The Creator, taking pity on the solitude of the man, resolves to provide him with a suitable companion. The naïveté of the conception is extraordinary. Not only did man exist before the beasts, but the whole animal creation is the result of an unsuccessful experiment to find a mate for him. Of the revolting idea that man lived for a time in sexual intercourse with the beasts (see page 91), there is not a trace.—18. a helper] The writer seems to be thinking (as in 2⁵), not of the original, but of the present familiar conditions of human life.—כְּנֶגְדּוֹ] (only here) literaly ‘as in front of him,’ i.e. corresponding to him.—19. The meaning cannot be that the animals had already been created, and are now brought to be named (Calvin, al. and recently Delitzsch, Stade): such a sense is excluded by grammar (see Driver A Treatise on the use of the Tenses in Hebrew § 76, Obsolete), and misses the point of the passage.—to see what he would call it] To watch its effect on him, and (eventually) to see if he would recognise in it the associate he needed,—as one watches the effect of a new experience on a little child.—whatever the man should call it, that (was to be) its name] The spontaneous ejaculation of the first man becomes to his posterity a name: such is the origin of (Hebrew) names.—The words נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה are incapable of construction, and are to be omitted as an explanatory gloss (Ewald, al.).—20. The classification of animals is carried a step further than in ¹⁹ (domestic and wild animals being distinguished), but is still simpler than in chapter 1. Fishes and ‘creeping things’ are frankly omitted as inappropriate to the situation.—21. It has appeared that no fresh creation ‘from the ground’ can provide a fit companion for man: from his own body, therefore, must his future associate be taken.—תַּרְדֵּמָה] is a hypnotic trance, induced by supernatural agency (compare Duhm on Isaiah 29¹⁰). The purpose here is to produce anæsthesia, with perhaps the additional idea that the divine working cannot take place under human observation (Dillmann, Gunkel).—one of his ribs] A part of his frame that (it was thought) could easily be spared. There is doubtless a deeper significance in the representation: it suggests “the moral and social relation of the sexes to each other, the dependence of woman upon man, her close relationship to him, and the foundation existing in nature for ... the feelings with which each should naturally regard the other” (Driver). The Arabs use similarly a word for ‘rib,’ saying hūa lizḳī or hūa bilizḳī for ‘he is my bosom companion.’ On the other hand, the notion that the first human being was androgynous, and afterwards separated into man and woman (see Schwally Archiv für Religionswissenschaft., ix. 172 ff.), finds no countenance in the passage.—22. built up the rib ... into a woman] So in the Egyptian “Tale of the two brothers,” the god Chnum ‘built’ a wife for his favourite Batau, the hieroglyphic determinative showing that the operation was actually likened to the building of a wall (see Wiedemann, A Dictionary of the Bible, Sup. 180).—23. By a flash of intuition the man divines that the fair creature now brought to him is part of himself, and names her accordingly. There is a poetic ring and rhythm in the exclamation that breaks from him.—This at last] Literally, ‘This, this time’ (v.i.): note the thrice repeated זֹאת.—bone of my bones, etc.] The expressions originate in the primitive notion of kinship as resting on “participation in a common mass of flesh, blood, and bones” (William Robertson Smith Lectures on the Religion of the Semites², 273 f.: compare Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia², 175 f.), so that all the members of a kindred group are parts of the same substance, whether acquired by heredity or assimilated in the processes of nourishment (compare 29¹⁴ 37²⁷, Judges 9², 2 Samuel 5¹ 19¹³). The case before us, where the material identity is expressed in the manner of woman’s creation, is unique.—shall be called Woman] English is fortunate in being able to reproduce this assonance (’Κ, ’Iššā) without straining language: other translations are driven to tours de force (e.g. Jerome Virago; Luther, Männin). Whether even in Hebrew it is more than an assonance is doubtful (v.i.).—24. An ætiological observation of the narrator: This is why a man leaves ... and cleaves ... and they become, etc.] It is not a prophecy from the standpoint of the narrative; nor a recommendation of monogamic marriage (as applied in Matthew 194 ff., Mark 106 ff., 1 Corinthians 6¹⁶, Ephesians 5³¹); it is an answer to the question, What is the meaning of that universal instinct which impels a man to separate from his parents and cling to his wife? It is strange that the man’s attachment to the woman is explained here, and the woman’s to the man only in 3¹⁶.
It has been imagined that the verse presupposes the primitive custom called beena marriage, or that modification of it in which the husband parts from his own kindred for good, and goes to live with his wife’s kin (so Gunkel: compare Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia², 87, 207); and other instances are alleged in the patriarchal history. But this would imply an almost incredible antiquity for the present form of the narrative; and, moreover, the dominion of the man over the wife assumed in 316b is inconsistent with the conditions of beena marriage. Compare Benzinger Encyclopædia Biblica, 2675: “The phrase ... may be an old saying dating from remote times when the husband went to the house (tent) of the wife and joined her clan. Still the passage may be merely the narrator’s remark; and even if it should be an old proverb we cannot be sure that it really carries us so far back in antiquity.”—See, however, Gressmann, Archiv für Religionswissenschaft., x. 353¹; van Doorninck, Theologisch Tijdschrift, xxxix. 238 (who assigns 2²⁴ and 3¹⁶ to different recensions).
one flesh] If the view just mentioned could be maintained, this phrase might be equivalent to ‘one clan’ (Leviticus 25⁴⁹); for “both in Hebrew and Arabic ‘flesh’ is synonymous with ‘clan’ or kindred group” (Lectures on the Religion of the Semites², 274). More probably it refers simply to the connubium.—25. naked ... not ashamed] The remark is not merely an anticipation of the account given later of the origin of clothing (3⁷, compare ²¹). It calls attention to the difference between the original and the actual condition of man as conceived by the writer. The consciousness of sex is the result of eating the tree: before then our first parents had the innocence of children, who are often seen naked in the East (Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, ii. 475).
Verse ²⁵ is a transition verse, leading over to the main theme to which all that goes before is but the prelude. How long the state of primitive innocence lasted, the writer is at no pains to inform us. This indifference to the non-essential is as characteristic of the popular tale as its graphic wealth of detail in features of real interest. The omission afforded an opportunity for the exercise of later Midrashic ingenuity; Jubilees iii. 15 fixes the period at seven years, while R. Eliezer (Bereshith Rabba) finds that it did not last six hours.
18. אעשה] May be cohortative (Gesenius-Kautzsch § 75 l); LXX, Vulgate render as 1st person plural (as 1²⁶).—עזר] (usually ‘succour’) = ‘helper’ (abstractum pro concreto) is used elsewhere chiefly of God (Deuteronomy 337. 26, Psalms 33²⁰ 1159 ff. etc.); possible exceptions are Ezekiel 12¹⁴ (if text right), Hosea 13⁹ (if emended with Wellhausen): see Brown-Driver-Briggs.—כנגדו] LXX κατ’ αὐτόν (but verse ²⁰ ὅμοιος αὐτῷ); Aquila ὡς κατέναντι αὐτοῦ; Symmachus ἀντικρὺς αὐτοῦ; Vulgate similis sibi (ejus, verse ²⁰); Peshiṭtå (‡ Syriac word); TargumOnkelos כקיבליהּ.—19. The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch, LXX insert עוֹד after אלהים.—Omission of את־ before כל־חית is remarkable in this chapter (see on verse ⁹), and is rectified by The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch.—נפש חיה] The only construction possible would be to take לו as dative ethical, and נ׳ ח׳ as direct object to יקרא; but that is contrary to the writer’s usage, and yields a jejune sense. Even if (with Rashi) we transpose and read ‘every living thing which the man called [by a name], that was its name,’ the discord of gender would be fatal, to say nothing of the addition of שֵׁם.—20. ולעוף] Read with MSS LXX, Vulgate, Peshiṭtå TargumJonathan ולכלֹ־עוף (Ball).—וּלְאָדָם] Here the Massoretic takes Adam as a proper name. Delitzsch, al. explain it as generic = ‘for a human being’ (Gunkel); Olshausen emends וְהָאדם. The truth is that the Massoretic loses no opportunity presented by the Kethîb of treating אדם as noun proper. Point וְלָֽאָדָם.—לא מצא] Tuch, al. take God as subject; but it may be passive expressed by indefinite subject (Gesenius-Kautzsch § 144 d, e) = ‘there was not found.’—21. תרדמה] LXX ἔκστασιν; Aquila καταφοράν; Symmachus κάρον; Peshiṭtå (‡ Syriac word) (‘tranquillity’); Vulgate sopor; TargumOnkelos and some Greek versions (Field) have ‘sleep’ simply. The examples of its use (15¹², 1 Samuel 26¹², Isaiah 29¹⁰, Job 4¹³ 33¹⁵, Proverbs 19¹⁵†), all except the last, confirm Duhm’s view that hypnotic sleep is indicated. It is true that in the verb (Niphal) that sense is less marked.—23. זאת הפעם] The construction rendered above takes זאת as subject of the sentence and הפעם = ‘this time,’ the article having full demonstrative force, as in 2934 f. 30²⁰ 46³⁰, Exodus 9²⁷ (so LXX, Symmachus, Theodotion, Vulgate; Delitzsch, Dillmann, Gunkel, al.). The accents, however, unite the words in one phrase ‘this time,’ after the rather important analogy of זֶה פַעֲמַיִם (27³⁶ 43¹⁰), leaving the subject unexpressed. This sense is followed by Peshiṭtå, TargumOnkelos-Jonathan, and advocated by Stade (Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, xvii. 210 ff.); but it seems less acceptable than the other.—אִישׁ, אִשָּׁה] The old derivation of these words from a common √ אנשׁ is generally abandoned, אישׁ being assigned to a hypothetical √ אוּשׁ = ‘be strong’ (Gesenius Thesaurus philologicus criticus Linguæ Hebrææ et Chaldææ Veteris Testamenti). Arabic and Aramaic, indeed, show quite clearly that the √ seen in the plural אֲנָשִׁים (and in אֱנוֹשׁ) and that of (אִנְשָׁה) אשָּׁה are only apparently identical, the one having s where the other has ṯ. The masculine and feminine are therefore etymologically distinct, and nothing remains but a very strong assonance. The question whether we are to postulate a third √ for the singular אִישׁ does not greatly concern us here; the arguments will be found in Brown-Driver-Briggs, s.v. See Nöldeke Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, xl. 740 (“Aber אִישׁ möchte ich doch bei אנשׁ lassen”). In imitation of the assonance, Symmachus has ἄνδρις, Vulgate Virago. Theodotion λῆψις, represents אֶשָּׂא, ‘I will take’: a curious blunder which is fully elucidated by the quotation from Origen given in Field, page 15³².—For מאיש, The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch, LXX, TargumOnkelos read מֵאִישָׁהּ, which is by no means an improvement.—לֽקֳחָה־זּאת] See Gesenius-Kautzsch §§ 10 h, 20 c.—24. והיו] Add שְׁנֵיהֶם with LXX, Vulgate, Peshiṭtå, TargumJonathan and New Testament citations. The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch has והיה משניהם, referring to the offspring.—25. עֲרוּמִּים] עָרוּם ‘naked,’ to be carefully distinguished from עָרוּם (√ ערם) ‘crafty,’ in 3¹, is either a by-form of עֵירֹם (√ עוּר = ‘be bare’) in 310 f., or (more probably) a different formation from √ ערה (‘be bare’). See Brown-Driver-Briggs, s.vv.—יתבששו] The Hithpael (only here) probably expresses reciprocity (‘ashamed before one another’); the imperfect is frequentative.
Attention is at once directed to the quarter where the possibility of evil already lurked amidst the happiness of Eden—the preternatural subtlety of the serpent: But the serpent was wily] The wisdom of the serpent was proverbial in antiquity (Matthew 10¹⁶: see Bochart, Hierozoicon, sive bipertitum opus de animalibus Sacræ Scripturæ iii. 246 ff.), a belief probably founded less on observation of the creature’s actual qualities than on the general idea of its divine or demonic nature: πνευματικώτατον γὰρ τὸ ζῶον πάντων τῶν ἑρπετῶν (Sanchuniathon, in Eusebius Præparatio Evangelica i. 10). Hence the epithet עָרוּם might be used of it sensu bono (φρόνιμος), though the context here makes it certain that the bad sense (πανοῦργος) is intended (see below).—beyond any beast, etc.] The serpent, therefore, belongs to the category of ‘beasts of the field,’ and is a creature of Yahwe; and an effort seems to be made to maintain this view throughout the narrative (verse ¹⁴). At the same time it is a being possessing supernatural knowledge, with the power of speech, and animated by hostility towards God. It is this last feature which causes some perplexity. To say that the thoughts which it instils into the mind of the woman were on the serpent’s part not evil, but only extremely sagacious, and became sin first in the human consciousness (so Merx, Dillmann, al.), is hardly in accordance with the spirit of the narrative. It is more probable that behind the sober description of the serpent as a mere creature of Yahwe, there was an earlier form of the legend in which he figured as a god or a demon.
The ascription of supernatural characters to the serpent presents little difficulty even to the modern mind. The marvellous agility of the snake, in spite of the absence of visible motor organs, its stealthy movements, its rapid death-dealing stroke, and its mysterious power of fascinating other animals and even men, sufficiently account for the superstitious regard of which it has been the object amongst all peoples.¹ Accordingly, among the Arabs every snake is the abode of a spirit, sometimes bad and sometimes good, so that ǧānn and ġūl and even Shaitān are given as designations of the serpent (Wellhausen Reste arabischen Heidentums 152 f.; compare William Robertson Smith Lectures on the Religion of the Semites², 120¹, 129 f., 442).² What is more surprising to us is the fact that in the sphere of religion the serpent was usually worshipped as a good demon. Traces of this conception can be detected in the narrative before us. The demonic character of the serpent appears in his possession of occult divine knowledge of the properties of the tree in the middle of the garden, and in his use of that knowledge to seduce man from his allegiance to his Creator. The enmity between the race of men and the race of serpents is explained as a punishment for his successful temptation; originally he must have been represented as a being hostile, indeed, to God, but friendly to the woman, who tells her the truth which the Deity withheld from man (see Gressman l.c. 357). All this belongs to the background of heathen mythology from which the materials of the narrative were drawn; and it is the incomplete elimination of the mythological element, under the influence of a monotheistic and ethical religion, which makes the function of the serpent in Genesis 3 so difficult to understand. In later Jewish theology the difficulty was solved, as is well known, by the doctrine that the serpent of Eden was the mouthpiece or impersonation of the devil. The idea appears first in Alexandrian Judaism in Wisdom 2²⁴ (‘by the envy of the devil, death entered into the world’): possibly earlier is the allusion in Enoch lxix. 6, where the seduction of Eve is ascribed to a Satan called Gadreel. Compare Secrets of Enoch xxxi. 3 ff., Psalms of Solomon 4⁹; also Bereshith Rabba 29, the name נָחָשׁ הַקַּדְמֹנִי (Sifrê 138 b), and in the New Testament, John 8⁴⁴, 2 Corinthians 11³, Romans 16²⁰, Apocalypse 12⁹ 20² (see Whitehouse, A Dictionary of the Bible, iv. 408 ff.). Similarly in Persian mythology the serpent Dahâka, to whose power Yima, the ruler of the golden age, succumbs, is a creature and incarnation of the evil spirit Angro-Mainyo (Vend. i. 8, xxii. 5, 6, 24; Yaçna ix. 27; compare Dillmann 70). The Jewish and Christian doctrine is a natural and legitimate extension of the teaching of Genesis 3, when the problem of evil came to be apprehended in its real magnitude; but it is foreign to the thought of the writer, although it cannot be denied that it may have some affinity with the mythological background of his narrative. The religious teaching of the passage knows nothing of an evil principle external to the serpent, but regards himself as the subject of whatever occult powers he displays: he is simply a creature of Yahwe distinguished from the rest by his superior subtlety. The Yahwistic author does not speculate on the ultimate origin of evil; it was enough for his purpose to have so analysed the process of temptation that the beginning of sin could be assigned to a source which is neither in the nature of man nor in God. The personality of the Satan (the Adversary) does not appear in the Old Testament till after the Exile (Zechariah, Job, Chronicles).
The serpent shows his subtlety by addressing his first temptation to the more mobile temperament of the woman (Rashi, al.), and by the skilful innuendo with which he at once invites conversation and masks his ultimate design.—Ay, and so God has said, etc.!] Something like this seems to be the force of אַף כִּי (v.i.). It is a half-interrogative, half-reflective exclamation, as if the serpent had brooded long over the paradox, and had been driven to an unwelcome conclusion.—Ye shall not eat of any tree] The range of the prohibition is purposely exaggerated in order to provoke inquiry and criticism. The use of the name אֱלֹהִים is commonly explained by the analogy of other passages of Yahwist, where the name יהוה is avoided in conversation with heathen (39⁹ etc.), or when the contrast between the divine and the human is reflected upon (32²⁹). But Yahwist’s usage in such cases is not uniform, and it is doubtful what is the true explanation here (see page 53).—2, 3. The woman’s first experience of falsehood leads to an eager repudiation of the serpent’s intentional calumny, in which she emphasises the generosity of the divine rule, but unconsciously intensifies the stringency of the prohibition by adding the words: nor shall ye touch it] A Jewish legend says that the serpent took advantage of this innocent and immaterial variation by forcing her to touch the fruit, and then arguing that as death had not followed the touch, so it would not follow the eating (Bereshith Rabba, Rashi). Equally futile inferences have been drawn by modern commentaries, and the surmise that the clause is redactional (Budde Die biblische Urgeschichte 241) is hypercritical.—the tree ... midst] See page 66 f.—4. Ye shall assuredly not die] On the syntax, v.i. The serpent thus advances to an open challenge of the divine veracity, and thence to the imputation of an unworthy motive for the command, viz. a jealous fear on God’s part lest they should become His equals.—5. But God knoweth, etc.] And therefore has falsely threatened you with death. The gratuitous insinuation reveals the main purpose of the tempter, to sow the seeds of distrust towards God in the mind of the woman.—your eyes shall be opened] The expression denotes a sudden acquisition of new powers of perception through supernatural influence (21¹⁹, Numbers 22³¹, 2 Kings 6¹⁷).—as gods] or ‘divine beings,’ rather than ‘as God’: the rendering ‘as angels’ (Abraham Ibn Ezra) expresses the idea with substantial accuracy. The likeness to divinity actually acquired is not equality with Yahwe (see Gunkel on verse ²²).—knowing good and evil] See page 95 ff.—“The facts are all, in the view of the narrator, correctly stated by the serpent; he has truly represented the mysterious virtue of the tree; knowledge really confers equality with God (3²²); and it is also true that death does not immediately follow the act of eating. But at the same time the serpent insinuates a certain construction of these facts: God is envious, inasmuch as He grudges the highest good to man:—φθονερὸν τὸ θεῖον, an antique sentiment familiar to us from the Greeks” (Gunkel).—6. The spiritual part of the temptation is now accomplished, and the serpent is silent, leaving the fascination of sense to do the rest. The woman looks on the tree with new eyes; she observes how attractive to taste and sight its fruit seems, and how desirable for obtaining insight (so most) or to contemplate (LXX, Vulgate, Peshiṭtå; so Tuch, Gesenius, Delitzsch, Gunkel, al.). The second translation is the more suitable—for how could she tell by sight that the fruit would impart wisdom?—although the verb is not elsewhere used in Hebrew for mere looking (v.i.).—gave also to her husband] “The process in the man’s case was no doubt the same as that just described, the woman taking the place of the serpent” (Bennett). That Adam sinned with his eyes open in order not to be separated from his wife has been a common idea both among Jews and Christians (Bereshith Rabba, Rashi, Abraham Ibn Ezra, Milton, etc.), but is not true to the intention of the narrative.—7. the eyes ... opened] The prediction of the serpent is so far fulfilled; but the change fills them with guilty fear and shame.—they knew that they were naked] The new sense of shame is spoken of as a sort of Werthurtheil passed by the awakened intelligence on the empirical fact of being unclothed. A connexion between sexual shame and sin (Dillmann) is not suggested by the passage, and is besides not true to experience. But to infer from this single effect that the forbidden fruit had aphrodisiac properties (see Barton, A Sketch of Semitic Origins¹, 93 ff.; Gressmann, page 356) is a still greater perversion of the author’s meaning; he merely gives this as an example of the new range of knowledge acquired by eating of the tree. It is the kind of knowledge which comes with maturity to all,—the transition “from the innocence of childhood into the knowledge which belongs to adult age” (Driver).—foliage of the fig-tree] To the question, Why fig-leaves in particular? the natural answer is that these, if not very suitable for the purpose, were yet the most suitable that the flora of Palestine could suggest (Dillmann, Driver, Bennett, al.). An allusion to the so-called fig-tree of Paradise, a native of India (probably the plantain), is on every ground improbable;—“ein geradezu philisterhafter Einfall” (Budde). For allegorical interpretations of the fig-leaves, see Lagarde, Mittheilungen i. 73 ff., who adds a very original and fantastic one of his own.
1. והנחש היה] The usual order of words when a new subject is introduced, Gesenius-Kautzsch § 142 d; Davidson § 105.—ערום] LXX φρονιμώτατος, Aquila, Theodotion πανοῦργος, Symmachus πανουργότερος Vulgate callidior. The good sense (which appears to be secondary, compare Arabic ‛arama = ‘be ill-natured’) is confined to Proverbs; elsewhere (Job 5¹² 15⁵) it means ‘crafty,’ ‘wily.’ The same distinction is observed in all forms of the √ except that in Job 5¹³ עֹרֶם has the good sense. The resemblance to ערומים in 2²⁵ is perhaps accidental.—ויאמר LXX, Peshiṭtå + הנחש.—אף כי] as a compound particple generally means ‘much more (or less),’ ‘not to mention,’ etc., as in 1 Samuel 14³⁰, 1 Kings 8²⁷, Proverbs 11³¹ etc. In some cases the simple אף has this sense, and the כי (= ‘when,’ ‘if’) introduces the following clause (1 Samuel 23³, 2 Samuel 410 f. etc.). It would be easy to retain this sense in verse ¹ (‘How much more when God has said,’ etc.), if we might assume with many commentaries that some previous conversation had taken place; but that is an unwarrantable assumption. The rendering on which Driver (Brown-Driver-Briggs) bases the ordinary meaning of אף כי—‘’Tis indeed that’—requires but a slight interrogative inflexion of the voice to yield the shade of meaning given above: ‘So it is the case that God,’ etc.? The versions all express a question: LXX τί ὅτι, Aquila μὴ ὅτι, Symmachus πρὸς τί, Vulgate cur, Peshiṭtå (‡ Syriac word), TargumOnkelos בקושטא (= ‘really’?).—לא ... מכל] = ‘not of any’: Gesenius-Kautzsch § 152 b.—2. מפרי] LXX מִכֹּל, Peshiṭtå מפרי כל.—3. ומפרי] Not ‘concerning the tree.’ There is an anakolouthon at אמר אלהים, and the emphatically placed מפרי is resumed by ממנו.—העץ] The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch + הַזָּה.—תמתון] On the ending, see Gesenius-Kautzsch §§ 47 m, 72 u.—4. לא מות תמתון] On the unusual order, see Davidson § 86 (b); Gesenius-Kautzsch § 113 v. It is often explained as a negation of the threat in 2¹⁷, adopting the same form of words; but the phrase had not been used by the woman, and the exact words are not repeated. More probably its effect is to concentrate the emphasis on the negative participle rather than on the verbal idea (compare Amos 9⁸, Psalms 49⁸).—5. כאלהים] LXX ὡς θεοί, TargumOnkelos כרברבין.—6. העץ²] LXX Vulgate omitted.—להשכיל] LXX κατανοῆσαι, Vulgate adspectu, and Peshiṭtå (‡ Syriac word) all take the verb as verb of sight; TargumOnkelos לאסתכלא ביה is indeterminate (see Levy, Chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Targumim und Midraschim 163 a). In Old Testament the word is used of mental vision (insight, or attentive consideration: Deuteronomy 32²⁹, Psalms 41², Proverbs 21¹² etc.); in New Hebrew and Aramaic it means ‘to look at,’ but only in Hithpael (Ithp.). On the other view the Hiph. is intransitive (= ‘for acquiring wisdom’: Psalms 94⁸) rather than causative (= ‘to impart wisdom’: Psalms 32⁸ etc.).—Gunkel considers the clause ונחמד העץ לה׳ a variant from another source.—ותקח] LXXLucian + האשׁה.—ויאכל] The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch, LXX ויאכלו.—7. עירמים] See on 2²⁵.—עלה] collectively; but some MSS and The Samaritan Recension of the Pentateuch have עֲלֵי.
Thus far the narrative has dealt with what may be called the natural (magical) effects of the eating of the tree—the access of enlightenment, and the disturbance thus introduced into the relations of the guilty pair to each other. The ethical aspect of the offence comes to light in their first interview with Yahwe; and this is delineated with a skill hardly surpassed in the account of the temptation itself.—8. they heard the sound] קוֹל used of footsteps, as 2 Samuel 5²⁴, 1 Kings 14⁶, 2 Kings 6³²: compare Ezekiel 312 f., Joel 2⁵.—of Yahwe God as He walked] The verb is used (Leviticus 26¹², Deuteronomy 23¹⁵, 2 Samuel 7⁶) of Yahwe’s majestic marching in the midst of Israel; but it mars the simplicity of the representation if (with Delitzsch) we introduce that idea here.—in the cool (literally ‘at the breeze’) of the day] i.e. towards evening, when in Eastern lands a refreshing wind springs up (compare Canticles 2¹⁷ 4⁶: but v.i.), and the master, who has kept his house or tent during the ‘heat of the day’ (18¹), can walk abroad with comfort (24⁶³). Such, we are led to understand, was Yahwe’s daily practice; and the man and woman had been wont to meet Him with the glad confidence of innocence. But on this occasion they hid themselves, etc.—9. Where art thou?] (compare 4⁹). The question expresses ignorance; it is not omniscience that the writer wishes to illustrate, but the more impressive attribute of sagacity.—10. I feared ... naked] With the instinctive cunning of a bad conscience, the man hopes to escape complete exposure by acknowledging part of the truth; he alleges nakedness as the ground of his fear, putting fear and shame in a false causal connexion (Holzinger).—11. Hast thou eaten, etc.?] All unwittingly he has disclosed his guilty secret: he has shown himself possessed of a knowledge which could only have been acquired in one way.—12. The man cannot even yet bring himself to make a clean breast of it; but with a quaint mixture of cowardice and effrontery he throws the blame directly on the woman, and indirectly on God who gave her to him.—13. The woman in like manner exculpates herself by pleading (truly enough) that she had been deceived by the serpent.—The whole situation is now laid bare, and nothing remains but to pronounce sentence. No question is put to the serpent, because his evil motive is understood: he has acted just as might have been expected of him. Calvin says, “the beast had no sense of sin, and the devil no hope of pardon.”
8. מתהלך] accusative of condition: Davidson § 70 (a).—לרוח היום] LXX τὸ δειλινόν, Vulgate ad auram post meridiem, Peshiṭtå (‡ Syriac word) (‡ Syriac word), TargumOnkelos למנח יומא. On this use of לְ (= ‘towards’), see Brown-Driver-Briggs, s.v. 6 a; and compare 8¹¹ 17²¹, Isaiah 7¹⁵, Job 24¹⁴. With רוח compare Arabic rawāḥ = tempus vespertinum. Jewish exegesis (Bereshith Rabba) and Calvin suppose the morning (sea) breeze to be meant, as is probably the case in Canticles 2¹⁷ 4⁶, and would seem more in accordance with Palestinian conditions. But it is manifestly improbable here.—עץ] collectively, as often. LXXLucian omitted.—9. איכה] Gesenius-Kautzsch § 100 o. LXX supplies ‘Adam’ before, and Peshiṭtå after, the interrogative.—10. שׁמעתי] LXX + περιπατοῦντος (as verse ⁸).—11. לבלתי] See Gesenius-Kautzsch § 114 s.—Before μὴ φαγεῖν LXX has τούτου μόνου.—13. מה־זאת] So commonly with עשה; with other verbs מה־זה (Gesenius-Kautzsch § 136 c; Davidson § 7 (c)).