The above table exhibits the estimated distances from sea to sea, on the various lines already described, as also the probable extent of actual canalization. It is assumed, throughout, that the river San Juan cannot be made navigable for ships, and that a lateral canal must be made, for its entire length. The length of the river, including its windings, is nearly one hundred and twenty miles; but it is probable that the distance, in a right line, between the lake and the Atlantic does not exceed ninety miles.

The length of the proposed line of communication from San Juan to Realejo is estimated by Louis Napoleon at 278 miles, as follows: Length of the San Juan, 104 miles; of Lake Nicaragua, 90 miles; River Tipitapa, 20 miles; Lake Leon, or Managua, 35 miles; and distance from the lake to Realejo, 29 miles. This is positively erroneous in some particulars; as, for instance, the distance from Lake Managua to Realejo, which, so far from being only 29 miles, is actually from 40 to 45 miles.

In the preceding chapter I have considered solely the question of the practicability of the projected inter-oceanic canal. It will be interesting next to notice, briefly, some of the measures which have been taken towards the construction of the work.

Although its feasibility was asserted early in the sixteenth century, nothing was practically attempted until late in the eighteenth century, when the attention of the Spanish government was called to the subject once more by Godoy, “the Prince of Peace,” and a survey of the route made, under his direction, by Galisteo. After the independence of Central America, another attempt toward the accomplishment of the same object was made by Señor Manual Antonio de la Cerda, afterwards Governor of the State of Nicaragua, who, in 1823, urged the matter upon the Federal Congress, but failed in securing its attention.

During the year 1824, however, various propositions were made from abroad, in respect to the enterprise. Amongst these was one from Messrs. Barclay & Co., of London, bearing date Sept. 18, 1824. They proposed to open a navigable communication between the two oceans, via the River San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, without cost to the government, provided the latter would extend the requisite assistance in other modes. On the 2d of February, 1825, other propositions were made, by some merchants of the United States, signed by Col. Charles Bourke and Matthew Llanos, in which they observe that they had, in the month of December preceding, (1824), sent an armed brig to San Juan, having on board engineers and other persons charged to make a survey of the proposed route. They prayed, in consideration of the advances already made, and the evidences of good faith thus exhibited, that the government would grant them, 1st, an exclusive proprietorship and control of the canal; 2d, an exclusive right of navigating the lakes and dependent waters by steam; 3d, free permission to use all natural products of the country, necessary for the work; 4th, exemption of duty on goods introduced by the Company, until the completion of the work. In return for this, they proposed that the government should receive twenty per cent. on the tolls, and that at the end of the term of —— years, the entire work should revert to the government. Whether the armed brig, and the party of engineers referred to, ever reached their destination, is unknown; nor is it known that the government of Central America ever took any specific notice of their propositions.

The subject was nevertheless regarded as of primary interest throughout all Central America, and the minister of that republic in the United States, Don Antonio José Cañas, was specially instructed to bring the matter prominently before the American government. This he did in an official letter, bearing date Feb. 8, 1825, addressed to Henry Clay, then Secretary of State. In this letter, Sr. Cañas solicited the coöperation of the United States, on the ground “that its noble conduct had been a model and a protection to all the Americas,” and entitled it to a preference over any other nation, both in the “merits and advantages of the proposed great undertaking.” He proposed also, by means of a treaty, “effectually to secure its advantages to the two nations.” The Chargé d’Affaires of the United States in Central America, Col. John Williams, was accordingly specially instructed to assure the government of that country of the deep interest taken by the United States in an undertaking “so highly calculated to diffuse a favorable influence on the affairs of mankind,” to investigate with the greatest care the facilities offered by the route, and to remit the information to the United States. But it appears no information of the character required ever reached the American government.

During this year, however, (1825,) various proposals were made to the government of Central America, from abroad, upon the subject; and in June of that year, the National Congress, with a view of determining the principles upon which it desired the work undertaken, passed a decree to the following purport:

This decree was published jointly with another fixing six months for receiving proposals; but the term designated was too short for any measures to be taken on the part of companies or individuals, and the Congress only received a repetition of a part of the proposals before made.

The principal of these were made by Mr. Baily and Mr. Charles Beniski—the first as agent of the English house of Messrs. Barclay, Herring, Richardson & Co., and the second of Mr. Aaron H. Palmer, of New York. Mr. Baily’s offer was conditional, while Mr. Beniski’s was positive, and was therefore accepted by the republic. The contractors, under the name and style of the “Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company,” were bound to open through Nicaragua a canal navigable for vessels of all sizes, and to deposit in the city of Granada the sum of $200,000 for the preliminary expenses within six months; to erect fortresses for the protection of the canal, and to have the works in progress within a period of twelve months. In compensation they were to have two-thirds of the profits of the tolls upon the canal until all the capital expended in the work was repaid, with interest at the rate of ten per cent., beside afterwards receiving one-half of the proceeds of the canal for seven years, with certain privileges for introducing steam vessels. The government was to put at their disposal all the documents relating to the subject existing in its archives, to permit the cutting of wood, and to furnish laborers at certain rates of wages. In case of non-completion, the works were to revert unconditionally to the republic. This contract bore date June 14, 1826, and the contractors at once endeavored to secure the coöperation of the government of the United States. A memorial was presented to Congress, and referred to a committee, which reported in due time; but here the matter stopped, although it appears to have received the sanction of De Witt Clinton and other distinguished men.

In fact, Mr. Palmer executed a deed of trust to Mr. Clinton, by which that gentleman, Stephen Van Renssalaer, C. D. Colden, Philip Hone, and Lynde Catlin, were constituted directors of the work. Mr. Clinton’s part was undertaken in entire good faith, and, as he himself expressed it, “for the promotion of a great and good object, which should be kept free from the taint of speculation.” Mr. Palmer went to England in 1827, to secure the coöperation of British capitalists in his enterprise; but, owing to various untoward circumstances, his mission proved abortive, and in the autumn of that year he appears to have abandoned the undertaking.

Although the administration of Mr. Adams did not at once fall in with the proposition of the Central American minister, it was not from a want of interest in the subject, but because it did not desire to commit the country to any specific course of conduct, until the feasibility of the enterprise and the leading facts connected with it should be better known and established. In the mean time, the principles upon which it conceived the work should be undertaken and executed, were well exhibited in Mr. Clay’s letter of instructions to the ministers of the United States, commissioned to the famous Congress of Panama. Mr. Clay said:

It will be seen that Mr. Clay, who was at that time a true exponent of the American system of policy, regarded the construction of this work as an enterprise peculiarly American, to be executed by the parties most deeply interested in it, to be under their control, but not therefore exclusive.

After the failure of Mr. Palmer’s project, the whole matter seems to have been allowed to slumber until some time in October, 1828, when the work was proposed to be undertaken by an Association of the Netherlands, under the special patronage of the King of Holland. In March, 1829, General Verveer arrived in Guatemala, as plenipotentiary of the king, with instructions regarding the undertaking of the canal. In consequence of civil distractions, the subject was not taken up until the succeeding October, when commissioners were appointed to treat with Verveer, and on the 24th of July, 1830, the plan agreed upon between them was laid before the National Congress. It was ratified on the 21st of September following. The principal features of the agreement were as follows:

Arrangements were accordingly made to send envoys to the Netherlands, with full powers to perfect the plan; and, for a time, the work seemed in a fair way to a commencement; but the revolution in Belgium and its separation from Holland, put an end to these hopes. The news of these events was received with profound regret. Mr. Henry Savage, U. S. Consul, in a letter to Mr. Van Buren, dated Guatemala, December 3, 1830, said: “All concur, and every one now seems tacitly to look forward to the United States for the completion of this grand project. They say that the United States, identified in her institutions with this government, ought to have the preference.”

In 1832, endeavors were made to renew the negotiations with Holland, and the State of Nicaragua passed resolutions agreeing to the propositions of the Dutch envoy, but nothing was accomplished.

Upon the 3d of March, 1835, public attention having again been directed to the subject, a resolution passed the Senate of the United States, “that the President be requested to consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the governments of other nations, and particularly with the governments of Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of effectually protecting, by suitable treaty stipulations with them, such individuals or companies as may undertake to open a communication from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, by means of a ship canal across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and of securing for ever, by means of such stipulations, the free and equal right of navigating such canal to all nations, on the payment of such reasonable tolls as may be established to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such undertaking and complete the work.”

Under this resolution, a special agent (Mr. Charles Biddle) was appointed by General Jackson, to proceed without delay, by the most direct route, to the port of San Juan de Nicaragua, ascend the river San Juan to the Lake of Nicaragua, and thence proceed across the continent, by the contemplated route of the proposed canal or railroad, to the Pacific ocean; after which examination, he was directed to repair to Guatemala, the capital of the republic, and, with the aid of Mr. De Witt, the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States, procure all such public documents connected with the subject as might be in existence, and especially copies of all such laws as had been passed, and contracts and conventions as had been made, to carry into effect the undertaking, and also all plans, surveys, or estimates in relation to it. From Guatemala he was directed to proceed to Panama, and make observations and inquiries relative to the proposed connection of the two oceans at that point. Unfortunately, from the difficulties of procuring conveyances to San Juan, the agent went to Panama first. From adverse circumstances, he never reached Nicaragua, and died soon after his return to the United States. He nevertheless made a partial report concerning the isthmus of Panama, to the effect that it was not practicable for a canal.

In 1837, the subject was again taken up in Central America, by General Morazan, who resolved to have the proposed line of the canal properly surveyed, intending to raise a loan in Europe for the execution of the work. Mr. John Baily was employed for the former purpose, but his work was brought to a sudden close by the dissolution of the government of the republic. He nevertheless made a survey of the narrow isthmus intervening between Lake Nicaragua and the Pacific, and also some observations on the river San Juan.

In 1838 a convention was made between the States of Nicaragua and Honduras, under which Mr. Peter Rouchaud was authorized to conclude an agreement in France, for the formation of a company to make a canal, and for other objects; but he effected nothing. The same result attended the efforts of Señor Don George Viteri, subsequently Bishop of San Salvador, and afterwards of Nicaragua, who was sent ambassador to Rome.

In the same year, Mr. George Holdship, representing a company composed chiefly of citizens of the United States, residing in New Orleans and New York, arrived in Central America, with a view of contracting for the opening of the canal with the general government. Finding that Nicaragua had “pronounced” against Morazan, and assumed an independent position, he proceeded to that State, where he at once entered into a contract, which provided for opening the canal, for the establishment of a bank to assist the enterprise, and for colonization on an extensive scale. He returned to the United States—and the matter ended.

This year was also signalized by some further movements on the subject in the United States. A petition was presented to Congress, signed by several citizens of New York and Philadelphia, viz., Aaron Clark, Wm. A. Duer, Herman Leroy, Matthew Carey, and Wm. Radcliff, setting forth that the wants of trade required the opening of a ship communication between the Atlantic and Pacific; that the accumulation of wealth among nations, and the prevalence of peace seemed to indicate a favorable opportunity for the undertaking; and recommending “that an extensive and powerful combination should be formed, and the most judicious and liberal measures adopted, for the purpose of carrying the plan into effect, and securing its benefits permanently to the world at large.” This memorial was referred to a committee, of which Chas. F. Mercer was chairman, who, March 2, 1839, made a report upon it, concluding with the following resolution, which was adopted:

The subsequent action, both of the Executive and Congress, was directed to the opening of a route across the Isthmus of Panama, and resulted in the negotiation of a treaty between the United States and New Granada, by which the neutrality of the Isthmus was guarantied by the former, in consideration of a free transit conceded by the latter. Under this treaty, the existing Panama Railroad Company was organized, and that route of communication between the two oceans placed in American hands.

The disturbances incident on the dissolution of the republic of Central America precluded any serious attention to the project of a canal from 1838 until 1844, when Señor Don Francisco Castellon, having been appointed minister from Nicaragua to France, and failing to interest that government, entered into a contract with a Belgian company, under the auspices of the Belgian king, for the construction of the work. The grant was for sixty years, at the end of which time it was to revert to the State without indemnity, the State receiving meantime an interest of ten per cent. in the profits.

Still later, in April, 1846, a contract was made by Mr. Marcoleta, Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affairs to Belgium, with Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, then a prisoner at Ham, which differed but little from the preceding one, except that the canal was to be called “Canal Napoleon de Nicaragua.” Beyond the publication of a pamphlet upon the subject, under the initials of L. N. Bonaparte, this attempt also proved abortive.^[53]

So the matter rested until 1849, when the acquisition of California by the United States, and the discovery there of vast mineral wealth, again directed public attention to the project in a more serious manner than at any previous period. It now began to assume a practical form, and, as a consequence, there was a renewal of propositions to the government of Nicaragua. The first of these, in the form of bases subject to future adjustment, came, under date of 16th of February, from Mr. Wm. Wheelwright, the projector of the British line of steamers on the western coast of South America, on behalf of an English company. It embodied, substantially, the provisions of the contract of 1844 with the Belgian company, but was never acted upon by the Nicaraguan government.

The second was in the form of a detailed contract, and was entered into between Mr. D. T. Brown, representing certain citizens of New York, and General Muñoz, Commissioner of the Nicaraguan government, on the 14th of March, 1849. Although it was very promptly ratified by the executive, it was not ratified by the company within the time stipulated by its terms.

In the meantime, however, namely, as early as January, 1848, when it became evident that the Mexican war could only terminate in large territorial acquisitions to the United States, the port of San Juan de Nicaragua, the only possible eastern terminus of the proposed canal, was seized by Great Britain, under the pretext of supporting the territorial rights of a savage, facetiously styled “King of the Mosquitos.” This act could not be viewed with indifference by the government of our own country; for it not only violated the principle constantly recognized and asserted by the United States, that the routes of transit between the two oceans should be free to the whole world, uncontrolled by any great maritime power, but it violated also a principle early and well established among the American nations, namely, the exclusion of all foreign, and especially monarchical, interference from the domestic and international affairs of this continent. The real purpose of the seizure of San Juan was too apparent to escape detection; and the government of the United States, upon these principles, would have been bound to interpose against the consummation of the felony. But it was specially bound to interpose, after it had been earnestly and repeatedly solicited to do so by the injured republic in question. These solicitations were forcibly made, in letters addressed to the President of the United States by the Supreme Director of Nicaragua, dated Dec. 15, 1847, as also in letters from the Secretary of State of that Republic of the dates respectively of Nov. 12, 1847, and March 17, 1848. “The obvious design of Great Britain,” said the Director of Nicaragua, “in seizing upon the port of San Juan, and setting up pretensions to sovereignty, in behalf of savage tribes, within the territories of Nicaragua, is to found colonies, and to make herself master of the prospective interoceanic canal, for the construction of which this isthmus alone has the requisites of feasibility and facility.”

Although the matter was thus brought before the American government, it does not seem to have elicited any action beyond certain vague instructions from Mr. Buchanan, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Hise, appointed Chargé d’Affairs to Central America. “The object of Great Britain in this seizure,” said Mr. Buchanan, “is evident from the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her history, of seizing upon every valuable commercial point in the world, whenever circumstances have placed it in her power. Her purpose probably is to obtain the control of the route for a railroad and canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by way of Lake Nicaragua.” But while insisting upon the policy of “excluding all interference on the part of European governments in the domestic affairs of the American republics,” Mr. Buchanan gave no specific instructions as to the line of conduct to be pursued by Mr. Hise in respect to the proposed canal or the British usurpation. He confined himself to a denial of the British pretensions, and concluded by observing that “the government of the United States has not yet determined what course it will pursue in regard to the encroachments of the British government.”

About this time, viz., under date of April 4, 1849, Mr. Manning, British Vice Consul in Nicaragua, wrote to Lord Palmerston as follows:

On his arrival in Central America, Mr. Hise became speedily convinced that the whole scope of British policy in that country was directed to acquiring permanent control of the Nicaraguan isthmus. Deeply impressed with the importance to the United States of a free transit across it, although not empowered to treat with Nicaragua, he nevertheless conceived himself authorized, under the circumstances, in opening negotiations with the government of that republic. He therefore requested the appointment of a commissioner for that purpose to meet him in Guatemala, where, upon the 21st of June, 1849, a special convention relating to this subject was agreed upon. The provisions of this convention, it is not to be denied, were, in some respects, extraordinary, and not in entire harmony with the established exterior policy of the United States. It provided,

But while Mr. Hise was thus occupied in Central America, the administration of General Taylor had been inaugurated. The affairs of that country attracted his immediate attention. The letters addressed by the government of Nicaragua to Mr. Polk and Mr. Buchanan, and which had remained unanswered, were replied to in the friendliest spirit; and before the expiration of the first month of General Taylor’s term of office, Mr. Hise was recalled, and the writer of these pages appointed in his stead, as Chargé d’Affaires of the United States to Guatemala, besides receiving special commissions to the other States of Central America, with full powers to treat with them separately, on all matters affecting their relations with this republic. It will be seen, therefore, that Mr. Hise was not only not empowered to treat with Nicaragua, but also that his negotiations were undertaken after the date of his letter of recall, which, however, failed to reach him until after the signing of the special convention, and after my arrival in the country. Under these circumstances, and having meantime determined on a specific line of policy, this convention was neither approved by the American government, nor accepted by that of Nicaragua.

The spirit in which the matter was taken up by the administration of General Taylor, and the principles upon which its action was predicated, are fully and clearly exhibited in the following passages from the instructions addressed to me by Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State. After disproving, in an unanswerable manner, the pretensions of Great Britain on the Mosquito Shore, Mr. Clayton submits the following significant question, and equally significant reply:

On arriving in Nicaragua, I found there a gentleman representing certain citizens of New York, the object of whose mission was to procure a charter or grant for the construction of a canal through the territories of that republic. Having previously entertained so many projects for the accomplishment of this object, all of which had failed, the government of Nicaragua was indisposed to listen to any further propositions until it was assured, as I was authorized to assure it, that the American government was willing to extend its guarantees to any charter, of a proper character, which might now be granted. Under the confidence inspired by this assurance, it proceeded with alacrity to arrange the terms of a charter, more liberal than any ever before conceded, which was signed on the 27th of August, 1849, and ratified on the 23d of the month following.

The terms of this grant are very well known; yet the following synopsis of its provisions will not prove out of place in this connection. It provides,

Article xxxvi., which is quoted in full, was drawn up by myself, and its insertion insisted on, in conformity with my instructions. Its simple object was, to put upon the same footing with the United States every nation which should undertake the same obligations with ourselves, in respect to the proposed work. These obligations were distinctly set forth in the treaty of commerce and friendship which was negotiated, simultaneously, with the Nicaraguan government, and which, in Article xxxv., provided as follows:

The provisions of this article were not only in conformity with my instructions, but their design and inevitable tendency were to make it to the interest of every nation in the world to maintain the neutrality of the canal, and the independence and territorial integrity of Nicaragua. They secured to the United States every desirable privilege in her intercourse, commercial or otherwise, with Nicaragua; yet those privileges were in no wise exclusive; they would accrue to every other nation, upon the same conditions; conditions to which no nation except England could possibly object, and she only in the event of insisting on her pretensions over the Mosquito Shore.

And this is precisely the reason why the treaty containing this article was met by the unqualified hostility of the British government; it placed England in a position of antagonism to the whole world, and made it to the interest of every maritime country that she should relinquish her hold on San Juan. To avoid the alternative which the consummation of this treaty would impose, the utmost efforts of her diplomacy were put forth to defeat its acceptance by the contracting parties. In Nicaragua these efforts signally failed; the treaty was unanimously ratified by the Legislative Chambers, simultaneously with the canal contract, on the 23d of September, 1849. It was at once dispatched to the United States, approved by General Taylor and his cabinet, and submitted, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution, to the Senate for its ratification.

This step caused the greatest alarm in the British legation, and Sir Edward Bulwer put forth every influence at his command to postpone, if he could not defeat, the approval of the Senate, which would have brought the whole question of British pretensions to an open issue and a definite conclusion. His exertions to this end were active and unremittingunremitting. In the Senate chamber and out of it, publicly and privately, over the council board and over the festive board, everywhere and at all times, this restless and unscrupulous agent wrought out his policy of opposition. His plans were greatly assisted by the distractions of Congress, which was at that moment engaged in the exciting decennial task of “saving the Union,” to the utter neglect of all other business. The blunt honesty and singleness of purpose of General Taylor, it is true, were unassailable; but the weakness and credulity of his Secretary of State proved more than a compensating advantage to Sir Henry in his diplomatic campaign. He prevailed upon this officer to enter into a convention, signed April 19, and proclaimed July 5, 1850, which has since obtained notoriety as the “Clayton and Bulwer treaty,” and has created infinitely greater trouble than it professed to cure. It provided in general terms for the joint protection of the proposed canal by Great Britain and the United States, as follows: