Before the middle of December, news of the intense excitement which prevailed in England reached the United States. About this time the New York Tribune said: “England is almost beside herself, is the tenor of the latest and most trustworthy private letters. They say that passion has swept away reason in a manner to an extent unknown since 1831, and that the national sympathy with the South developed by recent events is startling.” It having been suggested that the president submit a proposal to settle the matter by arbitration, the New York Journal of Commerce said that if only an adjudication by a court of admiralty were desired by the English government, it “could be easily accommodated by a return of the prisoners on board of the Trent at the point of capture, and then Captain Wilkes could fire a gun across her bow and bring her into port according to law.”

On December the 18th, the messenger of the British government, who had been sent from London with dispatches from his government relative to the affair, reached Washington and reported to Lord Lyons. The nature of the messages immediately became known by some means, and the entire North was excited anew by the prospect of a double war, but still there was a popular belief that the prisoners would not be surrendered, since there appeared to be no reason for a reversal of the almost universal verdict given at the time of the capture.

The momentous question everywhere was, “Will the government at Washington concede the British demand and give up the men?” Everybody wondered whether the angry growl of the British lion would have a sensible effect upon Mr. Lincoln and the administration. “The press took up the exciting theme, and, as usual, differed widely as to the course the government should adopt. Meanwhile the keen-sighted and adventurous began to talk of and to take steps toward the preparation of cruisers to prey upon the shipping of England, and an army of volunteers to meet the attack of the British army expected at Canada was on the tapis. Stocks went down at home and abroad as the warlike feeling in both countries went up, and to the public, war, for a while, seemed imminent.”⁠[1]

It was rumored that the prisoners would be given up by the administration. Among those that denied it was the New York Herald, which said it was only a “silly rumor” and that there “was not the slightest truth in the report.”

The “silly rumor,” however, speedily became a matter of seriousness, and, although not confirmed, it was universally believed, and was discussed by the press and the people of the North. Public opinion was everywhere strongly opposed to the course of action which rumor said would be pursued by the government. Such a proceeding, it was said, would be degrading to the nation, and was too humiliating to be endured. The right of a nation to deal as it wishes with its own citizens who are seeking to compass its destruction was confidently affirmed, and, although the case seemed a desperate one in view of the consequences which were almost certain to result from a refusal to accede to the British demand, there was a strong sentiment in favor of accepting what appeared to be the only alternative that remained to the American people, namely, to engage in another war with England. This opinion found favor with many public men, including prominent congressmen.

While this rumor was being discussed by the press and the public, Senator John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, made a speech in the United States senate concerning the matter. After saying that the measure involved more of good or evil to the country than anything that had ever occurred before, he continued as follows: “To my mind a more fatal act could not mark the history of this country—an act that would surrender at once to the arbitrary demand of Great Britain all that was won in the revolution, reduce us to the position of a second rate power, and make us the vassal of Great Britain. I would go as far as any reasonable man would go for peace, but not further. I would not be unwilling to submit this subject to the arbitration of any of the great powers of Europe, but I would not submit to the arbitrary, the absolute demand of Great Britain, to surrender these men, and humble our flag even to escape from a war with Great Britain. No man would make more honorable concessions than I would to preserve the peace, but sometimes peace is less honorable and more calamitous than war. The administration which is now in power ought to know what the feeling of the country is.”

Mr. Hale then referred to a conversation which he had just had with Senator Lane, of Indiana, who had said that the state of Indiana had then sixty thousand men in the field, and that she would double that number in sixty days if a war with Great Britain were brought about. “I have seen many gentlemen,” continued Mr. Hale, “and I have seen none, not a man can be found, who is in favor of this surrender, for it would humiliate us in the eyes of the world, irritate our own people and subject us to their indignant scorn. If we are to have war with Great Britain, it will not be because we refuse to surrender Messrs. Mason and Slidell; that is a mere pretense. If war shall come it will be because Great Britain has determined to force war upon us. They would humiliate us first and fight us afterwards. If we are to be humiliated I prefer to take it after a war, and not before. It is true, war would be a sacrifice to the people. I think I see its horrors, its disasters, its carnage, its blood, and its desolation, but, sir, let war come; let your cities be battered down, your armies be scattered, your fields barren, to preserve untarnished the national honor; a regenerating spirit among your people will restore your armies, and rebuild your cities and make fruitful your fields. * * * I pray that this administration will not surrender our national honor. I tell them that hundreds and thousands will rush to the battlefield, and bare their breasts to its perils rather than submit to degradation.

“But if we are to have war—I do not say that we shall—it will not be without its advantages. It will be a war that can not be carried on without fighting, and if we only understand our true position, we can proclaim to every man who speaks the English language on God’s footstool, the cause for which we are fighting; and this appeal will reach the hearts of millions of Englishmen, Irishmen and Frenchmen.

“We have heard, Mr. President, some fears expressed that Louis Napoleon is taking sides with England, and that we are to contend with the combined energies of both France and England. I do not believe it. I believe if Louis Napoleon harbors one single sentiment, if his action is guided by one single principle, if he has one single feeling that is predominant over all others, it is to have a fair field to retrieve the disastrous issue of Waterloo. And besides, sir, all over this country, throughout Canada, and in Ireland, there are hundreds and thousands and hundreds of thousands of true-hearted Irishmen who have long prayed for an opportunity to retaliate upon England for the wrongs which for centuries that government has inflicted upon their fatherland. If we know our own position and our own strength—I refer to the strength of principle—there will be nothing to be afraid of in this contest. If war must come, let it come; but I tell you, and I do not pretend to be a prophet, I think the slightest sagacity in public councils will sustain me in the position that if England enters upon this war, she will enter upon one of more than doubtful contingency.”⁠[2]

On December 16, in anticipation of the action of the government, Mr. Vallandigham, of Ohio, introduced into the House of Representatives a long preamble reciting the facts concerning the capture of the commissioners by Captain Wilkes, and the subsequent approval of his act by the secretary of the navy and by the popular branch of congress. To this was appended a resolution affirming it to be the sense of the house, “That it is the duty of the president to now firmly maintain the stand thus taken, approving and adopting the act of Captain Wilkes, in spite of any menace or demand of the British government, and that this house pledges its full support to him in upholding now the honor and vindicating the courage of the government and people of the United States against a foreign power.” By a vote of one hundred and nine to sixteen the resolution was referred to the committee on foreign affairs, Mr. Vallandigham and his friends voting with the minority.⁠[3]

A prominent public man who at that time was holding the position of minister to one of the European courts thought that “men and money should be sent into Ireland, India and all of the British dominions all over the world, to stir up revolt. Our cause is just, and vengeance will sooner or later overtake that perfidious aristocracy.”

The press throughout the North commented very freely upon the situation while the British demand was being considered. In general the newspapers did not sanction the proposed course of the government and their belligerent tone plainly indicated that they, too, favored a settlement of the controversy by a resort to arms. The Cincinnati Commercial said: “If war with England can with honor be avoided, we must avoid it; but if a peremptory demand for the release of Mason and Slidell has been made we do not see how it can be honorably complied with.”

“If we must fight we should pattern after England and hasten preparations on every side, on a scale commensurate with the danger, and with the celerity becoming action in so dreadful an emergency. One of the first things to be done would be the withdrawing from the southern coast of our fleets and armies, for, if exposed as at present, they would be annihilated in a month after the British commenced hostilities. We should also withdraw the outposts at Fortress Monroe, and provide that place with ample stores of provisions and ammunition that it might laugh a siege to scorn. The defense of our coast would also demand the utmost resources of the endangered communities and the supervision and assistance of the government.”

About the same time the Detroit Free Press said that “The threatened attitude of our affairs with England has once more called the attention of the public to our national defenses in the northern states. So far as the lakes are concerned, it would be impossible for England and Canada to offer any resistance, for our mercantile marine—much of which can be used temporarily until ships of war can be constructed—is more than a hundred fold more than theirs. We have more than a hundred ships where England and Canada have one, and our sailors upon these inland seas are in the same proportion. Under these circumstances it would be idle to expend any large sums of money, if war was probable, in fortifying our harbors or roadsteads. It is hardly possible to conceive of such a state of things to occur when we should not command the lakes absolutely. But to keep this ascendency the states bordering on the lakes should have large arsenals or depots of ammunition ready for instant use. If we had rifled cannon we could fit out a hundred gun-boats, which would command every harbor in the lakes in thirty days. We have the small steamers, but we have not the guns, the shot, the shell and other ammunition necessary to use the vessels to the best advantage.”

Another very well known newspaper said: “We can only hope that those at the head of the government may be equal to the emergency and that they will maintain the honor of the nation at whatever sacrifice.”⁠[4]

On December 12, the Cincinnati Gazette discussed the probabilities of a war with England and the true motive of that country for engaging in a contest with the United States: “National consciences are easily bent to suit their own interests. The possessions and the wars of England in every part of the world show this virtue in her to an eminent degree. She is now suffering great distress from our war, and has apprehensions of greater, as the winter advances. Therefore she supposes she has nothing additional to suffer by a war, and that by opening a market for her goods, and releasing the cotton supply, she will have immediate relief and a return to prosperity; while with her immense fleet she believes the job will be an easy one, and will not cause her any great additional expense. England believes it her interest to interfere, and her interest is her most reliable motive, as it is of all nations.”

On December 19, John W. Forney, who was, at that time, one of the best informed newspaper correspondents in the United States, discussed the situation in a contribution to the Philadelphia Press. He said: “England knows she is strong. This is our hour of weakness and she may make it her opportunity to strike. She can now be arrogant and insulting, for now her arrogance and insult can not be resented. The northern coast is exposed to her large and powerful navy; our towns are not fortified, and she may bring desolation upon our people and our manufacturing interests. All this she knows. Her armaments are large and well appointed; her army has been increased almost to a war footing; she is prepared to throw large bodies of troops into the eastern and northern portion of our republic; Canada is filled with armed men, and the frontiers of Canada are simply so many garrisons. Our commerce is at her mercy. In the Mexican gulf there is a large British fleet, which could render our newly gained strongholds on the southern coast untenable, and accomplish the destruction of the brave men at Port Royal, Hatteras and Santa Rosa Island. She may break our blockade and entirely nullify our expeditionary operations. With the Potomac virtually blockaded, and an immense army under Beauregard in our rear, Washington would probably fall. With the Chesapeake Bay open to any navy that may choose to enter; with a disloyal population in Maryland, with enemies along the Virginia and Atlantic coasts, England could precipitate a fearful series of disasters, and, perhaps, with the aid of the southern armies, turn the bloody tide of war upon the northern states.

“It may be in view of all these grave considerations, and the sad necessities of the case, that in order to avoid a war which could only end in our discomfiture, the administration may be compelled to concede the demands of England, and, perhaps, release Messrs. Mason and Slidell. God forbid, but in a crisis like this we must adapt ourselves to stern circumstances and yield every feeling of pride to maintain our existence. If this contingency should ever arrive—and I am only speculating upon a disagreeable possibility—then let us swear—not only to ourselves, but to our children who come after us—to repay this greedy and insolent power with the retribution of a just and fearful vengeance. If England, in our time of distress, makes herself our foe, and offers to become our assassin, we will treat her as a foe when we can do so untrammeled and unmenaced by another enemy.”

Mr. Seward evidently did not take so gloomy a view of the situation. About a month later, in a private letter in which was discussed the probability of English interference, he gave it as his opinion that “whatever nation makes war against us, or forces itself into a war, will find out that we can and shall suppress rebellion and defeat invaders besides. The courage and determination of the American people are aroused for any needful effort—any national sacrifices.”⁠[5]

News of the English demand and its consideration at Washington was quickly received throughout the South where it caused great rejoicing. The southern newspapers of December 21 are filled with expressions of delight at the prospect of a war between England and the United States. In the South it was believed that such a war would overcome the power of the Federal navy, bring upon the North and easily secure the independence of the Southern Confederacy. Virginia orators proclaimed at Richmond “that the key of the blockade had been lost in the trough of the Atlantic.”⁠[6] It was said by southern leaders that the only condition of war was that the North should maintain the position already assumed. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, seems to have exhibited much enthusiasm, for he said in a public address that his own nightly prayers were offered to God that upon this occasion “Lincoln’s backbone might not give way.”

Still an ominous silence prevailed at Washington. “The leading statesmen, senators and members of congress, clergymen and delegates from peace societies, newspaper reporters, speculators in the funds and many other lesser men, openly or surreptitiously, worked heaven and earth to ascertain the intentions of the president, but in vain. Lincoln and Seward smiled calmly at the questioners and evaded a reply.”⁠[7]

To one inquirer who seemed unusually anxious Mr. Lincoln replied by telling a story. “Your question reminds me,” said he, “of an incident which occurred out west. Two roughs were playing cards for high stakes, when one of them, suspecting his adversary of foul play, straightway drew his bowie-knife from his belt and pinned the hand of the other player upon the table, exclaiming: ‘If you haven’t got the ace of spades under your palm, I’ll apologize.’”⁠[8]

To persons who expressed a fear that public sentiment might become so strongly in favor of war that that course would have to be determined upon, and that such a proceeding would be fatal to the country, Mr. Lincoln replied by telling a characteristic story. He said: “My father had a neighbor from whom he was only separated by a fence. On each side of that fence there were two savage dogs, who kept running backward and forward along the barrier all day, barking and snapping at each other. One day they came to a large opening recently made in the fence. Perhaps you think they took advantage of this to devour each other? Not at all; scarcely had they seen the gap, when they both ran back, each with their tails between their legs. These two dogs are fair representatives of America and England.”⁠[9]

The language of Earl Russell’s demand and Lord Lyons’s manner of presenting it were in themselves sufficiently courteous. This feature of it would be worthy of commendation, if there were nothing else to be considered in connection with it. The United States government was to be allowed no opportunity for a full statement of the facts or to present its own views of the right to make the capture. Behind the demand was the instruction to Lord Lyons to leave Washington within a week in the event of the failure of the Federal government to comply with the British terms; there were the extensive preparations in England for war; there was the hurrying of several thousand troops into Canada and the hasty fortification of the frontier of that province, and lastly the evasive answer Lord Lyons should return, if he were asked what would be the consequences of a refusal to surrender the prisoners. These things all foretold with unmistakable clearness what the consequence would be, if any attempt were made by the United States to maintain the seizure on the principles of international law as determined even by British precedents and practice. It meant simply instant war—a struggle in which England would be actuated by motives of selfish policy in a much greater degree than by the principle that she was pretending to uphold and defend. The weavers of Lancashire at that time were beginning to suffer from a cotton famine, and there was much impatience from that quarter on account of the continuance of the civil war in America. It was a struggle in which England had everything to gain so far as her industrial and material interests were concerned, for it meant an abundant supply of cotton for Lancashire and the addition of millions of customers to British markets with all the advantages which that would confer. To the United States, on the other hand, such a war meant the loss of everything—the transfer of the Federal armies to the northern frontier, the raising of the blockade, the ravaging of unprotected coasts, the bombardment and blockade of sea coast cities, a probable invasion of the northern states by British troops from Canada, and last but not least an alliance between England and the Confederacy—a move which would probably result in establishing the independence of the latter and the permanent disseverance of the Union. It was necessary to bear all of these things in mind while considering the British demand.

Mr. Seward evidently did not expect England to take such a serious stand in regard to the matter. It had been his belief that the British government would not want the prisoners.⁠[10] He said on a later occasion that Lord Lyons’s communication was “our first knowledge that the British government proposed to make it a question of insult and so of war.”⁠[11]

Nothing is known of the first private conferences between Secretary Seward and the president concerning this matter. It is more than probable, however, in the light of subsequent events, that Mr. Lincoln foresaw the inevitable at once and hoped only for some method of escape from the difficulty, without dishonor to the country or loss of any indirect advantage to the United States which might result from a compliance with the British demand. He saw, too, the necessity of making the compliance in such a way that it would be as agreeable as possible to public opinion throughout the country, which was decidedly opposed to the surrender of the commissioners. A cabinet meeting was appointed for December 24, at which it was expected to consider the demand for the surrender of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The date of this meeting was afterward postponed, on account of urgent domestic affairs, until December 25. It is to be presumed that Mr. Lincoln gave the matter much earnest consideration during the interval. He prepared an experimental draft of a dispatch in answer to the one which had been submitted by Lord Lyons. In his proposed answer Mr. Lincoln acknowledged the receipt of his lordship’s dispatch, and said that redress would be due and cheerfully made to England, if the facts as stated in the British demand were all that bore upon the case. But such, he said, was not the case; the British side of the matter only had been presented and the record was incomplete. An unwillingness to express an opinion was then asserted, inasmuch as the Federal government had no assurance that its views would be heard or considered by her majesty’s government. It was then stated that no insult to the British flag had been intended, neither was it desired to force any embarrassing question into discussion. Both of these facts were evident, it was stated, because the seizure had been made without any instructions whatever from the United States government. The difficulty incident to a complete undoing of Captain Wilkes’s act, unless it were wrong or very questionable, was then mentioned and an inquiry made as to whether the British government would consider the American side of the question, including the fact of existing insurrection in the United States; the neutral attitude of England toward the belligerents; the American citizenship and the traitorous mission of the captured persons; the British captain’s knowledge of these things when the commissioners embarked at Havana; the place where the capture was made, and the bearing of international law and precedent upon the case. It was then stated that, if the foregoing facts together with any others pertinent to either side of the case could be submitted, the Federal government would, if England were willing, cheerfully submit the whole affair to a peaceable arbitration and would abide the result. The last paragraph of the proposed dispatch provided that no redress should exceed in kind and amount that which was already demanded and that the award should constitute the basis of a rule for the determination of similar cases between the two nations in future.

When the cabinet meeting to consider the matter was finally held Mr. Lincoln’s proposed dispatch was not discussed, neither was any similar proceeding urged. More than half of the days of grace had elapsed and something must be done quickly else a foreign war would be added to the domestic one. However desirable arbitration may have been it was precluded by the nature of the demand of England.

The principal discussion seems to have been devoted to a proposed dispatch of Secretary Seward by the terms of which the commissioners were to be surrendered. There may have been some miscellaneous talk and a discussion of current rumors. Senator Sumner, chairman of the senate committee on foreign relations, was invited in. One day was not found sufficient for the consideration of this important matter, and the session was therefore continued on the following day. Mr. Seward’s proposed dispatch upon which the surrender was based could not be fully discussed at one session, as the paper appears to have been prepared solely by the secretary of state without the assistance of either Mr. Lincoln or any of his cabinet officers. Of the debate and the various opinions, we have some record in the subsequent writings of the different persons who were present.

From the published extracts taken from the diary of Attorney-General Bates, it appears that there was a full and frank discussion of the paper of Mr. Seward. All of the members of the cabinet were impressed with the extraordinary gravity of the situation as probably the fate of the nation depended on the result of their deliberations. Mr. Bates himself urged the surrender. Waiving the legal right about which there was much doubt, he favored compliance with the British demand on account of the necessity of the case. The country could not afford to have a war with England, he thought, as that would be to give up hope of subduing the insurrection; it would ruin trade, bankrupt the treasury, and bring other calamities. President Lincoln and the other members were slow to acknowledge these truths.

Mr. Welles has said: “The president was from the first willing to make concession. Mr. Blair advocated it. Mr. Seward was at the beginning opposed to any idea of concession which involved giving up the emissaries, but yielded at once and with dexterity to the peremptory demand of Great Britain.”⁠[12] In another place Mr. Welles says: “Mr. Seward should receive credit for the dexterous and skillful dispatch which he prepared on his change of position. It exhibits his readiness and peculiar tact and talent to extricate himself from and to pass over difficulties.”⁠[13]

In private correspondence Mr. Seward afterward said of the matter: “The consideration of the Trent case was crowded out by pressing domestic affairs until Christmas day. It was considered on my presentation of it on the 25th and 26th of December. The government when it took the subject up had no idea of the grounds upon which it would explain its action nor did it believe that it would concede the case. Yet it was heartily unanimous in the actual result after two days examination in favor of the release. Remember that in a council like ours there are some strong wills to be reconciled.”⁠[14]

Secretary Chase recorded his own opinion as he gave it in the discussion. He thought it was too much for the English government to expect of the United States on that occasion, and that she ought to overlook the little wrong. He believed that Great Britain did not fully understand all of the circumstances as did the United States, and if she did, the surrender of the commissioners would not be expected. If the conditions were reversed the Federal government would accept the explanations of the English government, and allow their rebels to be retained, and he could not help believing that Great Britain would do likewise were the case fully understood. He continued to discuss the subject as follows: “But we can not afford delays. While the matter hangs in uncertainty the public mind will remain disquieted, our commerce will suffer serious harm, our action against the rebels must be greatly hindered, and the restoration of our prosperity—largely identified with that of all nations—must be delayed. Better, then, to make now the sacrifice of feeling involved in the surrender of these rebels, than even avoid it by the delays which explanations must occasion. I give my adhesion, therefore, to the conclusion at which the secretary of state has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than consent to the liberation of these men I would rather sacrifice everything I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection that, while nothing but severest retribution is due to them, the surrender, under existing circumstances, is but simply doing right—simply proving faithful to our own ideas and traditions under strong temptations to violate them—simply giving to England and the world the most signal proof that the American nation will not under any circumstances, for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit even a technical wrong against neutrals.”⁠[15]

The main reason for hesitation was doubtless the fear of public opinion in the North. It was certain that a surrender of the commissioners would bring the displeasure of the people upon the government, which would be accused of having timidly submitted to the unjust demands of England. Statesmen greatly dislike to act under what appears to be menace or dictation from a foreign power. The cabinet discussion ended, however, as has been stated already by two of the members, in a unanimous agreement upon the letter of reply which the secretary of state had prepared. This communication proposed a surrender upon diplomatic reasons which were apparently a triumph of the American principle.

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.

1. Congressional Globe: Pt. I, 2d Sess., 37th Cong.

2. Diary of Events, Moore’s Rebellion Record, Vol. III.

3. Magazine of American History, March, 1886, and June, 1886.

4. McPherson’s Political History of the Rebellion, p. 343.

5. Nicolay and Hay: Life of Lincoln, Vol. V.

6. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America.

7. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause.

8. Principal American Newspapers, December, 1861.

9. Southern Law Review, Vol. VIII.

10. Weed, Thurlow: Life of, Vol. II.

11. Welles, Gideon: Lincoln and Seward.