Extract from a Letter of Thomas Warre

London, June 20, 1810.

My Dear Father,

I write these few lines to inform you I this morning received a long letter from William, from Fornos d’Algodres, June 6th, the same place they were in before. He is very well and writes in very good spirits. They have had dreadful bad weather by continual rains.

The French have invested Ciudad Rodrigo closer, but William thinks before they attack that place, they will drive in our advance corps, General Crawfurd’s Division, which overlooks their operations, and should they succeed in driving them in, Beresford’s forces must retire to concentrate. But William does not expect they will succeed, not being in sufficient force. He still speaks favourably of the native troops, who are kept a good deal on the alert. They have lately had great feasting. Ld. Wellington on the 4th inst. gave a dinner to Beresford, which was returned by him, and all went off remarkably well.

William has again written to poor Clara, but fears nothing he can urge will induce her to move at present. I lament it exceedingly....

On getting to Throgmorton St. I found a few lines from Capt. Hardy. The date is 28th of May off Fernesen in the Gt. Belt. He merely says that he is quite well, and that they are proceeding on to the Baltic, that is the St George, Formidable, Stately and Resolution, and that nothing had occurred worth noticing.

Extract from a Letter of Thomas Warre

Hendon Place, July 8, 1810.

[I deferred writing to you as I expected to find letters in town from Wm., which we did of 13th June.]

He wrote as usual in great spirits, but the crisis of their fate approaches. The French had completed their bridges across the Agueda, so Cd. Rodrigo was invested, but their heavy artillery had stuck in the mud near Tamames, somewhere between Salamanca and C. Rodrigo. They have three Corps d’Armée, viz.: Junot, Ney, and Regnier’s, which is opposed to Genl. Hill to the Southward. Their force he supposes to be 60 to 70,000, very sick and discontented. Much will depend on their first sweep, but if the Portuguese troops fulfil the promise they give at present, he has no doubt they shall give them a good licking. Ld. Wellington’s Hd. Qrs. were at Celorico. The front of the allied army extended from Pinhel to Guarda. Adv. gd. at Gallegos, 2 leagues from C. Rodrigo and the advanced Picket at Marialva, close to the French outposts. I saw Col. Ross yesterday. He has exchanged into the 48th; both Batts. of which are in Portugal in Genl. Hill’s Division. He had seen a letter from Ld. Wellington to one of Mrs Ross’s Brothers. He writes in great spirits. My Father likewise saw a letter yesterday from General Off. of high rank, who said that their position was an excellent one, and that the C. in. C. has made the most judicious arrangements. All this is very good as far as it goes, but I shall look for the next arrivals with much anxious impatience.

Hd. Qrs., Fornos D’Algodres, June 20, 1810.

My Dear Father,

I am sorry to tell you that the Marshal has not yet received any answer from the Government respecting the admission of Rice and Grain free of duty; and I begin to fear that their usual narrow and absurd policy opposes more obstacles to this very desirable object than was at first expected. Indeed, if so, nothing can be more absurd, as although the harvest promises very well, particularly Rice and Barley, owing to the uncommon lateness of the season, the Indian corn is in most places but just sown, and in many not yet. Much must therefore depend upon the dryness of the latter end of the Autumn, and before that I think the scarcity will be so great, that they will be forced, though late, to open their ports, and give every encouragement to importation, or starve. The men and oxen have been kept away from their agricultural pursuits, to attend the armies with their carts, and this has delayed and impeded very much the ploughing, and hoeing, and reaping, as has also in some degree the very great consumption of cattle. The moment the Marshal gets an answer I will write to you, and to Porto to Pedro Alvez, which I have not done hitherto, because in the first place I could tell him nothing decisive, and in the next, it appeared to me prudent that it should be kept quite a secret that such an allowance in point of duties was in agitation.

The weather has at last set in very hot, which I hope will increase the great sickness of the French, who have been mostly exposed to the continued rains we have had till now. Our people, both English and Portuguese, are getting into the most satisfactory state of health, having been under cover and quiet.

The Enemy continues almost in statu quo. They have completed their bridges over the Agueda at Val d’Espino, and covered them by a small tête de pont. By their means the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo is completed. Their heavy Artillery and Mortars are, I believe, still fast in the mud half-way to Salamanca, but this hot weather will now soon enable them to bring them up. After which I have no idea that Ciudad Rodrigo can hold out a fortnight, from its construction, which is completely irregular and very defective, besides being in some degree commanded at about 800 yards. This will probably be the prelude to our play, and then we shall all become actors. They seem very shy of us, and I do not believe have as yet completed their preparations, or collected a sufficient force to attack us. Their foreigners continue to desert in considerable numbers, and more would I am sure come over, but for the steps the French have taken to prevent them. Our advanced Picquets have frequent skirmishes with them, which lead to nothing but wounding a few men and horses on each side.

We went over two days ago to Francozo to inspect a Portuguese Brigade with Lord Wellington, and afterwards to Minucal (?) to see the 16th Lt. Dgns., who are in very fine order, and made a most excellent review. At Francozo we visited the Nuns. The Porteress gave Lord Wellington, etc., etc., leave to enter, and some of us rambled all over the Convent. I never saw more poverty, misery, and dirt, except indeed some of the cells which were tolerably neat. Most of the Nuns were in the Choro at prayers, and not a little astonished at seeing a large party of men appear at the door from the inside. There were some pretty girls enough, but they were so long at Prayers, that we could not stop to speak with them, and had the full and free range of their abode. This visit of the great people will furnish conversation, I dare say, for years!

The price of Indian Corn at Montemor Velho, which regulates for Coimbra and all that neighbourhood, was last week at 11 Testoons[22] the Alqueire. It had been at 12 T. the fortnight before.

Believe me ever, my dear Father, Your most sincerely affectionate son,

Wm. Warre.

To His Brother

Hd. Qrs., P.A. Francoso, Nr. Pinhel, June 27, 1810.

My Dear Tom,

We removed our Hd. Qrs. here two days ago and the English Hd. Qrs. to Almeida, on account of the very interesting situation of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to be within reach of immediate information respecting any movements of the French Army, which becomes every day more interesting. Their heavy Artillery being arrived, they on the evening of the 24th commenced a brisk fire on the place, which was returned with great vivacity by the besieged, and continued until 10 o’clock on the 25th in the morning, when a most tremendous explosion took place in the French lines from their Powder Magazine blowing up, (N.B. has since been ascertained to have been in the town), and immediately after two lesser explosions (which were in the French lines). The quantity of Powder must have been very great, as it was seen at this place by several of our officers, nearly 40 miles off, and at Almeida, half-way between this and the Ciudad Rodrigo, the shock was very strongly felt, and Governor Cox writes that it shook the whole place. Certain it is that the French batteries ceased firing and the Spaniards continued for two hours after.

If their loss is what we suppose from these circumstances, it will be a most serious loss to them, as I know not how soon they can replace it in Spain, and will probably delay their attack upon us for 6 weeks or 2 months, a great point gained for us, whose object is by gaining time to complete the discipline of our Army, etc., and who are getting very healthy. These, however, are the effects we wish for, and, like other people, we are very apt to fancy the probability of what we wish for, though at the same time you must not imagine that we are the least afraid of them even now. We know that their army is very sickly. They average deaths 46 to 50 a day, are in want of everything, and their intercepted letters show that they are very much disgusted. The Spaniards carry on a desultory and most destructive warfare. They scarcely dare move out of their Quarters without risking to be assassinated, and their losses in this way and by desertion are very great in every part of Spain.

They drive in our Picquets now and then. They have a great superiority of Cavalry, but nothing of any consequence has taken place. But if the greatest part of their powder is not destroyed, we may expect something every day. I cannot think they will let Crawfurd with the advance Guard remain so near them. Their and our vedettes are 400 to 500 paces from each other and we overlook their camp, which is very extensive, I suspect more so than they have any occasion for, considering the number of men they have. They are quite up to all this sort of humbug. If our Portuguese do as we expect, we are not uneasy as to the result, and if we lick them what a glorious day for Old England! I like this place better than Fornos, though we are not very well off either, and have a large Brigade of Infantry with us in the town. I am very well, the only annoyance is my face, which as well as my lips always peel and are very sore. By the end of the campaign I daresay we may pass ourselves off for Portuguese Indians, or any other tawny gentry you please. Adieu, etc.

Francoso, July 9, 1810.

July 2.—Hardinge and myself left Francoso about 6 in the evening to visit the advanced guard and outposts of the Army under Br. Genl. Crawfurd stationed in front of Gallegos, in New Castile, with his Hd. Qrs. at Almeida, about 4 miles in the rear. We arrived late in the evening at Pinhel, where we remained the night. Next morning set out after breakfasting with our friend Major Murphy of the 88th, (the Bishop of Pinhel being absent from Pinhel,) having dined at Francoso the day we left it for Almeida, the direct road to which we missed, and proceeded by an almost impassable path down to the Coa, which here on either side presents a most formidable position, totally impracticable for cavalry and artillery except over the bridge and high road leading to Almeida from Freixedas, Guarda, Pinhel, etc. According to the reports of its whole course from its confluence into the Douro to near Alfaiates, with the exception of two leagues beyond Almeida towards its source, it presents, from the very great steepness and rocky soil of its banks, a most formidable barrier to any army attempting to advance towards Vizeu, Celorico, Guarda, or Francozo, from the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. It is, however, liable to be turned by Sabugal, or Castello Branco, and opposed to a superior army its great extent is a very serious inconvenience, as any part of the line being forced must oblige the rest to retire.

While Almeida, which is about a mile and a half from the river on the Spanish side, holds out, I consider any attack by that road as not to be feared. Though the greatest part of the descent to the bridge is out of sight of the town, the enemy’s movements would be very much impeded in attempting to advance. Considering all circumstances, the great superiority of the enemy and nature of a great part of our troops, I have much doubt in my own mind of any position being attempted to be defended on the Coa, as a general one for the Army, but this a few days must show, and I am no way in the secret.

We crossed the Coa at a very bad ford called Veia, about a mile below the bridge, and arrived at Almeida, waited on Governor Cox; and, after walking round the works (which from their nature I do not at all envy him the defence of, considering the troops he has, mostly Militia,) continued our march to Fort Conception to see our friend Lt. Col. Sutton, who had been appointed Governor, when there was an intention to defend it. But since the great superiority of the enemy rendered it impossible to attempt to relieve the brave Spaniards in Ciudad Rodrigo, it has been resolved to blow it up, and it has for that purpose been mined all round. When the enemy seriously advance this beautiful Fort will be entirely destroyed. It is a thousand pities. I never saw a more complete or perfect fortification with every part bomb-proof, even stabling for 200 horses. Its outworks are admirably adapted to defend the approaches, which are all round a perfect natural glacis to several hundred yards. Of the necessity of the measure I am no judge, but fear it will much vex the Spaniards.

We arrived about 3 o’clock at Almeida, and dined with Genl. Crawfurd, with whom after dinner we rode out to look at the French posts beyond the little river Azara, over which there is a bridge of stone leading to the village of Marialva, and about a mile beyond Gallegos. Along this line were about 3 squadrons of the German 1st Hussars doing the outpost duty, their reserves in Gallegos. I went down to the bridge and endeavoured to persuade two French Officers to come down and speak to me. They were, however, very shy, and only came near enough for me to tell them that some friends of theirs, who were taken prisoners near Chaves a year and a half ago, were well. I observed they were constructing a wooden bridge a short distance to the left of the former, and from the exhausted appearance of the Forage on the other side, their having removed the cars from blocking up the stone bridge, and certain reports of deserters, it appeared very probable they would drive in our posts next morning, the 4th July. They had there and near Carpio about 5 or 6 Regts. of Cavalry and some Infantry, 4 to 5000 men I should guess in all. Our Infantry, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, Rifle Corps, and two Portuguese Caçadores Battns., one very good and the other very bad, were stationed in the woods in front of Alumeda, about 3 or 4 miles in our rear.

At daybreak they crossed the little river Azara over their two bridges, and drove in our Picquets. They had 12 squadrons and 2 Brigades of Infantry, but our three squadrons were supported by a troop of Horse Artillery, which kept them in check and enabled our little body to retreat in safety on the Infantry though close pressed and skirmishing very sharply the whole way. It was the prettiest thing, en fait de guerre, I ever saw. The retreat was very well conducted. Their Artillery could not come up till near the end of the affair, and ours killed a great many of their men and horses, while our Cavalry were in comparative safety. Their numbers enabled them constantly to turn our flanks, and the superiority of our horses as often to get out of the scrape.

A party of the German Hussars under Capt. Kranckenberg behaved particularly well, charging at the passage of a small bridge a very superior number of the enemy, though supported by four Squadrons within pistol shot on the other side. It was very well done. Two French Officers were severely wounded and some men, and one prisoner was taken, though, poor devil, he was covered with wounds, 6 in the head, and his arm nearly cut off, also run through the body, and wonderful to say, he is expected to recover. The French seemed much irritated at this check, and kept up a very brisk fire up the road we retreated by, within about 50 yards from us. Nor were they sparing in abuse, and confident of still cutting us off, when we arrived at our Infantry which checked them, and a Squadron of their 3rd Hussars coming unexpectedly on the 3rd P. Caçadores (an excellent Corps commanded by Lt.-Col. Elder) received a very warm salutation which dispersed them. The Battalion behaved very steadily and well, and give us hopes of the Portuguese troops, on whose conduct the issue of this Campaign must in a great measure depend.

The Division commenced its retreat towards Fort Conception covered by the Cavalry, whom I here quitted, having offered myself to act as aide-de-camp to Genl. Crawfurd. The Infantry returned in very good order through Alumeda towards Fort Conception, and General Carrera with his Spaniards, who were in our rear, by the fords of Algardon to a very strong position covering the roads that way. These Spaniards are remarkably fine men, about 3000 well clothed, though not uniformly, and armed. I did not, however, think much of their discipline or regularity. Hardinge placed them, and seemed to be much pleased with General Carrera’s appearance and manner.

The French gave up the pursuit about half a league from Fort Conception, and retired again to Gallegos, on this side of which place they established their vedettes, having attained, what I suppose was their intention, a new ground to forage on, and having reconnoitred our force, to ascertain whether or not Lord Wellington had come up with the army. Our loss was about 4 or 5 men wounded and as many horses. That of the French, so far as we could see, and have since heard from deserters, several Officers and about 30 or 40 men killed and wounded. After halting about two hours near the Fort, our advanced guard took up a position at Val de la Mula, on the Portuguese frontier, with the Cavalry about a league in front, leaving a space of about a league between their vedettes and ours. And this ended this little affair which Hardinge and myself had so much wished to see, and which was certainly very instructive. Au reste a great deal of firing to very little purpose. A strong proof of how ineffectual the skirmishing of Cavalry is, except to cover the retreat of larger bodies, and prevent the columns being fired into. Our people and theirs were constantly within 30 yards of one another firing with no effect, though neither party had any idea of fear. When it can possibly be avoided the less powder wasted this way the better. The best arm for Cavalry is the sword or sabre, a well broken horse and firm presence of mind, reserving the pistol or carbine merely for the purpose of vedettes, or covering some movement.

At Val de la Mula Col. Pakenham asked us to breakfast and afterwards to dinner, and during the whole of our stay we are much indebted to his civility, as also to Capt. Rowan and Wm. Campbell, brother to Augustus, who prevented our ever wanting a meal or forage for our horses during our stay. General Crawfurd was also very civil to us. While retreating he sent me with some letters to Governor Cox at Almeida, whom, however, I was fortunate enough to meet at Val de la Mula, which saved me a very tiresome ride, and enabled me to return immediately, but everything was over, and I was so tired that I was very glad to lay down in the guard-room of the Fort, which was evacuated, to take a nap, which was not of long duration, as I had taken possession of the mattress of a Spanish shepherdess of no very gentle nature, who was so clamorous and violent in claiming her property, that I was forced to yield it up for fear I might not escape so well from her gentle paws, as I had from the French. Besides, poor things, I could not but pity them. It was most distressing to see them abandoning their habitations, and flying away from the miscreants, loaded with what little property they could carry away, crying and lamenting, followed by their helpless children, while the men drove away their cattle, and all uncertain where they might find a place of safety. In Portugal the natural animosity which exists so violently on the frontiers, and which even the similarity of their misfortunes and distress cannot do away, they had but a dismal prospect of meeting with a friendly reception. I pitied them from my heart, to relieve was not in my power. How little does the independent happy English Peasant know how to value the peace and security in which he lives! And how would those miscreants who preach discontent and faction through the country, giving them ideas of wants and liberties which are incompatible with society and government, how would they blush if they were to witness the sufferings and oppression which these poor people undergo! They would see that in England alone the peasantry are now happy and free, and would see their own infamy in sowing the seeds of discord and civil dissension among that happy people, when every mind should be united and heart joined to resist the oppressor of mankind! If reform is necessary let us wait for moments of peace with foreign enemies, when we do not risk, by dividing amongst ourselves, the entire ruin of the most perfect fabric of government that ever existed, even with all its faults, and give every advantage to our enemies by exposing as some of our Senators do, by way of opposition to Ministers, or to get themselves in, our forces, intentions, weakness, faults, etc., etc., in fact, for the sake of a popular speech in the House, tell the enemy everything they ought most to conceal, even the stations and exact numbers of the troops, of ourselves, or of our allies. This conduct leads us half way to our ruin, and we shall repent it when it is too late.

On the 5th, early in the morning, Hardinge and myself rode out beyond Alumeda, towards Gallegos, till near the enemies posts, to see what damage we had done them the day before and what they were about. We found in the road two of their dead and some horses, evidently from the effects of our Artillery, as they were much mangled, and we also saw some more to the right and left of the road at a distance. A very large flight of vultures of very large size were flying about them, and on the ground, which added much to the disgust of the scene, and after ascertaining the positions of their vedettes, we hastened to return. Being but indifferently mounted, and at a great distance from our outposts, we were very much afraid of being cut off by some of their patrols, and, returning through Alumeda, I was just observing to Hardinge that we should look very foolish if we were to be taken, when I turned my head and saw a French Hussar close to us. Hardinge had not even his sabre, having broken it the day before, and I saw nothing was to be done but to charge him, for which purpose I drew my pistol and galloped at him, when he surrendered, a no very glorious prize, as his horse was so tired that he could not move out of a very slow pace, and it was with difficulty and anxiety we got him into one of our picquets. He was a French lad, and told me he had deserted that morning, owing to the ill-treatment of his chief, and the want of everything they experienced in their Camp, and said he intended to go to England and work at his trade, a cabinet maker, as he had a cousin there, whom he intended to enquire for at the Commune (police office), though he had not heard of him for 4 years. I have great doubts of his being a deserter at all, and rather think he was as much surprised to see us, as we were to see him. He is quite a Frenchman, and contradicted himself twenty times!

We arrived at our quarters at 8 o’clock, and breakfasted with Col. Pakenham. After which we set out, 5 in number, well armed and mounted, to reconnoitre the enemy on our left, and proceeded without meeting any as far as Villa de Porco and Barcilha, from the heights above which we distinctly saw with our glasses Ciudad Rodrigo, which was keeping up a very heavy fire, and defending itself as if it were manned by heroes. Let them now surrender when they may. They have done their duty, and it is heartbreaking to think we can in no way assist them.

At Barcilha our party divided. Hardinge, Col. Pakenham, and Capt. Cotton went by the right, and Capt. Shaw, A.D.C. to Genl. Crawfurd, and myself agreed to go and visit Villar de Ciervo, and all that line, and ascertain whether the French had occupied all those places, or Villar de la Egoa, where there are some excellent fords over the Agueda, and which, being in rear considerably of our left on the 4th, gave Genl. Crawfurd no small anxiety. We met nothing, and returned about 4 to dinner, having suffered only from the extreme heat, which fagged me a good deal, being rather bilious, and prevented my accompanying them in the evening, instead of which I paid a visit to my friends in the 52nd, whom I was very glad to see looking as well as ever I saw them at Shorncliff, though perhaps with less pipeclay.

Next day was spent nearly in the same way. In the morning we rode out reconnoitring to Alumeda, dined afterwards with General Crawfurd, and set off on our return to Pinhel, 4 leagues, where we arrived late at night and slept, and next day came home, after a most delightful trip, and having just seen what we wished and expected. The retreat of the advanced guard had for some days appeared inevitable, and it was to see how it would be conducted that we went over.

The desertion continues from the French in great numbers, 8 to 12 of a day while we remained with the advance guard, and they all agree in stating that their Army is badly off for provisions, and the foreigners much disgusted, and would desert in greater numbers but for the vigilant means that are taken to prevent. Junot and Ney with their Corps are before C. Rodrigo, and I believe also Masséna, as are also the traitors Alorna, Pampeluna, Sancos Mezeude, against whom no measures are taken by this Government, and we know they are supplied with money, etc., from their estates in this country, which are not sequestered or disturbed. So much for weakness and infatuation! The count Doidga(?) has been declared infamous and his offspring for three generations, and his property sequestered. He is a poor wretch and can do no harm, though not less a traitor, while these scoundrels, with arms in their hands, known traitors before the Prince embarked, and treated by him with great lenity, are suffered to attack their native country with impunity. It is most disgusting.

I do not think the French will attempt anything till C. Rodrigo falls, which, notwithstanding their heroic conduct, cannot be long delayed. It will enable the French to establish their magazines and hospital. What the plans for the Campaign are I know not. Everything promises a very warm one, and I confess I look with some anxiety to the conduct of the Portuguese troops, on whom much, nay everything, must depend. They promise well, it is true, in every respect, but still they are very young troops and never tried. The force against us is very superior. But on the other hand the greater must be the difficulty of supplying them and means of transport. We retire on our supplies while they advance from them. And everybody has great confidence both in Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, and if the native troops fight like men, I have not a doubt we shall succeed, though the loss must be inevitably great on both sides.

My own idea of their attack is that they will keep their principal Corps in our front, leave Regnier with his Corps, and keep Hill in check in the Alemtejo, while with a strong column they endeavour to force the passes near Castello Branco, or by Sabugal, endeavouring to unite near Thomar. By this means if Hill retires and crosses the Tagus, either at Villa Velha or Abrantes, the Alemtejo is left open, and we cannot but feel some anxiety for the Capital, or rather for the opposite side of the river, which would occasion great confusion. Hill must then defend the passage of the Tagus, which abounds in fords as low as Salvaterra, and also endeavour to check the enemy’s advance by the passes of Salhadas, etc., from Castello Branco or Abrantes, and if either of these movements of the enemy succeed, I should imagine the whole Army must fall back from the Upper Beira upon our works round Lisbon, that is Torres Vedras, Bucellas, etc., etc., for fear of its communications with Lisbon and our stores. Or if they do not attempt Alemtejo, I think they will attempt advancing in three columns by Castello Branco from Coria and Placencia, and from Guinaldo, etc., by Sabugal, and in our front by Celorico or Guarda, endeavouring to unite beyond the Sierra de Estrella. In this case we shall come into play immediately. Almeida, I think, they will merely mask by a strong Corps, and leave in their rear. If they succeed, the place must fall of course. If not, there is not force enough in it to annoy them. These are my own private opinions, and, from the very little means I have of information, must be considered as mere speculations, and as such, if erroneous, I may be excused, as I really know not how far they may agree with any others.

Hd. Qrs., Francoso, July 10, 1810.

My Dear Father,

I received your letters of 13th, 15th June, on the 1st of this month, and my having been absent at the outposts alone prevented me writing by last packet to thank you for the very interesting information you give me about Ferguson in particular, and the other occurrences of the day, as also for the affectionate friendship and solicitude on my account, which would be a sufficient reward in themselves for anything I can ever do.

I send you, annexed, a sort of journal of my proceedings during my little excursion to the outposts, which was very interesting. It was written in considerable hurry and just as the things occurred to me. The opinions also merely speculative, as I have but little means of positive information. I should therefore wish you to consider it as merely for your amusement and confidential, and for those few who can feel any interest in such trifles because they concern me.

Our situation becomes every day more interesting. The heroic defence of Ciudad Rodrigo has delayed the operations against this country, but I consider that it is impossible the place can hold out much longer.

What the issue of this contest may be, it is very difficult to guess. The enemy have certainly from 70 to 80,000 men, and we as certainly Troops of the Line not so many, though we have other advantages which they cannot have, particularly the people and the country in our favor. Lord Wellington and the Marshal appear very confident and in high spirits, and so does the whole army, who are in excellent order. Our Chiefs know best the real situation in which they stand, and the confidence every one feels in them will make the Army do wonders. Much must depend upon the Portuguese troops. At all events I think prudence would dictate the removal of all property from this country, and leaving as little to chance of war in point of business as possible, and although I by no means wish to croak, when I consider the great superiority of the enemy in numbers, and the nature of our Troops, with many other circumstances, I confess I do not feel quite so confident of our ultimate success. But I shall not form any decided opinion till I see our people tried.

Pray thank my dear mother for her kind letter of the 30th May from Hendon, and Tom for his of the 19th June, and for Greenwood and Cox’s abstract of my account. I am a good deal surprised they have not received my claim for losses. By the account I see they have received no part of them and suspect they do not much exert themselves, as I know other Officers have received theirs. By Tom’s letter I observe a warrant has been issued for £36, 15s., I suppose for my horse shot at Vimiero.

I hope you have had a pleasant trip to Woburn and Holkham. I am always happy when I hear of your amusing yourself in a way I know to be so much to your satisfaction.

I have got at Lisbon two Merino Rams and 3 Ewes. They tell me they are very fine, and my difficulty now is how to send them to you. I write by to-day’s post to Messrs Bulkeley to beg them to take charge of them for you, and send them by the first ship to London, and shall inform you of their answer. If you had no place to keep them yourself, and nobody else you wish to give them to, pray present them to my uncle Greg with my kind love. I am, however, a good deal bothered about getting them home, being myself at such a distance from Lisbon.

Adieu; pray give my kindest love to my dearest mother, and believe me ever your most truely Affectionate and Dutiful Son,

Wm. Warre.

I will tell Ld. W. about the pipe of wine when I see him, and am much obliged by your attention about it.

July 11th.—A very heavy firing and cannonade was heard yesterday morning at Ciudad Rodrigo, which is a proof that the place still holds out. Poor fellows, I fear they will pay dear for their heroic gallantry, since we cannot assist them.

I have been able to hear nothing further about the free importation of rice and grain, and I fear it will not be allowed from the delay.

Hd. Qrs., Francoso, July 25, 1810.

My Dear Father,

I have but just time to write you a few lines that neither you nor my mother may be anxious about me, when you hear of the unfortunate affair of our Advanced Guard yesterday, at which, however, I was not even present. The French attacked Br. Genl. Crawfurd’s Division, consisting of 43, 52, 95, and 1st and 3rd Portuguese Caçadores, about 3000 men, and some squadrons of Cavalry, with 23 squadrons and about 10 to 12,000 Infantry. I fear there was some delay in retiring across the Coa, and, being very close prest in their retreat, our brave fellows suffered very considerable loss, about 300 killed and wounded and 30 Officers. The 43rd I hear have suffered most, and have 14 Officers killed and wounded, as also the 95th, of whose loss I am ignorant, except of the death of poor Capt. Creagh. Col. Nutt of 43rd is killed and Capt. Hull wounded. They had arrived from England the evening before. The 52nd also lost some men and Officers, but I have not been able to hear any names, except that of Lt.-Col. Barclay being slightly wounded in the head. The 3rd Caçadores under Col. Elder behaved very well, and suffered some loss.

I am sorry I cannot add as much for the 1st, who did not behave so, and ran off at the very beginning, though their Col. d’Arilez, a very fine young man, behaved very well, as also some of the Officers. So much for want of discipline and confidence. I had before expressed my fears about them. I am just about setting off to enquire into the business, and I hope a most severe example may be made to prevent the recurrence of such a horrid disgraceful business. If they will not fight from feelings of patriotism or honour, they must be made to do so from fear of a more infamous death, and a more certain one, if they deserve it. It is a measure of peremptory necessity; though I have much pleasure in being able to add that in an attack which Regnier made on Salvaterra away to our right, the 1st Portuguese Cavalry commanded by Col. Pays of Mangoalde behaved most nobly, charged three times, and as often repulsed the enemy, and at last completely drove them back, and I believe the French had the superiority in numbers. Our advance guard having effected its retreat at all before so very great a superiority is most fortunate, that is across the Coa, whose banks are tremendously steep, and the road narrow. The French three times attempted to force the bridge after them but were repulsed, and lost a good many men on it. The tremendously heavy rains and storm we have had these last two days had fortunately spoiled the Fords of the River entirely. Otherwise I much fear our little Corps would have been entirely cut off and taken.

The English kept possession of the bank till early this morning, when the whole line was abandoned and our advance established at Carvalhos or Carvalhal. The French vedettes are on this side the river, and Almeida is consequently in some degree invested. I scarce believe they will besiege it, but rather content themselves with blockading and starving it, which will not be easy, as they have 4 months’ provisions complete. Pray send Augustus Campbell word that I hear both John and William are well, the former I am not sure was engaged. Wm. was of course with Crawfurd. I fear you will be scarce able to read this very hasty scrawl, but I have at this moment so many things to do in order to get away before late in the evening to reach Freixedas to-night, that they must serve as my excuse. You shall hear from me every opportunity. Adieu. Pray give my kindest love, etc. Yr. ever dutiful and affectionate Son,

Wm. Warre.

Lagiosa, August 8, 1810.

My Dearest Father,

Many many thanks for your very kind letter from Eastley End of the 16th July, and for the excellent account you give me of all my friends.

We continue here very quietly, and except the taking of a few prisoners at the outposts in front, and the peasantry having risen and killed a good many of the enemy, who straggle into the villages to plunder or seek for food, nothing of any consequence has occurred since my last.

The French appear to be preparing for the siege of Almeida, but have not yet established any batteries. From the accounts of all deserters and prisoners they are much distressed for provisions, particularly bread, which as the Peasantry all fly from their ill-treatment, they are forced to thrash out, carry to the mills, and grind and bake themselves. In some places the Officers alone have bread, in others they sometimes receive 3 lb. between 8 men. They are also much in want of shoes. A very intelligent Italian sergeant, who was brought in yesterday, assured me that their 66th Regt. lost on the 24th Ultmo., in the attack near Almeida, 500 killed and wounded, and the other two Regiments also a very large proportion. They therefore must have lost upwards of 1000 men in all, which is more than we supposed. They continue to desert in great numbers whenever they have the opportunity.

Our Portuguese troops are behaving very well. The 1st Regt. of Dns. at Atalaya towards Castello Branco attacked 80 French who were in the town, killed 25, and took 20 men and horses. Yesterday evening an account arrived from Bragança that a squadron of the 12th Dns. had been attacked by a French squadron, which they defeated, took 40 men and horses Prisoners, and killed all the rest, except 2 Officers and a soldier who escaped. Many of these Prisoners are badly wounded. The Portuguese squadron must have behaved very well to have done the business so effectually, and although these small affairs are of no great consequence (in themselves), yet they give us very pleasant hopes of what the Portuguese [troops] will do when more seriously engaged.

I have this instant been to see three French Cavalry, who deserted yesterday evening. They say they did so because they are starved, and that 25 of the 3rd Hussars and 8 more of their men had deserted the day before. These men, who are native French, come over mounted and completely armed. They say that nothing but desperation could make the Infantry go leagues from the Army to get food at the risk they run from the Peasantry, and that their Regt. of the 15th Chasseurs à Cheval have in 4 months been reduced from 900 to 400 men by sickness (which is very great in their army) and loss of horses. These men belong to the 6th Corps, Ney’s, and could tell us nothing about Almeida. Adieu; Believe me ever yr. most truely affectionate Son,

Wm. Warre.

I hope my father will receive the Merinos safe which I sent him, and that they will turn out well. I wish him to keep them or dispose of them just as he pleases.

I send a letter from Clara, which pray deliver to him.

Lagiosa, 22nd August 1810.

My Dear Father,

I intended to have written (you will be amused at this beginning and the length of the letter, which I write at a gallop, expecting every moment that the Marshal will mount) you a long letter to-day, but, being on the move, I have only time to tell you that our Army has again made a forward movement, and we this day change our Hd. Quarters to Avelans da Ribeira, to the right of Alberca, which becomes for the present Lord Wellns. Hd. Quarters. The Army is all on the move, but I am ignorant of what the intention of our Generals is, whether to cross the Coa and raise the siege of Almeida, on which place they have not yet that we know of opened their batteries, or whether by a diversion on this side favor the disturbances which have been reported to have arisen in Spain. Whatever it is, it is a forward movement. Everybody is in high spirits.

The distance to which Junot has removed with his Corps d’Armée, and Regnier being occupied by General Hill, it leaves only the 6th Corps, Ney’s, to besiege Almeida, and, if the other Corps are really at such a distance as not to be able to support it, it would be a shame for us to let them take that place before our faces. As yet we know pretty correctly from deserters, who continue to come over in considerable numbers, that they have only completed the first parallel, and were at work at constructing the batteries in it. Their heavy guns had arrived but were not mounted. The garrison keep up a very brisk fire, and the enemy have lost some men. They press forward very boldly at daybreak, their light troops close to the place, and fire into the enclosures to annoy the gunners.

But Br. Genl. Cox, the Governor, by telegraph informs us that he does not much mind them, and that the garrison is in excellent spirits. Hitherto the Portuguese have had all the firing on their side. When the batteries open from the enemy, we shall be better able to judge how resolute they are. I daresay they will do very well.

I can, however, assure you that the situation of the French in Spain is most distressing. Officers of rank from Madrid write to France (intercepted correspondence) that they are reduced to the greatest necessity. Joseph the usurper, with an army of 250,000 men in Spain, is only in possession of that part of his kingdom which the Troops occupy. The supplies from Cordova and Grenada to Madrid are no longer sure, indeed most precarious. In short, all orders write almost in utter despair, and conjure Buonaparte to alter his system with regard to that wretched country. The army have not been paid for ten months, and in many parts, particularly Almeida and its neighbourhood, are dreadfully distressed for bread, and all the foreigners ready to desert the first opportunity. Buonaparte says he can only give them yearly 24 millions of Francs (1 million sterling), what folly! The tyrant recommends rigour, which is all in our favour, and his party from Spain write that if the Emperor cannot be got to alter his plans with regard to the Spaniards, they cannot with all their force and advantage answer for the consequences.

Kellerman with all his Divisions of cavalry cannot prevent the excursions of the Peasantry to the very gates of Valladolid. We have also reports of great disturbances in Madrid, and the movements of the French Corps make me believe it.

We have had no affair of consequence since my last to Emily. The Eagle which Silveira took with the Swiss Battalion at Puebla de Senabria arrived here. It is an imitation of the Roman Eagles, and I think an ugly one. It has, however, its effect upon the volatile courage and vanity of the French. To them a cap of liberty, or emblem of slavery, is equal, so long as it flatters the self-sufficiency and vain-glory of the grand nation. The Battalion is gone to Coruña to embark for England. None will return to France. They will almost to a man enlist with us.

I must again request, my dearest Father, to consider this information about Spain as confidential for the present. At all events not to mention my name, though I do not see any harm in your mentioning it, though not as coming from me.

This is the anniversary of the Battle of Vimiero, and at this time that day we were warmly engaged. I hope our next day may be as brilliant. Our army both English and Portuguese is in excellent health and spirits. I have great faith that our Portuguese will astonish the French most unpleasantly for them.

Adieu. Kindest and most affecte. love to my dearest Mother, etc., etc. Yr. ever affectionate and Dutiful Son,

Wm. Warre.

I have written this letter in such a hurry that I fear you will have considerable difficulty in either reading or understanding, but pray excuse it, as I have been every moment expecting to be called away. Adieu, Adieu.

May every blessing and happiness attend you and all my dear, dear family.

P.S.—I had little idea I should have had time to-day to write when I wrote this yesterday.

By the enclosed, which I send open, you will see that we have halted two days. But as I am completely ignorant of what the intentions were of our chiefs, it would be folly to attempt to account for it.

W. W.

Avelans da Riveira, 22nd Aug.