What are the causes of egoistic acts? How does it happen that one man does harm to another? The answers that have been given to this primeval question may be divided into two groups. The first group attributes the cause to the man himself, the second to his environment.
The great majority of persons who treat of this question settle it in favor of innate egoism. They are of the opinion that man is egoistic by nature and that environment can produce no change in this (this is implied in the Christian doctrine of original sin). This opinion, in order to be accepted as true, needs facts to prove that egoism has always and everywhere been the same among men.
Others, among whom are most of the well-known sociologists, also consider egoism as a fundamental trait of man, but are at the same time of the opinion that little by little egoism has decreased, that altruism has developed, and that this process continues.10 For this hypothesis to be correct it must be shown by the facts:
First. That the peoples of a much lower degree of social evolution than ours show much more egoistic traits of character.11
Second. That the animals from whom man has descended are inveterate egoists.
This theory is naturally of the highest importance for criminal [382]science, and it becomes still more so from the fact that, according to Professor Lombroso, crime is a manifestation of atavism, that is, that some individuals present anew traits of character belonging to their very remote ancestors. The criminal would thus be a savage in our present society. We must therefore examine to see whether the said theory is correct.
We have only to consult one of the standard works on zoölogy to perceive that there is no basis in this science to uphold the theory. There are some animals that are complete egoists. Two harpies (South American birds of prey) for example, upon meeting will attack each other at once and will fight till one is conquered. Other animals, on the contrary, show very altruistic traits of character. The following extract from Darwin’s “Descent of Man”, is one of many proofs which might be adduced: “Animals of many kinds are social;… We will confine our attention to the higher social animals; and pass over insects, although some of these are social, and aid one another in many important ways. The most common mutual service in the higher animals is to warn one another of danger by means of the united senses of all. Every sportsman knows, as Dr. Jaeger remarks, how difficult it is to approach animals in a herd or troop. Wild horses and cattle do not, I believe, make any danger-signal; but the attitude of any one of them who first discovers an enemy, warns the others. Rabbits stamp loudly on the ground with their hind-feet as a signal; sheep and chamois do the same with their fore-feet, uttering likewise a whistle. Many birds, and some mammals, post sentinels, which in the case of seals are said generally to be the females. The leader of a troop of monkeys acts as the sentinel, and utters cries expressive both of danger and of safety. Social animals perform many little services for each other: horses nibble, and cows lick each other, on any spot which itches; monkeys search each other for external parasites; and Brehm states that after a troop of the Cercopithecus griseo-viridis has rushed through a thorny brake, each monkey stretches itself on a branch, and another monkey sitting by, ‘conscientiously’ examines its fur, and extracts every thorn or burr.
“Animals also render more important services to one another: thus wolves and some other beasts of prey hunt in packs, and aid one another in attacking their victims. Pelicans fish in concert. The Hamádryas baboons turn over stones to find insects, etc.; and when they come to a large one, as many as can stand round, turn it over together and share the booty. Social animals mutually defend each other. Bull bisons in North America, when there is danger, drive the [383]cows and calves to the middle of the herd, whilst they defend the outside.… In Abyssinia, Brehm encountered a great troop of baboons, who were crossing a valley: some had already ascended the opposite mountain, and some were still in the valley: the latter were attacked by the dogs, but the old males immediately hurried down from the rocks, and with mouths widely opened roared so fearfully, that the dogs quickly drew back. They were again encouraged to the attack; but by this time all the baboons had reascended the heights, excepted a young one, about six months old, who, loudly calling for aid, climbed on a block of rock, and was surrounded. Now one of the largest males, a true hero, came down again from the mountain, slowly went to the young one, coaxed him, and triumphantly led him away—the dogs being too much astonished to make an attack. I cannot resist giving another scene which was witnessed by this same naturalist; an eagle seized a young Cercopithecus, which, by clinging to a branch, was not at once carried off; it cried loudly for assistance, upon which the other members of the troop, with much uproar, rushed to the rescue, surrounded the eagle, and pulled out so many feathers, that he no longer thought of his prey, but only how to escape.…
“It is certain that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other, which is not felt by non-social adult animals.”12
Later I shall treat of the question why some species of animals show altruistic proclivities while others do not. At present I wish to inquire whether peoples showing a much lower degree of civilization than our own are much more egoistic.
Nansen, the celebrated explorer, in speaking of the Eskimos, among whom he sojourned for some time, says: “The Greenlander is of all God’s creatures gifted with the best disposition. Good-humor, peaceableness, and evenness of temper are the most prominent features in his character. He is eager to live on as good a footing as possible with his fellow-men and therefore refrains from offending them and much more from using coarse terms of abuse. He is very loth to contradict another even should he be saying what he knows to be false. If he does so, he takes care to word his remonstrance in the mildest possible form, and it would be very hard indeed for him to say right out that the other was lying. He is chary of [384]telling other people truths that he thinks will be unpleasant to them; in such cases he chooses the vaguest expressions, even with reference to such indifferent things as wind and weather. His peaceableness even goes so far that when anything is stolen from him, which seldom happens, he does not as a rule reclaim it even if he knows who has taken it. The result is that there is seldom or never any quarreling among them.13
“The only thing that makes him [the Eskimo] really unhappy is to see others in want, and therefore he shares with them whenever he has anything to share.”
“The Greenlander is, on the whole, like a sympathetic child with respect to the needs of others; his first social law is to help his neighbor.”14
“One of the most prominent and attractive traits in the Eskimo’s moral character is certainly his integrity.… It is of special importance for the Eskimo that he should be able to rely with confidence upon his neighbors and his fellow-men; and it is the first condition of this mutual confidence, on which depends all united action in the battle for life, that every man should be upright in his dealings with his neighbors. The Eskimo therefore regards it as in the highest degree dishonorable to steal from his house-mates or from his fellow-villagers, and it is very seldom that anything of the sort occurs.”15
“The worst thing that can happen to a Greenlander is to be made ridiculous in the eyes of his fellows, and to be scoffed at by them.”16
With regard to the American Indians living in the region of the Columbia river, Dr. Waitz makes the following statement: “The qualities regarded as virtues by these peoples are honesty and love of truth, courage, obedience to parents and chiefs, and love of wife and child; and the Salish, whose moral ideals are here especially indicated, in general come up to these requirements very well. With them and with their cousins, the ‘Pends-d’Oreilles’ and Spokane, crimes are very rare, and a mere rebuke, administered by the chief, is of great effectiveness. Old age, too, finds among the Salish benevolent support and care, though children who have the misfortune to lose their fathers have often a sad lot, their property being frequently taken from them. Most of these peoples are upright and honest, live together in the most peaceable fashion, and have friendly intercourse with the whites.”17 [385]
G. Catlin, one of the authors who are best informed upon everything concerning the North American Indians, says of their character:
“I have roamed about from time to time during seven or eight years, visiting and associating with, some three or four hundred thousand of these people, under an almost infinite variety of circumstances; and from the very many and decided voluntary acts of their hospitality and kindness I feel bound to pronounce them, by nature, a kind and hospitable people. I have been welcomed generally in their country, and treated to the best that they could give me, without any charges made for my board; they have often escorted me through their enemies’ country at some hazard to their own lives, and aided me in passing mountains and rivers with my awkward baggage; and under all of these circumstances of exposure, no Indian ever betrayed me, struck me a blow, or stole from me a shilling’s worth of my property that I am aware of.
“This is saying a great deal, (and proving it too, if the reader believe me) in favour of the virtues of these people; when it is borne in mind, as it should be, that there is no law in their land to punish a man for theft—that locks and keys are not known in their country—that the commandments have never been divulged amongst them; nor can any human retribution fall upon the head of thief, save the disgrace which attaches as a stigma to his character, in the eyes of his people about him.
“And thus in these little communities, strange as it may seem, in the absence of all systems of jurisprudence, I have often beheld peace and happiness, and quiet, reigning supreme, for which even kings and emperors might envy them. I have seen rights and virtue protected, and wrongs redressed; and I have seen conjugal, filial and paternal affection in the simplicity and contentedness of nature. I have unavoidably, formed warm and enduring attachments to some of these men which I do not wish to forget—who have brought me near to their hearts, and in our final separation have embraced me in their arms, commended me and my affairs to the keeping of the great Spirit.”18
In treating of the question of which of the two are the happier, the civilized nations or the peoples he visited, the same author says:
“I have long looked with the eye of a critic, into the jovial faces of these sons of the forest, unfurrowed with cares—where the agonizing feeling of poverty had never stamped distress upon the brow. I have [386]watched the bold, intrepid step—the proud, yet dignified deportment of Nature’s man, in fearless freedom, with a soul unalloyed by mercenary lusts, too great to yield to laws or power except from God. As these independent fellows are all joint-tenants of the soil, they are all rich, and none of the steepings of comparative poverty can strangle their just claims to renown. Who (I could ask) can look without admiring, into a society where peace and harmony prevail—where virtue is cherished—where rights are protected and wrongs are redressed—with no laws, but the laws of honour, which are the supreme laws of their land. Trust the boasted virtues of civilized society for awhile, with all its intellectual refinements, to such a tribunal, and then write down the degradation of the ‘lawless savage’ and our transcendent virtues.”
Lewis H. Morgan, after passing a great part of his life among the Iroquois, says with regard to them: “All the members of an Iroquois gens were personally free, and they were bound to defend each other’s freedom; they were equal in privileges and in personal rights, the sachem and chiefs claiming no superiority; and they were a brotherhood bound together by the ties of kin. Liberty, equality, and fraternity, though never formulated, were cardinal principles of the gens. These facts are material, because the gens was the unit of a social and governmental system, the foundation upon which Indian society was organized. A structure composed of such units would of necessity bear the impress of their character, for as the unit so the compound. It serves to explain that sense of independence and personal dignity universally an attribute of Indian character.”19
He describes the hospitality of the peoples mentioned as follows: “Among the Iroquois hospitality was an established usage. If a man entered an Indian house in any of their villages, whether a villager, or a stranger, it was the duty of the women therein to set food before him. An omission to do this would have been a discourtesy amounting to an affront. If hungry, he ate; if not hungry, courtesy required that he should taste the food and thank the giver. This would be repeated at every house he entered, and at whatever hour in the day. As a custom it was upheld by a rigorous public sentiment. The same hospitality was extended to strangers from their own and from other tribes. Upon the advent of the European race among them it was also extended to them. This characteristic of barbarous society, wherein food was the principal concern of life, is a remarkable fact. The law of hospitality, as administered by the American aborigines, [387]tended to the final equalization of subsistence. Hunger and destitution could not exist at one end of an Indian village or in one section of an encampment while plenty prevailed elsewhere in the same village or encampment.20
A. R. Wallace speaks as follows of the primitive population of South America and the Indian Archipelago: “I have lived with communities of savages in South America and in the East, who have no laws or law courts but the public opinion of the village freely expressed. Each man scrupulously respects the rights of his fellow, and any infraction of these rights rarely or never takes place. In such a community, all are nearly equal. There are none of those wide distinctions, of education and ignorance, wealth and poverty, master and servant, which are the product of our civilization; there is none of the wide-spreading division of labor, which, while it increases wealth, produces also conflicting interests; there is not that severe competition and struggle for existence, or for wealth, which the dense population of civilized countries inevitably creates. All incitements to great crimes are thus wanting, and petty ones are repressed, partly by the influence of public opinion, but chiefly by that natural sense of justice and of his neighbor’s right, which seems to be, in some degree, inherent in every race of man.”21
In his work, “Village Communities in the East and West”, H. S. Maine says:
“Whenever a corner is lifted up of the veil which hides from us the primitive condition of mankind, even of such parts of it as we know to have been destined to civilisation, there are two positions, now very familiar to us, which seem to be signally falsified by all we are permitted to see—All men are brothers, and all men are equal. The scene before us is rather that which the animal world presents to the mental eye of those who have the courage to bring home to themselves the facts answering to the memorable theory of Natural Selection. Each fierce little community is perpetually at war with its neighbour, tribe with tribe, village with village. The never-ceasing attacks of the strong on the weak end in the manner expressed by the monotonous formula which so often recurs in the pages of Thucydides, ‘they put the men to the sword, the women and children they sold into slavery.’ Yet, even amid all this cruelty and carnage, we find the [388]germs of ideas, which have spread over the world. There is still a place and a sense in which men are brothers and equals. The universal belligerency is the belligerency of one total group, tribe, or village, with another; but in the interior of the groups the regimen is one not of conflict and confusion but rather of ultra-legality. The men who composed the primitive communities believed themselves to be kinsmen in the most literal sense of the word; and surprising as it may seem, there are a multitude of indications that in one stage of thought they must have regarded themselves as equals.”22
Scores of pages might be filled with facts proving that the primitive peoples of all races and in all parts of the world were not only not egoistic in their relations with the people they lived among, but rather the contrary. In conclusion I wish to note the opinions of two distinguished sociologists, Steinmetz and Kovalewsky, opinions which derive significance from the great ethnological knowledge of these authors.
At the Fifth Congress of Criminal Anthropology Dr. Steinmetz, in speaking upon the explanation of crime by the hypothesis of atavism, says: “It is not at all probable that our true born-criminal resembles the normal savage. The former is characterized by his ferocious egoism, while the latter is nothing if not a devoted member of the group whose customs he respects and whose interests he defends; the savage is very tender toward the children whom the criminal abandons; the savage is only cruel toward the enemy, the criminal toward all the world.”23
After having cited different altruistic traits of primitive peoples Kovalewsky says: “The enumeration would wear out your patience if one were to cite all the proofs that travelers give of the care that savages and barbarians have for their mutual welfare, and the fulness of their charity. To these facts, which indicate the prolonged existence of a sort of communism, others correspond.…”24
I am of the opinion that no one, taking the above facts into consideration, will maintain that man has always and everywhere shown the same egoistic traits, or that there has been a gradual evolution from egoism towards altruism.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that primitive peoples [389]present under all circumstances the altruistic characteristics that I have mentioned. I have already remarked that the position of woman is in general very dependent. In general the primitive peoples are very fond of their children and give them very tender care. Nevertheless infanticide is not uncommon among those who are at a low stage of civilization. And I have already remarked that among nomadic peoples the sick and aged were often abandoned. Here are then contradictions which it is necessary to explain.
Apparently—but only apparently—an evolution from egoism towards altruism has really taken place and has not yet ceased. This appearance is the effect of the alteration in the character of the egoism under the present economic system; it has become less violent than at earlier periods. The fight is no longer carried on with fire-arms or cold steel, but with other weapons no less dangerous, and this is what is generally lost sight of. We note that in ancient times the prisoners were killed; that later they were sold into slavery; that slavery was superseded by serfdom, which in its turn gave place to free labor.
But it is not always a growing altruistic sentiment that has been the motive in these changes. The life of prisoners of war has not been spared from reasons of humanity, but because the extension of the productivity of labor made it more profitable to make a prisoner work than to kill him. And slavery was not abolished because slave-owners had become less egoistic, but because it was more profitable to make free laborers work than to make slaves do so.25 We cannot speak of the diminution of egoism, but of the moderating of violence in the course of time. It cannot be maintained that a capitalist who tries by a lock-out to force his workmen to break with their union, in order that he may escape the danger of a decrease in his profits through a strike, and who in this way condemns them and their families to hunger, is less egoistic than the slave-owner driving his slaves to harder labor. The former does not use force—it is useless—he has a surer weapon at his command, the suffering with which he can strike his workmen; he seems less egoistic, but in reality is as egoistic as the latter. The great speculator who, by manipulating the market, forces thousands of persons to pay more for the necessaries of life, and to become his tributaries as it were, is not less egoistic than the robber-baron of the middle ages who, arms in hand, forced the traveling [390]merchants to pay him tribute. The difference is merely that the former attains his end without using violence like the latter. Capitalism is a system of exploitation in which, in place of the exploited person’s being robbed he is compelled by poverty to use all his powers for the benefit of the exploiter.26
The same thing is true of colonial history. At first the aborigines of the countries explored by the Europeans were often pillaged and massacred. This system has long been abandoned, not from altruism however, but because it is more profitable to make a conquered people work than to pillage and exterminate them. When they do not submit voluntarily, force is used as heretofore.
The apparent improvement has yet another cause. Christianity preaches “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy self.” And since this maxim has been often preached and many Christians have it always in their mouths, men come to believe that it is really put into practice. The contrary is true. The fact that the duty of altruism is so much insisted upon is the most convincing proof that it is not generally practiced or it would not be so much spoken and preached about. There are many persons in our days who ask nothing better than to see men act altruistically, but they preach in the wilderness; their wish has not come true. Present society is moulded by egoism. The egoism is less violent, however, and more disguised.
Before speaking of the real causes of egoism and altruism it may be well to attempt to answer the question, Whence come these inexact ideas? It is not difficult, in my opinion, to explain how it comes about that many men believe that the “homo homini lupus” of Hobbes has been true always and everywhere. The adherents of this opinion have studied principally men who live under capitalism, or under civilization; their correct conclusion has been that egoism is the predominant characteristic of these men, and they have adopted the simplest explanation of the phenomenon and say that this trait is inborn.
If they had known the periods anterior to civilization, they would have noted that the “homo homini lupus” is an historical phenomenon applicable during a relatively short period,27 and that consequently it is impossible that egoism should be innate in man. However great have been the social modifications during the period of civilization, the principal aim of men has always been, and still is, to acquire [391]personal wealth, and men still remain divided into classes, that is into groups whose economic interests are contrary. This is why an examination of the earlier periods is of such high importance for sociology.
An erroneous interpretation of the Darwinian theory has also contributed to bring about the strange notion of the eternal character of the struggle of all against all. Darwin himself maintains nothing of the sort. In his “Origin of Species” he says in the clearest terms that the struggle between the individuals of the same species does not at all happen in every species: “There must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life.”28
The explanation of the second hypothesis, that of the evolution from egoism towards altruism, is more complicated. In the first place the facts adduced in support of it are not numerous, and they serve rather to illustrate a theory than to furnish the materials by which it may be justified. In the second place a part of the ethnological materials in relation to the question it has been impossible to utilize. They have been collected partly by persons convinced beforehand of the superiority of Christian morality to every other system, and who consequently disapprove of everything opposed to it, and partly by persons whose own conduct has caused the enmity manifested by the peoples with whom they have come into contact. No part of the history of civilization offers a more hideous spectacle than that of colonization.29 In the third place it is necessary to exclude peoples that have had much contact with Europeans or other civilized peoples. In the fourth place we often lose sight of the fact that primitive peoples show great differences of development, and consequently cannot be placed in the same rank.30 For example, if peoples despotically governed show strong egoistic tendencies, we have no right to declare that all primitive peoples are egoistic.
Finally it is of the highest importance in studying primitive peoples to make the distinction between the acts which have to do with persons of the same social group, and those which have to do with strangers. One of the principal causes of the charge of egoism made against primitive peoples is to be found in the fact that this dualism of ethics [392]is forgotten. In the passages I have cited (those from Maine and Steinmetz, for instance) the great difference between acts committed within and without the group is brought out. We have seen that the Indians of North America, although very altruistic toward those who form the same group with them, as also toward their guests, are the most pitiless enemies of those who attack their independence or their hunting ground. Now it has been by these last acts that these peoples have been generally judged, a wholly wrong method, since the “dualism of ethics” has always existed. Great would be the astonishment if any one were to maintain that the South African war proved that the English were a nation of murderers and incendiaries. Yet this is just the sort of reasoning that is applied to primitive peoples.31
How does it happen that some animal species are social while others are not? It is impossible to maintain with some authors that sociability increases according to the degree of development attained by the animal.32 Certain insects, for example, are endowed with pronounced social feelings, while the cat tribe and some kinds of birds are on the contrary unsocial. Nevertheless the latter occupy a higher place in the scale than the former. The explanation, then, must be sought elsewhere.33
There are divers reasons that draw a more or less considerable number of animals to one place—the fact of being born in the same locality, for example. Most animals are social when they are young, even those which are no longer so when full-grown, like the arachnids. Another cause that brings animals together is emigration towards a country because of great changes of temperature. A third cause, probably the most important, that unites animals of the same species is the abundance of the food-supply of certain countries.
However, the occasional assembling of animals does not explain why certain animals are social while others are not. Lions, for example, often meet in places where they come to drink, and yet do not become social. It is not probable that there are animals who have remained together because they have comprehended the advantages [393]of a life in common, for this would suppose an intelligence on their part which it is difficult to attribute to them. In order that these animals should remain together they must find it agreeable, and disagreeable to be isolated.
When we study the social species of animals we notice that the life in common is in general one of their most powerful weapons in the struggle for existence, a weapon without which it would be nearly or quite impossible for them to maintain the fight. Consequently the animals for which the life in common is advantageous and which possess social instincts stronger than others, have, when brought together by any cause whatever, a greater chance to survive.34 Per contra the animals who have to stalk their prey have more chance of surviving when life in common is disagreeable to them. It is therefore by survival that social feelings are developed in some species of animals and not in others.35 Habit, and the tendency to imitate increase these feelings considerably.
The advantages to certain species of animals resulting from life in common are of two kinds; in the first place a better defense against their enemies, and in the second place greater ease in procuring subsistence. Wild cattle give us an example of the first case; while the wolves who in winter gather into packs for purposes of the chase, because food has become scarce, furnish us an example of the second. For other animals (like the simians) social sentiments are helpful in both ways.
It is unnecessary to amplify further upon the two ways in which life in groups is of advantage to certain species of animals. We have yet to turn our attention to the qualities developed by the group struggle for existence.
One of the principal characteristics of social animals is the pleasure they experience in living in common, so that a social animal is unhappy if he is separate from those of the group in which he lives. Further it is necessary that the animal that cannot live alone, and is happy with his group, should also feel a sympathy with that group. Pleasure or its opposite felt by any individual reacts upon the whole group. A social being will try then to favor the interests of his fellows as far as he can, and in so far as he comprehends these interests. This sympathy will not extend to the whole species but only to the group. [394]The general interest of the group does not permit the sympathy to embrace the whole species, but on the contrary requires one group to fight the other if, for example, the latter interferes with its food-supply. And even within the limits of the group the general interest may demand that a sick or wounded individual be abandoned, when by its presence it would for example, attract beasts of prey, and thus put the existence of all in danger.
Highly developed sympathy produces the spirit of sacrifice, which impels the individual to assist his companions sometimes even at the risk of his life.36 This quality is reinforced by the desire of gaining the praise and avoiding the blame of companions, which desire in its turn is brought about only by the life in common. For the one that lives in conjunction with others, and takes pleasure in doing so, whose interests are those of the members of the group, must be sensible of the approval or disapproval of his acts felt by others, since their feelings of pleasure or displeasure react upon himself. The lack of the power of speech among animals, however, limits the force of praise or blame among them.
We come now to the question: what are the causes of altruism among men?37 It must be considered as certain that man has always lived in groups more or less large, and it is even very probable that he is descended from animals equally social.38 A study of the means man has of sustaining the struggle for existence proves that they are of such a nature that he would have succumbed if he had lived in isolation. Kautsky puts it thus: “… man … whose mightiest and most effective, almost whose only weapon, indeed, in the struggle for existence, is association. He is, to be sure, distinguished above other animals by his intelligence, but this too is to the fruit of society, for in isolation he becomes dull and stupid. All man’s other weapons in the struggle for existence are less efficient than those of the beasts. He has no weapons of attack like the beasts of prey, nor is he protected by his size like the elephant, hippopotamus and rhinoceros. He lacks the quickness of the squirrel and deer, and cannot repair his losses through superabundant fertility.”39
It is therefore on account of his constitution and of the struggle [395]that he has had to sustain for his existence that man is a social being; in other words, those who showed social instincts stronger than the others ran less danger of succumbing in the contest for life, and had more chance of transmitting their leanings to their posterity. As man has greater intellectual capacities than the animals he is more capable of understanding the joys and sorrows of his fellows, and so is better able to assist the one and avoid the other. In the second place he has a developed language at his command, through which a great influence can be exercised upon conduct by blame and praise.40
The fact that man is born with social instincts does not, however, explain altruism sufficiently, for among animal species there is not one whose individuals have done so much harm to one another as men, who, though they are social beings, are capable of committing the most egoistic acts. How shall we explain these contradictions?
We have seen above that primitive peoples, to whom we have referred showed very altruistic traits of character. The members of a group extend mutual aid, and, in their relations with one another, are benevolent, honest, truthful, and very susceptible to the opinions of others,41 etc.
It is impossible to explain this either by the race to which these peoples belong or by the climate in which they live, for they are of different races (for example North American Indians and the Hindoos of the delta of the Ganges) and live under different climates (as the Eskimos and the South American Indians). Besides this some of these peoples show towards strangers, qualities directly contrary to those they display toward members of their own group. Thus, as we have already remarked, the North American Indians are most cruel enemies, most pitiless toward those who are not of their group, while they are quite the reverse toward their own fellow-tribesmen. It is plain, then, that their altruistic sentiments have nothing to do with race or climate.
Consequently the cause can only be found in the social environment, which is determined in its turn by the mode of production. What follows will show that in the last instance it is the mode of production that is able to develop the social predisposition innate in man (not in the same measure for each individual, which is a question that I shall return to) or prevent this disposition from being developed, or may even destroy it entirely. Upon examining the modes of production in force among the peoples cited we see that they are characterized [396]by the following traits, very different from those of the present system.
The first of these characteristic traits is this: production takes place among these peoples for personal consumption and not for exchange as with us. It has often been claimed that the primitive peoples lived in a state of communism. Taken in the sense of a communism in production this assertion is true only in part; except for hunts undertaken in common, production was not carried on in common but was individual. The weapons and utensils of the hunt were private property, while the hunting-ground was held in common. Just so as soon as architectural technique made some progress the houses often became common property. At its inception agriculture was not practiced in common. It was only when it had attained a certain development that this was sometimes the case.42 But if we take communism in the sense of consumption in common, then the assertion becomes much more exact. I do not mean to say that consumption always took place in common (though several primitive peoples took their food in common), but when from whatever cause some members of the group had failed to produce, the other members who had been more fortunate provided for them. The productivity of labor was still small; there was not generally any surplus of labor. Even if there had been there could not have been any possibility of exchange, since the division of labor was very slight, and consequently each one was capable of making for himself what others would have been able to offer in exchange.
The second characteristic of the modes of production of the peoples in question is bound up with the first, namely that there was neither wealth nor poverty. If there was privation (through scarcity of game, for example), all suffered; if there was abundance, all profited by it.43
The third fact to be noted is that the subordination of man to nature was very great, so great that we, who have so largely subjugated the forces of nature, can have no idea of it. If primitive men were very weak in their contest with nature even when joined together in a single group, individually they were absolutely unable to maintain the struggle, and were thus forced to unite.
If we consider the characteristics of the primitive modes of production it becomes clear, it seems to me, why the primitive peoples were not more egoistic. They had neither rich nor poor; their economic [397]interests were either parallel or equal (the latter in the case of production in common); the economic life, therefore, did not arouse egoistic ideas—they were not led into temptation. Where the economic system does not produce egoistic ideas it accustoms men to being unegoistic, and if their interests do happen occasionally to conflict, the matter is looked at altruistically and not egoistically. And since the economic life is the “conditio sine qua non” of life in general, and thus occupies the important place in human existence, it stamps the whole life with its non-egoistic character. Since the struggle for existence must be sustained in common against nature, if it is to be efficacious it binds human interests so closely together that they are inseparable; the interest of one is the same as that of his comrade.
We shall now understand why primitive men feel themselves to be first of all the members of a unit; why they not only abstain from acts harmful to their companions, but come to their aid whenever they can; why they are honest, benevolent, and truthful towards the members of their group, and why public opinion has so great an influence among them—characteristics which the quotations that I have already made have established. The cause of these facts is to be found in the mode of production, which brought about a uniformity of interest in the persons united in a single group, obliged them to aid one another in the difficult and uninterrupted struggle for existence, and made men free and equal, since there was neither poverty nor riches, and consequently no possibility of oppression.
It is only in such an environment that the social instincts innate in man can be developed, and the more the mode of production binds men’s interests together the greater will this development be. It is a truth as old as the world that one respects the interests of others and does not deceive them, only when these others do not make life more difficult, but aid in supporting it. If not, social instincts will be suppressed and the contrary instincts formed. The development of the social feelings is based upon reciprocity. When this is lacking these feelings lie dormant, but when reciprocity exists they grow stronger by constantly reacting from one to the other.44
There is still another reason which helped strengthen the solidarity among the members of the same group. The primitive peoples, who practiced agriculture little or not at all, needed an immense territory to provide for their needs. Lands whose population would seem small to the Europeans of our day, had in reality as dense a population as the mode of production would permit. From this there sprang [398]continual wars between groups disputing the possession of a certain territory. The necessity of defending as a body the territory acquired, or of conquering it anew, resulted in drawing always tighter the bonds uniting the members of the same group.
The same mode of production which drew the members of a group into an altruistic solidarity, forced these same persons into a position of excessive egoism toward those who did not belong to their group and opposed them in obtaining what they needed. The same act, killing an enemy for example, is the most egoistic act possible from the point of view of the enemy but a very altruistic act from the point of view of the slayer, since he has increased the security of his group. The development of the social feelings is, then, only determined by the form of the struggle for existence.
How then shall we explain certain egoistic acts directed against members of the same group? How, for example, can the infanticide so common among primitive peoples be explained? In seeking for a solution we shall see that this egoistic act does not result from innate insensibility toward children (the contrary is true, as we have seen above), but from the fact that the limited control over nature makes a great increase in the population impossible. The children were killed immediately after birth; no one dreamed of ridding himself of a child of greater age. Further, the nomadic life prevented the carrying along of a great number of children.45
It is for the same reason that the sick and the aged were sometimes abandoned by the primitive peoples. They were driven to this because these feeble persons were unable to make long journeys, and because their economic means did not allow them to support those who could no longer work. Here again there could be no question of innate insensibility.46 In these cases then, there was an opposition of interests; the act that was egoistic toward the individual was altruistic toward the group. If different action had been taken in such cases all would have succumbed. Thus these acts have fallen into desuetude as the productivity of labor has developed.
The continual development of the productivity of labor has modified the structure of society greatly. As soon as productivity has increased to such an extent that the producer can regularly produce more than he needs, and the division of labor puts him in a position to exchange the surplus for things that he could not produce himself, at this moment there arises in man the notion of no longer giving to [399]his comrades what they need, but of keeping for himself the surplus of what his labor produces, and exchanging it. Then it is that the mode of production begins to run counter to the social instincts of man instead of favoring it as heretofore.
In his work already quoted Nansen has described the influence exercised by exchange upon the character of the Eskimos studied by him. (The fact that this commerce has been developed by the coming of the Europeans makes no difference. Among primitive peoples exchange must have developed in the same way, only more slowly.) He says: “How baneful to them has been the introduction of money! Formerly they had no means of saving up work or accumulating riches; for the products of their labor did not last indefinitely, and therefore they gave away their superfluity. But then they learned the use of money; so that now, when they have more than they need for the moment, the temptation to sell the overplus to Europeans, instead of giving it to their needy neighbors, is often too great for them; for with the money they thus acquire they can supply themselves with the much coveted European commodities. Thus we Christians help more and more to destroy instead of to develop their old self-sacrificing love of their neighbors. And money does still more to undermine the Greenland community. Their ideas of inheritance were formerly very vague, for, as before mentioned, the clothes and weapons of a dead man were consigned with him to the grave. Now, on the other hand, the introduction of money has enabled the survivors to sell the effects of the deceased, and they are no longer ashamed to accept as an inheritance what they can obtain in this way. This may seem an advantage; but, here, too, their old habit of mind is upset. Greed and covetousness—vices which they formerly abhorred above everything—have taken possession of them. Their minds are warped and enthralled by money.”47 Thus are born avarice and rapacity, which, opposed in the beginning by altruistic sentiments developed earlier, become stronger from one generation to another.48
However, this is only one side of the question. Through the development of exchange not only does man become egoistic towards those who for any reason are unable to provide for their needs, but exchange itself is an entirely egoistic act for the two parties who enter into it. Each tries to get as much profit for himself as possible, and consequently to make the other lose. The existence of economic laws which in many, and even in most cases prevent the two parties from injuring each other, does not change the fact at all. Commerce [400]weakens the social instincts of man; the loss of one becomes the gain of another. When two persons are trading there springs up a tendency on the part of each to overvalue his own property and to disparage that of the other; commerce is one of the important causes of lying. In addition to this tendency another arises, that of giving goods of quality inferior to that agreed upon; the constant attention to one’s own interests produces and develops fraud.
The more production for one’s own use decreases, and the greater becomes the production for exchange, the more do habit and tradition produce in men the characteristics mentioned. As soon as exchange has developed to a certain point commerce begins to be a special trade. The merchant is much more exposed to the conditions named than those who trade only occasionally. Not only does he pass a great part of his life in exchanging but he is by profession egoistic in two directions; toward the producer from whom he buys, and toward the consumer to whom he sells.49
When it reaches a certain height the continually increasing productivity of labor brings a further important modification in the social structure, namely slavery. For this springs up when production is so advanced that man can regularly produce more than he actually needs for himself, and when it is possible for him to exchange the overplus for things which he can use but cannot make. Prisoners of war are no longer killed as formerly, but are obliged to work for the profit of the conquerors. In this way is formed a considerable opposition of interest between two classes of individuals who together form a social unit: on the one hand those who, deprived of one of the most important factors of human happiness, liberty, are obliged to exhaust themselves for the benefit of others, and have only the strict necessaries of life; and on the other hand those who profit by the enslavement and excessive labor of the first.
Slavery (with the other forms of forced service, serfdom and wage-labor) is one of the most important factors that undermine the social instincts in man. Slavery, runs the saying, demoralizes the master as well as the slave. It arouses in the master the notion that the slave is not a thinking and feeling man like himself, but an instrument destined exclusively to be useful to him. In the slave himself it kills the feeling of independence; lacking the arms which the free man has at his disposal, the slave has recourse to dissimulation to defend himself against his master. [401]
The overplus which one person can obtain by his own labor must always remain limited. Without the rise of slavery the great wealth of a single individual would not have been possible. To the difference between master and slave is now added that between rich and poor, and the envy and hatred of the poor for the rich, and the pride of the rich and their desire to dominate over the poor. Since the division of society into rich and poor the aristocracy has been formed, which does not owe its origin to the excellence of its members, as one might imagine from this inaccurate name, but to their wealth.
The period of civilization during which the social modification mentioned above has taken place is generally lauded to the skies, as compared with preceding epochs. In certain relations this is justifiable. Technique has made immense progress and especially during the last phase of civilization, capitalism; the power of man over nature has advanced greatly; the productivity of labor has been so increased that one class of men, exempted by this from permanent care for their daily bread, are able to devote themselves to the arts and sciences. All this is indisputable. But the development of the arts and sciences and of technique has only an indirect importance for the etiology of crime. The question first of all to be asked is this: What influence has this modification in the economic and social structure had upon the character of man? And the answer to this question can only be the following: this modification has engendered cupidity and ambition, has made man less sensitive to the happiness and misery of his fellows, and has decreased the influence exercised upon men’s acts by the opinions of others. In short, it has developed egoism at the expense of altruism.