A new era in battleship design, not only for the British Navy, but for the navies of the entire world, was opened with the advent of the Dreadnought. As has been seen, it was in a way led up to by previous designs, notably the Lord Nelson class. The essential point of difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the Lord Nelson carries heavy guns of two calibres, in the Dreadnought the main armament is confined to one calibre only. The advantages of this on paper are not particularly great, but for practical purposes, such as fire control and so forth, the superiority to be obtained by a uniformity of big gun armament is tremendous.

As the historical portion of this book indicates, the “Dreadnought idea” has been a fairly regular feature of British Naval Policy, but in this particular case the inception would seem to have been due to accident and circumstance rather than to any settled policy.

Immature and abortive attempts to realise something of the “Dreadnought ideal” had taken place in the past. The earliest ship claimed to represent the Dreadnought ideal was the U.S. Roanoake, built at the time of the Civil War. This was a high freeboard ship, fitted with three turrets in the centre line. A few years later something of the same sort found expression in the four-turreted British Royal Sovereign and Prince Albert, though these were merely coast defence ships. Still later in the Tchesma class, Russian, and in the Brandenburg class of the German Navy, six big guns were installed as the primary armament. Both these two ideas were laughed out of existence; and it became a settled fashion to carry four big guns, two forward and two aft.

Matters were at this stage when the late “Colonel” Cuniberti, Constructor to the Italian Navy, conceived the idea of a ship carrying a considerable number of big guns, and embodying in herself the power of two or three normal battleships. This design was considered altogether too ambitious for the Italian Navy; but permission was given him to publish the general idea, subject to official revision. It first saw the light in “Fighting Ships,” in 1903, and is now so historically interesting that I here reproduce the article in full, the original being long since out of print:—

“Admiral Sir John Hopkins, late Controller of the British Navy, in his admirable article, ‘Intermediates for the British Fleet,’ published in the last edition (1902) of this Annual, asks what results it would be possible to obtain in the British Navy by extending the ideas of the two Italian Ministers of Marine, Admiral Morin and Admiral Bettolo, which were translated into fact in the Vittorio Emanuele III (12,625 tons), so as to arrive at the much greater tonnage of recent British battleships, in the same manner as the ideas that found concrete form in the projected vessels of the Amalfi class were amplified and realised in the Italian battleships alluded to and regarding which, even now, so many doubts are expressed as to such realisation being practicable.

“To proceed from 8,000 to 12,000, and from 12,000 to 17,000 tons of displacement, constitutes not only a problem of naval architecture, but also involves high considerations of quite another nature, such as the special functions of the Fleet, so as to harmonise with the political objects of any given maritime Power, the geographical position of that Power, the state of its finances, etc., etc. So that not only does the answer to such a question entail a certain amount of difficulty from the constructive point of view, but before the answer can be seriously considered it is absolutely necessary to determine exactly what end this ideal British battleship is to serve; for it is not to be imagined that we are going merely to enlarge the Vittorio Emanuele until we arrive at a displacement equal to that of the King Edward VII. For example, putting an extra 4,000 tons on board will produce a vessel that will perhaps be a little steadier in heavy weather than the original ship.

“In Britain are to be found naval experts of the highest possible order, and they will have their own ideas as to what type of vessels best fulfil the needs and ideals of the British Fleet, so that it would almost appear a presumption on my part to offer suggestions for any Navy other than the Italian. But in deference to the courteous interrogation of Admiral Hopkins I may be permitted to point out that from the purely human point of view there are two leading methods by which one can strike to the ground one’s opponent, either by gradually developing the attack and disposing of him little by little, or, on the other hand, killing him at one blow without causing him prolonged suffering. In like manner there are two distinct modes of sending an enemy’s ship to the bottom.

“Let us take, for example, a human combat. The first—the most commonly used, and the most practical in the majority of cases—has as its basis the progressive dismemberment of the enemy.

“Two mortal foes place themselves on guard at a distance; they begin with exceptional strokes, with feints, with opportune advances and retreats, never coming to close quarters for a deadly blow until the capabilities of the enemy, both offensive and defensive, are well tested, and until some fortunate stroke, even although not actually deadly, has considerably weakened the foe, has rendered his defence less able, and has somewhat demoralised him. Covered with blood, stunned, mutilated, and hardly capable of remaining on his feet, then comes the moment when his adversary closes in upon him and delivers the final and mortal blow. And we may almost imagine we hear the beaten one, with thick and choking voice, repeat the terrible words of Francesco Ferruccio at the battle of Gavinana: ‘Maramaldo, thou but killest a man already dead!’

“Similarly, two opposing ships, with but slight differences in their powers, will commence their combat at a great distance, utilising their evolutionary abilities and their speed in prudent manœuvres, seeking to gain as much advantage as possible from their offensive powers, and attempting to place every obstacle in the way of the antagonist utilising powers in either direction. The discharge of projectiles will commence in earnest, greatly assisted by the rapid loading of which the guns of medium and small calibre are now capable. What results can reasonably be expected from the discharge of the smaller guns at such great distances is hard to say; nor can the slender expectation of, let us say, chancing to hit the captain of the opposing ship in the eye with a lucky shot, at all justify such a waste of ammunition. Gradually nearing one another, the ships manœuvring less freely, hits will become more dangerous; the boats that were not set adrift before the action began will be alight and burning fiercely; the cowls of the wind trunks, the funnels, and the masts will be in fragments.

“The crew, wounded and reduced in numbers, will have lost their calm, and consequently the firing will have become wilder; finally, one of the two antagonists will get in a lucky shot that will disable the other. She will speedily become unmanageable, and her enemy will as speedily close into within the thousand metres which will permit of a torpedo being launched with every chance of success, or the battle may be concluded by a final rush and the point of the ram.

“As the wounded hull sinks slowly beneath the waves, the flag which had put such heart into the crew, and the sight of which had spurred them to fight to the last, may well seem as it disappears to repeat to the enemy these sad words, ‘Thou but slayest one already dead.’

“Four ships in place of two, eight in place of four, will repeat in a perhaps more complex action the same phases of attack, and the same foolish waste of ammunition, which in these days causes the greatest preoccupation of those who, having to design warships, must decide on the quantity of ammunition and projectiles provided for each different calibre of the armament.

“There is, however, another method of fighting and sending your enemy to the bottom; but it is one that is capable of adoption only by a Navy at the same time most potent and very rich.

“Let us imagine a vessel whose armour is so well distributed and so impervious as to be able to resist all the attacks of an enemy’s artillery with the exception of the projectiles of the 12-inch guns. Such a ship could approach her enemy without firing a shot, without wasting a single round of ammunition, absolutely regardless of all the scratchings that her antagonist might inflict on the exterior of her armour plates.

“And as to-day the belts of fighting ships are generally of such thickness that, when we leave the results of the proving ground and come to the conditions of actual combat, we find that it would be more than difficult to penetrate them with 6-inch guns, we see at once that it would be useless to equip our contemplated ship with such artillery.

“Further, if this ideal vessel which we have imagined to be so potently armoured is also very swift, and of a speed greater than that of a possible antagonist, she could not only prevent this latter from getting away, but also avail herself of her superiority in this respect for choosing the most convenient position for striking the belt of the enemy in the most advantageous manner.

“For this swift vessel a numerous and uniform armament of 8-inch guns, such as was contemplated for the Amalfi class,27 would appear to be sufficient, if we had only to consider the penetration at right angles of modern belts, especially if capped projectiles are adopted.

“If, however, the hit is an oblique one, and the distance is considerable, it appears necessary that we should adopt the calibre of 12-inch if we want to be absolutely certain of sinking the adversary, striking him only on the belt. But the loading of such guns is as yet very slow, although it has been greatly improved of late. Besides, the number of hits that one can get in on to the belt itself is small. From this it appears that in our ideal and intensely powerful ship we must increase the number of pieces of 12-inch so as to be able to get in at least one fatal shot on the enemy’s belt at the water-line before she has a chance of getting a similar fortunate stroke at us from one of the four large pieces now usually carried as the main armament.

“We thus have outlined for us the main features of our absolutely supreme vessel—with medium calibres abolished—so effectually protected as to be able to disregard entirely all the subsidiary armament of an enemy, and armed only with twelve pieces of 12-inch. Such a ship could fight in the second method we have delineated, without throwing away a single shot, without wasting ammunition. Secure in her exuberant protection with her twelve guns ready, she would swiftly descend on her adversary and pour in a terrible converging fire at the belt.

“Having disposed of her first antagonist, she would at once proceed to attack another, and almost untouched, to despatch yet another, not throwing away a single round of her ammunition, but utilising all for sure and deadly shots. A large and abundant supply of 12-inch projectiles and ammunition can be provided, in addition to the belt and guns contemplated, out of the 4,500 tons of increase of displacement that will be disposable in the enlargement of the Vittorio Emanuele III to become the national British type of vessel in place of the King Edward VII.

“It will be necessary to defend our ‘Invincible’ with a thick complete belt of twelve inches, and a battery also protected with the 12-inch armour (for the redoubt must be thus defended as well as the water-line, so as to eliminate the perils of the first system of attack sketched out, of progressive damages being adopted against her); and at the same time she must be armed with twelve pieces of 12-inch, arranged as in the Amalfi class or in the Vittorio Emanuele III, so as to be able herself to attack in the second method that has been outlined, that is to say, the system of the stronger, of the better defended, and most certainly that of the richer. But when a certain number of such colossi of 17,000 tons—six, for example—had been constructed, it is more than probable that the adversary would do his utmost to prevent their getting near him, and, fearful of the fatal result of so unequal a combat, would seek to betake himself elsewhere immediately on the appearance of the famous Invincible division.

“In that case the command of the seas, or a deluded belief that they have such command, will remain with these Invincible ships, even although they may be of slow speed; but to stop at this point would be too little and unworthy of the Navy of the richest and most potent Power in the world.

“For this squadron or division, however ‘invincible,’ will not be really and truly supreme if it cannot also catch hold of the enemy’s tail. The bull in the vast ring of the amphitheatre deludes himself with the idea that because he is more powerful than the agile toreador he therefore has absolute command of the scene of the combat; but he is too slow in following up his adversaries and these almost always succeed in eluding his terrible horns.

“We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that the type of vessel will not be absolutely supreme and worthy of such a nation unless we furnish it with such speed that it can overtake any of the enemy’s battleships and oblige them to fight. It is, then, possible to give to a vessel of 17,000 tons displacement—

“It has been said and written—indeed, repeatedly written—that the Vittorio Emanuele III was a practical impossibility. But before long she will be actually in the water, and facts already show how vain were the suppositions and criticisms of such croakers.28

“But it has also been asserted that in the case of this vessel surpassing the contemplated speed of 21½ knots on trial and attaining that hoped for of 22 knots, such would only prove that that particular tonnage of displacement especially lends itself to obtaining a form of hull with which we can realise a very high speed, and more so than with larger ships. This, however, is not quite exact. The law which governs the speed and displacement, other things being equal, is well known to all naval constructors, who have by heart the rule that whilst the displacement increases as the cube of the dimensions, the resistance, on the other hand, at a given speed does not increase in the same proportion as the displacement. The pith of the kernel lies in utilising the most opportune dimensions, or, rather, let us say, in adopting the special form of hull most adapted to those dimensions, more than in the actual amount of the displacement itself.

“The amount of the displacement, however, is intimately bound up with the question of the defensive and offensive powers that it is wished to give to a ship; so that once the particular objectives of the Italian Navy had been laid down, and thereby the defensive and offensive power sought for decided on, the question resolved itself into harmonising them with a form of hull of the greatest possible efficiency, and this worked out at 12,600 tons. Nor does it appear that the problem could have been satisfactorily solved with a vessel of less displacement, as in that case it would have been impossible to realise the required power, while with a greater displacement the ship would have been incapable of obtaining the desired speed.

“In the same manner the defensive and offensive power of the projected ships of the Amalfi class was harmonised with a form of hull of such high efficiency that it would have been possible to obtain a speed of 23 knots and probably more; but the statement that the problem could not have been solved with a displacement of much less or much greater tonnage than that projected, is not to be taken as insisting that the solution must be interpreted in a too absolute manner, asserting that the speed of 23 knots could not be efficiently obtained save with a displacement of from 8,000 to 9,000 tons, for this would be inexact.

“If now the question be put—Is it possible for some naval architect to design a special form of hull having a displacement of 17,000 tons, and with which we can realise a very high speed—twenty-four knots, for example?

“‘Without doubt,’ will answer all practical naval constructors.

“If we go further, and ask—Is it possible for him at the same time to arm such a vessel with twelve pieces of 12-inch?

“‘Without doubt,’ will answer but a certain number of such experienced men.

“But if we go still further, and demand, finally—Is it also possible for him to protect such a ship with 12-inch armour?

“‘Without doubt,’ will answer only one here and there who may have already made researches in that direction.

“And as the solving of such a problem necessitates many and many a calculation, and no amount of discussion or argument on the matter could in any way be conclusive unless based on definite plans and figures, these lines might well conclude here.

“But, in deference to the courteous inquiry of Admiral Hopkins, this brief article must not be allowed to close in a manner so indefinite.

“I would, therefore, say frankly at once that the designs for such a vessel have already been worked out, and that its construction seems quite feasible and attainable. Following up the progressive scale of displacement from 8,000 to 12,000 tons, and then on to 17,000 tons, a new King Edward VII has been designed, 521½ft. (159 metres) in length, with a beam of eighty-two feet (twenty-five metres), and mean draught of 27ft. (8.5 metres); with the water-line protected with 12-inch plates, and the battery similarly armoured; having two turrets at the ends, each armed with a pair of 12-inch guns, and two central side turrets high up (similar to the two with 8-inch guns in the Vittorio Emanuele III), also each armed with two pieces of 12-inch, and four turrets at the four angles of the upper part of the battery, having each one 12-inch gun.

“This vessel has no ports whatever in her armour; she carries no secondary armament at all, but only the usual pieces of small calibre for defence against torpedo attack.

“The speed to be realised, as proved by the tank trials, is twenty-four knots.”

The idea was at first received with derision and scepticism, which lasted until, in the Russian-Japanese War, it was announced that the Japanese had laid down two battleships, the Aki and Satsuma, which “were to be more or less on the lines of the ship projected by Colonel Cuniberti.” Contemporaneous with this the United States authorised the building of the South Carolina and Michigan, which carry eight 12-inch guns, so disposed as to be available on either broadside.

Both these ideas were public property before the British Dreadnought was laid down. She was, however, built with such rapidity that she was completed long before any other vessel of the type.

In the design for a new type of British capital ship, a great many ideas were considered and rejected. Eventually, however, it was decided to equip the Dreadnought with five turrets so disposed that eight guns were available on either broadside and six guns available ahead or astern. The designed speed of the ship was twenty-one knots.

Together with this type of ship, another type, somewhat more resembling the Cuniberti ideal, was laid down. Three ships of this class, the Invincible class, were designed for a speed of twenty-five knots, and given big guns so disposed that eight guns were available on either broadside and six big guns ahead or astern.

The Dreadnought was officially laid down in December, 1905, and completed ten months later. Actually, however, materials for her were collected months beforehand, and the rate at which she was built,29 like the secrecy with which her building was surrounded, consisted in great measure of a theatrical display, very impressive to the general public at the time, but to-day generally regarded as “unfortunate” on account of the foreign attention thus attracted. But, while the previous chapter is clear proof of the futility of any real secrecy about the “Dreadnought idea,” so far as the British Navy was concerned, it likewise serves to refute a charge which has been made to the effect that the “secrecy policy” induced foreign nations to build Dreadnoughts also. The most that can be said is that had the Dreadnought been built without so much attention being attracted to her, foreign nations might have been less in a hurry to copy her. But it is absolutely clear that the all-big-gun ship era had arrived, just as in the past the ironclad era came, or, in earlier days still, the gun and steam eras did. The actual place of the Dreadnought in history is that she marks a wise and rapid recognition of new conditions.

Details of the Dreadnought are as follows:—

• Displacement—17,900 tons.
• Length—526ft. (over all).
• Beam—82ft.
• Draught—Maximum, 29ft. (normal).
• Armament—Ten 12-inch, 45 cal.; twenty-seven 12 pounders; five submerged tubes (18 inch).
• Armour Belt—11-in. to 6-in. forward; and 4-in. aft. On turrets 11-inch (K.C.)
• Machinery—Parsons Turbine; four screws.
• Horse-power—23,000 = 21 knots.
• Boilers—Babcock.
• Coal—(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; oil fuel also.
• Built at Portsmouth; Engined by Vickers.

The Dreadnought was unique in every particular. The exact disposition of her big gun armament was only arrived at after a long and careful consultation, and the consideration of a number of alternatives. It admits of eight big guns bearing in nearly every position, and allows a minimum fire of six in any case. It is understood that, in addition to the plan actually adopted, in the earliest plan of all (which was merely an adaption of the Lord Nelson class), consideration was given to a scheme of five turrets, all in the centre line, and also to an arrangement whereby the two amidship turrets would be placed en échelon.

One of the particular arguments in favour of the plan ultimately adopted was that next to four, eight big guns form the best workable unit for fire control purposes. It was also considered that eight guns would probably be the maximum that could safely be fired together continuously, with full charges in battle conditions.

In these days when all big gun armaments are the rule, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the Dreadnought’s main armament was double that of previous ships, with only a comparatively small increase of displacement, and that no intermediate experience existed as to what might be expected.

With a view to standing the shock of discharge, the Dreadnought was built with very heavy scantlings and generally given an immensely strong hull. The armouring followed orthodox lines, except that a certain amount was applied internally under-water as a protection against torpedoes. In addition she was given solid bulkheads,30 though this was no novelty except with the British Navy, as they had been introduced some years before in the battleship Tsarevitch and the armoured cruiser Bayan, built for the Russians at La Seyne. Another novelty in the Dreadnought was the adoption of a high forecastle, she being the first British battleship in which this appears. Another innovation was the placing of the officers’ quarters forward and putting the men aft, a system which, however, has since been abandoned in the most recent vessels.

The greatest novelty of the Dreadnought, however, was the adoption of turbine machinery, and the form of her hull, with a 30ft. overhang aft, in order to adapt the ship to the new means of propulsion. The fitting of turbines to the new Dreadnought was perhaps an even greater novelty than her armament, she being the first warship, other than small cruisers, to be so equipped.

The introduction of turbines was regarded with a good deal of apprehension in certain quarters, especially when it became known that the three other big ships belonging to the same programme were also to be turbine propelled. The type selected for all was the Parsons with four shafts. The wing shafts of the Dreadnought have each one high pressure ahead and one high pressure astern turbine. The amidship ones are fitted with three turbines each—one low pressure one ahead, and one low pressure astern, and one turbine for going astern. Each turbine has 39,600 blades.

On her first trials the Dreadnought exceeded her designed speed for short spurts by three-quarters of a knot, but on the eight hours’ run barely succeeded in making a mean of twenty-one knots. Shortly afterwards she fell a little below this, but at a later date picked up again, and on more than one occasion since she has easily made twenty-two knots or over. Such early difficulties as occurred were due to the fact that her engine-room complement were at first necessarily unfamiliar with working so large an installation. The total cost of the Dreadnought, which belongs to the 1905–06 programme, was £1,797,497, and save that her draught somewhat exceeded anticipations, the ship was a success in every way, proving a remarkably steady gun-platform.

The Committee which sat on the Dreadnought design was by no means entirely unanimous as to what sacrifice should be made for speed. The Dreadnought herself, despite a considerable increase of speed as compared with the battleships that preceded her, did not obtain that speed by the sacrifice of any battleship qualities, but almost entirely on account of the substitution of turbines for reciprocating engines. To that extent, therefore, though nearly as fast as the armoured cruisers of a few years before, she may be said to have developed entirely along normal lines, rather than on those laid down by Cuniberti.

The table on the next page and diagrams indicate how the original Cuniberti idea compares with the first results obtained. It will be noticed that, except in the case of the Invincible type, and there only at a sacrifice of armour and armament, was, however, anything like the Cuniberti speed attempted. It should be stated that in the Cuniberti ship the peculiar “girder construction” of his Vittorio Emanuele was obviously contemplated. This construction, which admits of far lighter scantlings than usually employed, has not been attempted in any other Navies, and a corresponding extra dead-weight results.

Coming to details, there is uncertainty as to the exact original design of the Satsuma; but a uniform armament of big guns was certainly the first to be projected. It is not clear whether it was abandoned from a preference for a numerically larger but mixed battery; or with a view to utilising such guns as were most likely to be available for early delivery. Japan was then at war, and there was the natural anticipation that the ships might be wanted before the war was over. It should, on the other hand, be borne in mind that the Kashima and Katori, of 16,400 tons, carrying four 12-inch, four 10-inch, twelve 6-inch, and twelve 14-pounders, with 9-inch belts and 18.5 knot speeds were at that time held up in England on account of the war. Hence it has with some considerable show of reason been argued that the Satsuma and Aki are nothing but normal developments of the Kashima design, bearing just the same relation to it as the British Lord Nelsons bear to the King Edwards. It was also practically admitted by the Japanese at a later date that for diplomatic reasons, in accounts of the contemporary armoured cruisers of the Tsukuba class, the armaments31 were exaggerated.

ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.

Note.—The Nassau was delayed a year owing to alterations in design.

Be all these things as they may, however, Japan is obviously entitled to some considerable share in originating the “Dreadnought movement.”

The claims of the United States Navy rest on a stronger basis. The South Carolina type, all big guns in the centre line, all bearing on either broadside, was a distinct advance and novelty. The actual chronological date of laying down goes for nothing; the ships were designed and authorised long before they were commenced. No secrecy whatever was observed about them, and a strong body of opinion will always credit the United States with being the first Navy that definitely adopted the “all-big-gun idea.” It is interesting to note (see table) that at one stage a mixed 12-inch and 10-inch armament was regarded as a possible alternative.

It has been claimed, either by those responsible for the Dreadnought herself, or by others professing to speak for them, that the Dreadnought was evolved entirely independently of Cuniberti’s ideal. It is practically impossible to say definitely how far there can be any truth in this. In all Admiralties, ships are, as a rule, designed as “projects” long before they see the light (some never see it at all, as witness the sea-going masted turret-ship of his design referred to by Sir Edward Reed in some remarks quoted on an earlier page!). The first British all-big-gun ship design (see diagram) is a lineal enough descendant of the King Edward and Lord Nelson, just as Cuniberti’s is a descendant of the Vittorio Emanuele.

The Cuniberti design appears, however, to have been submitted as early as 1901. In any case, to Cuniberti belongs the first clear exposition of the idea, while the ridicule with which it was at first received indicates the general novelty.

Germany is also a claimant to having evolved Dreadnoughts with the “S” type, intended to have been laid down in 1906, to follow the Deutschlands. These ships can hardly have been designed much later than 1904. When first heard of they were reported to carry four big gun turrets, of which two were placed on either side amidships. Six big guns was the first reputed armament, later each turret was to carry two guns.

The absurd secrecy with which subsequent German designs have been shrouded was not then in evidence; and all the indications are that the Nassau, as originally contemplated, was to have been a four-turret ship—the two extra 11-inch being Germany’s equivalent for the four 12-inch, four 9.2, of our King Edwards. This would perhaps accord Germany a priority in actually adopting the principle of an increased number of heavy guns.

All of which suffices to indicate that the adoption of more than four big guns had little or nothing to do with the somewhat theatrical building of the original Dreadnought.

On the other hand (with the possible and doubtful exception of the South Carolinas32) it appears clear that the Dreadnought was the first ship in which the all-big-gun principle was adopted as a technical asset in gun-laying over and above guns qua guns. After four, eight was the “tactical unit” of guns, promising results altogether out of proportion to anything that six, or for that matter, ten (in proportion) could achieve.

It may not be too much to say that what Cuniberti “saw as through a glass darkly,” the Dreadnought translated into fact, and that she was the first battleship avowedly so designed.

“Fire control” was a new thing in 1905. No navy, save the British, had considered it to any appreciable degree. The King Edwards had taught that control of two calibres from one position was a practical impossibility. Mixed calibres were damned accordingly, and there was no outlet but the Dreadnought.

But for Cuniberti she might, and possibly would, have remained a theoretical desirability for several more years. The measure of his genius may be the demonstration that such an ideal ship could be built. It is to be argued that he did nothing more than put into practicable shape what already existed as a hypothesis. Even so, however, to him belongs the honour of indicating that the step from theory to practice was possible; and on that account alone he deserves to go down to posterity as the actual creator of Dreadnoughts.

In the other three ships of the 1905–06 programme, however, a high speed was accepted as the governing factor. The ships as built were designated “armoured cruisers,” and in so far as the Japanese were known to be building armoured cruisers carrying battleship guns, that designation was legitimate. For that matter, there also existed a paper by Professor Hovgaard, of the Massachusetts School of Naval Architecture, in which it was tentatively laid down that the ideal armoured cruiser of the future would be a battleship in armament and armour, increased in size, to obtain greater speed.

The three companion ships to the Dreadnought—the Invincible, Inflexible, and Indomitable—adhered no more closely to the Hovgaard ideal than to the Cuniberti one. In principle they varied from the Dreadnought design only in that they sacrificed a certain amount of armour in order to obtain a greater speed. By the adoption of the échelon system, the same broadside-fire was secured for them (on paper, at any rate) as for the Dreadnought, though with a turret less. In practice it has been found that there are very few positions in which they can bring more than six big guns to bear, but this must be considered as an error of construction rather than of principle. They have turned out to be wonderful steamers, but considerably inferior sea-boats to the Dreadnought, and in the British Navy are generally likely in the future to become regarded as obsolete long before the former. For all that, they probably approximate more nearly to the warship of the future than the Dreadnought.

Admiral Bacon, in his views as to the warship of the future, generally inclined to the idea of very large and very swift ships, relying on armament, speed, and super-scientific internal sub-division rather than on armour protection. These ships would act more or less independently, each, as it were, representing a divided squadron group of to-day.

It is interesting to note that Italy, which in the seventies evolved in the Duilio and Dandolo the “Dreadnought” of that period, eventually developed a very similar idea in the Italia and Lepanto, which had no side armour whatever. In later designs a thin belt was reverted to, and finally the old cycle was resumed.

This result was brought about by the quickfirer, which appeared as a rival to the hitherto predominant monster gun. To-day the torpedo is becoming paramount and a danger to a fleet in close order at almost any range—hence the Bacon ideal. It remains to be seen whether the future will produce any analogy to the cycle of the quickfirer of the eighties.

Details of the Invincible type are:—

• Displacement—17,250 tons.
• Length (over all)—562ft. (p.p., 530ft.).
• Beam—78½ft.
• Draught—29ft.
• Armament—Eight 12-inch, XI, 45 calibre, sixteen 4-inch (model 1907); three submerged tubes.
• Armour Belt—7-inch, reduced to 4-inch at the ends.
• Machinery—Parsons Turbine.
• Horse-power—41,000 = 25 knots.
• Boilers—(Invincible and Inflexible) Yarrow, (Indomitable) Babcock.
• Coal—(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,000 tons; oil fuel also.
• Builders—(Invincible) Elswick, (Inflexible) Clydebank, (Indomitable) Fairfield.
• Engined—(Invincible) Humphrys, (Inflexible) Clydebank, (Indomitable) Fairfield.

As originally designed, the anti-torpedo guns of these ships would have been the same as the Dreadnought’s, but, having been completed nearly two years later and a new pattern 4-inch quickfirer having been invented in the interim, they were fitted with these guns. The trial results were as follows:—Invincible, 26.6 knots; Inflexible, 26.5 knots; and Indomitable, 26.1 knots; the designed horse power being considerably exceeded in every case. After they were commissioned and had shaken down, these trial speeds were considerably exceeded, and at one time and another they all did well over 28 knots; the Indomitable having made a record of 28.7.

The fuel consumption of these ships is naturally enormous. The Indomitable, in crossing the Atlantic at full speed, burned about 500 tons of coal a day, as well as about 120 tons of oil. As steamers they are to be considered remarkably successful. The average cost of construction was about £1,752,000, which works out at a little under £102 per ton.

Towards the close of the year 1911 the official designation of “armoured cruiser” for them and similar ships was abandoned, and the term “battle cruiser” substituted. No further secret was made of the fairly obvious fact that they were designed as “fast battleships,” intended to engage and hold a retreating enemy till such time as the main squadron could come up.

Curiously enough, for some while, though every nation started building Dreadnoughts, Germany alone proceeded to build Invincibles also. In 1911 Japan ordered a ship of fast battleship type; but, generally speaking, foreign nations have abstained from embodying this portion of the Cuniberti ideal in their designs.

The programme for the years 1906–07 had been originally intended to include the building of four armoured ships, presumably one Dreadnought and three Invincibles; but the Liberal party, which had just come into power, modified this to three battleships of an improved Dreadnought type. This action led to a popular agitation which ultimately eventuated in the provision of no less than eight armoured ships in the estimates of three years later.

The three ships which followed, the Dreadnought, the Bellerophon, Téméraire, and Superb, are some seven hundred tons heavier, but otherwise differ only in minor details. For the one heavy tripod of the Dreadnought, two were substituted, and the 4-inch anti-torpedo gun was also mounted. In the next year the St. Vincent class, a group of similar type, but increased by 650 tons, were provided. The anti-torpedo armament is carried to 20 guns in the St. Vincent class, which are 10ft. longer than their predecessors, and carry fifty-calibre big guns in place of the forty-five calibre pieces of the earlier ships. The constructive particulars of these ships are as follows:—

In the Estimates for 1908–09, the armoured ships provided were reduced to two, the Neptune and the Indefatigable. Provision in the United States, Argentine, and Brazilian Navies for ships bearing ten big guns on the broadside and the prospect of ships with equal broadsides being constructed elsewhere is presumably the reason why in the Neptune the original Dreadnought design was varied, and a new arrangement of turrets introduced. The Neptune, which is of 20,200 tons, is a species of compromise between the Dreadnought and Invincible designs, the amidship guns being en échelon, and so mounted that they give a very full arc of fire on either broadside. The increased space occupied by this arrangement necessitated a certain cramping aft, for which reason the forward of the two after turrets was superposed to train over the aftermost, American fashion.

Particulars of the Neptune are as follows:—

• Displacement—20,200 tons.
• Length (over all)—546ft.
• Beam—85ft.
• Draught—29ft.
• Guns—Ten 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch.
• Armour—Belt 12-in. amidships, 6-in. forward, 4-in. aft. Lower deckside, 9¾-in. Turrets, 12—8-in.
• Machinery—Parsons Turbine.
• Horse-power—25,000 = 21 knots.
• Boilers—Yarrow.
• Coal—(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil fuel also.
• Built at Portsmouth Dockyard.
• Engined by Harland and Wolff.

On trial she developed at three-quarter power I.H.P. 18,575, with a speed of nineteen knots, and at full power 27,721, with 21.78 knots. Her best maximum spurt speed was 22.7—that is to say, about one and three-quarter knots over contract.

In the Neptune the original Dreadnought practice of mounting the anti-torpedo armament on top of the turrets was entirely abandoned, and these guns were placed inside or on top of the superstructure in three main groups.

The number of torpedo tubes was reduced to three, the reason for this being partly to save space and also to take advantage of improved methods for securing rapidity of fire. In the Neptune the possibility of aero craft first received consideration, the upper deck being built sufficiently thick to be proof against bombs dropped from aloft.