149 Herodotus seems from his language to assume (viii. 31) that the whole army had come south by the Dorian route. That is, either a mistake; or, more probably, the impression his language gives is due to a mere omission. Few details are given of any part of the route of the army.

150 The position at Delphi, from a military point of view, is by no means weak, provided Amphissa be occupied, and the great pass from the north be thus closed. Under those circumstances, unless the assailant is in a position to land troops at the head of the Krissæan gulf, the only line of attack is along this easily defensible path from the west. It is imaginable that Xerxes, knowing it to be an open town, under-estimated the difficulty of its capture.

151 Pogon is an almost land-locked harbour between the island of Kalauria and the mainland.

152

A Comparison of the Lists of Vessels at Artemisium and Salamis respectively.

T. = trireme; P. = pentekonters.

Artemisium. Salamis.
Athenians (some Platæans in crews at Artemisium) {127 T.
53 T. later} 180 T.
180 T.
Corinthians 40 T. 40 T.
Megareans 20 T. 20 T.
Chalkidians in Athenian ships 20 T. 20 T.
Æginetans 18 T. 30 T.
Sikyonians 12 T. 15 T.
Lacedæmonians 10 T. 16 T.
Epidaurians 8 T. 10 T.
Eretrians 7 T. 7 T.
Trœzenians 5 T. 5 T.
Styreans 2 T. 2 T.
Keians 2 T.; 2 P. 2 T.; 2 P.
Opuntian Locrians 7 P.
Hermionians 3 T.
Ambrakiots 7 T.
Leukadians 3 T.
Naxians 4 T.
Kythnians 1 T.; 1 P.
Krotonians 1 T.
Malians 2 P.
Siphnians 1 P.
Seriphians 1 P.
324 T.; 9 P. 366 T.; 7 P.

Æschylus gives 310 as the number of the Greek fleet. Valuable as is the testimony of the poet with regard to those incidents in the battle which he observed as an eye-witness, his evidence on the dry question of numbers is not likely to be exact.

153 She did, indeed, send sixty vessels, to observe, so said the patriot Greeks, how the war went, but not with any intention of taking part therein. The Corcyræans’ own excuse for their non-participation was that their fleet had been unable to round Malea.

154 The mistake may be that of a manuscript copyist; but such mistakes are so common in the text of Herodotus, that they afford strong ground for supposing that the historian was, like the men of his time, inaccurate in numerical calculations. The mistake may be in the detailed list. Paus. ii. 29. 5. Pausanias implies that the Æginetan contingent was superior in numbers to that of the Corinthian, that is to say, more than forty. If the number were forty-two, the total given by Herodotus would be correct; and it is noticeable in this reference that he himself, in speaking of the number of ships which Ægina supplied, H. viii. 46. says: “Of the islanders the Æginetans supplied thirty; they had indeed other ships manned; but with these they were guarding their own country; but with the thirty best sailers they fought at Salamis.”

155 By Professor J. W. Bury.

156 Macan, Herod, iv., v., vi., “Athens and Ægina.”

157 Note on the Reference to Siris in Themistocles’ Speech.—The reference to Siris inevitably suggests that this reported passage in Themistocles’ speech is an invention of later date arising from the colonization of Thurii in or about 443. The rapid growth of Athenian trade in the earlier part of the fifth century, and its peculiar development along the western route, render it possible, however, that an idea of settlement on or near the deserted city of Sybaris may have been long anterior to the actual settlement, and may have been mooted even before 480. If Plutarch is to be believed, Themistocles had direct relations with Corcyra, and gave the name of Sybaris to one, and the name of Italia to the other of his daughters (Plut. Them. 32).

158 H. viii. 74. τέλος δὲ ἐξερράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον. Cf. also Diod. xi. 16, ad fin.

159 This Council of War must have been held on the morning of the day preceding the battle. It lasted, in all probability, several hours, and, if so, this would indicate the afternoon as the time at which Xerxes received the message of Themistocles. On this point, then, the indications in the narrative of Æschylus and Herodotus are in agreement.

160 Plut. Them. also mentions the same name; but the testimony is probably dependent on that of Herodotus.

161 There is a curious triangular concord at this point in the history.

Diodorus says that the Egyptian contingent was sent to block the strait towards the Megarid (xi. 17).

Plutarch says 200 vessels were sent to close the passage round Salamis (Them. 12).

Herodotus mentions that the Egyptian contingent numbered 200 (vii. 89).

162 This would account for the fact implied by Æsch. Pers. 400: the two fleets when they started their movement were not in sight of one another, though, very shortly after the movement began, the Persian fleet was visible to the Greeks. The latter would first catch sight of it after it rounded the Kynosura promontory and the island.

163 Cf. Arist. 8, where the revocation is said to have taken place τρίτῳ ἔτει after the sentence.

164 Cf. Stein’s brief note on the translation of the words στὰς ἐπὶ τὸ συνέδριον in H. viii. 79.

165 In so far as I know, this last very important point was first raised by Prof. J. B. Bury in an article in the Classical Review on “Aristides at Salamis.”

166 This is Professor Bury’s suggestion. It is open to the objection that Herodotus expressly mentions the arrival of this vessel (H. viii. 83) immediately before the battle began. But this objection is not by any means insuperable. It is much more probable, under the circumstances, that Herodotus made a mistake as to the time of its arrival, than that it managed at the time he mentions to force its way through the blockading fleets at either end of the strait.

167 It would seem as if it were a description of this movement, taken from his notes on, or sources of information for, the details of the battle, which Herodotus has used by mistake in describing the movement of the Persian fleet during the night. He has, of course, intensely confused the original description by reading into it what he knew to be the object of that night-movement—the surrounding of the Greek fleet by blocking the issues both to east and west of it; but, eliminating this motive from his description, it is possible to see that in its original form it must have resembled very closely the description of the advance of the Persian fleet which has been drawn from the details which Æschylus and Diodorus give.

H. viii. 76. “The west wing put out and made a circling movement towards Salamis.” It has been already pointed out that by “west wing” Herodotus evidently means, not the west wing in the original formation, but the west wing when the fleet had completed the movement, and had taken up the position which he imagined it to have assumed when the movement was complete. This “west wing” would be the east wing in the original position. That it cannot have been the original west wing has been pointed out in a previous note.

If this correction be made, Herodotus’ language in describing this movement is peculiarly applicable to the movement of that part of the Persian fleet which entered the strait by the channel east of Psyttaleia—ἀνῆγον κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα; and the applicability becomes still more striking in view of the evidence, which will be given later, that this wing of the Persian fleet got in advance of the other.

The left wing, which would use the channel west of Psyttaleia, is equally referred to in the words: “Those about Keos and Kynosura put out in order,” to which he adds, in accordance with his knowledge that part of the object of the night-movement was the blocking of the straits, “And they occupied the whole strait as far as Munychia with their ships.”

168 This phenomenon of the morning wind is very common in the Greek seas. It will be remembered that Phormio based his tactics in his first battle with the Corinthian fleet just outside the Corinthian gulf on its occurrence. I have experienced it there; and on the three occasions on which I have been through the Strait of Salamis, once in the summer of 1895, and twice in the summer of 1899, I have experienced it on each occasion. It began in all three cases quite suddenly, a little before seven in the morning, blowing from the west, right down that part of the strait south of Ægaleos. It was extremely violent while it lasted, though it did not raise a dangerous sea. To the inexperienced it gave the impression that it meant the beginning of a very windy day. On two occasions it ceased about 8.30, on the other, shortly after nine, and the dead calm by which it had been preceded ensued once more.

169 As is shown by the presence of an Attic vessel opposite the Persian left, where her ships must almost certainly have been.

170 Cf. Æsch. Pers. 724,—Ναυτικὸς στρατὸς κακωθεὶς πεζὸν ὤλεσε στρατόν. Thuc. i. 73, 5.—Νικωθεις γὰρ ταῖς ναυσίν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας οὔσης της δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀπεχώρησεν.

171 Modern historians have taken this account of the intended or attempted construction of the mole too seriously. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the only point in the strait east of the bay of Eleusis at which it could possibly be carried out, is at the narrows where the island of St. George contracts the width of the channel, and that it is impossible that, under the circumstances as they stood, Xerxes should have been able to bring vessels to that part of the strait. But Herodotus never attempts to give the impression that the operation was ever undertaken seriously; he makes it plain, indeed, that it was not. If that were so, and it was merely designed to give the Greeks a wrong impression, it did not in the least matter whether it was made at a possible or impossible point. Ktesias, Pers. 26, and Strabo, 395, say that the mole was begun before the battle. This would imply that a serious attempt was made to construct it. The notorious unreliability of Ktesias, and the lateness of Strabo’s evidence, render this account of the matter unworthy of consideration.

172 H. viii. 103. Λέγουσα γὰρ ἐπετύγχανε τὰ πὲρ᾿ αὐτὸς ἐνόεε.

173 Οὐδεμία συμφορὴ μεγάλη ἔσται σεό τε περιεόντος καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν πρηγμάτων περὶ οἶκον τὸν σόν.

174 It has been suggested that the real intention was to induce the Ionians to revolt. The behaviour of this contingent in the recent battle was not calculated to encourage such a plan, conceived within a few days of the actual fight.

175 Ἐπείτε οὐκ ἐπαύετο λέγων ταῦτα ὁ Τιμόδημος, etc.

176 May it not be suggested that some archæologist acquainted with the extant remains of Phœnician Carthage might confer a distinct service on history by examining the structures at Agrigentum which date from this period? The workman as well as the designer must have set his mark there.

177 It has already been remarked that his description of Thermopylæ is that of a traveller coming from the north—“from Achaia”—as he himself says.

178 Herodotus himself (ix. 8) takes this view of the matter. He implies that the Spartans did not care whether the Athenians medized or not after the wall was completed. It is quite out of the question, however, to suppose that the Spartans could have regarded with equanimity the possible transference of the Athenian fleet to the Persian side. They had the experience of Artemisium and Salamis to guide them.

179 It is sometimes assumed from H. vii. 229, that the usual quota was one helot to each hoplite; but a more probable interpretation of that passage is that the reference is to the personal armed servant who accompanied each hoplite to war, and that it cannot be deduced therefrom that the body of these formed the whole number of the helots present on an ordinary occasion.

Modern criticism of the impossibility of despatching so large a force unknown to the Athenian embassy is not convincing. We do not know the place at which it gathered. It is extremely likely that a large number of helots were drawn from Messenia, and joined the army at Orestheion, where the great route from Messenia meets the route from Sparta by way of the valley of the Eurotas.

180 His departure from the Isthmus is ascribed by Herodotus to the fact that when he was sacrificing ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ an eclipse of the sun took place. This eclipse has been calculated to have occurred on the 2nd of October, 480. If so, it would be about the time of the Persian retreat from Attica after Salamis, and Stein’s conjecture that the sacrifice had something to do with a plan to harass the Persian retreat, has a certain amount of probability in its favour.

181 If Sparta had been careless as to whether Athens medized or not, she might, probably would, have despatched troops to the Isthmus at an earlier date. But if she was waiting until pressure of circumstances forced Athens to adopt Peloponnesian views as to the line of defence, then the delay is accounted for. Had her army been at the Isthmus when Mardonius advanced into Bœotia, the Athenians would certainly have called upon it to carry out the agreement, and march to the northward of Kithæron. In that case the Spartan government would have been obliged either to comply, or, by a refusal, to show in the most unmistakeable manner possible the war policy which it intended to adopt.

182 I was, I confess, surprised to find in August, 1899, that, in spite of the excellent road to Megara from Bœotia by the way of Eleusis, the track on the old line of the Platæa-Megara road is still largely used.

183 A road has been constructed through it in recent years, running from Kriekouki on the Bœotian side to Villa on the south of the range.

184 I am inclined to think that the site of Skolos is that which Leake, and others following him, have identified with Erythræ. Paus. ix. 4, 3, says that if before crossing the Asopos river on the road from Platæa to Thebes, you turned off down the stream, and went about forty stades, i.e. four and three-quarter miles, you came to the ruins of Skolos. This would place it not far east of the road from Thebes to Dryoskephalæ. He speaks of Skolos in another passage as a village of Parasopia beneath Kithæron, a rugged place, and δυσοικητός. That seems to preclude the idea of its being near the river, which traverses alluvial lands at this part of its course. The ruins identified by Leake as Erythræ cannot belong to that town if the testimony of Herodotus and Pausanias is accurately worded. This point will be discussed in a later note. In actual fact, however, the exact site of Skolos is very difficult to determine. My main reason for suggesting that it stood where Leake places Erythræ is that those ruins are the only ruins in the neighbourhood indicated by Pausanias, and are certainly not the ruins of Erythræ.

185 It is necessary to pursue so obvious a line of argument, because, for some incomprehensible reason, modern historians have thought it right to judge of the plans of these able Persian commanders as though they were dictated by no higher considerations than such as might occur to an untutored savage.

186 The weakness of this line in case of attack from the north was conclusively shown twenty years later in the manœuvres which led to the battle of Tanagra.

187 It is almost certain that an ancient road from Eleusis followed the eminently natural line taken by the modern road from Eleusis to Eleutheræ. There was also, in all probability, a route from Athens to Eleutheræ which did not enter Eleusis at all, but, branching from the Sacred Way near the Rheitoi after traversing the low pass through Mount Ægaleos, went up the Thriasian plain and joined the road from Eleusis among the low hills of Western Attica.

188 These ridges will be found numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, in the accompanying map.

189 Marked A 6 in the map.

190 Called in the map, for purposes of distinction, the Asopos ridge, the Long ridge, and the Plateau.

191 Those of the streams marked A 4 and A 5 on the map.

192 During my stay at Kriekouki, in December ’92–January ’93, the rainfall was at times extraordinarily heavy. Nevertheless, I had not on any occasion the slightest difficulty in crossing any of the streams, and it was not even necessary to get wet in so doing. On one occasion also I happened to be following the line of one of the watercourses leading to the Œroë amid a downpour of rain such as we rarely see in England, which had been going on with more or less continuity for the previous fourteen hours; and yet, as I descended the brook towards the plain the water became less and less until, on the plain, there was no water running in the stream bed.

193 Pausanias knew the roads through these two passes.

(1) Platæa-Athens road.

He says (xi. 1, 6) that Neokles, the Bœotarch, in his surprise of Platæa in the year 374, led the Thebans οὐ τὴν εὐθεῖαν ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβῶν τὴν πεδιάδα, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ Ὑσιὰς ἦγε πρὸς Ἐλευθερῶν τε καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.

There will be occasion to show that Hysiæ was in all probability a small place, on a site just outside the southernmost end of the village of Kriekouki. It was therefore at the eastern side of the opening of the valley through which the road from Platæa to Athens passed. The remains of that ancient road are, however, at the other side of the valley opening; and, therefore, Hysiæ was not upon it. Probably, however, down the valley came a track which is still used, and which, after passing through the village of Kriekouki, goes due north to Thebes in a line parallel to the main road from Dryoskephalæ. This would be the road which Pausanias here mention. It would, in entering the valley to the pass, go close to this site of Hysiæ. Of the identity of this site it will be necessary to speak in a later note.

In 379, after the revolution in Thebes (X. H. v. 4, 14), the Spartans despatched Kleombrotos with a force to Bœotia. As Chabrias, with Athenian peltasts, was guarding “the road through Eleutheræ,” he went, κατὰ τὴν εἰς Πλαταιὰς φέρουσαν.

This is almost certainly the Platæa-Athens pass. Kleombrotos probably did not discover that the Dryoskephalæ pass was guarded until he got to Eleutheræ. After doing so he turned to the left and made his way through the Platæa-Athens pass, exterminating a small body of troops which attempted to defend it.

(2) The Platæa-Megara road.

Pausanias (ix. 2, 3) says, Τοῖς δὲ ἐκ Μεγάρων ἰοῦσι πηγή τέ ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ καὶ προελθοῦσιν ὀλίγον πέτρα· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀκταίωνος κοίτην.

In the previous sentence he has expressly spoken of the road from Eleutheræ to Platæa. The Megara road is therefore a different road. The κοὶτη Ἀκταίωνος can, I think, be determined with sufficient certainty at the present day. It is on the top of a low cliff, probably the πέτρα mentioned, overhanging the sources of the stream O 3. Near the foot of the cliff is an ancient well, known in Leake’s time as the Vergutiani Spring.

194 Ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπωρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος.

195 The site of Erythræ.

Colonel Leake identified it with certain ruins which are found at the foot of the mountain slope several miles east of the road from Dryoskephalæ to Thebes. The available evidence seems to me to be strongly against this view.

(1) The traditional site is where I have placed it, though I am afraid that but little stress can be laid on traditions in modern Greece.

(2) Its comparatively frequent mention by Greek writers seems to indicate that, though a small place, its position was of some importance. If Leake’s view be correct this cannot have been the case. If it were where I believe it to have been, it would be at the northern exit of one of the most important passes in Greece. There is an ancient φρουρίον on the bastion of Kithæron to the east of the site. Its remains are so scanty, however, that they do not afford any clue as to its date.

(3) There are remains of ancient buildings on the site. There are also remains of an ancient well, besides which is a heap of stones, from which two stones were obtained a few years ago with inscriptions showing them to have belonged to a temple of Eleusinian Demeter. Pausanias mentions so many temples in the neighbourhood dedicated to that deity, that the discovery contributes but little to the identification of the site. I was informed at Kriekouki last year (August, 1899) that those particular stones were known to have been originally discovered on another site. As neither my informant nor any one else could tell me whence, why, or by whom they were removed, I did not place much credence in the report.

(4) Pausanias says (ix. 2, 1), Γῆς δὲ τῆς Πλαταιίδος ἐν τῶ Κιθαιρῶνι ὀλίγον τῆς εὐθείας ἐκτραπεῖσιν ἐς δεξιὰν Ὑσιῶν καὶ Ἐρυθρῶν ἐρείπιά ἐστι; and further on (ix. 2, 2), he says, referring to the road of which he is speaking: αὕτη μὲν (i.e. ὅδος) ἀπ’ Ἐλευθερῶν ἐς Πλάταιαν ἄγει. The road referred to is of course the Athens-Platæa road, on which he is travelling towards Platæa. Can any one suppose that Pausanias would have used the expression quoted, especially the word ὀλίγον, had the ruins of Erythræ, as Leake conjectured, lain some three and a half miles away from the nearest point of this road, and hidden from it, moreover, by the great projecting bastion of Kithæron, which is shown at the south-east corner of the accompanying map?

Leake quotes Thucydides (iii. 24), who says that the two hundred and twelve fugitives from Platæa first took the Thebes road in order to put their pursuers off the scent, and then turning, ᾔεσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὁδόν ἐς Ἐρύθρας καὶ Ὑσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὀρῶν διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Meanwhile the pursuers were searching the road along the ὐπωρέη. This last road would lead the pursuers near the site where I conjecture Hysiæ to have stood, and the objection may be raised that it is unlikely that the fugitives would have gone to a place close to the road along which they could see the pursuers were searching for them. It is, however, to be remarked that Thucydides does not say that they went to either Erythræ or Hysiæ. Had he intended to imply this he would have mentioned those places in their proper order, Hysiæ first and Erythræ second. Whenever he refers to the actual course taken by a body of men, or by a fleet, he invariably mentions the places touched at or arrived at in their geographical order. Vide Th. ii. 48, 1; ii. 56, 5; ii. 69, 1; iv. 5, 2; vii. 2, 2; vii. 31, 2.

The passage seems perfectly comprehensible and in accord with the hypothesis which I put forward with respect to the positions of Hysiæ and Erythræ. These fugitives, turning from the Platæa-Thebes road, took the track which in modern times leads from Pyrgos to Kriekouki, and which in ancient times would be the road from Thespiæ to Hysiæ, Erythræ, and the passes. They did not go to but towards those places, making in reality for those high rugged bastions to the north-east of the pass of Dryoskephalæ.

But, after all, Pausanias’ words in the passage quoted dispose effectively of Colonel Leake’s site. He would not have described a place twenty-five stades away from the road as a short distance to the right of it.

(5) Herodotus (ix. 15) speaks of the Persian camp as ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ Ἐρυθρέων παρὰ Ὑσιάς, κατέτεινε δὲ ἐς τὴν Πλαταίιδα γῆν. These words merely show that Erythræ was east of Hysiæ.

(6) Perhaps one of the strongest pieces of evidence is Herodotus’ statement that the first Greek position was “at Erythræ.” Is it conceivable that the Greek force, especially in its then state of feeling with regard to the Persians, would be likely, after issuing from the pass of Dryoskephalæ, to turn east along Kithæron, leave the pass open, and take up a position with their backs to a part of the range through which there was no passage of retreat?

(7) We are told later that their reason for moving to their second position was the question of water-supply. This accords with the present state of the locality about the traditional Erythræ. The streams in that neighbourhood have but little water in them in the dry season.

(8) The ground in this neighbourhood accords peculiarly with the description given by Herodotus of the first engagement.

196 Marked ridges 1, 2, 3, 4, in the map.

197 These positions will be found marked upon the accompanying map. It is necessary, however, to explain the evidence on which they are determined.

198 The details of the contingents given by Herodotus are:⁠—

Lacedæmonians—
Spartans 5000
Periœki 5000
Helots 35,000
Tegeans 1500
Corinthians 5000
Potidæans 300
Orchomenians (Arcadia) 600
Sikyonians 3000
Epidaurians 800
Trœzenians 1000
Lepreans 200
Mykenæans and Tirynthians 400
Phliasians 1000
Hermionians 300
Eretrians and Styreans 600
Chalkidians 400
Ambrakiots 500
Leukadians and Anaktorians 800
Paleans from Kephallenia 200
Æginetans 500
Megareans 3000
Platæans 600
Athenians 8000
Miscellaneous light-armed troops 34,500
Total 108,200

199 I.e. A 1. In the days before scientific survey there was frequently the utmost confusion with regard to the application of names to the head streams of main rivers. This generally took the form of applying the name of the main stream to several of its feeders. The tendency of the local population was to apply the well-known name to that upper tributary which was in their immediate neighbourhood, and was therefore best known to them. Examples of this are frequent in England; the upper waters of the Thames are a case in point. In early sketch maps it will be found that the name Thames is applied with the utmost diversity to the head streams of the river, and even a tributary so far down as the Evenlode is sometimes given the name of the main river. This is, I fancy, what has taken place with regard to the Asopos. The Platæans, with whom Herodotus must have come in contact in the course of his visit to the region, called this stream, A 1, by the name of the main river, and consequently “Asopos” in Herodotus is to be understood to mean this stream up to its junction with the stream which comes from the west, rising not far from Leuktra, and, after that, to refer to what is really the main river. From Platæa itself the course of this stream is plainly traceable in the plain, running along the western base of the Asopos ridge. The stream coming from Leuktra is not visible, and it is quite conceivable that Herodotus never had any definite knowledge of its existence. In Leake’s time (vide his sketch map) the inhabitants of Kriekouki seem to have called the stream, A 6, Asopos. It is not so called at the present day. My own impression is, however, that Herodotus, although he heard the Platæans speak of A 1 as the Asopos, may in one passage refer to the stream from Leuktra with a special attribute: τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα (H. ix. 31). A sentence previously, at the end of Chapter 30, he has a reference to the Asopos without any qualification, οὗτοι μὲν νὺν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδἐυοντο, and this reference is undoubtedly to A 1, which is to him, as other references in his narrative show, the upper Asopos “ordinarily so called.”

200 H. ix. 31, ad init., πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἶναι ἐν Πλαταιῇσι.

201 Cf. especially the mention of the Asopos and its context in Chapter 40.

202 It will be remarked that Artabazos’ statement on this point is in direct conflict with that reported by Herodotus to have been made at the same time by Alexander of Macedon to the Greeks.

203 It appears later (Chap. 46, ad init.) that it was to the Athenian generals alone that Alexander’s story was in the first instance imparted. That tends to confirm, what the lie of the ground would suggest, that the Greek left was nearer the Asopos than the right wing.

204 This is one of the most important passages in Herodotus’ description of the battle. It indicates more clearly than has been hitherto indicated, the position of the Greeks in their second position.

In the first place, if we remember that the Lacedæmonians were on the Greek right, it will be seen that it forms a very strong argument in favour of the identification of Gargaphia which has been adopted. Had it been at Apotripi it would certainly have been near the Greek centre. It also shows the obliquity of the Greek line with respect to the course of the Asopos; in other words, that it was, as might be expected, extended along the Asopos ridge.

205 This is shown still more clearly in the account of the withdrawal from this position.

206 The three developments of the Greek second position may be summed up as follows:⁠—

1. The Greek right was near the spring of Gargaphia, not on the Asopos ridge, while the left was near the Heroön of Androkrates.

2. After a forward movement of the whole line, the right took up position on the Asopos ridge, while the line extended along the course of that ridge, until the left was actually on the Asopos.

3. The left, when its position on the plain became untenable, took to the higher ground of the north extension of the Asopos ridge.

207 It would seem as if this determination were not come to at the morning council. Their idea at that time appears to have been to move during the night, in case the enemy did not renew their attack. As the attack was renewed, the movement was deferred until the following night.

208 The members of the American school at Athens who excavated parts of the site of Platæa some years ago were inclined to believe that at the time of the battle the town stood on the higher or southern end of the bastion which is now strewn with the traces of the successive towns which have occupied the site; and that it did not extend northward to the point where the bastion sinks more or less abruptly into the plain. They also believed that they discovered the foundations of the temple of Hera on this north extension of the bastion. I am disposed to think that their conjecture as to the position of the contemporary town is correct, though the question is not of sufficient importance with respect to this particular passage in Greek history to render it desirable or necessary to quote the mass of evidence on which the opinion is founded. The position of the temple of Hera as determined by them agrees with the brief mention of it in this passage of Herodotus.

209 Herodotus, in words already quoted, says that it was the intention of the Greeks, on moving to the “Island,” to detach a part of the army to relieve the attendants who were blocked in the pass. This is certainly the Dryoskephalæ or the Platæa-Athens pass, probably the latter, which they were attempting to use as an alternative way, after the fearful disaster which had befallen the former provision train in the exit of the Dryoskephalæ pass. Herodotus shows, too, that this relief was urgently required, since the Greek army was running short of provisions; for, although the Platæa-Megara pass must have been open, it is of such a character as to render it impossible that the commissariat for a force of 100,000 men could be adequately maintained through its channel. It is therefore in the very highest degree probable that an attempt, at any rate, was made to carry out this part of the arrangement between the generals. Now, the Spartan force on the right of the Greek line would be, in so far as position was concerned, that portion of the Greek army on which this duty would naturally devolve. The mission of this force for the relief of the pass was one of extreme danger and difficulty, and it would be natural that the service should devolve on that part of the army which enjoyed the highest military reputation. It was, I venture to think, while carrying out this movement that the Spartans became involved in that series of events which led to the last catastrophe in the great tragedy.