The first agents of the South had spent seven months in Europe without accomplishing anything. It became painfully evident to the Confederacy that those who were then representing its interests abroad would never be able to secure for it the much desired recognition of its independence. Although disappointed at this failure, Mr. Davis was not disheartened, but determined to try the effect of a second and much more formal mission, in which the interests of the Confederate government would be represented by men of much more ability and force of character than those who had been sent in the first instance. The new representatives were to be duly commissioned as “ambassadors” for the Confederate States. Their proposed work abroad was thought to be of vital importance to the interests of the Confederacy. After due consideration of the matter, therefore, Messrs. James Murray Mason, of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, were selected for this employment and credentials duly furnished them by which the former was to represent the Confederate States in England, and the latter in France.

Mr. James M. Mason was a Virginian whose name was historic. His family had been distinguished in the history of his state from the earliest colonial times, and Mr. Mason himself was a man of great personal mark, possessing ability of the highest order. He had represented Virginia in the United States senate for years prior to the secession of that state. He had been chairman of the senate committee on foreign affairs and was the author of the fugitive slave law. Indeed an examination of his senatorial record shows that he never lost an opportunity to dilate upon the fugitive slave question. The failure or refusal of citizens of the free states to apprehend and return to their masters runaway slaves that were constantly escaping from Virginia was to Mr. Mason a grievance of unexampled proportions. On the first day that congress convened again after the John Brown raid, Senator Mason introduced a resolution of inquiry into the facts attending the invasion and seizure of Harper’s Ferry, Virginia: “whether such invasion and seizure was made under color of any organization intended to subvert the government of any of the states of the Union; what was the character and extent of such organization; and whether any citizens of the United States not present were implicated therein or accessory thereto by contributions of money, arms, munitions or otherwise; what was the character and extent of the military equipment in the hands or under the control of said armed band and where and how and when the same was obtained and transported to the place so invaded.”⁠[1] This resolution was evidently intended to fix the responsibility for the John Brown raid where it did not belong, viz., upon the Republican party in the northern states.

Mr. Mason was one of the first to advocate the secession of Virginia. A powerful minority in that state opposed the movement, and it was not without considerable opposition that the secessionists triumphed. The convention called to consider the question of seceding passed an ordinance withdrawing the state from the Union, provided the measure be approved by the people of Virginia at a special election called to decide the matter. Some ten days before the election Mr. Mason published a letter which was widely circulated giving his views with regard to the act of secession, which, he declared, “withdrew the state of Virginia from the Union with all the consequences resulting from the separation,” and nullified “all the constitution and laws of the United States within its limits.” He thought Virginia could not afford to reject the secession ordinance at the coming election, and said: “If it be asked what those shall do who can not in conscience vote to separate Virginia from the United States, the answer is simple and plain. Honor and duty alike require that they should not vote on the question, and if they retain such opinions they must leave the state.”⁠[2] This was meant to encourage intimidation of the loyal people throughout the state, and the history of the time shows that such advice was not given in vain.

Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, had also been known in public life previous to the civil war. A native of New York, he had in early life become a citizen of Louisiana, where he had married an accomplished French Creole lady. He entered public life in 1842, being elected to the house of representatives.

Mr. Slidell represented Louisiana in the United States senate when his state seceded from the Union. His withdrawal speech was bitter in the extreme. The following is an extract from it: “We have no idea that you will even attempt to invade our soil with your armies; but we acknowledge your superiority on the sea, at present, in some degree accidental, but in the main, natural and permanent, until we shall have acquired better ports for our marine. You may, if you will it, persist in considering us bound to you during your good pleasure; you may deny the sacred and indefeasible right, we will not say of secession, but of revolution—aye, of rebellion, if you choose so to call our action—the right of every people to establish for itself that form of government which it may, even in its folly, if such you deem it, consider best calculated to secure its safety and promote its welfare. You may ignore the principles of our immortal Declaration of Independence; you may attempt to reduce us to subjection, or you may, under color of enforcing your laws or collecting your revenue, blockade our ports. This will be war and we shall meet it with different but equally efficient weapons. We will not permit the consumption or introduction of any of your manufactures; every sea will swarm with our volunteer militia of the ocean, with the striped bunting floating over their heads, for we do not mean to give up that flag without a bloody struggle; it is ours as much as yours; and although for a time more stars may shine on your banner, our children, if not we, will rally under a constellation more numerous and more resplendent than yours. You may smile at this as an impotent boast, at least for the present, if not for the future, but, if we need ships and men for privateering, we shall be amply supplied from the same sources as now almost exclusively furnish the means for carrying on, with such unexampled vigor, the African slave trade—New York and New England. Your mercantile marine must either sail under foreign flags or rot at your wharves.”

“You were,” continued Mr. Slidell, “with all the wealth and resources of this great Confederacy, but a fourth or fifth rate naval power, with capacities, it is true, for large, and in a just quarrel almost indefinite expansion. What will you do when not merely emasculated by the withdrawal of fifteen states, but warred upon by them with active and inveterate hostility?”⁠[3]

Perhaps enough has been said of these men to convey an adequate idea of the character and motives of each of them. Both were ultra secessionists, active, talented and with sufficient ability to do all that could be done for their cause in Europe.

The object of the mission of Mason and Slidell to Europe was to secure, if possible, the recognition of the independence of the Confederate government by the respective states to which they were accredited; to effect alliances or to conclude treaties of commerce or amity; to procure the intervention of France and England, if their government so desired; to neutralize and defeat any diplomatic measures of the United States in Europe; to serve the financial and military needs of the insurgent government by procuring foreign loans, securing munitions of war, granting commissions, and, in short, to aid the Confederacy by every means in their power.

The United States was most fortunate at this time in having all of her foreign affairs in the hands of men who possessed more than ordinary ability as diplomats. Mr. Seward had early anticipated the work of all Confederate agents abroad and sent to each United States minister, accredited to any country which he thought would be applied to by insurgent missionaries, a carefully prepared letter of instructions containing an outline of the arguments to be used in thwarting the efforts of the southern representatives. The instructions given to Mr. Adams were, perhaps, the most careful and extended of any.

Mr. Seward thought the agents of the Confederates would not appeal to the magnanimity or justice of Great Britain, but rather to her cupidity and caprice; that they would ask recognition as a measure of retaliation against the Morrill tariff.

In response he thought it would be well to argue that every state has a right to regard its own convenience only in framing its revenue laws; that a recognition of the Confederacy would be equivalent to a deliberate resolve on the part of her majesty’s government that the American Union which had so long constituted a single prosperous nation should be permanently dissolved and forever cease to exist; that the excuse for so doing would be only a change in the American revenue laws—a change that in its very nature could be only temporary and ephemeral because of public sentiment in the United States which in a brief time would probably demand a change; that as a retaliatory measure recognition would be out of all proportion to the temporary disadvantage created by the revenue law; that a magnanimous nation which desired to retaliate could find other and more friendly remedies for foreign legislation that was injurious without deliberately seeking to destroy the offending nation. Mr. Seward thought that England should not be in haste to assume that the Confederate States would offer more liberal facilities for trade than the United States would be disposed to concede; that it might be well to wait and see whether the best terms of the South would be any more desirable than those which the North could offer. Attention was also to be called to the fact that absolute free trade had always existed among the several states of the Union, which was in effect free trade throughout the largest habitable part of North America; that during the entire national period of American history, except brief intervals that did not affect the result, constantly increasing liberality in commercial relations with foreign nations had been the policy of the United States; that these advances had been made necessarily, because with an increasing liberality the Federal government had, at the same time, owing to controlling causes, continually augmented its revenues and the whole country had increased its productions; and finally that it was quite evident that no different course would be followed in the future. It was also to be noted that the Confederate States might not be able to continue for any length of time the proposed commercial liberality which they proffered as an equivalent for recognition, since such liberality implied that peace must continuously exist and that trade relations would not be disturbed. If war rather than peace should mark the existence of the new government, there would be very strong temptations to levy an import duty since that would be one of their chief means of raising much needed revenue. It was further affirmed that only a limited examination of commercial statistics was sufficient to show that while the chief American exports to European countries were staples of the Confederate States, yet a very large proportion of the fabrics and products from abroad which were consumed in those states were obtained and must continue to be obtained not from Europe but from the northern states of America, and that the chief consumption of European goods imported into the United States took place in the same northern states; that the great features of that commerce could not be modified by the action of either the Confederate congress or the British parliament, since its composite character was due to the great variety of soils and climates of a continent, as well as the various institutions, customs and dispositions of the numerous communities living upon it. Mr. Seward was also of opinion that the Morrill tariff would not diminish the amount of English goods consumed in the United States, since the American people were active, energetic, industrious, inventive and not penurious, and they were engaged in developing a practically new continent of unlimited natural resources. This in his opinion caused both individual and public wealth to increase daily, and with such increase grew the habit of liberal if not profuse expenditure—results which no revenue legislation could change other than to vary the character and not the amount and value of foreign imports.

Mr. Adams was also advised to say that Great Britain was committed to a policy of industry and peace rather than of ambition and war; that such a policy had undoubtedly brought the best results to her as a nation; and that continued success in this career required peace throughout the civilized world and especially on this continent. “Recognition by her of the so-called Confederate States,” continued Mr. Seward, “would be intervention and war in this country. Permanent dismemberment of the American Union in consequence of that intervention would be perpetual war—civil war. The new Confederacy which Great Britain would have aided into existence would, like any other new state, seek to expand itself northward, westward and southward. What part of the continent or of the adjacent islands would be expected to remain in peace? President Lincoln would not for a moment believe that upon consideration of mere financial gain that government could be induced to lend its aid to a revolution designed to overthrow the institutions of this country and involving ultimately the destruction of the liberties of the American people.”

Another point to be noted was that recognition of the independence of a new state was the highest possible exercise of sovereign power, because it might result in establishing the new nation among the powers of earth—a result often fraught with grave consequences to other nations and to the peace of the world; that such a use of sovereign power should be made with greater prudence and caution in American than in European affairs, since its effects could not fail to be more serious.

That principle of international law was also invoked which regards nations as moral persons, bound so to act toward each other that not only the least injury but the most good-will be done. It was held that this great principle of international law would be reduced to the merest abstraction, too refined for an enlightened nation to practice, if recognition were granted to the Confederacy.

Lastly, Mr. Adams was instructed to remind the British government that the empire over which it ruled was made up of an aggregation of divers communities covering a large portion of the earth and including one-fifth of its total population; that many of its possessions were held by ties no stronger than those which held together the Federal Union; that a time would come when the strength of those bonds would be put to a severe test by insurrection or otherwise; and to conclude by asking whether it would be wise on that occasion to set so dangerous a precedent or to pursue such a course as might invoke the future retaliation of a powerful state.

Such were the arguments as they were outlined for the use of Mr. Adams in answering the expected appeal of the Confederate agents for the recognition of their government. They afford a thorough analysis of the whole matter. Every possible argument for recognition is fairly stated, fully discussed, and a logical conclusion reached. They are amply sufficient to convince any candid mind that not a single valid reason existed for recognizing the Confederacy, and that the mission of Mason and Slidell deserved only failure.

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.

1. Appleton’s Cyclopedia of American Biography.

2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress.

3. Congressional Globe: Part 1, 1st Session 36th Congress and Part 1, 2d Session 36th Congress.

4. Dana’s Wheaton’s International Law, note, pp. 653-6.

5. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861.

6. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America.

7. Senate Ex. Doc.: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I.

8. Winchester Virginian, May 16, 1861.