The forcible seizure of the Confederate commissioners while on board the Trent caused more or less of discussion throughout Europe. The technical right of Captain Wilkes to make the capture was not admitted. Neutral governments regarded it as prejudicial to their own interests. It was held that such an act tended toward an abridgment of the rights and privileges which had been previously enjoyed by the neutral flag. Many of the European governments took occasion to make public their views concerning the matter, and to express the hope that the government at Washington would not insist upon maintaining the right to seize even its own rebellious citizens on board a neutral ship. Such a proceeding, it was said, did not conform to the principles of international law, and was not consistent even with American precedents and practice.

Many of the United States ministers in Europe sent reports to Washington concerning the feeling in the various capitals to which they were respectively accredited.

Three of the principal European powers communicated their views of the matter to the United States government. This was done in the usual courteous language of diplomacy and through the medium of their respective ministers at Washington. In a dispatch to M. Mercier, M. Thouvenel, the French minister for foreign affairs, communicated his opinion as follows:

“Paris, December 3, 1861.

“Sir—The arrest of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board the English mail packet Trent by an American cruiser has produced in France, if not the same emotion as in England, at least a profound astonishment and sensation. Public opinion was immediately occupied with the legality and the consequences of such an act, and the impression which has been thereby produced has not been for an instant doubtful. The act seemed to the public to be so entirely at variance with the ordinary rules of international law that it has determined to throw the responsibility exclusively on the commander of the San Jacinto. We are not yet in a position to know if this supposition is well founded, and the government of the emperor have been therefore compelled to examine the question raised by the removal of the two passengers from the Trent. The desire to aid in preventing a conflict, perhaps imminent, between the powers towards whom they are animated by equally friendly sentiments, and the desire to maintain, with a view to placing the rights of their own flag beyond the danger of any attack, certain principles essential to the security of neutrals, have convinced them, after mature reflection, that they could not remain perfectly silent on the matter.

“If, to our great regret, the cabinet at Washington should be disposed to approve the conduct of the commander of the San Jacinto, it would be because they consider Messrs. Mason and Slidell as enemies, or because they only recognize them as rebels. In the one case as in the other there would be an extremely painful forgetfulness of principles on which we have always found the United States agree with us.

“On what ground can the American cruiser, in the first case, have arrested Messrs. Mason and Slidell? The United States have admitted, with us, in the treaties concluded between the two countries, that the freedom of the flag extends to persons found on board, even were they enemies of one of the two parties, except, at least, in the case of military men actually in the service of the enemy. Messrs. Mason and Slidell were, by virtue of this principle, the insertion of which in our treaties of amity and commerce has never encountered any difficulty, perfectly free under the neutral flag of England. It will not, doubtless, be pretended that they could be considered as contraband of war. That which constitutes contraband of war has not yet, it is true, been precisely determined. Its limits are not absolutely the same with all the powers. But, as far as regards persons, the special stipulations which are found in treaties concerning military men clearly define the character of those who may be seized by belligerents. Now there is no occasion to demonstrate that Messrs. Mason and Slidell can not be assimilated to persons in this category. There would therefore remain nothing to explain their capture but this pretext—that they were bearers of official dispatches of the enemy. Now this is the place to recall a circumstance which should govern this entire affair, and which renders unjustifiable the conduct of the American cruiser. The Trent was not bound to a point belonging to either of the belligerents. She was carrying her cargo and passengers to a neutral country, and it was, moreover, in a neutral port where she had embarked them. If it was admissible that, under such circumstances, the neutral flag did not completely cover the persons and goods on board, its immunity would be an empty word. At any moment the commerce and navigation of third powers would be liable to suffer in their innocent or even indirect relations with one or other of the belligerents. These latter would not have the right to require from the neutral a complete impartiality—to prohibit him from all participation in acts of hostility; they would impose upon his liberty of commerce and navigation restrictions of which modern international law has refused to admit the legality. In a word, we should return to those vexatious practices against which, in former times, no power has protested more energetically than the United States.

“If the cabinet at Washington could only regard the two persons arrested as rebels, whom they have always a right to seize, the question, to place it in another light, could not thereby be solved any the more in a sense favorable to the conduct of the commander of the San Jacinto.

“In such a case there would be a non-recognition of the principle which constitutes a ship to be a portion of the territory of the country whose flag she bears, and there would be a violation of the immunity which forbids a foreign sovereign to exercise there his jurisdiction. It is not necessary, doubtless, to recall the energy with which on every occasion the government of the United States have defended this immunity, and the right of asylum, which is a consequence of it.

“Without wishing to enter into a deeper discussion of questions raised by the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I have said enough, I think, to establish that the cabinet of Washington can not, without aiming a blow at those principles which all neutral powers are equally interested in maintaining, nor without putting itself in contradiction with its own conduct up to the present day, give its approval to the proceedings of the commander of the San Jacinto.

“In this state of things, there can not be, in our opinion, any hesitation as to the course to pursue. Lord Lyons is already instructed to present the demands for satisfaction which the English government is under the necessity of drawing up, and which consist in the immediate release of the persons taken from on board the Trent, and in sending explanations calculated to remove from this act its offensive character to the British flag.

“The Federal government would be inspired by a just and elevated sentiment in yielding to these demands. One would vainly search for what object or in what interest they would risk to provoke, by a different attitude, a rupture with Great Britain. For ourselves, who would see in this case a complication, in every way deplorable, of the difficulties with which the cabinet at Washington has already to struggle against, and a precedent of a nature to render seriously uneasy all those powers not parties to the present contest, we think we are giving a proof of loyal amity towards the cabinet of Washington in not allowing them to be ignorant of our opinion in this circumstance. I invite you, sir, to take the first opportunity of speaking frankly to Mr. Seward, and if he should ask it, to leave with him a copy of this dispatch.

Receive, etc., Thouvenel.”

This dispatch was submitted to the president, but it had been previously decided to give up the commissioners. After stating this fact in his answer to the French dispatch, Mr. Seward said: “That disposition of the subject, as I think, renders unnecessary any discussion of it, in reply to the comments of Mr. Thouvenel. I am permitted, however, to say that Mr. Thouvenel has not been in error in supposing, first, that the government of the United States has not acted in any spirit of disregard of the rights or of the sensibilities of the British nation, and that he is equally just in assuming that the United States would consistently vindicate, by their practice on this occasion, the character they have so long maintained as an advocate of the most liberal principles concerning the rights of neutral states in maritime war.

“You will assure Mr. Thouvenel that this government appreciates as well the frankness of his explanations, as the spirit of friendship and good-will towards the United States in which they are expressed.”

Exception may be taken to some of the things said by M. Thouvenel in this letter. He expressed the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell were “perfectly free under the neutral flag of England,” and referred to the treaties between the United States and France, which provided that persons, though enemies to either or both countries, should not be taken from a free ship. The treaties referred to had expired and were, consequently, of no effect. If they had been in full force, however, they could have determined nothing definitely in the settlement of a maritime question between the United States and England. The analogy only, in such a case, would be of any value.

M. Thouvenel also held that in this case “there would be a non-recognition of the principle which constitutes a ship to be a portion of the territory of the country whose flag she bears.” This doctrine is not sound. Neutral territory can not be seized and condemned because offenses against the rights of neutrals are practiced upon it. If a ship were simply a bit of neutral territory it could not be seized and condemned for carrying contraband of war or otherwise offending against neutral rights. The law of nations, however, permits capture and confiscation of a vessel for such offenses. If M. Thouvenel’s doctrine be admitted, who can tell what this small portion of neutral territory, protected by its own flag, might not do?

The views of the Austrian government were duly submitted in the following dispatch to its representative at Washington.

“Vienna, December 18, 1861.

(Confidential.)

“The difference which has occurred between the government of the United States and that of Great Britain in consequence of the arrest of Messrs. Slidell and Mason, effected by the captain of the American ship of war, the San Jacinto, on board the English packet, the Trent, has not failed to attract the most serious attention of the imperial cabinet. The more importance we attach to the preservation of good relations between the United States and England the more must we regret an accident which has complicated in such a grave manner a situation already surrounded with difficulties.

“Without having any intention of entering here into an examination of the question of right, we can not, however, overlook the fact that according to the notions of international law adopted by all the powers, and which the American government itself has often taken as the rule of its conduct, England could not by any means refrain in the present case from making a representation against the attack made on its flag, and from demanding a just reparation for it. It appears to us, moreover, that the demands drawn up for this purpose by the cabinet of St. James have nothing in them hurtful to the feelings of the cabinet of Washington, and that the latter will be able to do an act of equity and moderation without the least sacrifice of its dignity.

“We think that we can hope that the government of the United States, in taking counsel both from the rules which govern international relations, as well as from considerations of enlightened policy rather than from the manifestations produced by an over-excitement of national feeling, will bring to bear on its deliberation all the calmness which the gravity of the case requires, and will think it right to decide on a course which, while preserving from rupture the relations between two great states to which Austria is equally bound in friendship, will tend to avert the grave disturbances which the eventuality of a war could not fail to bring about, not only upon each one of the contending parties, but upon the affairs of the world in general.

“Be so good, M. le Chevalier, as to bring the preceding reflections to the notice of Mr. Seward, and to inform us of the manner in which the minister shall have received your communication.

Receive, etc.,
“Rechberg.”

This dispatch having been submitted to the president, a brief answer was prepared by Mr. Seward as soon as a settlement of the matter had been effected with Great Britain. A copy of the correspondence which had passed between the United States government and those of Great Britain and France, concerning the detention of the Trent, and the capture of the Confederate commissioners, was also forwarded to the Austrian government with the statement that important facts would be learned from them as follows:

“First. That the United States are not only incapable, for a moment, of seeking to disturb the peace of the world, but are deliberate, just and friendly in their intercourse with all foreign nations.

“Secondly. That they will not be unfaithful to their traditions and policy, as an advocate of the broadest liberality in the application of the principle of international law to the conduct of maritime warfare.

“The United States, faithful to their sentiments, and at the same time careful of their political constitution, will sincerely rejoice if the occasion which has given rise to this correspondence shall be improved so as to obtain a revision of the law of nations, which will render more definite and certain the rights and obligations of states in time of war.”

Assurances were also expressed that the president highly appreciated the frankness and sincerity of the Austrian government on an occasion of such great interest to the welfare of the United States.

In about a month after the reception of the news of the capture of the Confederate commissioners, the Prussian government expressed its views in the following dispatch to its minister at Washington:

“Berlin, December 25, 1861.

“M. le Baron—The maritime operations undertaken by President Lincoln against the southern seceding states could not, from their very commencement, but fill the king’s government with apprehension lest they should result in possible prejudice to the legitimate interests of neutral powers.

“These apprehensions have unfortunately proved fully justified by the forcible seizure on board the neutral mail packet the Trent, and the abduction therefrom of Messrs. Slidell and Mason by the commander of the United States man-of-war the San Jacinto.

“This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has produced in England and throughout Europe the most profound sensation, and thrown, not cabinets only, but also public opinion into a state of the most excited expectation. For, although at present it is England only which is immediately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other hand, it is one of the most important and universally recognized rights of the neutral flag which has been called into question.

“I need not here enter into a discussion of the legal side of the question. Public opinion in Europe has, with singular unanimity, pronounced in the most positive manner for the injured party. As far as we are concerned we have hitherto abstained from expressing ourselves to you upon the subject, because in the absence of any reliable information we were in doubt as to whether the captain of the San Jacinto, in the course taken by him, had been acting under orders from his government or not. Even now we prefer to assume that the latter was the case. Should the former supposition, however, turn out to be the correct one, we should consider ourselves under the necessity of attributing greater importance to the occurrence, and to our great regret we should find ourselves constrained to see in it not an isolated fact, but a public menace offered to the existing rights of all neutrals.

“We have as yet no certain information as to the demands made by England to the American cabinet, upon the acceptance of which the maintenance of peace appears to depend. As far, however, as our information reaches on the subject, we are convinced that no conditions have been put forward by the British government which could justly offend President Lincoln’s sense of honor.

“His majesty, the king, filled with the most ardent wishes for the welfare of the United States of North America, has commanded me to advocate the cause of peace with President Lincoln, through your instrumentality, to the utmost of my power. We should reckon ourselves fortunate if we could in this wise succeed in facilitating the peaceful solution of a conflict from which the greatest dangers might arise. It is possible, however, that the president has already taken his decision and announced it. Whatever that decision may be, the king’s government, when they reflect upon the uninterrupted relations of friendship and amity which have existed between Prussia and the United States ever since the latter was founded, will derive satisfaction from the thought of having laid with the most unreserved candor their views of this occurrence before the cabinet at Washington, and expressed the wishes which they entertain in connection with it.

“You will read this dispatch without delay to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, and, should he desire it, you will give him a copy of it. I shall await your report upon the instructions contained in this dispatch, and I avail, etc.,

Bernstorff.”

The publication of the opinions of other European governments caused the expression of much gratification in England. There appeared to be so much harmony of sentiment throughout Europe upon this matter that the confidence of the British ministry was much increased in the position which it had at first assumed. It endured with the greatest patience the severe criticism upon the past policy of Great Britain relating to the rights of neutrals. The cabinet probably thought that a substantial advantage would be gained to England in the immediate dispute which was under consideration, and hence it was easier to bear censure for past misconduct. In a discussion of the matter one of the English reviews said: “The whole of Europe has pronounced that we were right.”⁠[1]

A brief consideration of the matter, however, is sufficient to show that it was not sentiments of unfriendliness toward the United States which prompted the other nations of Europe so quickly to disapprove the the act of Captain Wilkes, and urge the Federal government to concede the British demand to surrender the commissioners. For a century the tendency of Great Britain had been toward a restriction of the rights of neutrals to the narrowest possible limits. When an act of doubtful legality was performed on the deck of an English cruiser by an American captain, it was with the greatest satisfaction that the nations on the continent of Europe saw England disavow her own former precedents bearing upon this case, and plant herself squarely upon the doctrine of enlarged neutral rights. The view of the other countries was that it was a most fortunate opportunity for securing new and enlarged modifications of the law of nations such as would restrain England in future from a policy that was disagreeable to themselves. It was their own interests which they were seeking to promote, not those of England. The concession of the British demand by the Federal government would establish a principle of maritime law which would be of value to the world in all future time. This was the motive which induced the other nations to assume the position that was common to all of them.

One of the most devoted European friends of the United States at that time was Count Agénor De Gasparin of France.⁠[2] He says in his discussion of the views of other nations concerning the matter: “On seeing such haste and so haughty a proclamation of indisputable exigence, on seeing the idea of an impious war accepted with so much readiness by some, and so much ill-dissembled joy by others, Europe declared without circumlocution or reserve that if England were not miraculously rescued from her own enterprise, if she drew the sword against the North in the capacity of an ally of the South, she would destroy with her own hands her chief claim to the respect of the civilized world. The language on this point was the same at Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Turin. As they were unanimous in deciding the technical question of right against America, so were they unanimous in deciding the moral question against England. To recognize the technical right in favor of England, was to recognize the right of neutrals against her. Who is simple enough to be astonished at the eagerness displayed here by the other powers?”

It is worthy of special notice that, during the entire period of the American civil war, the most powerful ruler in all Europe was an outspoken and steadfast friend of the United States. If a war had occurred between England and the northern states of America as a result of the affair of the Trent, it is well-nigh certain that the Federal government would have had a powerful ally in the czar, Alexander of Russia, who, doubtless, remembered the losses he had recently sustained in the Crimean war. In this war England had been his most powerful enemy. In a few weeks after the capture of the Confederate commissioners, a fleet of Russian war vessels appeared in New York harbor and remained there for several months. At the same time a number of Russian men-of-war were stationed at San Francisco. No official explanation was ever given for the long-continued presence of these war vessels in American waters. Their extended visit caused much comment, but their purpose was easily divined and their presence was not unwelcome while a war between England and the northern states was imminent.

While at the Astor House, in New York, Admiral Farragut was visited by the Russian admiral, with whom he had formerly become well acquainted. On being asked why he was spending the winter in idleness in an American harbor the Russian replied: “I am here under sealed orders, to be broken only in a contingency which has not yet occurred.” He also added that the commander of the Russian men-of-war lying off San Francisco harbor had received similar orders. In the same interview he admitted that his orders were to break the seals, if, while he remained at New York, the United States became involved in a war with any foreign nation.

Soon afterward, when Secretary Seward asked the Russian minister why the czar kept his war vessels so long in American harbors, he replied that, while he did not know the exact nature of the orders under which the commanders of the fleets were acting, he felt at liberty to say that it was no unfriendly purpose which caused the prolonged stay of these men-of-war in the waters of the United States.

It seems that when official knowledge was conveyed to the czar that England was making preparations for war with the United States on account of the detention of the Trent and the seizure of the Confederate commissioners two fleets of war vessels were immediately sent to America under orders which were sealed so that the intentions of the Russian government might remain unknown to the world in the event that the services of the men-of-war should not be needed on this side of the Atlantic.

A prominent American who was in St. Petersburg at that time made an unofficial call upon the Russian chancellor, and was shown the czar’s order to his admiral to report to the president of the United States for duty in case the northern states became involved in a war with England.⁠[3]

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.

1. Bernard, Montague: Pamphlet on the Trent Question.

2. British Annual Register, 1861.

3. Dana’s Wheaton’s International Law, section 504, note.

4. De Gasparin: L’Amérique devant l’Europe.

5. London Quarterly Review, No. 221.

6. Seward, William H.: Works of, Vol. V.

7. Weed, Thurlow: Life of, Vol. II.