,” and “Interview” returned in faultless Chinese. It was announced that the fleet would remain for some time.
“The Entering Wedge of Civilization.”
On the following day, May 30th, the fleet anchored between the Isles Boisée and Guerrière. A stiff breeze had blown away the fogs and revealed the verdure and the features of a landscape which struck all with admiration for its luxuriant beauty. Approaching the squadron in a junk, some natives made signs of friendship, and came on board without hesitation. They bore a missive acknowledging the receipt of the Americans’ letter, and announcing that three nobles had been appointed by the regent for conference. These junk-men were merely messengers, and made no pretence of being anything more. They were hospitably treated, shown round the ship, and dined and wined until their good nature broke out in broad grins and redolent visages. They stood for their photographs on deck, and some fine [408]pictures of them were obtained. One of them, after being loaded with an armful of spoil in the shape of a dozen or so of Bass’ pale ale bottles, minus their corks, and a copy of Every Saturday, a Boston illustrated newspaper, was told in the stereotyped photographer’s phrase to “assume a pleasant expression of countenance, and look right at this point.” He obeyed so well, and in the nick of time, that a wreath of smiles was the result. “Our first Corean visitor” stands before us on the page.
Strange coincidence! Strange medley of the significant symbols of a Christian land! The first thing given to the Corean was alcohol, beer, and wine. In the picture, plainly appearing, are the empty pale ale bottles, with their trade-mark, the red triangle—“the entering wedge of civilization.” But held behind the hands clasping the bottles is a copy of Every Saturday, on the front page of which is a picture of Charles Sumner, the champion of humanity, and of the principle that “nations must act as individuals,” with like moral responsibility!
Promptly on May 31st, a delegation of eight officers, of the third and fifth rank, came on board evidently with intent to see the minister and admiral, to learn all they could, and to gain time. They had little or no authority and no credentials, but they were sociable, friendly, and in good humor.
“Mr. Low would not lower himself,” nor would Admiral Rodgers see them. They were received by the secretary, Mr. Drew. They were absolutely non-committal on all points and to all questions asked, and naturally so, since they had no authority whatever5 to say “yes” or “no” to any proposition of the Americans. [409]
A golden opportunity was here lost. The Corean envoys were informed that soundings would be taken in the river, and the shores would be surveyed. It was hoped that no molestation would be offered, and, further, that twenty-four hours would elapse before the boats began work.
“To all this they (the Coreans) made no reply which could indicate dissent.” [Certainly not! They had no power to nod their heads, or say either “yes” or “no.”] “So, believing that we might continue our surveys while further diplomatic negotiations were pending, an expedition was sent to examine and survey the Salée [Han] River.”6
The survey fleet consisted of the Monocacy, Palos, the only ships fit for the purpose, and four steam-launches, each of the latter having a howitzer mounted in the bow. Captain H. C. Blake, the commander, was on board the Palos. The old hero understood the situation only too well. As he started to obey orders he remarked: “In ten minutes we shall have a row.”
Exactly at noon of June 2d, the four steam-launches proceeded [410]in line abreast up the river, the Palos and Monocacy following. The tide was running up, and neither of the large vessels could be kept moving at a rate slow enough to allow the survey work to be done well, so that this part of their work is of little value.
Yet everything seemed quiet and peaceful; the bluffs and high banks along the water were densely covered with green woods, with now meadows, now a thatched-roof village, anon a rice-field in the foreground. Occasionally people could be seen in their white dresses along the banks, but not a sign of hostility or war until, on reaching the lower end of Kang-wa Island, a line of forts and fluttering flags suddenly become visible. In a few minutes more long lines of white-garbed soldiery were seen, and through a glass an interpreter read on one of the yellow flags the Chinese characters meaning “General Commanding.” In the embrasures were a few pieces of artillery of 32-pound calibre, and some smaller pieces lashed together by fives, or nailed to logs in a row. On the opposite point of the river was a line of smaller earthworks, freshly thrown up, armed only with jingals. Around the bend in the river was “a whirlpool as bad as Hell Gate,” full of eddies and ledges, with the channel only three hundred feet wide. The fort (Du Condè) was situated right on this elbow. Hundreds of mats and screens were ranged within and on the works, masking the loaded guns. As the boats passed nearer, glimpses into the fort became possible, by which it was seen that the cannon “lay nearly as thick together as gun to gun and gun behind gun on the floor of an arsenal.” (See map, page 415.)
For a moment the silence was ominous—oppressive. The hearts of the men beat violently, their teeth were set, and calm defiance waited in the face of certain death. The rapid current bore them on right into the face of the frowning muzzles. It seemed impossible to escape. Were the Coreans going to fire? If so, why not now? Immediately? Now is their opportunity. The vessels are abreast the forts.
The Corean commander was one moment too late. From the parapet under the great flag a signal gun was fired. In an instant mats and screens were alive with the red fire of eighty pieces of artillery. Then a hail of shot from all the cannon, guns, and jingals rained around the boats. Forts, batteries, and walls were hidden for a moment in smoke. The water was rasped and torn as though a hailstorm was passing over it. Many of the men in the boats were wet to the skin by the splashing of the water over them. [411]Old veterans of the civil war had never seen so much fire, lead, iron, and smoke of bad powder concentrated in such small space and time. “Old Blake,” who had had two ships shot under him by the Confederates, declared he could remember nothing so sharp as this.
The fire was promptly returned by the steam-launch howitzers. The Palos and Monocacy, which had forged ahead, turned back, and “Old Blake came round the point a-flying, and let drive all the guns of the Palos at them. The consequence was that they kicked so hard as to tear the bolts out of the side of the ship and render the bulwarks useless during the remainder of the fight.” The Monocacy also anchored near the point, and sent her ten-inch shells into the fort. During her movements, she struck a rock and began to leak badly. After hammering at the forts until everything in them was silenced, the squadron returned down the river, sending their explosive compliments into the forts and redoubts as they passed. All were quiet and deserted, however, but the commander’s flag was still flying unharmed and neglected. Strange to say, out of the entire fleet only one of our men was wounded and none was killed; nor did any of the ships or boats receive any damage from the batteries. Two hundred guns had been fired on the Corean side. The signal coming too late, the immovability of their rude guns, the badness of the powder, and the poor aim of the unskilled gunners, were the causes of such an incredibly small damage. It was like the bombardment of Fort Sumter in 1861, or like those battles which statistics reveal to us, in which it requires a ton of lead to kill a man.
However, it was determined by the chief representatives of the civil and naval powers to resent the insult offered to our “flag” in the “unprovoked” attack on our vessels, “should no apology or satisfactory explanation be offered for the hostile action of the Corean government.”
Ten days were now allowed to pass before further action was taken. They were ten days of inaction, except preparation for further fight and some correspondence with the local magistrate. What a pity these ten days had not been spent before, and not after, June 2d! Some civilians, not to say Christians, might also be of the opinion that ample revenge had already been taken, enough blood spilled, the “honor” of the flag fully “vindicated,” a delicate diplomatic mission of “peace” spoiled beyond further damage, and that further vengeance was folly, and more blood spilled, murder. But not so thought the powers that be. [412]
The chastising expedition consisted of the Monocacy, Palos, four steam-launches, and twenty boats, conveying a landing force of six hundred and fifty-one men, of whom one hundred and five were marines. The Benicia, Alaska, and Colorado remained at anchor. The total force detailed for the work of punishing the Coreans was seven hundred and fifty-nine men. These were arranged in ten companies of infantry, with seven pieces of artillery. The Monocacy had, in addition to her regular armament, two of the Colorado’s nine-inch guns. Captain Homer C. Blake, who was put in charge of the expedition, remained on the Palos.
The squadron proceeded up the river at 10 o’clock, on the morning of the 10th of June, two steam-launches moving in advance of the Monocacy. The boats were in tow of the Palos, which moved at 10.30. The day was bright, clear, and warm. A short distance above the isle Primauguet a junk was seen approaching, the Coreans waving a white flag and holding a letter from one of the ministers of the court. One of the steam-launches met the junk, and the letter was received. It was translated by Mr. Drew, but as it contained nothing which, in the American eyes, seemed like an apology, the squadron moved on. At 1 o’clock the Monocacy arrived within range of the first fort and opened with her guns, which partly demolished the walls and emptied it in a few seconds.
The landing party, after a two minutes’ pull at the oars, reached the shore, and disembarked about eight hundred yards below the fort. The landing-place was a mud-flat, in which the men sunk to their knees in the tough slime, losing gaiters, shoes, and even tearing off the legs of their trousers in their efforts to advance. The howitzers sank to their axles in the heavy ooze.
Once on firm land, the infantry formed, the marines deploying as skirmishers. Unarmed refugees from the villages were not harmed, and the first fort was quietly entered. The work of demolition was begun by firing everything combustible and rolling the guns into the river. Day being far spent when this was finished, the whole force went into camp and bivouacked, taking every precaution against surprise. Four companies of infantry were first detailed to drag the howitzers out of the mud, a task which resembled the wrenching of an armature off a twenty-horse power magnet.
Our men lay down to sleep under the stars. All was quiet that Saturday night, except the chatting round the camp-fires and [413]the croaking of the Corean frogs, as the men cleaned themselves and prepared for their Sunday work. Toward midnight a body of white-coats approached, set up a tremendous howling, and began a dropping fire on our main pickets. As they moved about in the darkness, they looked like ghosts. When the long roll was sounded, our men sprang to their arms and fell in like old veterans. A few shells were scattered among the ghostly howlers, and all was quiet again. The marines occupied a strong position half a mile from the main body, a rice-field dividing them, with only a narrow foot-path in the centre. They slept with their arms at their side, and, divided into three reliefs, kept watch.
While at the anchorage off Boisée Island that evening, twelve native Christians, approaching noiselessly in the dark, made signs of a desire to communicate. They had come in a junk from some point on the coast to inquire after their pastor, Ridel, and two other French missionaries whom they expected. To their great distress, the Americans could give them no information. Fearing lest the government might know, from the build of their craft, from what part of the country they came, and punish them for communicating with the foreigners, they burned their boat and returned home.
Next day was Sunday. The reveille was sounded in the camps, breakfast eaten, and blankets rolled up. Company C and the pioneers were sent into the fort to complete its destruction, by burning up the rice, dried fish, and huts still standing.
The march began at 7 A.M. The sun rolled up in a cloudless sky and the weather was very warm. It was a rough road, if, indeed, it could be called such, being but a bridle-path over hills and valleys, and through rice fields. Whole companies were required to drag the howitzers up the hills and through the narrow defiles. The marines led the advance. The next line of fortifications, the “middle fort,” was soon entered. The guns were found loaded, as they had been deserted as soon as the fort was made a target by the Monocacy, every one of whose shots told. The work of dismantling was here thoroughly done. The sixty brass pieces of artillery, all of them insignificant breech-loaders of two-inch bore, were tumbled into the river, and the fort appropriately named “Fort Monocacy.”
The difficult march was resumed under a blazing sun and in steaming heat. A succession of steep hills lay before them. Sappers and miners, with picks, shovels, and axes, went ahead levelling and widening the road, cutting bushes and filling hollows. The [414]guns had to be hauled up and lowered down the steep places by means of ropes. Large masses of white coats and black heads hovered on their flanks, evidently purposing to get in the rear. Their numbers were increasing. The danger was imminent. The fort must be taken soon or never.
A detachment of five howitzers and three companies were detailed to guard the flanks and rear under Lieutenant-Commander Wheeler. The main body then moved forward to storm the fort (citadel). This move of our forces checkmated the enemy and made victory sure, redeeming a critical moment and turning danger into safety.
Hardly were the guns in position, when the Coreans, massing their forces, charged the hill in the very teeth of the howitzers’ fire. Our men calmly took sure aim, and by steadily firing at long range, so shattered the ranks of the attacking force that they broke and fled, leaving a clear field. The fort was now doomed. The splendid practice of our howitzers effectually prevented any large body of the enemy from getting into action, and made certain the capture of the citadel.
Meanwhile the Monocacy, moving up the river and abreast of the land force, poured a steady fire of shell through the walls and into the fort, while the howitzers of the rear-guard on the hill behind, reversing their muzzles, fired upon the garrison over the heads of our men in the ravine. The infantry and marines having rested awhile after their forced march, during which several had been overcome by heat and sunstroke, now formed for a charge.
The citadel to be assaulted was the key to the whole line of fortifications. It crowned the apex of a conical hill one hundred and fifty feet high, measuring from the bottom of the ravine. It mounted, with the redoubt below, one hundred and forty-three guns. The sides of the hill were very steep, the walls of the fort joining it almost without a break. Up this steep incline our men were to rush in the face of the garrison’s fire. Could the white-coats depress the jingals at a sufficiently low angle, they must annihilate the blue-jackets. Should our men reach the walls, they could easily enter through the breaches made by the Monocacy’s shells. As usual, slowness, and the national habit of being behind time, saved our men and lost the day for Corea.
A terrible reception awaited the Americans. Every man inside was bound to die at his post, for this fort being the key to all the [415]others, was held by the tiger-hunters, who, if they flinched before the enemy, were to be put to death by their own people.
Map of the American Naval Operations in 1871.
All being ready, our men rose up with a yell and rushed for the redoubt, officers in front. A storm of jingal balls rained over [416]their heads, but their dash up the hill was so rapid that the garrison could not depress their pieces or load fast enough. Their powder burned too slowly to hurt the swift Yankees. Goaded to despair the tiger-hunters “chanted their war-dirge in a blood-chilling cadence which nothing can duplicate.” They mounted the parapet, fighting with furious courage. They cast stones at our men. They met them with spear and sword. With hands emptied of weapons, they picked up dust and threw in the invaders’ eyes to blind them. Expecting no quarter and no relief, they contested the ground inch by inch and fought only to die. Scores were shot and tumbled into the river. Most of the wounded were drowned, and some cut their own throats as they rushed into the water.
Lieutenant McKee was the first to mount the parapet and leap inside the fort. For a moment, and only a moment, he stood alone fighting against overwhelming odds. A bullet struck him in the groin, a Corean brave rushed forward, and, with a terrible lunge, thrust him in the thigh, and then turned upon Lieutenant-Commander Schley, who had leaped over the parapet. The spear passed harmlessly between the arm and body of the American as a carbine bullet laid the Corean dead.
The fort was now full of officers and men, and a hand to hand fight between the blue and white began to strew the ground with corpses. Corean sword crossed Yankee cutlass, and clubbed carbine brained the native whose spear it dashed aside. The garrison fought to the last man. Within the walls those shot and bayoneted numbered nearly one hundred. Not one unwounded prisoner was taken. The huge yellow cotton flag, which floated from a very short staff in the centre, was hauled down by Captain McLane Tilton and two marines. Meanwhile a desperate fight went on outside the fort. During the charge, some of the Coreans retreated from the fort, a movement which caught the eye of Master McLean. Hastily collecting a party of his men, he moved to the left on the double quick to cut off the fugitives. He was just in time. The fugitives, forty or fifty in all, after firing, attempted to rush past him. They were driven back in diminished numbers. Hemmed in between the captured fort and their enemy, McLean charged them with his handful of men. Hiding behind some rocks, they fought with desperation until they were all killed, only two or three being made prisoners. Another party attempting to escape were nearly annihilated by Cassel’s battery, which sent canister into their [417]flying backs, mowing them down in swaths. Moving at full speed, many were shot like rabbits, falling heels over head. At the same time Captain Tilton passed to the right of the fort and caught another party retreating along the crest of the hill joining the two forts, and, with a steady carbine fire, thinned their numbers. At 12.45 the stars and stripes floated over all the forts. A photographer came ashore and on his camera fixed the horrible picture of blood.
The scene after the battle smoke cleared away, and our men sat down to rest, was of a kind to thoroughly satisfy those “who look on war as a pastime.” It was one from which humanity loves to avert her gaze. Two hundred and forty-three corpses in their white garments lay in and around the citadel. Many of them were clothed in thick cotton armor, wadded to nine thicknesses, which now smouldered away. A sickening stench of roasted flesh filled the air, which, during the day and night, became intolerable. Some of the wounded, fearing their captors worse than their torture, slowly burned to death; choosing rather to suffer living cremation than to save their lives as captives. Our men, as they dragged the smoking corpses into the burial trench, found one man who could endure the torture no longer. Making signs of life, he was soon stripped of his clothes, but died soon after of his wounds and burns. Only twenty prisoners, all wounded, were taken alive. At least a hundred corpses floated or sunk in the river, which ran here and there in crimson streaks. At this one place probably as many as three hundred and fifty Corean patriots gave up their lives for their country.
On the American side, the gallant McKee, who fell as his father fell in Mexico, at the head of his men, the first inside the stormed works, was mortally wounded, and died soon after. One landsman of the Colorado and one marine of the Benicia were killed. Five men were severely, and five slightly, wounded.
The other two forts below the citadel being open to the rear from the main work were easily entered, no regular resistance being offered. The results of the forty-eight hours on shore, eighteen of which were spent in the field, were the capture of five forts—probably the strongest in the kingdom—fifty flags, four hundred and eighty-one pieces of artillery, chiefly jingals, and a large number of matchlocks. Of the artillery eleven pieces were 32,– fourteen were 24,– two were 20,– and the remaining four hundred and fifty-four were 2- and 4-pounders. The work of destruction was carried on and made as thorough as fire, axe, and shovel could make [418]it. A victory was won, of which the American navy may feel proud. Zeal, patience, discipline, and bravery characterized men and officers in all the movements.
The wounded were moved to the Monocacy. The forts were occupied all Sunday night, and early on Monday morning the whole force was re-embarked in perfect order, in spite of the furious tide, rising twenty feet. The fleet moved down the stream with the captured colors at the mast-heads and towing the boats laden with the trophies of victory. Reaching the anchorage at half past ten o’clock, they were greeted with such ringing cheers of their comrades left behind as made the woodlands echo again.
Later in the day, Dennis Hendrin (or Hanrahan) and Seth Allen, the two men slain in the fight, were buried on Boisée Island, and the first American graves rose on Corean soil. At 5.45 P.M. McKee breathed his last.7
Yet the odds of battle were dreadful—three graves against heaps upon heaps of unburied slain. Well might the pagan ask: “What did Heaven mean by it?”
The native wounded were kindly cared for, and their broken bones mended, by the fleet surgeon, Dr. Mayo. Admiral Rodgers, in a letter to the native authorities, offered to return his prisoners. The reply was in substance: “Do as you please with them.” The prisoners were therefore set ashore and allowed to dispose of themselves.
Admiral Rodgers having obeyed to the farthest limit the orders given him, and all hope of making a treaty being over, two of the ships, withal needing to refit, the fleet sailed from the anchorage off Isle Boisée the day before the fourth of July, arriving in Chifu on the morning of July 5th, after thirty-five days’ stay in Corean waters. He arrived in time to hear of the Tientsin massacre, which had taken place June 20th. “Our little war with the heathen,” as the New York Herald styled it, attracted slight notice in the United States. A few columns of news and comment from the metropolitan press, a page or two of woodcuts in an illustrated newspaper, the ringing of a chime of jests on going up Salt River (Salée), and [419]the usual transmission of official documents, summed up the transient impression on the American public.
In China the expedition was looked upon as a failure and a defeat. The popular Corean idea was, that the Americans had come to avenge the death of pirates and robbers, and, after several battles, had been so surely defeated that they dare not attempt the task of chastisement again. To the Tai-wen Kun the whole matter was cause for personal glorification. The tiger-hunters and the conservative party at court believed that they had successfully defied both France and America, and driven off their forces with loss. When a Scotch missionary in Shing-king reasoned with a Corean concerning the power of foreigners and their superiority in war, the listener’s reply, delivered with angry toss of the head and a snap of the fingers, was: “What care we for your foreign inventions? Even our boys laugh at all your weapons.” [420]
1 Mr. Low, who had served one term in Congress and as governor of California from 1864 to 1868, had been chosen by President Grant to be minister to China the year before, 1869, was new to his duties. He was in the prime of life, being fifty-two years of age. All his despatches show that Chō-sen was as unknown to him as Thibet or Anam, and from the first he had scarcely one ray of hope in the success of the mission. ↑
2 Admiral Rodgers left New York, April 9, 1869, with the Colorado and Alaska. The Benicia had left Portsmouth March 2d, and the Palos set sail from Boston June 20th. These vessels, with the Monocacy and Ashuelot, were to form the Asiatic squadron of Admiral Rodgers. Of our vessels on the station during the previous year, two had returned home, two had been sold, the rotten Idaho was moored at Yokohama as a store-ship, and the Oneida, which had been sunk by the British mail-steamer Bombay, lay with her uncoffined dead untouched and neglected by the great Government of the United States. Admiral Rodgers was so delayed by repairs to the Ashuelot, that finally, in order to gain the benefit of the spring tides, had to sail without this vessel. ↑
3 Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, who commanded the fleet, was a veteran in war, in naval science, and in polar research. He had served in the Seminole and Mexican campaigns, and through the civil war on the iron-clad monitors. He had visited the Pacific in 1853, when in command of the John Hancock. He had cruised in the China seas and sailed through Behring’s Straits. He, too, was in the prime of life, being at this time fifty-eight years of age. His whole conduct of the expedition displayed consummate skill, and marked him in this, as in his many other enterprises, as “one of the foremost naval men of the age.” Yet princes in naval science are not always princes in diplomacy. ↑
4 The first appearance of the flag of North Germany in Corean waters was at the mast-head of the China, when plunder and dead men’s bones were the objects sought. Its second appearance, on the Hertha man-of-war, was in peace and honorable quest of friendly relations. Its third appearance, in May, 1871—while, or shortly before, the American fleet were in the Han River—was on the schooner Chusan, which was wrecked on one of the islands of Sir James Hall group, the Chinese crew only, it appears, being saved. On June 6th, a party of three foreigners left Chifu in a junk to bring back salvage from the wreck. These men were not heard from until July 6th, when the Chinese crew returned without them. On the same day the British gunboat Ringdove, with the consul of Chifu, left for the Hall group. It was found that the foreigners had landed to bring away the crew of the Chusan, when the Chinamen, pretending or thinking that they had been taken prisoners, put off to sea without them. The consul found them in good health and spirits, and the Ringdove brought away for them whatever was worth saving from the Chusan. Again the Corean policy of kindness toward the shipwrecked was illustrated. The two foreigners—a Scotchman and a Maltese—had been well fed and kindly treated. ↑
5 These men simply acted as the catspaws for the monkey in the capital to pull out as many hot chestnuts from the fire as possible. It is part of Asiatic policy to send official men of low rank and no authority to dally and prelude, and, if possible, hoodwink or worry out foreigners. Their chief weapons are words; their main strength, cunning. When these are foiled by kindness, and equal patience, firmness, and address, the Asiatics yield, and send their men of first rank to confer and treat. Perry knew this, so did Townsend Harris in Japan; so have successful diplomats known it in China. Was it done in the American expedition to Corea in 1871? Let us see.
These Coreans had no right to say either “yes” or “no” to any proposition of the Americans. Had they committed themselves to anything definite, degradation, crushed shin-bones, and perhaps death, might have been their fate. The only thing for the Americans to do—who came to ask a favor which the Coreans were obstinately bent on not giving—was to feast them, treat them with all kindness, get them in excellent good humor, send them back, and wait till accredited envoys of high rank should arrive. In the light of the [409]French failure, this was the only course to pursue. There were even men of influence in the American fleet who advised this policy of patience. As matter of fact, such a course was urged by Captain H. S. Blake.
In such an emergency, patience, kindness, tact, the absence of any burning idea of “wiping out insults to the flag,” and an antiseptic condition toward fight were most needed—the higher qualities, of resolution and self-conquest rather than valor. Even if it had been possible to inflict ten times the damage which was afterward actually inflicted, and win tenfold more “glory,” the rear-admiral must have known that nature and his “instructions” were on the side of the Coreans, and that the only end of the case must be a retreat from the country. And the only possible interpretation the people could put upon the visit of the great American fleet would be a savage thirst for needless vengeance, a sordid greed of gain, and the justification of robbers and invaders. In spite of all the slaughter of their countrymen, they would read in the withdrawal of their armies, defeat, and defeat only. ↑
6 These are the rear-admiral’s own words. Here was the mistake! From what may be easily known of the Corean mind, it must have seemed to them that the advance of such an armed force up the river, leading to the capital—following exactly the precedent of the French—was nothing more than a treacherous beginning of war in the face of assurances of peace. To enter into their waters seemed to them an invasion of their country. To do it after fair words spoken in friendship seemed basest treachery. Had a Corean officer counselled peace in the face of the advancing fleet, he would undoubtedly have been beheaded at once as a traitor. There were men on the American side who saw this. Some spoke out loud of it to others, but it was not “theirs to make reply.” ↑
7 In the chapel of the Naval Academy, at Annapolis, a tasteful mural tablet, “Erected by his brother officers of the Asiatic squadron,” with the naval emblems—sword, belt, anchor, and glory-wreath—in medallion, and inscription on a shield beneath, keeps green the memory of an unselfish patriot and a gallant officer. ↑