The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with the coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the communion of the one with other things is apparent, and we must no longer consider the one alone by itself, but according to its habitude towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what occasion is there to say that the term other things, is a sign of a corporeal condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to characterize an incorporeal nature by the one, but indicated to us the nature which is divisible about body, through the term others? In the second place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides] is doubled. For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from itself,[304] and to be different from other things, and the same with other things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates in the Cratylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order is apparent, the prolific power coordinate with it, the undefiled monad the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes; and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all things, and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of his father.

How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become apparent? We reply, that the same with itself (for this Parmenides first demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of the one, the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists. Hence, likewise, the one is said to be the same with itself. For the another is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different causes; but the same, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demiurgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that which is allied to bound. But the same with other things, is the singular good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading through all things without impediment. For the demiurgus is present to all things which he produces, and is in all things the same, which he arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and infinity subsist in him demiurgically. And the one indeed is in the sameness which is separate from other things, but the other is in the power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis.

Moreover, the different from other things, manifests his undefiled purity, and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or communion[305] with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as Timæus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other participants. Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he is the same with them. For he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity, undefiled power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is disjoined from them, and is imparticipable by other things. And as the first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through the guard which is united to him, and through the undefiled monad; and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and inflexible power from the second cause of the guardian Gods; thus also the demiurgic intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate with the demiurgus, who hastens to produce[306] all things, and to pervade through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power, is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellectual conceptions [i.e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts an undefiled union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order, and which Parmenides also producing for us together with the whole demiurgus, defines it in difference, in the same manner as he does the undefiled cause in the demiurgus. He says however, that this difference separates the demiurgic monad itself from itself. For we have before observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods. As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the paternal union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this power? From being in himself, says Parmenides, and in another. For these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Separation therefore, pre-existed there according to cause; but in the demiurgus it shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself.

That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in the first father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis, when he says, “that every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect a duad, and is separated from itself.” There however, the duad is occultly; but here it subsists more clearly, where also all intellectual multitude shines forth to the view. For difference is the progeny of the firmly-abiding duad which is there. This therefore separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and divides the monads in it from each other. For if so far as it is in another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far as it is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according to each order of its own intelligible,—if this be the case, it is necessary that this difference should be the cause to it of separation from its father. All the intellectual monads therefore, have appeared to us to subsist coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, in another is the sign of the father. But the subsistence in itself, is the sign of the first unpolluted monad. Again, motion is the sign of vivific goodness; but permanency of the inflexible power conjoined with motion. And sameness with itself, and with another, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity; but the being different from other things, is the sign of the guard about the demiurgus. And in the last place, the being different from itself, is the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to cause indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its hypostasis more clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears to me, when dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in the middles themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad, and of the dividing monad, so far as they also are in a certain respect comprehended in the fabrication. For he shows in the first of the conclusions that the one is the same with itself; in the second, that it is different from itself; in the third, that it is different from other things; and in the fourth that it is the same with other things. For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing power with the paternal union; but connects with a transcendency separate from secondary natures, the providential cause of them. For in the Gods, it is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and a purity unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential inspection of them; through which likewise, being every where, they are no where, being present with all things, they are exempt from all things, and being all things, they are not any of their progeny.

END OF VOL. I.