I have now given a short account of the forces, regular and irregular, composing the whole Russian army, which is, perhaps, the most stupendous military engine which the world has ever yet seen.

While the nations of Europe have been disarming, Russia has been augmenting her forces, and spending a very large proportion of her revenue in storing up weapons of destruction. Peaceful avocations have been discouraged by her, and men of peace looked upon with contempt. She knows no titles but military ones; and rewards no virtues except those calculated to support her despotism. She has resisted the natural influence of Europe upon her people, and kept them in poverty-stricken isolation; by her stupendous military force she prevents the further disarming of the nations of Europe. In proportion as they approach the Russian frontier, they are obliged to keep up larger armies, and waste more of their revenues on fortresses and military preparations. The threatening aspect of the Russian army towards its neighbours will be more distinctly seen if we look at it according to its division into the active, mobilized army, always assembled in Poland, with its reserves behind it to the eastward, and the local troops, which have been already mentioned.

Every regiment is divided into a certain number of battalions for active service, ready immediately to enter the field, and others which form the reserve or dépôt, whose duty it is to instruct recruits, and, like the Prussian landwehr, to form skeleton battalions for veterans, and those absent on “indefinite leave.” The artillery is arranged in the same manner. The active troops, distributed in corps, are completely organized, with staff, engineers, train-equipage, and parks of artillery; and even all the necessary horses are kept ready, in time of peace, for entering instantly upon a campaign. To use the words of M. Haxthausen, writing before the present war, “there is no army in the world, with the exception of the Austrian army in Italy, that up to 1848 was always so completely ready for war as the great, active army of Russia in Poland.”

The composition of this army is given in the following table, taken from M. Haxthausen, and its effective force is stated by him as follows (see p. 134):—

After a deduction of 50 soldiers for the train, the musicians, and the superior officers, every battalion of infantry counts about 1000 combatants, i. e., soldiers and non-commissioned officers; and the battalions of riflemen, 653 men.⁠[119]

The number of officers is 22 for each battalion; and the musicians, besides the band, which is very numerous in many regiments, are generally about 25. As there are 8 battalions of riflemen, the Grand Army counts—

A further deduction must be made for deaths, discharges, deserters, reducing the battalions to about 700 men, which is believed to be their real numbers, from which no further deduction need be made. This will leave 260,000 infantry combatants really under arms.

A squadron of cavalry contains, on an average, 190 combatants in time of war, and therefore—

of regular cavalry, always ready to march.

The above deduction will be more than sufficient, if there be allowed a loss of 27 or 28 men in each squadron before it can arrive at the frontier. The lowest force, then, of regular cavalry immediately disposable for the army of operation is about 70,000 men. No deduction need be made from the artillery, which, on the contrary, must be increased by the artillery of the Cossacks. The reserves are divided into two levies, of which the details are given in the note.⁠[120] They amount—the first levy, to 98,000 men and 192 guns; and the second levy to 115,000 men and 280 guns.

Recapitulation of the Divisions of Troops composing the Grand Army, according to data of the Year 1852.

Such were the numbers of the Russian active army in Poland in 1848; and it was further increased in 1850. At that time (the end of 1850) the active army of operation, according to the official account, consisted as follows:—

To which must be added the engineers, the train, and the irregular corps.

Of course, as has been observed, the whole disposition of the army has been altered since the present war began. The Moscow corps has been moved to the Caucasus; the Polish corps have been moved south, and the Grenadiers have taken their place; and the reserves have, I believe, been all called out, and probably consumed in replacing those who have fallen in the last two years.

So that when we look at the Russian forces now assembled in the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the German and Baltic frontiers, we see the whole of the Russian army, including its reserves, which cannot be easily augmented. Each man that falls now becomes of great importance to the Emperor; for the conscription is becoming more and more difficult, and bearing with increased severity upon all the interests of the empire. The age at which conscripts are taken is now raised to thirty-seven;⁠[121] and the sons of aged or widowed parents, who have hitherto been exempted, are to serve, and be formed into separate corps. I believe that in the manufacturing establishments in Russia as many as 25 per cent. of the workmen have lately been carried off for the conscription.

The difficulties of Russia are increasing every day; and it is hardly possible for her to carry on the war for another six months, if with our change of Ministry we likewise have a change of system, and if at home and in the Crimea our superior officials, both military and civil, have anything like that intelligence, activity, intrepidity, and single-minded love of their country displayed by the common soldiers and regimental officers of our army, who have hitherto been the only bulwarks to save us from national disgrace.