Enquiring, whether there be any thing in the nature and condition of man, to oblige him to think, that he is not to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from the nature of things.
I BEGIN with enquiring what there is to oblige a man to hold this opinion, because if there is not some strong and plain proof arising from the nature and condition of man, to oblige him thus to abide by the sole light of his own reason; it may be so far from being a duty, which he owes to God, that it may be reckoned amongst his most criminal presumptions. And the pleading for this authority of his own reason; may have the guilt of pleading for his greatest vanity. And if, as this writer observes, spiritual pride be the worst sort of pride,¹ a confident reliance upon our own reason, as having a right to determine all matters between God and man, if it should prove to be a groundless pretension, bids fair to be reckoned the highest instance of the worst kind of the worst of sins.
Every other instance of vanity, every degree of personal pride, and self-esteem, may be a pardonable weakness in comparison of this. For how small is that pride which only makes us prefer our own personal beauty or merit to that of our fellow-creatures, when compared with a self-confiding reason, which is too haughty to adore any thing in the divine counsels, which it cannot fully comprehend; or to submit to any directions from God, but such as its own wisdom could prescribe? Thus much is certain, that there can be no medium in this matter. The claiming this authority to our own reason, must either be a very great duty, or among the greatest of sins.
If it be a sin to admit of any secrets in divine providence, if it be a crime to ascribe wisdom and goodness to God in things we cannot comprehend: if it be a baseness and meanness of spirit to believe that God can teach us better or more than we can teach ourselves: if it be a shameful apostacy from the dignity of our nature, to submit to any mysterious providence over us, to comply with any other methods of homage and adoration, than such as we could of ourselves contrive and justify; then it is certainly a great duty to assert and maintain this authority of our own reason.
On the other hand; if the profoundest humility towards God, be the highest instance of piety: if every thing within us and without us, if every thing we know of God, every thing we know of ourselves preaches up humility to us, as the foundation of every virtue, as the life and soul of all holiness: if sin had its beginning from pride, and hell be the effect of it, if devils are what they are through spiritual pride and self-conceit, then we have great reason to believe, that the claiming this authority to our reason, in opposition to the revealed wisdom of God, is not a frailty of flesh and blood, but that same spiritual pride which turned angels into apostate spirits.
Since therefore this appealing to our own reason, as the absolutely perfect rule of all that ought to pass between God and man, has an appearance of a pride of the worst kind, and such as unites us both in temper and conduct with the fallen spirits of darkness, it highly concerns every pleader on that side, to consider what grounds he proceeds upon, and to ask himself, what there is in the state and condition of human nature, to oblige him to think, that nothing can be divine or holy, or necessary, in religion, but what human reason dictates?
I hope the reader will think this a fair state of the case, and that all the light we can have in this matter, must arise from a thorough consideration of the state and condition of man in this world. If without revelation he is free from mysteries as a moral and religious agent, then he has some plea from his state and condition to reject revealed mysteries.
But if in a state of natural religion, he can’t acknowledge a divine providence or worship God, without as much implicit faith, and submission of his reason, as any revealed mysteries require; then his state and condition in the world, condemns his refusal of any revelation sufficiently attested to come from God. This enquiry therefore into the state and condition of man, being so plainly the true point of the controversy, I hope to obtain the reader’s impartial attention to it.
Had mankind continued in a state of perfect innocence, without ever failing in their duty either to God or man, yet even in such a state, they could never have known what God would or would not reveal to them, but by some express revelation from him. And as God might intend to raise them to some higher, and unknown state of perfection; so he might raise them to it by the revelation of such things as their own reason, though uncorrupt, yet could not have discovered.
But if man, in a state of innocence, could have no pretence to set himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason the final judge of what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he any pretence for so doing in his present state of sin, ignorance, and misery. His nature and condition is so far from furnishing him with reasons against revelation, against any supernatural help from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms of mercy and deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according to schemes of his own contrivance, not from his own knowledge of the nature, and reason, and fitness of things, but from some incomprehensible depth of divine goodness.
For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of any methods of atoning for our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make war against God.
For to insist upon the prerogative of our own nature, as qualifying us to make our own peace with God, and to reject the atonement which he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable, that our own repentance should be sufficient without it, is the same height of pride and impiety, as to affirm, that we have no need of any repentance at all.
For as mankind, if they had continued in a state of innocence, could not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these things unto them: so after they were fallen into a state of guilt and sin, they could never know what misery it would expose them to, or when, or how, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it, and made as happy as if they had never sinned; these are things that nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.
So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint the atonement for his own sins, or to think himself able to tell what it ought to be, is as foolish and vain a presumption, as if man in innocence should have pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into a cherub.
The writers against revelation appeal to the reason and nature of things, as infallibly discovering every thing that a revelation from God can teach us.
Thus our author; If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity¹.
It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children, and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us.
But then, this whole argument proves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it.
I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by the sole light of his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be the sole rule of God’s actions.
* For if the fitness of actions is founded in the nature of things and persons, and this fitness be the sole rule of God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be entirely inconceivable by us, so as not to be known at all, and in no instances fully known, or perfectly comprehended.
* For if God is to act according to a fitness founded in the nature of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his own incomprehensible nature, must he not necessarily act by a rule above all human comprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a rule that is just as incomprehensible to us as his own nature.
* And we can be no farther competent judges of the fitness of the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is not infinitely wise in God, than we can raise ourselves to a state of infinite wisdom.
So that if the fitness of actions is founded in the particular nature of things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which is particular to his nature, then we have from this argument, the utmost certainty that the rule or reasons of God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not an arbitrary being, that acts by mere will, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.
How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner. If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being? For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?
Supposing God not to be an arbitrary being, but to act constantly, as the perfections of his own nature make it fit and reasonable for him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehending the reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.
* For instance; look at the reason of things, and the fitness of actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men, than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating man of such a form and condition, to go through such a state of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.
Shew me according to what fitness, founded in the nature of things, God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner, bring you into such a world, and suffer and preserve such a state of things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce from the nature of things.
But whilst your own form, whilst creation and providence are depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature and reason of things.
Revelation, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to see the reasonableness and fitness of it. And don’t you also say, that God has made you for your own sake; ought you not therefore to know the reasonableness and fitness of God’s forming you as you are? Don’t you say, that providence is for the sake of man? Is it not therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there should be no mysteries, or secrets, in providence, but that man should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be constantly fit and reasonable?
Don’t you say, that the world is for the sake of man; is it not therefore fit and reasonable that man should see, that the past and present state of the world has been such as the reason and fitness of things required it should be?
* Now if the imperfect state of human nature, the calamities of this life, the diseases and mortality of human bodies, the methods of God’s continual providence in governing human affairs, are things that as much concern us, as any methods of revealed religion; and if these are things that we cannot explain, according to any fitness or unfitness founded in the nature of things, but must believe a great deal more of the infinite wisdom of God, than we can so explain; have we any reason to think, that God cannot, or ought not to raise us out of this unhappy state of things, help us to an higher order of life, and exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of himself, by any means, but such as our own poor reason can grope out of the nature and fitness of things?
Now what is the reason, that all is thus mysterious and unmeasurable by human reason, in these matters so nearly concerning human nature? ’Tis because God is not an arbitrary being, but does that which the incomprehensible perfections of his own nature, make it fit and reasonable for him to do. Do but grant that nothing can be fit for God to do, but what is according to his own infinite perfections: let but this be the rule of his actions, and then you have the fullest proof, that the fitness of his actions must be above our comprehension, who can only judge of a fitness according to our own perfections; and then we must be surrounded with mystery for this very reason, because God acts according to a certain rule, his own nature.
Again: What is the nature of a human soul, upon what terms, and in what manner it is united to the body, how far it is different from it, how far it is subject to it, what powers and faculties it derives from it; are things wherein the wisdom and goodness of God, and the happiness of man are deeply concerned. Is it not necessary that these things should have their foundation in the reason and fitness of things? And yet what natural reason, uninspired from above, can shew that this state of soul and body is founded therein?
* Again: The origin of sin and evil, or how it entered into the world consistently with the infinite wisdom of God, is a mystery of natural religion, which reason cannot unfold. For can we shew from the reason and nature of things, that it was fit and reasonable, for the providence of God to suffer sin to enter, and continue in the world? Here therefore the man of natural religion must drop his method of reasoning from the fitness of things, and that in an article of the highest concern to the moral world, and be as mere a believer, as he that believes the most incomprehensible mystery of revealed religion.
Now as there have been in the several ages of the world, some impatient, restless and presuming spirits, who, because they could not in these points explain the justice of God’s providence, have taken refuge in horrid atheism, so they made just the same sober use of their reason, as our modern unbelievers, who because they can’t comprehend the fitness and necessity of certain Christian doctrines, resign themselves up to an hardened infidelity. For it is just as reasonable to allow of no mysteries in revelation, as to allow of no mysteries in creation and providence.
And whenever this writer shall think it proper to attack natural religion with as much freedom as he has revealed, he need not enter upon any new hypothesis, or different way of reasoning. For the same turn of thought, may soon find materials in the natural state of man, for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion, and the mysteries of providence, as is here brought against revealed doctrines.
To proceed: If the fitness of actions is founded in the nature and relation of beings, then nothing can be fit for God to do, but so far as it is fit for the Governor of all created beings, whether on earth, or in any other part of the universe; and he cannot act fitly towards mankind, but by acting as is fit for the Governor of all beings.
* Now what is fit for the Governor of all created nature to do in this or that particular part of his creation, is as much above our reason to tell, as it is above our power to govern all beings. And how mankind ought to be governed, with relation to the whole creation, of which they are so small a part, is a matter equally above our knowledge; because we know not how they are a part of the whole, or what relation they bear to any other part, or how their state affects the whole, or any other part, than we know what beings the whole consists of.
Now there is nothing that we know with more certainty than that God is governor of the whole, and that mankind are a part of the whole; and that the uniformity and harmony of divine providence, must arise from his infinite wise government of the whole; and therefore we have the utmost certainty, that we are vastly incompetent judges of the fitness or unfitness of any methods that God uses in the government of so small a part of the universe, as mankind are.
Again: If the fitness of actions is founded in the relations of beings to one another, then the fitness of the actions of God’s providence over mankind, must be in many instances altogether incomprehensible to us.
For the relation which God bears to mankind, as their all-perfect Creator and continual Preserver, is a relation that our reason conceives as imperfectly, and knows as little of, as it does of any of the divine attributes. When it compares it to that of a father and his children, a prince and his subjects, a proprietor and his property, it has explained it in the best manner it can, but still has left it as much a secret, as we do the divine nature when we only say, it is infinitely superior to every thing that is finite.
By the natural light of our reason we may know with certainty, several effects of this relation, as that it puts us under the care and protection of a wise, and just, and merciful providence, and demands from us the highest instances of humility, adoration and thanksgiving. But what it is in its own nature, what kind of state, it is to exist in and by God, what it is to see by a light that is his, to act by a power from him, to live by a life in him; are things as incomprehensible to reason, left to itself, as what it is to be in the third heavens, or to hear words that cannot be uttered.
But if this relation consists in these inconceivable things, in a communication of life, light and power, if these are enjoyed in God, and in ourselves, in a manner not to be explained by any thing that we ever heard, or saw; then we must necessarily be poor judges of what is fit for God to require of us, because of this relation. It teaches us nothing but the superficialness of our own knowledge, and the unfathomable depths of the divine perfections.
How little this writer has considered the nature of this relation between God and man, may be seen by the following paragraphs. The Holy Ghost, says he, cannot deal with men as rational creatures, but by proposing arguments to convince their understandings; and influence their wills, in the same manner as if proposed by other agents. As absurd, as to say, God cannot create us as rational beings, unless he creates us in the same manner, as if we were created by other agents. For to suppose that other agents can possibly act upon our understanding, and will, in the same manner that God does; is as gross an absurdity, as to suppose that other agents can create us in the same manner that God creates us.
And to confine the manner of the Holy Ghost’s acting upon us, to the manner of our acting upon one another by arguments and syllogisms, is as great a weakness, as to confine the manner of God’s creating us, to the manner of our making a statue with tools and instruments.
But he proceeds and says, For to go beyond this, would be making impressions on men, as a seal does on wax; to the confounding of their reason, and their liberty in chusing; and the man would then be mearly passive, and the action would be the action of another being acting upon him, for which he could be no way accountable¹.
Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting upon men, it must either only propose an argument, just as a man may propose one, or it must act like a seal upon wax.
I only ask this writer, whether God communicates life, and strength, and understanding, and liberty of will to us, only as men may communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so, it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way.
But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor as wax receives the impression of the seal, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all our power of acting, by a continual communication from him, and yet as free agents, have all our light from him, and yet are accountable intelligent beings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.
The short of the matter is this. Either this writer must affirm, that our rational nature, our understanding faculties, our power of action, our liberty of will, must necessarily subsist without the continual action of God upon them, or else he must grant, that God can act upon our understandings and wills without making us as merely passive as the wax under the seal.
This writer says, Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men—yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects. But how are we to know this? This, says he, the divine nature, which contains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us¹.
If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infinite perfection and happiness, therefore his conduct over us may be very mysterious, he had drawn a plain conclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his own incomprehensible nature.
His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his own infinite perfection and happiness; but we do not know what his infinite perfections and happiness are:
Therefore we plainly know how he is to govern us.
Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is no wonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration.
But if he knows no more of what arises from the relation between God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.
It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly require of us either in a state of innocence or sin. For as the fitness of actions between beings related, must result from their respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly impossible for mere natural reason to say, what kind of homage, or worship, he may fitly require of man in a state of innocence; or what different worship and homage he may, or must require of men, as sinners.
And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, as plainly pointing this out, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to the incomprehensibility of God as a plain proof of our comprehending what God is.
As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are the same in the state of innocence or sin, and we know that we truly act according to the divine will, when we act according to what these relations require of us.
But the question is, What distinct kind of homage, or service, or worship, God may require us to render to him, either in a state of innocence or sin, on account of that relation he bears to us as an all-perfect Creator and Governor?
But this is a question that God alone can resolve.
Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon in it. For as the necessity of divine worship, so the particular manner of it, must have its reason in the divine nature.
Sacrifice, if considered only as an human invention, could not be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as a divine institution, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine appointment altered the nature and fitness of things; but because nothing has the nature and fitness of divine worship, but as it is of divine appointment.
Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God, and observed every duty both of moral and civil life, as an act of obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any particular manner of divine worship himself, or to reject any that was appointed by God, as unnecessary. It would have been ridiculous to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship. For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject a revealed manner of divine worship, because God had given them reason of their own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?
And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God from sinners.
For what the relation betwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.
This is a new state, and the foundation of a new relation, and nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has its fitness resulting from it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, as our Governor and Preserver, but what we derive from our idea of human fathers and governors: which idea only helps us to comprehend these relations, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend the omnipotence of God. For a father or governor, no more represents the state of God as our Governor and Preserver, than our living in our father’s family, represents the manner of our living in God.
These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very plain, as to the reality of their existence; and highly mysterious and inconceivable, as to the manner of their existence.
That which is plain, in these relative characters of God, plainly shews our obligations to every instance of duty, homage, love, and gratitude.
And that which is inconceivable in them, is a solid foundation of that profound humility, awful reverence, internal piety and tremendous sense of the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at the offices of religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for all things, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.
And if some people, by a long and strict attention to reason, and the fitness and unfitness of things, have at last arrived at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are mere bigotry, superstition, and enthusiasm; I shall only now observe, that youthful extravagance, passion, and debauchery, by their own natural tendency, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upon great wits, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of that reason and philosophy, which teaches old men to think the same of religion, that passion and extravagance teach the young.
To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, a creditor and his debtors, a physician and his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.
For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of the nature and guilt of sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.
To ask, whether sin hath solely the nature of an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like an error in a road or path, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken; whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as a wound or disease affects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is really thinking, or his nature a real substance. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the terms thinking and substance, so the nature of sin is not strictly represented under any of these characters, but is capable of receiving some representation from every one of them.
When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it on God’s account, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.
When it is compared to a debt, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in the same manner, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.
When it is compared to a wound, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body, so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.
Since therefore the nature and guilt of sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to be dreaded, but not so known as to be fully understood, by any thing we can compare to it:
Since the relation which God bears to sinners, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not an arbitrary being, but acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation, he must, in this respect, act by a rule known only to himself, and such as we cannot possibly state from the reason and nature of things.
For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, then reason must be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating the nature, the guilt, or proper atonement of sin in men, than of sin in angels.
For reason can no more tell us what the guilt of sin is, what hurt it does us, how far it enters into, and alters our very nature, what contrariety to, and separation from God, it necessarily brings upon us, or what supernatural means are, or are not, necessary to abolish it; our reason can no more tell this, than our senses can tell us, what is the inward, and what is the outward light of angels.
Ask reason what effect sin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what effect the omnipresence of God has upon the soul.
Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, the true nature of an atonement for sin, how far it is like paying a debt, or healing a wound, or how far it is different from them? And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is the true degree of power that preserves us in existence, how far it is like that which at first created us, and how far it is different from it.
All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities, and we cannot take upon us to be philosophers in these matters, but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up to vision and imagination.
And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal to hunger and thirst, and sensual pleasure, to tell us how our souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to our reason and logic, to demonstrate how sin is to be atoned, or the soul prepared, and purified, for future happiness.
For God has no more given us our reason to settle the nature of an atonement for sin; or to find out what can, or cannot, take away its guilt, than he has given us senses and appetites to state the nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.
And he who rejects the atonement for sins made by the Son of God, as needless, because he cannot prove it to be necessary, is as extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by his only Son, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son, as our reason is to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God, with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.
When therefore this writer says, Can any thing be more evident, than that if doing evil be the only cause of God’s displeasure, the ceasing to do evil, must take away that displeasure?¹
* Just as if he had said, if conversing with a leper has been the only cause of a man’s getting a leprosy, must not departing from him, be the removal of the leprosy? For if any one, guessing at the guilt of sin, and its effects on the soul, should compare it to a leprosy in the body, he can no more say, that he has reached its real, internal evil, than he, that comparing the happiness of heaven to a crown of glory, can be said to have described its real happiness.
This writer has no occasion to appeal to the nature of things, if he can be thus certain about things, whose nature is not only obscure, but impossible to be known. For it is as impossible for him to know the guilt and effects of sin, as to know the shape of an angel. It is as impossible to know by the mere light of reason, what God’s displeasure at sin is, what separation from sinners it implies, or how it obliges God to deal with them; as to know what the internal essence of God is. Our author therefore has here found the utmost degree of evidence, where it was impossible for him to have the smallest degree of knowledge.
If a man, having murdered twenty of his fellow-creatures, should afterward be sorry for it, and wish that he had a power to bring them to life again, or to create others in their stead, would his ceasing to kill, and wishing he had a power to create others in their stead, put him just in the same state with God, as if he had never murdered a man in his life? But unless this can be said, it cannot be said that repentance is sufficient to put a man in the same state, as if he never had sinned.
The writer has two more objections against the atonement for sin, made by Jesus Christ. First, as it is an human sacrifice, which nature itself abhors: and which was looked upon as the great abomination of idolatrous Pagan worship.
The cruelty, injustice, and impiety, of shedding human blood in the sacrifices of the Pagans is fully granted; but reason cannot thence bring the smallest objections against the sacrifice of Christ.
For how can reason be more disregarded, than in such an argument as this? The Pagans were unjust, cruel, and impious, in offering human blood to their false gods; therefore the true God cannot receive any human sacrifice, or allow any persons to die, as a punishment for sin.
For, if no human sacrifice can be fit for God to receive, because human sacrifices, as parts of Pagan worship, were unjust and impious; then it would follow, that the mortality, to which all mankind are appointed by God, must have the same cruelty and injustice in it. Now that death is a punishment for sin, and that all mankind are by death offered as a sacrifice for sin, is not only a doctrine of revealed religion, but the plain dictate of reason. But if reason must acknowledge the death of all mankind, as a sacrifice for sin, then it can have no just objection against the sacrifice of Christ, because it was human.
I need not take upon me to prove the reasonableness of God’s procedure in the mortality of mankind; revelation is not under any necessity of proving this; because it is no difficulty that arises from revelation, but equally belongs to natural religion; and both of them must acknowledge it to be reasonable; not because it can be proved to be so from the nature of things, but is to be believed to be so, by faith and piety.
But if natural religion, will not suffer us to think it inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, to appoint all mankind victims to death on the account of sin, then natural religion, can have no objection against the sacrifice of Christ, as it is an human sacrifice.
And all that revelation adds to natural religion, on the point of human sacrifice, is only this; the knowledge of one, that gives merit and effect, to all the rest.
Secondly, It is objected, that the atonement made by Jesus Christ, represents God as punishing the innocent and acquitting the guilty; or, as punishing the innocent instead of the guilty.
But this proceeds all upon mistake: for the atonement made by Jesus Christ, though it procures pardon for the guilty, yet it does not acquit them, or excuse them from any punishment, or suffering for sin, which reason could impose upon them. Natural religion calls men to repentance for their sins: the atonement made by Jesus Christ does not acquit them from it, or pardon them without it; but calls them to a severer repentance, than natural religion alone prescribes.
God therefore does not by this proceeding, shew his dislike of the innocent and his approbation of the wicked.
For how can God be thought to punish our blessed Saviour out of dislike, if his sufferings are represented of such infinite merit with him? Or how can he shew thereby his approbation of the guilty, whose repentance is not acceptable to him, till recommended by the infinite merits of Jesus Christ?
As to the fitness of our Lord’s sufferings, as God and man; and the nature and degree of their worth; reason can no more enter into this matter, or prove or disprove any thing about it, than it can enter into the state of the whole creation, and shew, how it could, or could not, be in the whole, better than it is.
For you may as well ask any of your senses, as ask your reason this principal question, Whether any supernatural means be necessary for the atonement of the sins of mankind? Or, supposing it necessary, whether the mediation, death, and intercession of Jesus Christ, as God and man, be that true supernatural means?
For as the fitness or unfitness of any supernatural means, for the atonement of sin, must result from the incomprehensible relation God bears to sinners, as it must have such necessity, and dignity, as this relation requires, it necessarily follows, that if God acts according to this relation, the fitness of his actions cannot be according to our comprehension.
Again: Supposing some supernatural means to be necessary, for destroying the guilt and power of sin; or that the sufferings, and intercession, of the Son of God incarnate, is that true supernatural means, it necessarily follows, that a revelation of such, or any other supernatural means, cannot possibly be made obvious to our reason and senses, as the things of human life, or the transactions amongst men are; but can only be so revealed, as to become just occasions of our faith, humility, and pious resignation, to the divine wisdom and goodness.
For, to say that such a thing is supernatural, is only saying, that it is something, which, by the necessary state of our own nature, we are as incapable of knowing, as we are incapable of seeing spirits.
If therefore supernatural things are by the letter of scripture ever revealed to us, they cannot be revealed to us as they are in their own nature: for if they could, such things would not be supernatural.
If an angel could appear to us, as it is in its own nature, then we should be naturally capable of seeing angels; but, because our nature is not capable of such a sight; therefore, when angels appear to men, they must appear, not as they are in themselves, but in some human or corporeal form.
It is just thus, when any divine matter is revealed by God; it can no more possibly be revealed to us, as it is in its own nature, than an angel can appear to us, as it is in its own nature; but such supernatural matter can only be revealed to us, by being represented to us, by its likeness to something, that we already naturally know.
Thus revelation teaches us this supernatural matter; that Jesus Christ is making perpetual intercession for us in heaven: for Christ’s real state, or manner of existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, cannot, as it is in its own nature, be described to us; it is in this respect ineffable, and incomprehensible. And therefore, this high and inconceivable manner of Christ’s existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, is revealed to us under an idea, that gives us the truest representation of it, we are capable of.
But if any one should thence infer, that the Son of God must therefore either be always upon his knees, or prostrate in some humble form of a supplicant, he would make a very weak inference.
Because this revealed idea of Christ, as a perpetual Intercessor in heaven, is only a comparative representation of something, that cannot be directly and plainly known as it is in its own nature; and only teaches us, how to believe something, though imperfectly, yet truly of an incomprehensible nature.
Again: When it is by the letter of scripture revealed to us, that the blessed Jesus is the one Mediator between God and man; that he is the Atonement, the Propitiation, and Satisfaction for our sins: these expressions only teach us as much outward knowledge of so great a mystery, as human language can represent. But they do not teach us the perfect nature of Christ’s state between God and sinners. For that being a supernatural matter, cannot by any outward words be revealed to us as it is in its own nature, any more than the essence of God can be made visible to our eyes of flesh.
But these expressions teach us thus much with certainty, that there is in the state of Christ between God and sinners, something infinitely and inconceivably beneficial to us; and truly answerable to all that we mean by mediation, atonement, propitiation, and satisfaction.
And though the real, internal manner, of this mediation and atonement, as it is in its own nature, is incomprehensible, yet this does not lessen our knowledge of the truth and certainty of it, any more than the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, lessens our certainty of its real existence.
And as our idea of God, though consisting of incomprehensible perfections, helps us to a real and certain knowledge of the divine nature; and though all mysterious, is yet the solid foundation of all piety; so our idea of Jesus Christ, as our Mediator and Atonement, though it be incomprehensible as to its real nature, yet helps us to a certain knowledge of Christ, as our Mediator and Atonement; and, though full of mystery, is yet full of motives to the highest piety, love, and gratitude unto God.
All objections therefore, raised from any difficulties about the nature of atonements, propitiations, and satisfactions, as these words are used in common language, are vain, and entirely groundless.
For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, that atonement, or satisfaction, when attributed to Jesus Christ, signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms in human laws or in civil life; take away this supposition, and all objections are entirely removed with it.
To return: I have granted this writer his great principle, That the relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions: and I have granted it upon this supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to his own nature; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then the rule of his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And consequently, reason alone, could not be a competent judge of God’s proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it.
But though I have thus far, granted the nature and relations of things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that plainly supposes, that his own nature must be the rule of his actions; yet since our author, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not what eternal, immutable reasons and relations of things, independent of any being, and which are a common rule and law of God and man, I entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion.
Thus, when this writer says, If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being? As he here means some eternal, immutable relations, independent of God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be a wise and good being, unless such eternal, independent relations, be the sole rule of his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot be omniscient, unless mathematical demonstrations be his sole manner of knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledge solely in mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of his infallible knowledge, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, the sole rule of his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is not arbitrary, but a wise and good being.
And we have as strong reasons to believe God to be, in the highest degree, wise and good, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness is founded; as we have to believe him to be omniscient, and eternal, without knowing on what his omniscience is founded; or to what, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to be wise and good, as to ask what obliges him to be omniscient, or eternal.
And as it would be absurd to ascribe the existence of God to any cause, or found it upon any independent relations of things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God to any cause, or found them upon any independent relations of things.
Nor do we any more lose the notion, or lessen the certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say on what they are founded, than we lose the notion of God, or render his existence uncertain, because it cannot be founded on any thing.
And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed to any cause because every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account of wisdom and goodness, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that never began to be, and that is as different as to its manner of existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning, as the existence of God is different from the existence of the creatures.
* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness that never began to be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more be founded upon the relations of things, than the unbeginning existence of God can be founded upon the existence of things. And to seek for any reasons of a wisdom and goodness that was always in the same infinite state, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or asking what it is that contains infinity.
* When therefore this writer saith, Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things;¹ he might as justly have said, an infinite Creator can have no power of creating, but what is founded on the unalterable nature of creatures.
* For the reason of things, is just as unalterable, as the nature of creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but their manner of existence, or the state of their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the same beginning, and the same alterable or unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist in such a manner, though it does not exist at all.
When therefore he says again, That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things;¹ It is the same as if he had said, the omnipotence of God is always determined by the nature of causes and effects. For as all causes and effects are what they are, and owe their nature to the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God.
Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God, destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than the existence of things depending on the power of God, destroys the certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time, though their relations depend upon his will.
So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God, brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as nature itself is continued; and when that either ceases entirely, or is only altered, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations cease, or are altered with it.
Our author says, Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on the eternal reason of things?¹
* I dare say it with the same assurance, as that his existence is not founded on the eternal existence of things. And that it is the same extravagance to say, that God’s laws are founded on the eternal reasons of things, as to say, that his power is founded on the eternal capacities of things. For the capacities of things have just the same solidity and eternity, as the relations of things have, and are just such independent realities as they are: and are just the same proper materials to found the omnipotence of God upon, as the relations of things are, to found his infinite wisdom upon.
And as we can say, that the omnipotence of God in preserving and supporting the creation, will certainly act suitably to itself, and consistent with that omnipotence which first made things be what they are, and put nature into such a state as it is in; so we can say, that the infinite wisdom of God in giving laws to the world, will act suitably to itself, and consistent with that wisdom which at first made the nature and relations of the rational world be what they are.
But then as the omnipotence of God, though it acts suitably to the state of the creation, and the nature of causes and effects, which it first ordained, yet cannot be said to be founded upon the nature of causes and effects, because neither causes nor effects have any nature, but what they owe to omnipotence; so the infinite wisdom of God, though in giving laws to the world, it acts suitably to the natures and relations of rational beings, yet cannot be said to be founded upon such relations, because such relations are the effects of the divine wisdom, and owe their existence to it.
And the reason or relations of things shew God’s antecedent wisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature of causes and effects shew his antecedent power, and are the effects of it. And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from the reason and nature of things.
Again; if God is infinite wisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded on the relations of things, unless things finite, and relations that began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite, and could not begin to be.
Therefore to ask, what it is founded upon, when it can have no foundation upon any thing, is asking, what an independent being is dependent upon, or how that began, which could have no beginning?
And to ask the reason or foundation of any one of the divine attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all. And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes, is seeking for the cause of God’s existence.
And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to the end of causes, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause.
Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say, something exists without ever beginning to exist. For as nothing can have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom ever began to be infinite, and we could know when that beginning was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its infinity was founded; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning.
This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that God was not an arbitrary being.
* Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being, that is, a being of the highest freedom and independency, that does every thing according to his own will and pleasure, is as vain, as to seek for reasons to prove, that all things are not the effect of his will. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and arbitrary in as high a manner, as he is powerful?
This writer says, It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and caprice.¹
But if God’s will is as essentially opposite to humour and caprice, as his omnipotence is to weakness and inability; then it is as absurd to suppose, that God must act according to humour and caprice, because he acts according to his own will, as to suppose that he must act with inability, because he acts by his omnipotence.
And if the will of God, as such, is in the highest state of perfection, then we have the highest reason to love and adore God, because he is arbitrary, and acts according to his own all-perfect will. And if it be asked, what it is that makes the will of God all-perfect, it may as well be asked, what it is that makes him omnipotent, or makes him to exist. For, as we have not found out a God, till we have found a being that has no cause; so we have not found the will of God, till we have found a will, that has no mover, or director, or cause of its perfection. For that will which never began to be, can no more be any thing, but what it is in itself, than it can begin to be.
That which makes people imagine, that will alone is not so adorable, is because they consider it as a blind imperfect faculty that wants to be directed. But what has such a will as this to do with the will of God?
For if the will of God is as perfect a will, as his omniscience is a perfect knowledge, then we are as sure, that the will of God cannot want any direction, or will any thing amiss, as we are, that his omniscience cannot need any information, or fall into any mistake. And if the will of God wanted any direction or government, it is impossible it should have it; for having no superior, it could only be so governed, because it willed it, and therefore must be always under its own government.
All the perfection therefore that can be ascribed to God, must be ascribed to his will, not as if it was the production of his will, (for nothing in God is produced) but as eternally inherent in it.
And as God’s will has thus all the perfection of the divine nature, and has no rule, or reason, or motive to any goodness, that comes from it, but its own nature and state in God: so this great will is the only law of all creatures, and they are all to obey and conform to it, for this reason, because it is the will of God.
* Nothing has a moral reason, or fitness to be done, but because it is the will of God that it should be done.
* It may be asked, Is there then no reason or nature of things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, considered independently of the divine will, have no more obligation in them, than a divine worship considered independently of, and without any regard to the existence of God. For the will of God is as absolutely necessary to found all moral obligation upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the will of God, is only like the fitness of religious worship without the existence of God.
And it is as just to say, that he destroys the reason of religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God.
It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is in itself absolutely unfit to be done?
This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fit in themselves, than it makes things to exist in, or of themselves. No things, nor any actions have any absolute fitness, of and in themselves.
A gift, a blow, the making a wound, or shedding of blood, considered in themselves, have no absolute fitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.
When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit in itself, which is just in the same state considered in itself, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God.
For instance, the bare eating a fruit, considered in itself, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation.
But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered in itself fit or unfit: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.
Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances, without that command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which is absolutely unfit in itself, fit to be done: but only adds new circumstances to an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral in itself, but because of its circumstances.
Again, it is objected, If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another.
It is answered, first, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is as eternal as God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are either antecedent or consequent, dependent or independent of his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore, whether there is not something right and wrong, antecedent to the will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any other source or reason of the divine goodness, besides the divine nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine omnipotence.
The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither antecedent, nor consequent to his will.
Secondly, Nothing is more certain, than that all moral obligations and duties of creatures towards one another, began with the existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal qualities and effects, began with the existence of bodies.
As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter so created and constituted by the will of God; so no actions have any moral qualities, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature in which they are created by the will of God.
* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the same origin, and the same reason, that natural qualities and effects have in the corporeal world, viz. the sole will of God. And as in a different state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.
The pretended absolute independent fitnesses, or unfitnesses of actions therefore in themselves, are vain abstractions, and philosophical jargon, serving no ends of morality, but only helping people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God, which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginary absolute fitnesses the common law both of God and man, is still more extravagant. For if the circumstances of actions give them their moral nature, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.
And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of his different state, cannot require of his brother; surely that which God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may require of a son, as God is different from a father.
Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much under authority; for law can no more be without authority, than without a law-giver. And if God and we are under the same law, we must be under the same authority.
* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures, any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any ♦of us; so neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under any authority at all.
And though God is not to be looked upon as an arbitrary being, in the sense of this author, who will not distinguish arbitrary from humour and caprice; yet in a true sense of the word, when applied to God, he must be affirmed to be an arbitrary being, that acts only from himself, from his own will, and according to his own pleasure.
And we have no more reason to be afraid to be left to a God without a law, or to be left to his will and pleasure, than to be left under the protection and care of a being, that is all love, and mercy, and goodness. For as the existence of God, as such, necessarily implies the existence of all perfection; so the will of God, as such, necessarily implies the willing every thing, that all perfection can will.
And as the existence of God, because it contains all perfection, cannot for that reason have any external cause; so the will of God, because it is all perfection, cannot, for that reason, have any external rule or direction. But his own will is wisdom, and his wisdom is his will. His goodness is arbitrary, and his arbitrariness is goodness.
But this writer does not only thus bring God into this state of law and obligation with us, but makes farther advances in the same kind of errors.
Hence, says he, we may contemplate the great dignity of our rational nature, since our reason for kind, tho’ not for degree, is of the same nature with that of God’s.¹
Here you see our reason, that is, our faculty of reasoning, (for reason cannot be called ours in any other respect,) has no other difference from reason as it is in God, but that of degree. But what greater absurdity can a man fall into, than to suppose, that a being whose existence had a beginning but a few years ago, differs only in a degree from that which could not possibly have a beginning; or that a dependent and independent being, should not be different in kind, but only in degree?
For to say, that the faculties of a dependent and independent being, may be of the same kind, is as flat a contradiction, as to say, the same kind of thing may be dependent, and independent.
Reason belongs to God and man, just as power, existence, life, and happiness, belong to God and man; and he that can, from happiness being common to God and man, prove our happiness to be of the same kind and nature with God’s, may also prove reason in God and man to be of the same kind.
This writer indeed says, Our happiness is limited, because our reason is so; and that God has unlimited happiness, because he alone has unlimited reason.¹
But if that which is necessarily limited, is different from that which is necessarily unlimited, then we have proof enough from this very argument, that a reason necessarily limited cannot be of the same kind with that reason, which is necessarily unlimited. Unless it can be said, that limited and unlimited, finite and infinite, beginning and unbeginning, have no contrariety in kind, but only differ, as a short line differs from a long one.
* The truth of the matter is this; reason is in God and man, as power is in God and man. And as the divine power has some degree of likeness to human power, yet with an infinite difference from it: so that perfection which we call reason in God, has some degree of likeness to reason as it is in man, yet is infinitely and beyond all conception different from it.
* And as our enjoyment of power is so limited, so imperfect, so superficial, as to be scarce sufficient to tell us, what power is, much less what omnipotence is; so our share of reason is so small, and we enjoy it in so imperfect a manner, that we can scarce think or talk intelligibly of it, or so much as define our own faculties of reasoning.