3. Now that monarchy, of the foresaid forms of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, hath the pre-eminence, will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the ancients preferred the monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the decrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government, instituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that other governments were compacted by the artifice of men[15] out of the ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings: although, I say, these do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will pass them over.
4. Some there are, who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing, that one man among so many should so far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envy, while they see one man in possession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge it to be as unreasonable if a few commanded, unless they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely an aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore inequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality, whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man, attend his person, not his unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.
5. But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any city at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth chapter, a city is defined to be one person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the same article of the same chapter, one person is that, when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared in the fifth article of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure. It follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is constituted by a lord and many servants. Neither can any reason be brought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a city constituted by a father and his sons. For to a lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of sons; for they are both his honour and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their lords, then children to their parents, as hath been manifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.
6. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles, waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of government, but are more tolerable in a monarchy than in a democracy. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a democracy, look how many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are with the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing), so many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be rewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of themselves. A monarch may in great part satisfy his officers and friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures given in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a democracy, where many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be done without the subject’s oppression. Though a monarch may promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a democracy, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it, because it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it, would so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those others, but even to the whole city also.
7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself, that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he lists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never offended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance in any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is therefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done. But it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less often undeservedly condemned under one ruler, than under the people. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful words, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that excess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly punished. Whosoever therefore in a monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For the ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many Neros as there are orators who soothe the people. For each one of them can do as much as the people, and they mutually give way to each other’s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, spare me to-day and I’ll spare thee to-morrow, while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have a care, that the common weal do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party, without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was usually practised in democracies. For the Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years’ banishment on those that were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a kingdom. In this democracy and monarchy were even; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the people; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And therefore what the monarch does, is said to be done out of envy to their virtues; which if it were done by the people, would be accounted policy.
8. There are some, who therefore imagine monarchy to be more grievous then democracy, because there is less liberty in that, than in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the laws, that is, the commands of the people; neither in democracy, nor in any other state of government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden, there could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in democracy than monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty, as the other. For although the word liberty may in large and ample letters be written over the gates of any city whatsoever, yet is it not meant the subject’s, but the city’s liberty; neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a city which is governed by the people, than that which is ruled by a monarch. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but dominion; which yet for want of understanding they little consider. For if every man would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for himself, as is commanded by the law of nature; that same natural state would return again, in which all men may by right do all things; which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse than all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his single freedom, the rest being bound, what does he else demand but to have the dominion? For whoso is freed from all bonds, is lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a popular, than in a monarchical state. That which deceives them, is the equal participation of command and public places. For where the authority is in the people, single subjects do so far forth share in it, as they are parts of the people ruling; and they equally partake in public offices, so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing magistrates and public ministers. And this is that which Aristotle aimed at, himself also through the custom of that time miscalling dominion liberty. (Polit. lib. vi. cap. 2.) In a popular state there is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were free out of this state. From whence, by the way, we may collect, that those subjects who in a monarchy deplore their lost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are not received to the steerage of the commonweal.
9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a popular state is much to be preferred before a monarchical; because that where all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to exceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy, this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest part of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours; to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family: these, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits, although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in it.
10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at home, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is nourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be raised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear towards their prince or governors of their country; and many the like. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and wherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men understand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I say not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other than mere lets and impediments?
11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more esteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best and smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, honest and dishonest, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to make that seem just which is unjust, according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which for the most part are erroneous. Neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their minds to whom they speak; whence it happens, that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the man, but in the nature itself of eloquence, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is not truth (except by chance), but victory; and whose property is not to inform, but to allure.
12. The third reason why men advise less successfully in a great convent is, because that thence arise factions in a commonweal; and out of factions, seditions and civil war. For when equal orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches, the conquered hates the conqueror and all those that were of his side, as holding his council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all means to make the advice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state: for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Furthermore, where the votes are not so unequal, but that the conquered have hopes, by the accession of some few of their own opinion, at another sitting to make the stronger party, the chief heads do call the rest together; they advise a part how they may abrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order each man shall speak, that the same business may again be brought to agitation; that so what was confirmed before by the number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people, is commonly called a faction. But when a faction is inferior in votes, and superior, or not much inferior in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft and language, they attempt by force of arms; and so it comes to a civil war. But some will say, these things do not necessarily, nor often happen. He may as well say, that the chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.
13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and change, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor according to the changeableness of men’s minds, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction, do convene. Insomuch as the laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.
14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and will is as soon known abroad, as to the people itself commanding at home.
15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies, do so far forth evince monarchy to be better than democracy, as in democracy affairs of great consequence are oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a monarchy. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own private, than the public business, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother. But if the people in a democracy would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular democracy and monarchy would be equal.
16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence, namely, because the government itself, or the administration of its affairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other side, to many than to some few. For government is the power, the administration of it is the act. Now the power in all kinds of government is equal; the acts only differ, that is to say, the actions and motions of a commonweal, as they flow from the deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any government depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on his officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal may be well governed, although the monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with the public offices and charges. And that which is said, woe to the land whose king is a child, doth not signify the condition of a monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the king being a child, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding themselves into public councils, the government comes to be administered in a democratical manner; and that thence arise those infelicities, which for the most part accompany the dominion of the people.
17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute monarchy is the best state of government, that not only kings, but even those cities which are subject to the people or to nobles, give the whole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing can be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no king can give a general greater authority over his army, than he himself by right may exercise over all his subjects. Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else are many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms and men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature; which is the state of war.
18. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves to be subject to some man or council, we cannot on better condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon our safety and welfare; and this then comes to pass, when we are the inheritance of the ruler. For every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the lands and monies of the subjects are not only the prince’s treasure, but their bodies and wildy minds. Which will be easily granted by those, who consider at how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued; and how much easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his prince been despoiled of his life or goods, through the sole licentiousness of his authority.
19. Hitherto we have compared a monarchical with a popular state; we have said nothing of aristocracy. We may conclude of this, by what hath been said of those, that that which is hereditary, and content with the election of magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which simply imitates the government of monarchs most, and the people least of all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting than the rest.
15. Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] It seems the ancients who made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention, which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person; which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it; that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.
1. The beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people. 2. Judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme commanders. 3. That they who have the chief authority, are by right unpunishable. 4. That without a supreme power there is no government, but anarchy. 5. That from servants and sons there is a simple obedience due to their lords and parents. 6. Absolute authority proved by most evident places, as well of the New as the Old Testament.
1. We have, in the sixth chapter and the second article, so derived the original of institutive or political government from the consent of the multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or be esteemed as enemies. Such was the beginning of God’s government over the Jews instituted by Moses, (Exod. xix. 5-8): If ye will obey my voice indeed, &c. Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, &c. And Moses came and called the elders of the people, &c. And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath spoken we will do. Such also was the beginning of Moses’s power under God, or his vicegerency, (Exod. xx. 18-19): And all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings, and the noise of the trumpet, &c. And they said unto Moses, speak thou unto us, and we will hear. The like beginning also had Saul’s kingdom, (1 Sam. xii. 12, 13): When ye saw that Nahash king of the children of Ammon came out against you, ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your king. Now therefore behold the king whom ye have chosen, and whom ye have desired. But the major part only consenting, and not all; for there were certain sons of Belial, who said, (1 Sam. x. 27), How shall this man save us? And they despised him; those who did not consent, were put to death as enemies. And the people said unto Samuel (1 Sam. xi. 12): Who is he that said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men, that we may put them to death.
2. In the same sixth chapter, the sixth and seventh articles, I have showed that all judgment and wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who bears the supreme authority; that is to say, in a monarchy, on a monarch or king; and this is confirmed by the people’s own judgment. 1 Sam. viii. 20; We also will be like all the nations, and our king shall judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles. And what pertains to judgments, and all other matters whereof there is any controversy, whether they be good or evil, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon, (1 Kings iii. 9): Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil. And that of Absolom, (2 Sam. xv. 3): There is no man deputed of the king to hear thee.
3. That kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been showed above in the sixth chapter and the twelfth article, King David also confirms; who, though Saul sought to slay him, did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbade Abishai, saying, (1 Sam. xxvi. 9): Destroy him not; for who can stretch forth his hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent? And when he had cut off the skirt of his garment, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6): The Lord forbid, saith he, that I should do this thing unto my master the Lord’s anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him. And (2 Sam. i. 15) commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had slain Saul, to be put to death.
4. That which is said in the seventeenth chapter of Judges, at the sixth verse: In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes: as though where there were not a monarchy, there were an anarchy or confusion of all things: may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of monarchy above all other forms of government; unless that by the word king may perhaps be understood not one man only, but also a court; provided that in it there reside a supreme power. Which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a supreme and absolute power (which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth chapter) there will be a liberty for every man to do what he hath a mind, or whatsoever shall seem right to himself; which cannot stand with the preservation of mankind. And therefore in all government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent.
5. We have, in chap. VIII. art. 7 and 8, said that servants must yield a simple obedience to their lords, and in chap IX. art. 7, that sons owe the same obedience to their parents. Saint Paul says the same thing concerning servants (Coloss. iii. 22): Servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God. Concerning sons (Colos. iii. 20): Children obey your parents in all things, for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord. Now as we by simple obedience understand all things which are not contrary to the laws of God; so in those cited places of St. Paul, after the word all things, we must suppose, excepting those which are contrary to the laws of God.
6. But that I may not thus by piecemeal prove the right of princes, I will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power; namely, that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects. And first out of the New Testament: Matth. xxiii. 2, 3: The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do. Whatsoever they bid you (says Christ) observe, that is to say, obey simply. Why? Because they sit in Moses’ seat; namely, the civil magistrate’s, not Aaron, the priest’s. Rom. xiii. 1, 2: Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. Now because the powers that were in St. Paul’s time, were ordained of God, and all kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their subjects, it follows that such a power was ordained of God. 1 Peter ii. 13-15: Submit yourselves unto every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that do well; for so is the will of God.God. Again St. Paul to Titus, (chap. iii. 1): Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, &c. What principalities? Was it not to the principalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience? Furthermore, that we may come to the example of Christ himself, to whom the kingdom of the Jews belonged by hereditary right derived from David himself; he, when he lived in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto Cæsar, and pronounced it to be due to him, Matth. xxii. 21: Give unto Cæsar (saith he) the things which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s. When it pleased him to show himself a king, he required entire obedience, Matth. xxi. 2, 3: Go (said he) into the village over against you, and straight-way ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her; loose them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say aught unto you, ye shall say the Lord hath need of them. This he did therefore by the right of being lord, or a king of the Jews. But to take away a subject’s goods on this pretence only, because the Lord hath need of them, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the Old Testament are these: Deut. v. 27: Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God shall say; and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and do it. But under the word all, is contained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua (Joshua i. 16-18): And they answered Joshua, saying, all that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go; according as we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee; only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moses; whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death. And the parable of the bramble (Judges ix. 14, 15): Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon. The sense of which words is, that we must acquiesce to their sayings, whom we have truly constituted to be kings over us, unless we would choose rather to be consumed by the fire of a civil war. But the regal authority is more particularly described by God himself, in 1 Sam. viii. 9, &c.: Show them the right of the king that shall reign over them, &c. This shall be the right of the king that shall reign over you; he will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and some shall run before his chariots, &c. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take your vineyards, and give them to his servants, &c. Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the king’s right. Neither was any man among the Jews, no not the high-priest himself, exempted from this obedience. For when the king, namely, Solomon, said to Abiathar the priest (1 Kings ii. 26, 27): Get thee to Anathoth unto thine own fields; for thou art worthy of death; but I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou barest the ark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted. So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being priest unto the Lord; it cannot by any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord; neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his person at that time was any whit less acceptable to God.
1. That the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons is a seditious opinion. 2. That subjects do sin by obeying their princes is a seditious opinion. 3. That tyrannicide is lawful is a seditious opinion. 4. That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws is a seditious opinion. 5. That the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion. 6. That faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason, but always supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion. 7. That each subject hath a propriety or absolute dominion of his own goods is a seditious opinion. 8. Not to understand the difference between the people and the multitude, prepares toward sedition. 9. Too great a tax of money, though never so just and necessary, prepares toward sedition. 10. Ambition disposeth us to sedition. 11. So doth the hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only faculty needful to raise seditions. 13. How the folly of the common people, and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the destruction of a common-weal.
1. Hitherto hath been spoken, by what causes and pacts commonweals are constituted, and what the rights of princes are over their subjects. Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of natural bodies three things are to be considered, namely, internal disposition, that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced; the external agent, whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced; and the action itself: so also in a commonweal where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present themselves to our regard; first, the doctrines and the passions contrary to peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted and disposed; next, their quality and condition who solicit, assemble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up arms and quit their allegiance; lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction itself. But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, proved it in chap. I. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. VI. art. 9) that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. XI. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil? Since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a king who does righteously, and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things; and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust, proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings; which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God’s commands is, (Gen. ii. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil: and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5): Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and God’s expostulation with man, (verse 11): Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil.
2. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience, is a sin; for he who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another man’s sin, I may sometimes do that without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right lord over me, I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment of my prince, conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly; but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them which either is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they obey, they sin against their conscience; and if they obey not, against right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they fear not the pains of the world to come; if they sin against right, they do, as much as in them lies, abolish human society and the civil life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sin when they obey their prince’s commands which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that original error which we have observed above, in the foregoing article. For by our taking upon us to judge of good and evil, we are the occasion that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.