CHAPTER V.

A voyage across the Atlantic must ever be attended with greater peril than almost any other ocean service of similar length and duration; arising, as this does, from the boisterous character and uncertainty of the weather, from the icebergs which float in huge masses during spring along the northern line of passage, from the dense fogs frequently prevailing, and from the many vessels of every kind to be met with, either as employed in the Newfoundland fisheries, or in the vast and daily increasing intercourse between Europe and America.

In such a navigation the utmost care and caution requires to be constantly exercised, especially by steamships. Nevertheless, though the Collins line of steamers performed this passage with a speed hitherto unequalled, they encountered no accidents worthy of note during the first four years of their career; but terrible calamities befell them soon afterwards.

On the 21st of September, 1854, the Arctic, according to her usual course, left Liverpool for New York. She had on board 233 passengers, of whom 150 were first class, together with a crew of 135 persons, and a valuable cargo. At mid-day on the 27th of that month, when about 60 miles south-east of Cape Race, and during a dense fog, she came in contact with the French steamer Vesta. By this collision the Vesta appeared at first to be so seriously injured that, in their terror and confusion, her passengers, amounting to 147, and a crew of fifty men, conceived she was about to sink, and that their only chance of safety lay in getting on board the Arctic. Impressed with this idea many of them rushed into the boats, of which, as too frequently happens, one sank immediately, and the other containing thirteen persons was swamped under the quarter of the ship, all on board of her perishing. When, however, the captain of the Vesta more carefully examined his injuries, he found that, though the bows of his vessel were partially stove in, the foremost bulkhead had not started. He, therefore, at once lightened his ship by the head, strengthened the partition by every means in his power, and by great exertions, courage, forethought, and seamanship, brought his shattered vessel without further loss into the harbour of St. John’s.

In the meantime a frightful catastrophe befell the Arctic, and one so little anticipated that the persons on board of her, supposing that she had sustained only trifling injury by the collision, had launched a boat for the rescue of the passengers and crew of the Vesta. It was soon, however, discovered that their own ship had sustained fatal injuries, and that the sea was rushing in so fast through three holes which had been pierced in the hull below the water-line, that the engine fires would be soon extinguished. The Arctic’s head was therefore immediately laid for Cape Race, the nearest point of land, but in four hours from the time of the collision, the water reached the furnaces and soon afterwards she foundered. As it was blowing a strong gale at the time, some of the boats into which her passengers and crew rushed were destroyed in launching, others which got clear of the sinking ship were never again heard of, and only two, with thirty-one of the crew and fourteen passengers, reached Newfoundland. Among those who perished were the wife of Mr. Collins and their son and daughter, but the captain, who remained on board to the last, and the first as well as the second and fourth officers were saved. Seventy-two men and four females sought refuge on a raft which the seamen, when they found the ship sinking, had hastily constructed, but one by one they were swept away—every wave as it washed over the raft claiming one or more victims as its prey; and at eight o’clock on the following morning, one human being alone was left out of the seventy-six persons who, only twelve or fifteen hours before had hoped to save their lives on this temporary structure. The solitary occupant of this fragile raft must have had a brave heart and a strong nerve to have retained his place upon it for a day and a half, after all his companions had perished, for it was not until that time had elapsed that he was saved by a passing vessel: his tale of how he and they were parted was of the most heart-rending description.[207]

As a large proportion of the first-class passengers of the Arctic, consisted of persons of wealth and extensive commercial relations in the United States, as well as in England and her colonies, besides more than one member of her aristocracy, the loss of the Arctic and the terrible incidents in connection with her fate caused an unusual amount of grief and consternation on both sides of the Atlantic.

Within little more than twelve months from this time, another great calamity befell the Collins Company, and the sad loss of their steamer Pacific, from the mystery in which it is shrouded, if not as lamentable as that of the Arctic (for the soul of man has never been harrowed by its details), was equally deplorable. Though the ocean, as in this instance, leaves no record of its ravages, the stern fact, announced in the brief words she was never heard of, tells itself the sad, sad tale, that a great ship, with all her living inmates, in infancy, in manhood and in old age, it may be full of hope and joy, has been engulfed in the deep blue waters of the Atlantic—summoned, perhaps in a moment, to an eternity more mysterious than that which still surrounds their melancholy fate.

This splendid but unfortunate ship left Liverpool on the 23rd of January, 1856, having on board 25 first-class passengers, 20 second-class passengers, and a crew of 141 persons, almost all of whom were Americans. She carried the mails and a valuable cargo; the insurances effected on her amounting to $2,000,000. But no living soul ever appeared to tell when and where or how she was lost, nor were any articles belonging to her ever found to afford a clue to her melancholy fate; it can only be supposed that she sprang an overwhelming leak, or more probably struck suddenly, when at full speed, on an iceberg and instantly foundered.[208]

These terrible disasters did not, however, quench the spirit of the American people, however much they may have grieved over them. They were still as resolved as ever to maintain an Atlantic mail service of their own, and the requisite capital was soon found to supply the place of the two vessels which had been lost; one of the new steamers, the Adriatic, surpassing in size, speed, and splendour any of her predecessors. Nor did these disasters check the passenger traffic which, in eight years from the time of starting the Collins line, had increased five-fold. This, however, is in a great measure accounted for by the fact that, in the meantime, another line of steamers, specially adapted for the emigrant trade, to which reference will hereafter be made, had, during that period, been started, thus affording far greater facilities for an economical and comparatively easy intercourse between the two countries, than the sailing packets had hitherto provided.

The Cunard Company having now other steam companies to contend against besides the Collins line, made renewed and extraordinary exertions to maintain their position. In 1852, they sent forth the Arabia, of 2400 tons, and of 938 horse-power, built on the Clyde and supplied with engines by Robert Napier; and, in 1855, the first iron ship of their fleet, the Persia, was dispatched to compete with the Adriatic.

The Persia[209] was a great step in advance of any other ship built for the Cunard Company up to that period, and though they had added twenty-six vessels to their fleet since they launched the Britannia, she was not merely the first they had constructed of iron, but the first ocean-going steamer in any way approaching her dimensions, launched from the yard of Robert Napier and Sons, who had now added to their business of engineers that of iron-ship builders.

Curious to relate, among the vast concourse of people who witnessed the launch of this ship, there were persons who had been also present at the launch of the Comet on the Clyde, and who were thus living witnesses of the extraordinary progress of steam navigation during the course of their own experience. The Persia, besides being the largest vessel hitherto owned by the Cunard Company, surpassed in speed all their other vessels.[210]

With such vessels as the Asia, Africa, Arabia, and Persia on their line, the Cunard Company bade defiance to competition. In a comparative statement of the voyages of the principal steamers then engaged in the Transatlantic trade, including the Collins line, the average speed of the Cunarders throughout the year 1856 exceeded that of all others;[211] the Persia during that year having, on four occasions, made the passage from New York to Liverpool in less than nine days and a half, indeed, in one instance, in nine days, four hours, and thirty-five minutes.

But the Collins Company continued to run their ships with regularity and undaunted vigour up till 1858, and it was only when the shareholders discovered that they were competing with the Cunard and other British steamers at a ruinous loss, and declined to provide more capital, that this great but spirited undertaking was relinquished. Though the most strenuous exertions were made, every effort failed to resuscitate the Company. The losses had been stupendous: minor and separate interests, moreover, as well as those persons who, from the first, had been opposed to subsidies for the conveyance of the mails, now brought their influence to bear upon Congress. The merchants and shipowners of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other places, envious of New York, complained loudly of that city having a virtual monopoly of the Transatlantic trade, nor did the owners of the sailing packets fail to renew their protests against the large annual grants of public money voted for ocean steam communication. In the face of these remonstrances, and of the numerous hostile interests now at work, the American Government declined to grant any further subsidies to the Collins Company, or to aid, from the public purse, another undertaking which proposed to take its place.

But the Cunarders did not relax their efforts to maintain the high position they had now attained. In 1862 they sent forth the Scotia, of which an illustration will be found on the following page.

She also was built of iron, but superior in speed and strength to the Persia, and of somewhat greater power and dimensions.[212]

“In framing the Scotia, the utmost attention was bestowed for the purpose of giving strength and firmness to the whole of her large hull so as to enable her to resist strain, and make her invulnerable to concussion. To secure strength she is bound in the strongest manner throughout from stem to stern, and she is fitted with six transverse bulkheads which, in the length of the ship, divide the hull into seven perfectly water-tight compartments, and besides these she has also four water-tight subsidiary or caisson compartments. She is traversed from stem to stern by five keelsons, all of which are firmly secured at each bulkhead. At the bow, her framing is diagonal to afford the greatest possible resistance in case of concussion, and from the various peculiarities of her construction and the excellence of the material with which she has been built, the Scotia is admitted to be the strongest as she is certainly (1865) the finest merchant-steamer afloat, and, as such, may be safely adopted as the champion and model of a mercantile ocean steam-ship.”[213]

This magnificent specimen of a merchant-steamer surpassed in all respects any vessel which had hitherto crossed the Atlantic, having made the passage (allowing for difference in time, but including the detention of landing mails and passengers at Queenstown) in eight days, twenty-two hours, from New York to Liverpool.

Though the Collins Company had collapsed, the Cunard Company were not left in undisputed possession of the intercourse they had established, except so far as regards any further competition from steam-vessels subsidised by the Governments of Great Britain or of the United States. But as no mean rivals in the trade had arisen from among their own countrymen, they found it necessary to add vessel after vessel to their fleet, each new one of a still more improved description, and therefore wisely turned their attention to the screw as a means of propulsion.

In 1862 they sent forth the China, in 1864 the Cuba, in 1865 the Java, and in 1867 the Russia, all built of iron in the Clyde, but fitted with the screw instead of paddle-wheels, and embodying various improvements upon even the Scotia. The Russia is 2960 gross register, and, though her engines are only 492 horse-power,[214] her speed equalled that of either the Persia or Scotia, she having made the passage from New York to Queenstown in eight days and twenty-eight minutes, and from Queenstown to New York in eight days, five hours, and fifty-two minutes mean time, thus affording another instance (if, indeed, any more were required) of the superiority of the screw over the paddle-wheels.

But as the trade increased the Cunard Company found it necessary to direct their attention to the adoption of every improvement, however minute, which their experience, combined with the knowledge and science of the age suggested, so as to increase considerably the capacity of their vessels, without lessening their speed. Since they launched the Russia they have added to their fleet five vessels, the Calabria, Algeria, and Abyssinia, each of 3300 tons, and the Bothnia and Scythia, each of 4535 tons, all built of iron and fitted with the screw. The Bothnia and Scythia, (built by Messrs. James and George Thomson, of Glasgow,) are in all respects similar. They are each 455 feet in length over all, with a breadth of 42½ feet, and a depth of 36 feet. In each, accommodation has been afforded for 300 first-class and 800 third-class passengers. They are barque-rigged, and have four decks—the upper or promenade deck, the spar deck, the main deck, and the lower or orlop deck; their engines are on the compound principle.[215] Their engines are 507 nominal horse-power, of the massive description common to the Cunard liners, so essential for safety on an Atlantic voyage. They have each two jacketed cylinders, the small cylinder being 60 inches and the large one 104 inches, with eight tubular boilers and twenty-four furnaces.

The coal bunkers of the Bothnia are capable of holding 1200 tons of coals. Steam winches of extra size are attached to all the hatches, and the weighing of the anchor is secured by the use of Harfield’s[216] steam windlass. Her steam steering gear is amidships, besides which she has powerful screw gearing, and, in further supplement of the guiding resources of the vessel, she can be directed, from a wheel-house aft, in the event of the steam gearing getting out of order while at sea.

The Bothnia (as well as the Scythia) is of unusual strength, being double plated for a considerable distance round the bilge, and having nine intercostal keelsons, while her spar deck, which is all of teak, is plated with iron. She carries twelve lifeboats, an unusual number for even a vessel of her large dimensions. Nor has the comfort and luxury as well as the safety of the passengers been neglected. In her main saloon, situated nearly amidships, 300 persons can conveniently dine at one time. There are besides separate drawing-rooms for ladies, and smoking and lounging-rooms for gentlemen.

Beyond the advance which has been made in the strength, speed, and capacity of these ships, since iron has been employed in their construction and the screw adopted as a propelling power, the improved accommodation afforded to passengers of all classes has been equally surprising. The state rooms of the Bothnia are indeed splendid, affording every comfort possible at sea, the sleeping-berths, in space, light, ventilation, and convenience, more resembling the rooms of an hotel than the cabins of a ship. (See illustration, p. 236.) By arrangements, which I have not space to describe in detail, the scuttles, or rather windows, of the upper tier of berths are no longer exposed to the wash of the sea, so that they can be kept open if desired, without in any way jeopardizing the safety of the ship in the most stormy weather; nay, even when closed, the ventilation remains perfect, and is continued to the other range of cabins below. Thus a passage across the stormy Atlantic is no longer one of enduring discomfort or suffering, as it was in the days of our fathers, but, to those who are not subject to sea-sickness, has now become a voyage of pleasure; and, though many of my readers may not be disposed to agree with me in this respect, the improvements in accommodation are so great that I should prefer spending the proverbial “month’s holiday,” which everybody now-a-days seems to require, on board of a modern steam-ship to spending it in most of our European hotels.

The Scythia was launched in October 1874, and the Saragossa and Cherbourg, now in course of construction on the Clyde by Messrs. Thomson for the Cunard Company, are not likely to be in any way inferior.

This company now own forty-nine steam-vessels of 90,208 tons, and 14,537 horse-power;[217] and, in a foot note, will be found an interesting table of the comparative consumption of coal in fourteen of these steamers employed in different trades.[218] But, a much more interesting and instructive table (embracing all the Cunard vessels that have been employed in the Transatlantic trade since 1840) is given in the Appendix,[219] and forms in itself a complete history of the advance of steam-vessels during the last thirty-five years. It is remarkable to note the extraordinary progress achieved since the Britannia made her first voyage in 1840. Though measuring 1,139 tons, she had a capacity for only 225 tons of cargo, whereas the Bothnia, of 4,335 tons, built in 1874, takes 3000 tons of cargo, or nearly fourteen times as much, though only four times larger. The Britannia carried ninety passengers, whereas the Bothnia carries 340, or close upon four times as many. The former steamed 8¼ knots an hour, whereas the latter steams 13, or more than half as quick again, and the Bothnia does all this extra work on less than half the quantity of fuel per indicated horse-power per hour, and on about the same quantity for the actual number of miles run.

As it thus appears that engines of 507 nominal horse-power now drive a vessel of 4,335 tons, at a speed nearly twice as great as engines of 425 nominal horse-power drove a vessel of only 1039 tons in 1840, with not half the consumption of coals, may we not hope from the progress of science and increased knowledge for still more extraordinary results at the expiration of another thirty-five years?

The Cunard Company have now afloat, and engaged in their Transatlantic service alone, no less than twenty-three magnificent steam-ships and two steam-tenders of a gross registered tonnage of 64,718 tons, and 10,000 horse-power.[220] And here I must state that, though they have for thirty-five years been traversing that stormy ocean, now almost daily, with surprising regularity and during the most tempestuous weather, they have only lost two vessels; but it is still more remarkable,—indeed, it is an extraordinary fact,—that neither life nor letter entrusted to their care has been lost through shipwreck, collision, fire, or any of the too frequent causes of disaster, during the numerous voyages made by the Cunard steamers across the Atlantic.

How is this? Here is a problem well worthy of solution, and one too of great national importance. When we consider the terrible loss of life and property at sea, as revealed by the returns of casualties annually published by the Board of Trade, and observe the mass of legislation to prevent or lessen, but in vain, these ever increasing, and too frequently most lamentable casualties, we cannot but feel that a noble work has yet to be achieved. What a boon would be conferred on mankind if this great problem could be satisfactorily solved! I cannot hope to do so, but I shall endeavour to show that, in the success of the operations of the Cunard Company, in the regularity of the voyages of their ships, and in the safety of life and property entrusted to their care, there exists a wise power of control which might be advantageously applied to vessels in other trades.

Now, regularity in itself, though perhaps more applicable to transit on land than sea, is a means of safety, while irregularity or rather want of punctuality has been the cause of an untold number of accidents involving destruction of property beyond estimation, with a sacrifice of life which no mathematician would attempt to value. Indeed it may safely be affirmed that the number of persons who have lost their lives through irregularity alone while travelling by land and sea during the present century, would exceed that of the occupants of a town of considerable size.

With the Cunard Company punctuality is a matter of the highest consideration, for their ships sail as is the rule with the Transatlantic lines in all weathers, not merely to the day but to the hour and even to the minute of the time advertised. On board every man has his allotted station and his special duty to perform. Nor is this all, every commander and officer must show that he is thoroughly competent, in all respects, for his duties, while attention to these duties is rigidly enforced. From my own experience I can state (for I have on two occasions crossed the Atlantic as a passenger in their steamers) that I found prevailing on board a very superior state of things to what I have noticed in too many steam-vessels in other trades. The captain was seldom to be seen, except at his duty, nor was he ever to be found mingling or gossiping with the passengers when any duty, however trivial, required his attention, even though the regulations laid down by the owners for his guidance might have allowed him to do so. No officer was ever seen speaking to the passengers except perhaps to answer a question. If you entered the engine-room, the engineers in charge were invariably at their stations ready to stop the machinery at a moment’s notice, while all the assistants, down to the furnace-men and coal-trimmers, were at their respective posts attending to their individual duties. Going aft, you would find the men at the helm with an officer by their side to make sure that the steering course was adhered to, and, whether you walked to the bridge or the forecastle, you would find men on the “look out,” alike in fine weather and in foul, with their attention steadily directed to the ship’s course, and with the means of instant communication with the officer of the watch, and, through him, with the engineer in case of danger. In approaching land, when in soundings, seamen in both chains were to be found casting or prepared to cast the lead, or with the deep sea line on the weather bulwark ready to be run out according to circumstances or the anticipated depth of water.[221] If you looked around you would find everything in its place ready for instant action; if you glanced at the boats you would find their tackles in order and the boats themselves clear and free from all encumbrances with the plugs, oars, and rudder ready for immediate use; if you looked below you would observe the night-lamps carefully guarded from accident, and the hose stretched out and attached to the engine so that water could be instantly applied to quench any fire that might accidentally arise in any part of the ship. Everywhere the most perfect order and quietness prevailed.

That my readers may understand more thoroughly the nature and value of these regulations, I furnish[222] for their information the more important heads of the instructions given to all the commanders of the Cunard ships. They are clear and to the point and, though every person on board is subordinate to the commander, the engineer also receives printed instructions for his guidance. Distinct regulations are laid down for exercising the boats and fire-pumps, and for their prompt and efficient use in case of accident:[223] even the duties of the stewards and servants are as clearly defined, so that in the cabin the same quiet and order prevails as in all other parts of the ship.

Neglect of these or similar orders has too often led to the most serious consequences; hence, in all the ships of the Cunard Company, as on the Transatlantic ships, generally, they are enforced even to the most minute detail. Any negligence with regard to them would be severely reprimanded, and any second offence or any wilful neglect, would be punished by disrating or dismissal from the service. Every person on board from the captain to the cook’s mate knows this: consequently, these regulations do not hang neglected on the walls as regulations of the same kind too frequently do in too many other vessels, they are carefully studied, as every man on board knows full well that they must be attended to. Nor does the care of the Company for the safety of their ships and the lives of their passengers end here. To avoid as far as possible collision at sea they have within the last two or three years issued a notice, which is advertised almost daily in the leading public journals, of the course their ships will pursue in their passages across the Atlantic.[224]

Though the “dangers of the sea” are proverbial, they might be reduced by at least two-thirds of their present amount. This is neither an exaggerated nor a haphazard statement, for upon a close examination of the wreck returns, it will be found that a still larger proportion could be prevented. A large volume might be indeed written to advantage on this important subject. But as our space is limited, and, having already (vol. iii. chap. xvii.) directed the attention of my readers to it, I shall only now ask them to turn over in their minds the too frequent accounts of shipwrecks which appear in the public journals, and such expressions as “drunkenness,” “overloading,” “negligence,” “incompetency,” “fire,” “collision,” and “unseaworthy ships and sailors,” will recur to their recollection as the alleged causes of too many of these disasters. This is no overdrawn picture, it is but too true.[225]

With these facts in view, and having before them the regulations of the Cunard Company with the knowledge, also, of the perfect safety with which their ships have traversed, at the highest rate of speed for a long series of years, one of the most stormy oceans; one, too, where icebergs abound, and where far more ships navigate than anywhere else, they may ask themselves with advantage this question and study it in their own minds: Cannot this melancholy list of maritime casualties be materially reduced? It can and must. Opinions may differ widely as to the most effective mode of carrying into practice the means at our disposal for bringing about a more satisfactory state of things than exists at present. But the work has to be done, and ought to be done, when the great fact, which cannot be too often repeated, is considered that the Cunard Company’s steamers have for thirty-five years constantly traversed the Atlantic without the loss of the life of a passenger, or of a letter entrusted to their care.

Some persons may say that this arises from extraordinary “good luck.” As a rule, I have no faith in such old sayings; good or bad luck are expressions only applicable to games of chance where no skill, genius, industry, or prudence are required, and where every man has an equal opportunity of winning a prize. In all other matters success depends on the means applied to obtain it. And there can be no doubt that the freedom from accident on board of the ships of the Cunard Company may be attributed, almost entirely, to the wise measures adopted to prevent casualties, and to the rigour with which they are enforced. If this conclusion is sound and borne out by the facts, why should we not make the rules of that company or similar rules adopted by other steam lines, the bases of our maritime legislation, especially in passenger ships, and enforce them by legislative enactments? We could thus dispense with a large portion of the confused mass of maritime legislation now in force, and from its extent, in too many cases, practically worthless.[226]

With regard to the seaworthiness, of a ship and the competency of her crew, it would, while maintaining the valuable existing laws for the examination of the officers, and the engagement and discharge of the seamen, be desirable to sweep away the great bulk of the legislative technical details, which even Parliament in its wisdom knows little about, and require shipowners to produce vessels in all respects seaworthy, under heavy penalties for negligence, while leaving them to manage their own affairs as to the best mode of construction, number, and efficiency of crew, outfits, load line, and so forth. Such matters cannot be effectually dealt with by Act of Parliament; but, if they could, is it just, is it proper, that the nation should be required to take upon itself responsibilities, essentially, belonging to individuals? If it does, we shall most assuredly create greater dangers and bring about greater misfortunes and calamities, than those we attempt to obviate by well-meant but injudicious legislation.

The case of the Cunard Company is a striking instance of what individuals can do. Legislative enactments are not required to regulate the conduct of such men as constitute the managing owners of this company, nor of that of the great majority of British shipowners. They know that a good ship, well managed and well found, is a much better investment than a bad one. But they likewise know, and therefore the Government can always depend upon the support of such men in any wise and necessary legislative measure, that there are interlopers in their trade who “go down to the sea in ships and do business on the mighty waters” of quite as knavish a character and, even more heartless, than the swindlers who concoct joint stock undertakings on shore to rob the widow of her mite and the fatherless children of their daily bread: they know, also, that there are very bad men who send their ships to sea to be lost, and villains who actually scuttle them. Nor are they unaware that, among their number, there are men who smile when their ships are lost because they are well insured.[227] Therefore, so far from objecting to general laws of even a much more stringent character than those at present in force, they would welcome them if, by their rigorous enforcement, the perpetration of crime could be more effectually checked. If, for instance, punishment was made more certain and severe, bad men would hesitate before they over-insured their ships in the hope of realising profits out of disasters, especially where loss of life occurs. It is only a question of degree between the man who smiles when his ship founders, and the rogue who dispatches her for the purpose of being cast away; and Parliament, when it again deals with the loss of life and property at sea, might do well to direct its attention more than has hitherto been done to over-insurance, and to the insurance laws of our own and other countries. To limit the amount insured to the honest value of the article thus protected from loss, may appear a simple enough matter, but the whole subject is surrounded with difficulties. It must not, therefore, be hastily dealt with, and before any legislation is attempted, should be fully investigated, either by a committee of the House of Commons or by a Royal Commission.