1. Another of the laws of nature is, to perform contracts, or to keep trust. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that the law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that this, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract. But this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or omitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to them. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by the second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the natural law.

2. Neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with whom we contract; as if they keep no faith with others, or hold that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice. For he that contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vain; and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so he affirms the contract to be made in vain. He therefore who contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain, and not in vain; which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace.

3. The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action or omission), is called an injury. But that action or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing, and both are the same with breach of contract and trust. And it seems the word injury came to be given to any action or omission, because they were without right; he that acted or omitted, having before conveyed his right to some other. And there is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call injury, and that which in the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the Schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.

4. From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no man^[6] but him with whom we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined. For if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any man offend another with whom he hath made no contract, he damages him to whom the evil is done; but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs. For if he who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief, he that did it should answer thus: what art thou to me; why should I rather do according to your than mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath no manner of pre-contract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible.

5. These words, just and unjust, as also justice and injustice, are equivocal; for they signify one thing when they are attributed to persons, another when to actions. When they are attributed to actions, just signifies as much as what is done with right, and unjust, as what is done with injury. He who hath done some just thing, is not therefore said to be a just person, but guiltless; and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. So as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing, that of an action or omission another; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just. But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind.

6. The justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds, commutative and distributive; the former whereof, they say, consists in arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion; and that is conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to contractors; where, if there be an equal return made, hence, they say, springs a commutative justice: but this is busied about the dignity and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that deserves less, and that proportionably; hence, they say, ariseth distributive justice. I acknowledge here some certain distinction of equality: to wit, that one is an equality simply so called; as when two things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver: the other is an equality secundum quod; as when a thousand pounds is to be divided to a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to sixty men, and four hundred to forty, where there is no equality between six hundred and four hundred; but when it happens that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal distribution. But such like equality is the same thing with geometrical proportion. But what is all this to justice? For neither if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure the buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore is no distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot be denied but that justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he have fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of justice, although now almost generally received by all; lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath been defined above.

7. It is an old saying, volenti non fit injuria, the willing man receives no injury; yet the truth of it may be derived from our principles. For grant that a man be willing that that should be done which he conceives to be an injury to him; why then, that is done by his will, which by contract was not lawful to be done. But he being willing that should be done which was not lawful by contract, the contract itself (by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter) becomes void. The right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it is done by right; wherefore it is no injury.

8. The third precept of the natural law is, that you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who, out of the confidence he had in you, first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. For without this, he should act without reason, that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this means all beneficence and trust, together with all kind of benevolence, would be taken from among men, neither would there be aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war would necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. But because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract, (for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them), therefore is it not usually termed an injury; but because good turns and thanks have a mutual eye to each other, it is called ingratitude.

9. The fourth precept of nature is, that every man render himself useful unto others: which that we may rightly understand, we must remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the building, by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure. For as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones than it fills up itself, neither because of the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together, or easily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible by reason of the stubbornness of his affections, is commonly said to be useless and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by right only, but even by natural necessity, is supposed with all his main might to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a war; because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending; he therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence it follows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept of nature, that every man accommodate himself to others. But he who breaks this law may be called useless and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulness, as having regard to this very law.

10. The fifth precept of the law of nature is, that we must forgive him who repents and asks pardon for what is past, having first taken caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it, after he hath warred against us, and now is become penitent. But peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him that retains a hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the future, that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future caution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to the natural law.

11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, that in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the future good: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been showed in the foregoing article. Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be only considered, is nothing else but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which points at no end; for it contemplates only what is past, but the end is a thing to come; but that which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vain glory, and is therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason, introduces a war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature. It is therefore a precept of the law of nature, that in revenge we look not backwards, but forward. Now the breach of this law is commonly called cruelty.

12. But because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander; it follows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed by the law of nature, that no man, either by deeds or words, countenance or laughter, do declare himself to hate or scorn another. The breach of which law is called reproach. But although nothing be more frequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak, and namely, of judges against guilty persons, which neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the judges; yet these kind of men do act against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

13. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civil state. For it hath been showed before (Chap. I. Art. 3) that all men by nature are equal; and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his first book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of the whole political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others only to serve; as if lord and servant were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation is not only against reason, (as but now hath been showed), but also against experience. For neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger do contest, have these always or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged; or whether unequal, because they are like to contest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace, that they be esteemed as equal; and therefore it is in the eighth place a precept of the law of nature, that every man be accounted by nature equal to another; the contrary to which law is pride.

14. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he should part with some of his rights, so it is no less necessary to the same conservation that he retain some others, to wit, the right of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of air, water, and all necessaries for life. Since therefore many common rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the natural law, to wit, that what rights soever any man challenges to himself, he also grant the same as due to all the rest; otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society, but to attribute equal right and power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe equal things to equals, is the same with giving things proportional to proportionals. The observation of this law is called meekness, the violation πλεονεξὶα; the breakers by the Latins are styled immodici et immodesti.

15. In the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature, that every man in dividing right to others, shew himself equal to either party. By the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right by nature to ourselves, than we grant to others. We may take less if we will; for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others, we are forbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another. For he that by favouring one before another observes not this natural equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared above, that a reproach is against the laws of nature. The observance of this precept is called equity; the breach, respect of persons. The Greeks in one word term it προσωποληψία.

16. From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, those things which cannot be divided, must be used in common if they can, and if the quantity of the matter permit, every man as much as he lists; but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proportionally to the number of the users. For otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which we have showed in the foregoing article to be commanded by the law of nature.

17. Also what cannot be divided nor had in common, it is provided by the law of nature, which may be the twelfth precept, that the use of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one only by lot; and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot, who shall have the first use of it. For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be found but that of lot.

18. But all lot is twofold, arbitrary or natural.

19. The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is, that safety must be assured to the mediators for peace. For the reason which commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of reason is peace; all the rest are means to obtain it, and without which peace cannot be had. But neither can peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is therefore a dictate of reason, that is, a law of nature, that we must give all security to the mediators for peace.

20. Furthermore because, although men should agree to make all these and whatsoever other laws of nature, and should endeavour to keep them, yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done were against the law or not, which we call the question of right; whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides supposing themselves wronged: it is therefore necessary to the preservation of peace, because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer the matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to stand to his judgment in deciding the controversy. And he to whom they thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is therefore the fifteenth precept of the natural law, that both parties disputing concerning the matter of right, submit themselves unto the opinion and judgment of some third.

21. But from this ground, that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine the controversy, we gather that the arbiter must not be one of the parties. For every man is presumed to seek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for peace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man would do. It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature, that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own cause.

22. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, that no man must be judge, who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or glory from the victory of either part: for the like reason sways here, as in the foregoing law.

23. But when there is some controversy of the fact itself, to wit, whether that be done or not which is said to be done, the natural law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is, because they affirm contradictories, that he believe neither. He must therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be able to give judgment of the fact, as often as by other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The eighteenth law of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact, that where firm and certain signs of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both parts.

24. From the above declared definition of an arbiter may be furthermore understood, that no contract or promise must pass between him and the parties whose judge he is appointed, by virtue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or be obliged to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equal. The judge is indeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equal, by the law of nature recounted in the 15th article: to the obligation of which law nothing can be added by way of compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgment he should contend for the equity of it, except such compact be of no force, the controversy would remain after judgment given: which is contrary to the constitution of an arbiter, who is so chosen, as both parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment which he should pronounce. The law of nature therefore commands the judge to be disengaged, which is its nineteenth precept.

25. Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought else but the dictates of reason; so as, unless a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the laws of nature; it is manifest, that he who knowingly or willingly doth aught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened, he knowingly and willingly breaks the law of nature. For there is no difference between a man who performs not his duty, and him who does such things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who do that which disturbs the mind from its natural state; that which most manifestly happens to drunkards, and gluttons. We therefore sin, in the twentieth place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.

26. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of nature derived by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us to look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves, will say that the deduction of these laws is so hard, that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will they prove obliging: for laws, if they be not known, oblige not, nay indeed, are not laws. To this I answer, it is true, that hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetousness, vain glory, and other perturbations of mind, do hinder a man, so as he cannot attain to the knowledge of these laws whilst those passions prevail in him: but there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind. At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and unlearned, than this only rule, that when he doubts whether what he is now doing to another may be done by the law of nature or not, he conceive himself to be in that other’s stead. Here instantly those perturbations which persuaded him to the fact, being now cast into the other scale, dissuade him as much. And this rule is not only easy, but is anciently celebrated in these words, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris: do not that to others, you would not have done to yourself.