Mr. Labouchere's amendment on that occasion was defeated by a majority of 61 in a House of 385 members. On November 21, 1884, Labouchere had moved the following resolution: "That in view of the fact that the Conservative party is able and has for many years been able, through its permanent majority in the House of Lords, to alter, defeat, or delay legislation, although that legislation has been recommended by the responsible advisers of the Crown, and approved by the nation through its elected representatives, it is desirable to make such alterations in the relations of the two Houses of Parliament as will effect a remedy to this state of things." Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in seconding the resolution, said that he remembered a few years ago Mr. Labouchere giving notice of a very similar resolution. He asked him if he thought a House could be made for it. Mr. Labouchere had answered, "No, I do not think there will be, for all the Radicals want to be made peers." The member for Northampton prophesied truly, for not forty members could be got to come down.
With untiring patience, however, Mr. Labouchere moved a resolution of the same nature almost every year that he was in Parliament. His perseverance on the subject was only matched by the dogged persistence with which he attacked the ridiculous appurtenances inseparable from the upkeep of a constitutional monarchy. When he was asked by Captain Fred Burnaby once at Homburg why he was always attacking the Royal family, who after all were well meaning people, he replied: "One must find some very solid institution to be able to attack it in comfort. If the love of royalty were not so firmly established in the middle-class English breast, I should not dream of attacking it, for the institution might topple over, and then what should I do? I should have all the trouble of finding something else to tilt against."
Another expression of his views on the Establishment is found in his speech on Mr. Albert Grey's amendment on the occasion of the Second Reading of the Church Patronage Bill. "From a Radical standpoint," he said, "it was undesirable that there should be an Establishment at all, and there seemed to be no reason why they should be continually tinkering up and remedying this and that abuse in connection with the Church.... He agreed with the Secretary of State that this Bill did not go far enough, if it granted compensation in the case of those who now held livings. To sell a cure of souls had always been regarded as a most monstrous iniquity, and why should they give compensation to those who were enjoying what was wrong? They might as well suggest that Simon Magus himself should have had compensation. There was another preposterous clause in the Bill. These advowsons could only be sold to the great landlords and the lords of the manor. If the livings were sold at all, they should be sold to anybody who might be ready to buy them. But why should the great landlords—the race he should be glad to see cleared off the land—why should the great landlords and lords of the manor be allowed to buy livings while other people were not? ... There was no doubt that matters would be infinitely improved if the parishioners had the right to veto the appointment of clergymen. But the amendment did not go far enough. Why was there only to be a veto? Why not allow the parishioners to elect any clergyman they liked? Why was the bishop to be the only person to be allowed to have a veto? If the majority of the people in a locality were dissenters, he thought they should not be compelled to elect a Church of England clergyman. He was opposed to all this tinkering of the Church of England, which should be disestablished and disendowed.... He was quite ready to leave the Church such amounts as had been given to it within the last twenty years; but he had seen calculations made that, deducting these amounts, a sum of about £5,000,000 per annum ought to come to the public. That sum was the property not of a sect, but of the English people who paid it, and he should like to see a Bill introduced dealing with glebe lands. These glebe lands were, he believed, the worst cultivated in the country, and it would be infinitely better to redistribute them in allotments amongst the deserving labourers of the village than to leave them in the hands of the clergymen. When his honourable friend brought in a Bill dealing with glebe lands, and giving back to them the £5,000,000 of which they were now deprived for the benefit of a sect, then he would give him his most cordial support." And so on.
In the June of 1884 he made one of his common-sense speeches on the subject of the enfranchisement of women. It occurred during the debate on the Representation of the People Bill. "It may be that we should enfranchise women," he said, "but because we have enfranchised men is no reason that we should do so. We may discuss the subject eloquently, we may refer to Joan of Arc and Boadicea, but, in point of fact, from the time of Eve till now there has been a distinct difference between men and women. There are a great many things which I am ready to admit women can do better than men, and there are other things which I think men can do better than women. Each have their separate functions, and the question is whether the function of electoral power is a function which women would adequately discharge. I do not think it is. As yet I understand that no country has really given women the vote; and were it not that honourable gentlemen opposite, who are generally averse to giving the franchise to any large body of men, think, and think justly, that a very large majority of women would vote for Conservatives, I should be surprised at their making this desperate leap in the dark. Some honourable members on this side of the House have told us that women are better than men. That is the language of poetry. But when we come to facts I am not at all disposed to admit that women are better than men. It is not a question of whether women are angels or not, but whether they will make good electors ... the honourable member has told us that he was convinced of this because Queen Anne was a great queen; and he told us also that Elizabeth was a great queen. But Anne was not a great queen, and Elizabeth had the intellect of a man with the weaknesses of a woman. The honourable member also spoke of Queen Christina of Sweden, but every one knows that she was one of the most execrable queens that ever lived, for, after being deposed by her subjects, she went to Paris and murdered her secretary. We learn that, by the operation of nature, more women are born into the world than men, that women live longer than men, and that a considerable number of men leave the kingdom as soldiers and sailors, while women remain at home. In consequence of this there are, at any given moment, a greater number of women than men in the country. I am told that in every county, with the exception of Hampshire, more women would be put on the register than men if we had woman suffrage. And what would be the consequence? They would look to the interests of women; they would band themselves together, and we should have them, of course, asking to be admitted to this House; and then, if they were admitted, instead of being on an equality with them, we should put ourselves under petticoat government; we should have women opposite, women on these benches, and a woman perhaps in the chair. They would, of course, like women everywhere, have their own way. The honourable member had hesitated as to whether he would give the vote to married women as well as to unmarried women, and, by his mode of dealing with the question, it would seem that he gave to vice what he denied to virtue. As long as a woman remains a spinster, it appears that she is to have the vote, but that, so soon as she marries, she is to cease to be an elector; she is to lose her rights if she enters into the holy and honourable state of matrimony, and, if her husband dies, she is again to get the vote. When Napoleon was asked by Mme. de Stael who was the best woman in the State, he said: 'Madame, the woman who has the most children.'"
It will be seen from the above extract that his opinion of the female sex was early Victorian, and so it remained to the end of his life. He was always a bitter opponent of woman suffrage; and when, in 1896, a petition for the Suffrage signed by 257,000 women from all parts of the United Kingdom was exhibited, "by kind permission of the Home Secretary," in Westminster Hall on a series of tables for the inspection of members, he immediately called the attention of the Speaker that afternoon in the House to the "unseemly display," and insisted upon its removal.
He was indefatigable in his efforts to introduce economical Radical finance into every detail of government, always assuring his hearers that he was fighting for the principle of economy, and not merely against the mere absurdity of the existence of certain traditional offices and extravagances. In 1885 we find him requesting the Attorney-General to do his best to suppress the offices of Trainbearer, Pursebearer, and Clerk of the Petty Bag. He protested ably against the large sums spent upon the upkeep of the royal yacht, and upon the "objectionable practice" of asking the Commons to vote a sum of money for special packets for conveyance of distinguished persons to and from England. He protested against the nation being asked to pay the expenses incurred in the ceremony of making the present King (then Prince George of Wales) a Knight of the Garter. He was, in short, unceasingly vigilant wherever the spending of public money was concerned, and his remarks were usually practical and to the point. A quotation from a letter he wrote to the Times in the same year on the Graduated Income Tax will be of interest, as peculiarly illustrative of his clear and simple view of the rights of the poor man versus those of the rich man. "The income tax," he wrote, "when first put on by Mr. Pitt, was a graduated tax. No one then regarded this as a spoliation or confiscation. That a rich man should pay a higher percentage of taxation than a poor man is based upon what Mr. Stuart Mill terms 'equality of sacrifice.' It will, I presume, he admitted by all that the first call upon a man's income is that portion of it which is necessary for him and his family to eat, to be clothed, and to secure some sort of home. If a man earns only £50 per annum, and has an average family of two children, let me ask what remains after this call has been met? Nothing. And if he has to pay taxes, he and his family are obliged to go without a sufficiency of clothing, or without a fitting home. Now look at the case of a man with £50,000 per annum, and with a family of the same size. He pays in taxation about 4½% on his income—-let us say 5%. This absorbs £2500. He may secure to himself and them not only all necessaries, but all comforts, for £500 per annum. Surely the sacrifice on his part to the exigencies of the State of £7000 per annum would not be so great a one as would be that of £2, 10s. per annum by the man with an income of £50 per annum. As a matter of fact, however, the rich man pays at present a maximum of 5%, and the poor man about twice that percentage...."
He made a speech in the Radical Club at North Camberwell on November 14, 1885, in which he once more resumed his creed, and with it I must end this chapter, so as to proceed with the history of the practice to which he put his theories. "In the House of Commons," he said, "Radicals had hitherto been in a very small minority, and were not appreciated, and it was therefore gratifying to him as a strong Radical to find what they did in the House of Commons was appreciated by those who made the House of Commons. For his own part he was bound to say he could not form any clear idea of what 'Conservative' meant now. In the past, Conservatives were a party banded together to support the landed interest, but Lord Randolph Churchill told them that this was to be all forgotten, and that the Conservatives were to become Tory Democrats. These two words were utterly antagonistic in themselves, and he could not understand how men could be fish and fowl at the same time. The only principle which was guiding the Tories was to get into office and remain there. No reasonable man could become a Conservative. As for the Whigs they were more dangerous than the Tories. There were about thirty of them in the House of Commons. They rarely spoke, but their influence—a backstair influence—was such that Ministers yielded to them, and it was to them that the action in Egypt was due, and they were the cause of the Crimes Bill in Ireland—both of which had been steadfastly opposed by the Radicals in Parliament. It was easier to deal with an open enemy than with a traitor in the camp. Happily the Whigs were expiring, and he did not think any one would care to adopt their creed. Coming to the Radical creed he said it was that England should become a democracy, by which was meant the rule of the people by the people and for the people. He was surprised statesmen could not see that the people would use the power given them for their own advantage. They would insist on a Government not mixed, as now, with an aristocratic element in it. They would deal with the entire Legislature, the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons; and, if they were of his mind, they would go in for a much more sweeping franchise. The vote was a right and not a privilege, and every man, not a criminal, ought to possess it, or he was defrauded of his right. He went in for residential manhood suffrage, for free education, for which he would apply the Church revenues and the misused charities. He was opposed to all indirect taxation, and advocated what had been described as equality of sacrifice in general and local taxation—that was, he would have a graduated income tax, and, in no case, tax the necessaries of life. In conclusion he said he hoped Mr. Chamberlain would succeed Mr. Gladstone as Prime Minister, and as for the Whigs they were welcome to go over to the Tories. He would not refuse to accept Lord Hartington, if he elected to fight under the Radical party, but he would refuse to sink his own personal opinions for any one."[1]
[1] Times, October 15, 1885.
(JUNE, 1885—DECEMBER, 1885)
Mr. Labouchere was not only a zealous friend and advocate of the Irish members in Parliament, but a variety of circumstances conspired with his own aptitudes to constitute him an unofficial ambassador between conflicting parties in the House, and, in particular, between the Liberal Cabinet and the Nationalist leader. "His real influence," wrote Sir Henry Lucy recently, "was exercised beyond the range of the Speaker's eye. Nothing pleased him more than being engaged in the lobby, the smoking-room,[1] or a remote corner of the corridors, working out some little plot. By conviction a thorough Radical, such was the catholicity of his nature that he was on terms of personal intimacy with leaders of every section of party, not excepting those who sat on the Treasury Bench. He was one of the few men—perhaps the only man—whom Parnell treated with an approach to confidence. He watched the growth of the Fourth Party with something like paternal interest. Lord Randolph Churchill and he were inseparable. In these various episodes and connections he delighted to play the part of the friendly broker."[2] In this way, far more effectively than by formal speech or resolution, though here too he was untiring in the fight, he was able to use what is called "the personal factor in politics." And in his case the personal factor was no light weight. His extreme opinions, in which he had never wavered since the days when, as a young man, he had scornfully declined the succession to his uncle's peerage, secured him the confidence both of the Irish and of the left wing of the Liberals, while, by birth, education, and habit of life, he was the welcome intimate of men who sat on the other side of the House. Eton, Trinity, and the diplomatic service were an unusual training for an ultra-Radical and gave an attractive flavour of sacrilege to his views. No one appreciated this circumstance more than he did himself, and certainly no one could have put it out to better interest.
On June 8, 1885, a coalition of Tories and Irish defeated the Government by a majority of twelve. The occasion was an amendment moved by Sir Michael Hicks Beach during the second reading of the Budget Bill, condemning the increase of beer and spirit duties proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The combination between the Opposition and the Irish was due to information having been given by one of the Opposition leaders to the Irish party to the effect that the Tories, if returned to power, would not renew the Coercion Act, which would automatically expire in the following August.[3] Mr. Gladstone resigned the next day, and, after some delay, Lord Salisbury accepted office and formed his first administration. The new Viceroy, Lord Carnarvon, following the precedents of Lord Mulgrave in 1837 and Lord Clarendon in 1850, himself made the declaration of the Irish policy of the new Government. That policy was a complete renunciation of coercion. Ireland was to be governed by the ordinary law of the land. "My Lords, I do not believe that with honesty and single-mindedness of purpose on one hand, and with the willingness of the Irish people on the other, it is hopeless to look for some satisfactory solution of this terrible question. My Lords, these I believe to be the views and opinions of my colleagues." The "honesty and single-mindedness" of this piece of tactics were severely criticised by Mr. Chamberlain. "A strategic movement of that kind executed in opposition to the notorious convictions of the men who effected it, carried out for party purposes and party purposes alone, is the most flagrant instance of political dishonesty this country has ever known."
The Irish party were much impressed by the advances of the Conservatives, and when Lord Carnarvon arranged to meet Parnell in conversation on Irish affairs, in the course of which they discussed whether "some plan of constituting a Parliament in Dublin, short of the repeal of the Union, might not be devised and prove acceptable to Ireland,"[4] Parnell may be excused for having thought that salvation was to come from the Tories. Mr. Gladstone had not yet pronounced himself. The Liberal Government had imprisoned the Irish leader; its record in Ireland, with the exception of the Arrears Bill, was summed up in the word coercion. Liberal politicians were naturally upset at the new turn of events. Mr. Healy had written on May 25 to Mr. Labouchere saying that "apart from coercion, it was the policy of the Irish party to equalise all Liberals and Tories as much as possible pour nous faire valoir, so that the matter will have to be looked at by us apart from the renewal of coercion, though of course, I imagine, if we thought we could trust the Liberals to avoid obnoxious legislation and to stick to reform, we should support them strongly. But how can we have any guarantee of the kind?" Mr. Healy continues further on in the letter: "I think a little time in the cool of Opposition would do your party a world of good.... If we supported your party next time, the Lords would throw out or render worthless any Bill the Commons passed, and time has proved that the Whigs won't face the Lords. If that institution were abolished we should be great fools not to be friendlier with the Liberals, but they are almost powerless to help us, even if they were sincere, so long as the Lords are all-powerful." In a letter to Mr. Labouchere, dated July 18, Mr. Chamberlain made the following significant statement as to his feeling in the matter:
The present attitude of the Irish leaders is not at all encouraging to Radicals. They take no account whatever of our difficulties or of the extent to which we have, in the past, supported Irish claims, and now that a Tory Government is in office they are ready to accept from them with joy and gratitude the merest crumbs of consolation, while they reject with scorn and contumely the offers of further legislation which we have made. I think, under these circumstances, we must stand aside for the present. The Irish Members "must stew in their juice" with the Tories until they find out their mistake. Whether the support of the Radicals will still be forthcoming is a question. My information from the country satisfies me that further concessions to Irish opinion are not at all popular even with our Radical constituents, and, under all the circumstances, I am not unwilling to keep silence for a time and await the course of events.
The Parnellites, as I understand, cannot count upon two things:
First, on holding the balance after the next General Election. I am convinced that they are mistaken, and we shall have a majority over them and the Tories combined.
Secondly, they believe in the readiness of the Tories, under the stress of party exigency, to make concessions to them in the shape of Home Rule and otherwise, which even the Radicals are not prepared to agree to. In this, also, I am convinced they are mistaken. To whatever lengths Randolph Churchill may be willing to go, his party will not follow him so far, and, sooner or later, the Parnellites will find that they have been sold. I believe the experience will be a healthy one for them and for us.
The situation appealed strongly to Mr. Labouchere, and he took up the part of the "friendly broker" with zest. On July 22, he saw Mr. Healy and wrote the following account of his interview to Mr. Chamberlain:
Healy favoured me to his views during three hours to-day. I told him that we were sure to win without the Irish, but that if he and his friends wished for any sort of Home Rule, he must understand that his only chance was to ally himself with the Radicals and to support you. I said that I had tried to impress this upon Parnell, but that he talked rubbish about Grattan's Parliament, and seemed to me to be thoroughly impractical. Healy said that Parnell in his heart cared little for the Irish, particularly since a mob ill-treated him in 1880. He regretted to be obliged to admit that personal feeling actuated his leader's policy at times, but Parnell felt his dignity offended by his arrest and his present feeling was revenge on Gladstone and Forster.
I suggested a rebellion. But he said that this was impossible because the present policy of all Irishmen was hanging together, for they attributed all their troubles to divided councils. He said that Parnell is very astute. He generally finds out which way the feeling is amongst his followers before he suggests anything, but, in one or two cases, he has put his foot down, when he obtained his way.
I asked him about Davitt. He laughed at the idea of his being of any use to the Liberals. He is a very difficult man, he said, and a trouble to Parnell, who would like him to go against us openly, for this would smash him; he cares neither for Tories nor Radicals. If Parnell joined the latter he would coquette with the former and vice versa.
As regards the present situation he said that there never was anything which could be called a treaty with the Conservatives, but that there was an understanding that, if they helped the Tories to turn out the late Government, and generally supported them during the remainder of the Session, there was to be no coercion. "Churchill talks to us vaguely about Home Rule, but we do not pay much attention to this. We are now paying our debt that we have incurred." According to present arrangements, the Party is to put out a manifesto calling upon all Irish in England to vote solid for the Conservative candidates. This policy was adopted, he continued, in order to hold the balance. I went into figures to show him that we should win without the Irish, and said that the balance policy would only end in their tying themselves to a corpse.
He admitted that this was possible, and said that personally his sympathies were with the Radicals, but that it was impossible to trust the Liberal party, and to hope that the Liberal party could do anything even if they wished to, owing to the House of Lords. "No alliance," I said, "is worth anything which is not based upon mutual interest. We shall win at the election, but we shall have to count with the Whigs. The English electors will be indignant at your conduct, and we shall naturally take our revenge on you for your supporting the Tories. Now, if you would join us, we should be strong enough to hold our own against Whigs and Tories. We want your votes in the House of Commons; you will find that you will do nothing without ours. What do you say to Chamberlain's scheme of Home Rule in the Fortnightly? He said: "... there are ... some things that I object to in it, but Chamberlain could not carry it. Even if he got it through the House of Commons, the Lords would throw it out."[5]
Well, we went on discussing. At last he said: "Can we have any assurance that Chamberlain's scheme would be one on which a Radical or Liberal Ministry would stand or fall? Will Gladstone declare for it?" "What would you do if you could be certain of a big scheme forming part of the Liberal platform?" I asked. "Our party really is guided by about six men. What we decide," he said, "the others accept. I would propose that we do not compromise ourselves with the Tories, that we should issue no manifesto, leaving Irish electors to vote as they like. When the plan is put forth in the next Parliament, we should have to say that it does not go far enough, etc., but it might merely be a dummy opposition. Whether I could carry this I don't know, but I think that I could." ... Finally he said that he would be back at the commencement of August, and that, if any arrangement could be made, he would do his best to further it.
There are two points in your scheme that he wants modified, and these I will explain to you when I see you at the House, and you have a moment's spare time. He told me to tell you that those who wished that you should be ill received in Ireland would not have their way, and that you may count on a perfectly friendly reception.
This letter is long, but I thought that you would like to know Healy's ideas, as he is by far the most honest and ablest of the Irishmen.... It is all very well expecting to win the elections, but the Irish vote is an important factor, and if only we could square the eighty Irish in the House, and turn them into your supporters, Whigs and Tories would be dished. Certainly there is no love lost between the Allies. W. O'Brien, Healy told me, declines to speak to any of them, regarding them as intriguers with whom they are allied because of the Coercion Acts.
Mr. Healy wrote again to Mr. Labouchere on August 2, and his letter concluded with the following decisive words: "Of course, however, I should be bound by the majority, and would steadfastly carry out Parnell's policy, whatever it is declared by the Party to be."
On August 11, Parliament was prorogued and politicians soon began the campaign in the constituencies with a view to the General Election, which was to take place in November. Lord Salisbury had made the first bid for the Irish vote in a speech at the Mansion House on July 29, in which he defended Carnarvon's policy as the logical outcome of the Franchise Act of 1884. On August 24, Parnell made a very important speech at Dublin, in which he said that the Irish platform would consist of one plank only—legislative independence. The English press was roused to vehement denunciation. The Times said that an Irish Parliament was "impossible." The Standard besought Whigs and Tories "to present a firm uncompromising front to the rebel chief." The Daily Telegraph hoped that the House of Commons would not be seduced or terrified into surrender. The Manchester Guardian declared that Englishmen would "condemn or punish any party or any public man who attempted to walk in the path traced by Mr. Parnell." The Leeds Mercury did not think the question of an Irish Parliament worth discussing; while the Daily News felt that Great Britain could only be saved from the tyranny of Mr. Parnell by a "strong administration composed of advanced Liberals."[6] The right wing of the Liberals, represented by Lord Hartington, and the left by Mr. Chamberlain, both protested. Hartington, speaking on August 2, referred to Parnell's manifesto as "so fatal and mischievous a proposal." Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Warrington in the early days of September, said very definitely: "Speaking for myself, I say that if these and these alone are the terms on which Mr. Parnell's support is to be obtained, I will not enter into competition for it." The veteran leader, for the moment, was silent, having retired for repose and meditation to Norway. But though he said nothing himself, he stimulated others to speak. Mr. Barry O'Brien was approached in August by a well-known English publicist, who begged him to write some articles on the Irish question of a "historical and dispassionate nature." The publicist made this request "at the suggestion of a great man—in fact a very great man." The very great man was Mr. Gladstone. The first article was published in November under the title of "Irish Wrongs and English Remedies." On September 18 Mr. Gladstone issued the famous Hawarden Manifesto admitting the necessity for Home Rule.
Mr. Labouchere was busy all the autumn trying to get at the various shades of opinion prevalent among the Irish members. Michael Davitt was often a thorn in Parnell's side, and the following letter he wrote to Mr. Labouchere on October 9 is very interesting as indicating clearly the way in which the two patriots often came into collision:
There is a general impression among the rank and file of Irish Nationalists that the G.O.M. will come nearest to Parnell's demand. There is no English statesman more admired by the mass of the people, notwithstanding what United Ireland and platform speakers may say to the contrary. But the priests and bishops would rather have the Tory party attempt the solution of the Home Rule problem, owing to the fact of the Conservatives being in favour of Denominational Education. Men like Healy, strange to say, are also pro-Tory in this respect, as they fear that if Chamberlain and his party become dominant, the Radical or democratic element in the Irish Nationalist movement will be able to settle the Land question on more advanced lines than those of the Parliamentary party. In fact we have Tory Nationalists and democratic Nationalists in our ranks, and the latter would like to see men like Chamberlain, Morley, and yourself in a position to arrange the Anglo-Irish difficulty. Parnell's attitude on Protection is absurd. If we had a National Assembly in Dublin to-morrow, he could not carry a measure in favour of Protection. Three-fourths of our people live by agriculture, and these want to export their surplus produce, and would, beyond doubt, be in favour of Free Trade. Since Parnell's Arklow speech I have more than once attacked Protection, and, in his recent Wicklow pronouncement, he considerably modified his views on the question. How singular that the volunteers in Grattan's time demanded Free Trade from England, and that England squelched our manufactures by—Protection!
I wish to Heaven Chamberlain had not made that Warrington "30 to 4" speech of his. He has played into the hands of the Tory Nationalists.
Have you read my suggestions about a possible modus vivendi between England and Ireland in the concluding chapter of my book? Parnell took his One Chamber idea from it. There is no room for a Custom House in my simple plan, and the Irish people would jump at such a scheme of self-government, while every soldier now in Ireland might be removed without any danger to the integrity of the Empire, if such a plan of settlement were adopted....
No more vivid light can be thrown on Mr. Labouchere's political activities at this period than is derived from his letters. He was in communication with all parties. The following selection from his correspondence illustrates the delicacy and importance of the negotiations with which he was concerned. The most interesting of these letters are undoubtedly those exchanged between himself and Mr. Chamberlain. In them we see clearly enough what was the main interest of Mr. Labouchere's life at this time. I have already pointed out how completely he subordinated all other political questions to his wide-reaching plans for the Radicalisation first of the Liberal party and secondly of the country. Irish or Egyptian or South African politics were but pawns in his game. In this correspondence we see how that dominant interest came to be identified in his mind with Mr. Chamberlain himself. His frank admiration of and political devotion to Mr. Chamberlain may be read between the lines of all his letters. A note that may almost be called pathetic creeps into the later letters, when he has realised at last that his glorious schemes are going to be frustrated by the man on whom he had so completely relied for their success. The dramatic quality of some of the letters is intense. The angel wrestles with Jacob and knows it is in vain.
Mr. T. M. Healy to Mr. Labouchere
DUBLIN, Oct. 15, 1885.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,—A number of us had a long chat with Parnell on Saturday, and he seems quite confident that whether Liberals or Tories get in, Home Rule will be granted. I quite agree that, if the Tories get in with our votes and are kept in by our help, they will come to terms, but I am not at all so sure that if the Liberals get in they would have the courage (even if they had the will—did we oppose them) to face the question.
It is no use discussing our attitude from any other than the expediency standpoint. We have to make the best fight we can for a small country, and clearly, if we could put the Tories in and hold them dependent on us, that is our game. With the House of Lords behind them and our help, they could play ducks and drakes with the Union, were they so minded. I confess, however, I am so ignorant of the English campaign that I don't find myself able to speculate on the outcome of the ballot box, but I can hardly believe that there is much prospect of the Liberals being beaten. What you have not touched upon in any letter to me is the point which always ghosts me—if the Liberals bring in a bold scheme how will they overcome the House of Lords? You must remember that the Tories would then raise the anti-Irish cry and the Lords would be in no unpopular position in rejecting a scheme which they would allege meant dismemberment. Of course, if the Liberals then promised to dissolve, it is hard to believe that with our support they would not win, but it must be remembered that Liberals are not united in our favour, and though Mr. Gladstone could keep them together, yet men like Hartington and Harcourt would secretly sympathise with the Tories, and would certainly not show enthusiasm in rallying the constituencies on an Irish cry. I don't believe a bit in principle being of any account with English parties. Look at the way Chamberlain spoke of Ireland when he was baulked of coming over. Read—to take a minor creature—Osborne Morgan's speeches. Mr. Gladstone is the only one who has shown no bitterness and has kept the controversy in what the Germans call the heitern regionen wo die reinen formen wohnen. Of course I admit that we have given great cause for bitterness, but I maintain that we could not have fought successfully in any other style, whereas the English, with their bayonets to rely on, need not grudge us Billingsgate—though certainly we have not been allowed the exclusive use of this feeble weapon.
I was glad to read Childers' speech, which produced an excellent impression here by its moderation and practicalness. With regard to a plan, Parnell asked Sexton and myself to try and draw up something, but we were so busy—that without a good library, which we have not here, easily available, the task is appalling. Parnell's idea is to abolish the Lord Lieutenancy, strike a financial balance between the two countries, giving, as our Imperial quota, an average on ten years' returns of Irish contributions with the cost of ruling Ireland deducted. This would get rid of the Irish Parliament voting or refusing supplies, as the sum would be a fixed one, and if we did not pay it we could very easily be compelled. He would be for retaining the Irish members at Westminster, and I suppose there would not be much trouble in the arrangement being made in that case, that they should be summoned by the Speaker to debate affairs which he declared Imperial or Irish, and in the English Legislature taking them at a particular period of the Session for the sake of convenience. I think we should have full power over everything here except the Army and the Navy, as I cannot see what other interest England has here. If we pay her a due taxation, what possible care of hers is it how else we order our affairs? As for the minority, the Protestants would soon realise they were safe with the Catholics (and they would be the pets of our people). Let there be, by all means, every guarantee given for their protection however. If the Tories come in they would give us Protection, I am sure, but would stipulate for terms for the landlords.—Faithfully yours,
T. M. HEALY.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, Oct. 18, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—Just before the end of the Session Herbert Gladstone came to me, and asked me to endeavour to arrange some sort of modus vivendi with the Irish. His father, he said, required time, if any joint action was to be taken in the next Parliament, to gain over the Whigs, and he was determined not to lead unless he had a united party behind him. I told Herbert Gladstone that I was convinced that Parnell, for various reasons, did not want an arrangement and that he would prefer to remain an irreconcilable, but that it might be possible to influence him through Healy and others. So I sent to Healy, who came over to England. Healy explained that personally he was strongly in favour of an arrangement, but that any one going against Parnell would be nowhere just now, because the Irish had got it into their heads that union was strength. But he promised to do all that he could. Then I went abroad. On my return Herbert wrote to ask what had been done. Healy replied that a Committee consisting of Sexton, T. P. O'Connor, etc., had been appointed to look into federations generally, and to report thereon, but that Parnell hardly spoke to his followers upon political matters, beyond such as concerned the Irish elections, and he went into various details as to what he thought would prove satisfactory. This letter I sent to Hawarden, and got back a letter stating the views of the G.O.M., the phrase being always "I" or "I think my father" as had been agreed. The G.O.M. says that he is disposed to grant the fullest Home Rule etc., but that he does not think it is desirable to formulate a scheme before the elections, and he again presses for the Irish minimum. I have sent this to Healy. Evidently the game of the G.O.M. is to endeavour to unite the Party on Irish Legislation, and to make that his cheval de bataille; but he says that he will do nothing unless he can get some assurance that the Irish will in the main back him up. I don't think that they will, but, with such strange creatures, there is no knowing.
I spent yesterday morning with our friend Randolph. He says that the Conservatives count upon 280 returns in their favour, and that if they get anything like this they will not resign, and they hope to remain in office for two or three years, owing to the coalition between the Whigs, the Irish, and the Radicals. He says that Hartington, who up to now has been very guarded in his observations, now in private denounces you, and vows that he will not stand it. In his (Randolph's) opinion, he will withdraw from politics. If he does not, Randolph anticipates that the outcome will be an Aberdeen Ministry. Randolph looks very ill, though he says that he is pretty well. He is taking digitalis for his heart, and says that he is certain that the late hours in the House of Commons will knock him up....
What is the real feeling in the country I do not know, but I have in the last fortnight attended some of the meetings of the nonentities who are contesting the Metropolitan Constituencies, and here you are first and the rest nowhere. The Whigs seem to have disappeared entirely. My impression is that they have all gone over to the Conservatives, and that the Whig leaders are—if the country is to be judged by the metropolis—entirely without followers. When you allude to Goschen there are groans, when you allude to Hartington there is silence; and you have to get up a cheer for the G.O.M. by dwelling upon his noble heart and that sort of trash. I think, however, that the Conservatives will gain more seats in London than we anticipate.
By the way, I do not think that the alliance of Randolph with the Irish is going on very smoothly. He complained to me that it was impossible to trust Parnell, and that the Maamtrasna business had been sprung as a surprise. Before the Conservatives came in, Parnell told me that he would support the Conservatives on no Coercion Bill, a scheme for buying out the landlords, and money expended in further works. No sooner were they in than he told me that the feeling in Ireland was so strong for Home Rule that it must be pushed forward. My own experience of Parnell is that he never makes a bargain without intending to get out of it, and that he has either a natural love of treachery, or considers that promises are not binding when made to a Saxon....
Would it not be possible to have one grand Bill for local government in both islands, and settling the difference between local and Imperial Sessions. It might be made so as to oblige English Conservatives to oppose it in their own interests, and sufficiently strong to make it difficult for the Irish to reject it on the second reading?—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere
HIGHBURY, BIRMINGHAM, Oct. 20, 1885.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,—Thanks for your most interesting letter, which confirms my suspicions as to the intentions of our great chief. I was led to them in the first instance by the speeches of H. G. at Leeds—he is generally inspired, I think. Mr. G. himself was cautious with me at Hawarden, though he did not conceal that his present interest was in the Irish question, and he seemed to think that a policy for dealing with it might be found which would unite us all and which would necessarily throw into the background those minor points of difference about the schools and small holdings which threaten to drive the Whigs into the arms of the Tories or into retirement. But I agree with you that the modus vivendi cannot be found. First, because all Liberals are getting weary of making concessions to Parnell, and will not stand much more of it, and secondly, because Parnell cannot be depended on to keep any bargain. I believe, therefore, that Mr. G.'s plans will come to naught.
I hope Randolph Churchill is all out in his calculations. I do not give the Tories more than 200. Of course the future depends on the result of the Elections, but my impression is that Hartington will yield, grumbling as usual, but still yielding.
The effect of the campaign I have just completed has surprised me. I really had no idea at first of giving more than a "friendly lead" to candidates in the new constituencies. The idiotic opposition of the Whigs and the abuse of the Tories has turned my gentle hint into a great national policy—and now it must be forced on at all hazards. The majority of new County candidates are pledged to it—ditto Scotch members, ditto London. In Lancashire it is not so strong, as there are signs of rebellion in the constituencies against the half-hearted orders of the local Caucus.
I fear we cannot run English and Irish Local Government in one Bill—the present conditions are so absolutely dissimilar—but we will consider this again, if we have the opportunity. I am glad to say there is a good chance that Goschen will be defeated at Edinburgh. The working men are dead against him.
On the whole I am satisfied with the outlook. The first difficulty is to find fellow-workers: the rank and file are all right, but there is an awful lack of Generals, and even of non-commissioned officers.—Yours very truly,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, Oct. 20, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—I send you enclosed to look at.[7] I have forwarded copy to Healy. Evidently the G.O.M. is getting a little anxious about the Election, and is now trying to persuade the Parnellites that they must try and get pledges from the Conservatives, because he knows that they cannot. As he says, the Land question is the difficulty, because he is not prepared to admit that its regulation in Ireland is involved in Local Government, and that it in no way affects the integrity of the Empire, whether land in Kilkenny belongs to this man or that. I have pointed out to Healy that the difficulty might perhaps be turned by supporting your plan of compulsory purchase by local authorities in both islands, and I have explained to him the meaning of a fair price—viz. such an amount as would give the landlord the same net income in consols or Government bonds, as he gets now from his land, or ought to get, and I have urged upon him that if such a Bill were passed, and if there were Home Rule in Ireland, the Irish might surely make things so uncomfortable to the landlords that they would be glad to clear out for very little.
Would it not be a good plan to have one grand Bill, coupling together local self-government here, and Home Rule in Ireland? We should in that way get the Irish votes for England, and if the portions of the Bill really do give substantial Home Rule in Ireland, I greatly doubt whether the Irish would venture to vote against the second reading. They might develop their views and swagger in Committee. If this Bill were coupled with another on your lines respecting land, the two questions could be solved, or your purchase claims might form part of the Bill. At the bottom of the difficulty is the G.O.M. He still hankers first after the Whigs, and is not sound on the land question..., and is bent upon that difficult task of making oil and water combine. Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere
HIGHBURY, BIRMINGHAM, Oct. 23, 1885.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,—My last letter has partly anticipated yours of 21st. I return H. G.'s communication. He has apparently his father's capacity for mystification, for I cannot possibly make out what he is really driving at.
Does he imagine that the Tories can be committed beforehand to support a small Liberal majority in some scheme of advanced Local Govt.?
He must be an ingenuus puer. For my part I believe in leaving the Irishmen to "stew in their own juice." My proposal is the maximum that English Radicals will stand and a great deal more than the Whigs will accept. It had practically been agreed to by Parnell, and yet he threw it over at the last moment. It is impossible to depend on him and it is much better policy now to play the waiting game. If Randolph is right we shall be the better for not being pledged.
I am sure, however, that he is wrong, but even then we shall be much stronger in negotiation when we have a majority at our backs.
If the G.O.M. were ill-advised enough to propose a separate Parliament, he will find very little support from any section of the party.—Yours very truly,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, Nov. 12, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—This is the last communication from Healy, which he wants sent to the G.O.M. So I send it through the usual channel. After saying that he will do his best for Lefevre, he says:
"It is very difficult for us to adopt a piecemeal policy, although it certainly is the intention to issue instructions that in regard to half a dozen Liberals, they shall be supported at all hazards, but so far as I can gather the working of Parnell's mind up to the present, it is not certain that he will go against the Liberals bald-headed, if at all. T. P. O'Connor is strong for supporting the Tories. If we could have an understanding with the leaders, it would settle this and every other question. It seems to me curious that we are now to be asked to define our demands, on a question on which English Statesmen do not need much instruction, seeing that in 1881, when the agrarian question was certainly complicated, nobody dreamed of asking our opinion, but on the contrary the beauty of the measure was that it was supposed to be disapproved by the Nationalists. I cannot, therefore, help feeling that this demand for a plan from us is simply a desire for our discomfort, and the profit of the English. If there is really earnestness in the Liberal Party next Session (should they be in a majority) to settle the Irish question, I do not think they will find us unreasonable. God knows it is time we were at peace, but if they insist on forcing on us a Bill, which we denounce, and which we shall wreck in the working, the contest between the two countries will grow more aggravated than ever. Spencer and Forster were hit a thousand times more than Trevelyan, and yet they never went pushing about, spitting gall as he has done. The G.O.M. is the father of them all, and I do urge him to develop a little the lines of his first speech which I have just read."
And then he goes into a puff of the G.O.M.'s Article against Darwin, which, it seems, delights the Roman Catholics.
Could you not give them a few smooth words in a speech, particularly in regard to land. They have taken it into their silly heads that you are now their enemy, and as they have eighty votes it is just as well to clear this illusion away.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, Nov. 16, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—This is the proposal to the Irish, which I forward.[8] It is in reply to Healy's last communication. You will see that the question of the land etc., being under the control of the Irish Chamber, is shirked.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere
HIGHBURY, BIRMINGHAM, Nov. 22, 1885.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,—You see, Parnell has gone against the Liberals. I felt certain he would. He has been playing with those around him and has intentionally deceived some of his own friends. I really think he will force us all, Radicals and Liberals, to reject all arrangements with him. If we had a good Speaker with dictatorial powers he could stop Irish obstruction and P.'s power in Ireland would be shaken as soon as the people saw he was impotent in Parliament.
We are having a much harder fight than we expected. I think we shall win all our seats here, but it is a hard pull. The Tories are very confident and are regaining courage in the counties. My hope is that the labourers will lie courageously—promise to the Tories and vote for us....—Yours very truly,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, Nov. 25, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—That undaunted sportsman the G.O.M. is still hankering after the Irish and his general scheme of pacification. I get a letter from Rosebery every day, asking for this and that information. I have written to say that if the Liberals get a majority, it may be possible to negotiate, but that at present it is a mere waste of time to try anything.
We have been losing for a very clear reason. You put forward a good Radical programme. This would have taken. But no sooner had you put it forward than Hartington and others denounced it. Then the G.O.M. proposed that any question should be shunted to the dim and distant future, and that all should unite to bring him back to power, with a Coalition Ministry—in fact the old game which had already resulted in shilly shally. I think the inhabitants of towns have shown their wisdom in preferring even the Conservatives to this. I want to find the people on our side, who are against disestablishment. Some Peers and leaders are, but the masses go for it. They are simply sulky at being told that everything must knock under to Peers and Whigs. This is how I read the elections. Our only hope now is in the "cow," and here too I am afraid that the Whigs will have thrown cold water on all enthusiasm. I am not myself particularly sorry at what is occurring. A year or two of opposition will be far better—from the Radical standpoint—than a Cabinet with a Whig majority in it. With all the elements of disintegration, we surely shall be able to render Conservative legislation impossible, and to force on a dissolution very soon, when your Caucus must come out with a clear and definite programme. Milk may be good for babes, but Whig milk will not do for electors. The Whigs have dished themselves, thank God. Even Gladstone's name goes for little at public meetings. Yours is the only one which makes any one stand up and cheer.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, Dec. 1, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—I quite agree with you. But would it not be well to make it clear that the Election was run on the Whig and not on the Tory Programme?[9]
I should imagine that the Irish will come round. The aim of the Conservatives will be to keep in a short time with their aid, then to quarrel with them, and to seek to hold their own against the Irish and the Radicals by a combination with the Whigs. This scheme Randolph Churchill explained to me a short time ago. If G.O.M. still hankers after an alliance with the Irish, it may be possible to arrange one, which would cause a split between him and his Whig friends. He was always wanting to know as soon as possible what could be effected, because he said that he wanted time to gain over some of his late colleagues.
I am not the least surprised at results. Putting aside the Irish vote and bad times, was it likely that there would be great enthusiasm for a cause, which was explained to be to relegate everything of importance to the dim distant future, and to unite in order to bring back to power the old lot, with all their doubts and hesitations, under a leader who was always implying, without meaning it, that he meant to retire?—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
SIGN MANSIONS, BRIGHTON, Dec. 3, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—This afternoon I got a telegram from Randolph to say he was coming down, and I have had him here all the evening.
He says (but don't have it from me) that, if a vote of want of confidence is not proposed, they will adjourn for three weeks after the Speaker is chosen. If they have a majority with the Irish, he says that they are inclined to throw their Speaker as a sop to the Irish, and evidently he has a scheme in his head to get Hicks-Beach elected Speaker, and to take his place himself.
He told me that he had given in a memorandum to Lord Salisbury about the state of parties in the House of Commons, in which he puts down Hartington as worth 200 votes, and you for the balance. They intend to give a non possumus to all proposals for Home Rule, and they expect to be supported by Hartington, even if the G.O.M. goes for Home Rule. Salisbury is ready to resign the Premiership to Hartington if necessary, and the new Party is to be called the "Coalition Party." It appears that the G.O.M. (but this I have vowed not to tell) has given in to the Queen a scheme of Home Rule, with a sort of Irish President at the head, who is to be deposed by the Queen and Council, if necessary.
Should they not be turned out, they will at once start a discussion on Procedure.
Is not the cow working wonders for us? Next time we must have an urban cow.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere
HIGHBURY, BIRMINGHAM, Dec. 4, 1885.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,— ... The "urban cow" is the great difficulty. I put my money on free schools, but, judging by London, the electors do not care much about it.
Things are going better for us. I was forced to speak yesterday at Leicester, and you will see I had a dig at the Whigs. I will drive the knife in on the 17th.
Surely Hartington will not be such a fool as to make a coalition. If he is inclined that way I should be happy to give him a lift. It would be the making of the Radical party.
If the Tories go against Peel they will irritate Hartington and the Moderates. I don't care a straw either way.
I should warmly support any proposals for amendment of Procedure which gave more power to the majority.—Yours truly,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
P.S.—We must keep the Tories in for some time. If R. Churchill will not play the fool, I certainly should not be inclined to prefer a weak Liberal or Coalition Government to a weak Tory one. His best policy is to leave us to deal with the Whigs and not to compel us to unite the party against the Tories.—Yours,
J.C.
Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere
HIGHBURY, BIRMINGHAM, Dec. 7, 1885.
DEAR LABOUCHERE,— ... The G.O.M. is very anxious to come in again. I am not, and I think we must sit on his Irish proposals. It will require a careful steering to keep the Radical boat head to the wind.—Yours very truly,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
Foljambe is out, for which I am devoutly thankful. There goes another Moderate Liberal and Hartington's speech did not help him. I hope E. Cavendish will go too. He is not safe.
Mr. T. M. Healy to Mr. Labouchere
DUBLIN, Dec. 7, 1885.
MY DEAR L.,—Thanks for your postings. As far as I can make out your party will be in a minority of 5 or 6 when all is over a couple of days hence. We shall have 86 in our party. I have not seen Parnell for over a fortnight and know nothing of his mind except that I think it significant he should have told his interviewer that he expected Home Rule from the Liberals. This, of course may have been a hint to prick up Salisbury, and it remains to be seen how it will work. But in my opinion we have no course but to turn out the Tories. Eighteen of their men are Irish, who would oppose tooth and nail every concession to us, and as they would vote against their own party on H. R. (supposing "Barkis is willing") that would count 36 against them, which, of course, would hardly be made up to them by Liberal votes, as your party, with three or four exceptions, would stand coldly aside and rejoice to see them and us, combined, put in a minority. Looking at the matter in the most cynical manner, therefore, I don't see what P. can do but put out the Conservatives. With us you would have such an immense majority that you could spare the desertion of a score of rats amongst the Whigs, while many of the Borough Conservatives who owe their seats to us might abstain from a H. R. division.
As to the means of putting them out, I assume, if we were agreed as to terms, that it would be easy to move an amendment to the Address which we could support. Whether this should have relation directly to Ireland is a matter for the strategists of your party to consider, as while it would suit our book perfectly it might not rally all your men and might lead to inconvenient debate. It would, however, look odd in us, after denouncing you so bitterly, to put you in straightway on some by-issue, not in relation to self-government, and, moreover, as we should be strictly "dark horses" as to which side we should support, an Irish amendment would have the advantage of extracting from ministers certain expressions or promises in order to fetch us, which could be made great capital out of afterwards by you. Without having thought deeply on the strategical aspect of the situation, it occurs to me that the best thing would be to have an understanding with the Liberals and "play" the Government for a few weeks with the Irish fly to see would it rise, without actually landing them. Both you and we would then get time to see their programme and how their party swallowed it—so as to corner them afterwards.
It is clear no scheme of Home Rule can be carried through the Lords without a dissolution, and then, with our help, you could have a majority of 200 over the Tories. But we should have a good registration of Voters' Bill passed first and some amendments of the Ballot Act. I think your people should at once get into touch with Parnell. He went to England this morning and should be seen by some one from your side. I agree with you that Mr. Gladstone alone can settle the Irish question. He is the only man with head and heart for the task, and the only man who can reduce to decency the contemptible cads who so largely composed the last Liberal party. I thank God that so many of the howlers and gloaters over our sufferings have met their fate at the polls.—Yours,
T. M. HEALY.
Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain
BRIGHTON, Dec. 8, 1885.
MY DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—I have just got a letter from Herbert Gladstone, which I have sent on to Healy.[10]...
I have replied that it is very questionable whether any sort of arrangement can be come to with Parnell, but that, if so, it will be necessary for "Herbert" to explain precisely "logical issues and solid facts"—or, in other words, to let us have the maximum of concession.
I doubt Parnell agreeing to any scheme which "Herbert" may propose, their views are so divergent. But suppose that he does —would it not be well to use the G.O.M. to settle this question and get it out of the way. If he agrees with Parnell, he will not agree long with his Whig friends. So soon as the Irish question is over, something might be done to separate the Whigs entirely from the Radicals—or at least something to cause the G.O.M. to begin those ten years of probation which he requires before meeting his Maker.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. T. M. Healy to Mr. Labouchere
DUBLIN, Dec. 10, 1885.
MY DEAR L.,—Better try, would a letter to Parnell at 9 Palace Chambers, Westminster, find him, and ask him to make an appointment with you. There is no necessity to refer him to the correspondence that has taken place, but tell what you feel in a position to say on behalf of your party leaders. He must see that Gladstone must come in if we are to get anything, and the only thing I see to be settled is the ritual to be observed in bowing the Government out. I presume he will move an amendment to the Address, unless he has some satisfactory pledge from Salisbury, which I don't believe, and I don't believe in the power of Salisbury or anybody else to throw dust in Parnell's eyes. "Hard cash"[11] or a Catholic University won't bait the Tory hook for us to swallow. I'm for the whole hog or none. I think it would be important if we could have some understanding as to the procedure, we, in the opinion of your leaders, should adopt as to the terms of an amendment to the Address. They might prefer it should be one they could speak on and not support, or both support and speak on. The latter seems most convenient in case it is thought better to turn the Government out immediately, so as to allow of the re-election of the new Ministers. My view, however, is (and it is not a strong one, because I have not heard the arguments contra) that it would be better to keep the Tories in a little for the reasons previously given, and also for the additional one that once they accept our help they will all be tarred with the Irish brush, and cannot afterwards complain of your party accepting an alliance by which they are not ashamed to profit. "Sour Grapes" would then be a complete answer to them in opposition.
The stupidity of men like Harcourt calling us "Fenians" is inconceivable. Personally I should not object to the epithet, which I regard by no means an ignoble one, but I can well forecast the use Churchill would make of it in opposition with Sir William in power by grace of the "Fenian" vote. "The Gods themselves fight in vain against stupidity."
If you exercise any control over the Daily News, it ought to keep your party straight by purging it of the rancour of defeat. Swear at us in private as much as you like, but avoid flinging bricks of the boomerang make. The Daily News calling the Anglo-Irish voters "clots of turbid intrigue" must have cost you a trifle at the polls. We can slang you de droit because we are powerless and irresponsible, but a governing body shall go "all delicately marching in most pellucid air." Excuse the philosophy!—Yours,
T. M. HEALY.
Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere
40 PRINCE'S GARDENS, S. W., Dec. 11, 1885.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,—There is much in what you say, but the fear is that anything like a bargain with the Irish would be resented by the English and Scotch workmen and that a Tory-Whig Coalition appealing to their prejudices against a Radical-Parnellite alliance would carry all before them then. This is a real danger. I am convinced, from personal observation, that the workmen will not stand much more in the way of Irish conciliation or concessions to Parnell.
I am clear that we had better bide our time and rub the Tories' noses well in the mess they have made. Till the 16th.—Yours,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
Mr. Parnell to Mr. Labouchere
IRISH PARLIAMENTARY OFFICES,
LONDON, S. W., Dec. 17, 1885.
DEAR LABOUCHERE,—I have only just opened your letters, as I have not been in London for some time. I will try and give you notice the next time I am in town, but my present impression is that it would be better to await events, and see what attitude the two English Parties may take towards each other at the commencement of the new Parliament.—Yours sincerely,