And, confiding in his own genius, he begins his poem without soliciting supernal inspiration,

To which may be added, that this placing himself before the Muse, resembles the ego et meus rex of Wolsey. On the contrary, divinely-inspired poets, as Hermeas well observes, knock, as it were, at the gates of the Muses, and thus being filled from thence exclaim,

And,

And,

For being always extended to them, they dispose the whole of what they afterwards say as derived from their inspiring influence. With an arrogance too, peculiar to the Romans, who, as a certain Greek poet^[163] says, were a people

He associates himself, in his fourth Eclogue, with the Muses, as their equal:

Which reminds me of what Suetonius relates of Caligula, that he would place himself between the statues of Castor and Pollux, and confer privately with Jupiter Capitolinus, fancying that he was intimate with, and of equal dignity with, these divinities. And as to the poets that have lived since the fall of the Roman empire, it would be ridiculous to suppose that they possessed this highest enthusiasm, as they did not believe in the existence of the sources from whence it is alone genuinely derived.

P. 67. The attentive power of the soul. This is that part or power of the rational soul which primarily apprehends the operations of the senses. For the rational soul not only has intellect in capacity, the dianoetic power, will, and choice, but another power, which is called by the best of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle, as well as by Iamblichus, το προσεκτικον, the attentive. This power investigates and perceives whatever is transacted in man; and says, I understand, I think, I opine, I am angry, I desire. And, in short, this attentive part of the rational soul passes through all the rational, irrational, vegetable, or physical powers. If, therefore, it is requisite it should pass through all these powers, it will also proceed through the senses, and say, I see, I hear; for it is the peculiarity of that which apprehends energies thus to speak. Hence if it is the attentive power which says these things, it is this power which apprehends the energy of sensibles; for it is necessary that the nature which apprehends all things should be one, since man also is one. For if one part of it should apprehend these, and another those things, it is just, as Aristotle says, as if you should perceive this thing, and I that. It is necessary, therefore, that the attentive power should be one indivisible thing.

P. 74. For the human soul is on all sides darkened by body, which he who denominates the river of Negligence, or the water of Oblivion, &c.——will not by such appellations sufficiently express its turpitude. “The whole of generation, as well as the human body,” says Proclus in Tim. lib. v. p. 339, “may be called a river, through its rapid, impetuous, and unstable flux. Thus also in the Republic, Plato calls the whole genesiurgic nature the river of Lethe; in which are contained, as Empedocles says, Oblivion, and the meadow of Ate; the voracity of matter, and the light-hating world, as the Gods say; and the winding streams under which many are drawn down, as the Chaldean oracles assert.”

P. 105. But there are a certain few who by employing a certain supernatural power of intellect, are removed from nature, &c. The class to which these few belong is beautifully unfolded, as follows, by Plotinus, in the beginning of his Treatise on Intellect, Ideas, and real Being. “Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some proceeding no farther, pass through life, considering these as the first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil, and whatever is pleasant is good; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among them who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, who collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed with the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford them rest, they betake themselves, together with the name of virtue, to actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. In the third class is the race of divine men, who, through a more excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which they raise themselves above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this lower world, and there abiding despise every thing in these regions of sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who after many wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country.” See my translation of the whole of this treatise.

P. 117. By mire, therefore, understand every thing corporeal-formed and material. “Matter,” says Simplicius in his Commentary on the first book of Aristotle’s Physics, “is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles, with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried downwards to nonbeing. Those things, indeed, which are the properties of sensibles are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into generation, viz. into matter; for matter is always truly the last sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life, which they symbolically denominate water, matter, being as it were a certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of generated and sensible natures, not subsisting as any definite form, but as the state or condition of subsistence; just as the impartible, the immaterial, true being, and things of this kind, are the constitution of an intelligible nature; all forms, indeed, subsisting both in sensibles and intelligibles, but in the former materially, and in the latter immaterially; viz. in the one impartibly and truly, but in the other partibly and shadowy. Hence every form is in sensibles distributed according to material interval.”

P. 120. Through the innovation and illegality of the Greeks. Iamblichus says, that through this innovation and illegality, both names and prayers have at present lost their efficacy. For during his time, and forborne centuries prior to it, the genuine religion of the Greeks was rapidly declining, through their novelty and volatility, of which he here complains. Hence the Emperor Julian, in the fragments of his treatise against the Christians, preserved by Ciryl, says, speaking of the Christians, “If any one wishes to consider the truth respecting you, he will find that your impiety consists of the Judaic audacity, and the indolence and confusion of the heathens. For deriving from both, not that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web of evils.——Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you have seized blasphemy towards the venerable Gods; but from our religion you have cast aside reverence to every nature more excellent than man, and the love of paternal institutes.” Το γαρ αληθες ει τις υπερ υμων εθελοι σκοπειν, ευρησει την υμετεραν ασεβειαν, εκ τε της Ιουδαϊκης τολμης και της παρα τοις εθνεσιν αδιαφοριας και χυδαιοτητος συγκειμενην. εξ αμφοιν γαρ ουτι το καλλιστον αλλα το χειρον ελκυσαντες, παρυφην κακων ειργασασθε.——Απο μεν ουν της Εβραιων καινοτομιας το βλασφημειν τιμωμενους θεους ηρπασατε· απο δε της παρ’ ημιν θρησκειας το μεν ευλαβες τε ομου προς απασαν την κρειττονα φυσιν, και των πατριων αγαπητικον, απολελοιπατε.

P. 122. Prior to truly existing beings, and total principles, &c. Of the two most ancient principles of all things mentioned in this chapter, as celebrated by Hermes, the first corresponds to the one itself of Plato, and the second to being itself, or superessential being, the summit of the intelligible triad; which two principles are beautifully unfolded by Proclus in the second and third books of his treatise on the Theology of Plato.

P. 122. He arranges the God Eneph prior to, and as the leader of, the celestial Gods.—But prior to this he arranges the impartible one, which he says is the first paradigm, and which he denominates Eicton. It appears to me that the former of these two divinities is the same with Saturn, who is the summit of the intellectual order of Gods; and that the latter is the animal itself of Plato, or the Phanes of Orpheus, who subsists at the extremity of the intelligible triad. For the God Eneph is said by Iamblichus to be an intellect intellectually perceiving itself, and converting intellections to itself; and these are the characteristics of Saturn. And the God Eicton is said to be the first paradigm, and this is also asserted of Phanes.

P. 123. For the books which are circulated under the name of Hermes, contain Hermaic opinions, though they frequently employ the language of the philosophers: for they were translated from the Egyptian tongue by men who were not unskilled in philosophy. A few only of these books are now extant, but what is here said by Iamblichus sufficiently proves their authenticity, and that they contain the genuine doctrines of Hermes. They have doubtless, however, been occasionally interpolated by some of the early Christians, though not to that extent which modern critics, and that mitred sophist Warburton, suppose.

P. 123. And such as have written concerning the decans. The twelve parts, mentioned in the preceding chapter, into which the Egyptians divide the heavens, are the twelve signs of the zodiac. But the thirty-six parts are the twelve houses of the planets, divided into three other portions, which they call decans. Ptolemy, however, in his Quadripartite, subverts this doctrine of the Egyptians. Concerning these decans, see Scaliger ad Manilium, Kircher II. parte Oedipi, and Salmasius de Annis climactericis. Gale also gives the following extract from Hermes relative to the decans, which had not been before published, and which he derived from a MS. copy of Stobæus in the possession of Vossius. Φαμεν ω τεκνον, περιεκτικον των απαντων ειναι το σωμα. εννοησον ουν αυτο ωσπερ κυκλοειδες σχημα——υπο δε τον κυκλον του σωματος τουτου τεταχθαι τους λϛ δεκανους, μεσους του παντος κυκλου του ζωδιακου.——νοησωμεν ωσπερει φυλακας αυτους προϊστασθαι των εν κοσμῳ απαντων παντα συνεχοντας——και τηρουντας την των παντων ευταξιαν.——ετι δε νοησον ω Τατ, οτι απαθεις εισιν ων οι αλλοι αστερες πασχουσιν. ουτε γαρ επεχομενοι τον δρομον στηριζουσιν, ουτε κωλυομενοι αναποδιζουσιν, αλλ’ ουδε μην απο του φωτος του ηλιου σκεπονται, απερ πασχουσιν οι αλλοι αστερες. ελευθεροι δε οντες υπερανω παντων, ωσπερ φυλακες και επισκοποι ακριβεις του παντος, περιεχονται τῳ νυχθημερῳ το παν.——εχουσι προς ημας την μεγιστην δυναμιν. i. e. “We say, O son, that the body [of the universe] is comprehensive of all things. Conceive, therefore, this to be as it were of a circular form.——But under the circle of this body the thirty-six decans are arranged, as the media of the whole circle of the zodiac.——These, likewise, must be understood to preside as guardians over every thing in the world, connecting and containing all things——and preserving the established order of all things.——Farther still, understand, O Tat, that these decans are impassive to the things which the other stars suffer. For neither being detained, do they stop their course, nor being impeded do they recede, nor are they, like the other stars, concealed as with a veil by the light of the sun. But being liberated above all things, they comprehend the universe as the guardians and accurate inspectors of it, in the Nycthemeron [or the space of night and day].——They also possess, with respect to us, the greatest power.”

P. 125. So that what you add from Homer, “that the Gods are flexible,” it is not holy to assert. The words of Homer are στρεπτοι δε τε και θεοι αυτοι, and are to be found in Iliad ix. v. 493. But when Iamblichus says, it is not holy to assert the Gods are flexible, he means that it is not holy according to the literal signification of the words; divine flexibility indicating nothing more than this, that those who through depravity were before unadapted to receive the illuminations of the Gods, and in consequence of this were subject to the power of avenging dæmons; when afterwards they obtain pardon of their guilt through prayers and sacrifices, and through methods of this kind apply a remedy to their vices, again become partakers of the goodness of the Gods. So that divine flexibility is a resumption of the participation of divine light and goodness by those who through inaptitude were before deprived of it.

P. 130. Dæmons preside over the parts of our body. Proclus in the fragments of his Ten Doubts concerning Providence, preserved by Fabricius in the eighth vol. of his Bibliotheca Græca, observes, “That the Gods, with an exempt transcendency, extend their providence to all things, but that dæmons, dividing their superessential subsistence, receive the guardianship of different herds of animals, distributing the providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to the most ultimate division. Hence some of them preside over men, others over lions or other animals, and others over plants; and still more partially, some are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the heart, and others of the liver.” He adds, “all things, however, are full of Gods, some of whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others through dæmons as media: not that the Gods are incapable of being present to all things, but that ultimate are themselves unable to participate primary natures.” Hence it must be said that there is one principal dæmon, who is the guardian and governor of every thing that is in us, and many dæmons subordinate to him, who preside over our parts.

P. 134. Hence it is requisite to consider how he may be liberated from these bonds. “The one salvation of the soul herself,” says Proclus in Tim. lib. v. p. 330, “which is extended by the Demiurgus, and which liberates her from the circle of generation, from abundant wanderings, and an inefficacious life, is her return to the intellectual form, and a flight from every thing which naturally adheres to us from generation. For it is necessary that the soul, which is hurled like seed into the realms of generation, should lay aside the stubble and bark, as it were, which she obtained from being disseminated into these fluctuating realms; and that purifying herself from every thing circumjacent, she should become an intellectual flower and fruit, delighting in an intellectual life, instead of doxastic nutriment, and pursuing the uniform and simple energy of the period of sameness, instead of the abundantly wandering motion of the period which is characterized by difference. For she contains each of these circles, and twofold powers. And of her horses one is good, but the other the contrary [as is said in the Phædrus]. And one of these leads her to generation, but the other from generation to true being. The one also leads her round the genesiurgic, but the other round the intellectual circle. For the period of the same and the similar elevates to intellect, and an intelligible nature, and to the first and most excellent habit. But this habit is that according to which the soul being winged governs the whole world, becoming assimilated to the Gods themselves. And this is the universal form of life in the soul, just as that is the partial form, when she falls into the last body, and becomes something belonging to an individual, instead of belonging to the universe. The middle of these, also, is the partial universal, when she lives in conjunction with her middle vehicle, as a citizen of generation. Dismissing, therefore, her first habit, which subsists according to an alliance to the whole of generation, and laying aside the irrational nature which connects her with generation, likewise governing her irrational part by reason, and extending opinion to intellect, she will be circularly led to a happy life from the wanderings about the regions of sense; which life those that are initiated by Orpheus in the mysteries of Bacchus and Proserpine, pray that they may obtain, together with the allotments of the [celestial] sphere, and a cessation of evil. But if our soul necessarily lives well, when living according to the circle of sameness, much more must this be the case with divine souls. It is, however, possible for our soul to live according to the circle of sameness, when purified, as Plato says. Cathartic virtue, therefore, alone must be called the salvation of souls; since this cuts off, and vehemently obliterates, material natures, and the passions which adhere to us from generation; separates the soul and leads it to intellect; and causes it to leave on earth the vehicles with which it is invested. For souls in descending receive from the elements different vehicles, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial; and thus at last enter into this gross bulk. For how, without a medium, could they proceed into this body from immaterial spirits?”