When the southern states began to secede, the attitude of foreign governments toward them was a matter of much concern to the Federal government. At that time any acts of foreign powers looking toward a recognition of the seceding states would have increased the embarrassment of the United States government and tended to give encouragement to the rebellion.

A few days prior to the close of President Buchanan’s administration, his secretary of state, Jeremiah S. Black, sent a circular letter to all United States ministers at foreign courts, requesting them to do all that was necessary and proper to prevent the independence of the seceding states from being recognized by the governments to which they were respectively accredited. Among other things Mr. Black said: “This government has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of those states, nor does it desire to do so. It must be very evident that it is the right of this government to ask of all foreign powers that the latter should take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movements of the seceding states or increase the danger of disaffection in those which still remain loyal.”⁠[1]

When this matter was brought to the attention of Lord Russell by Mr. Dallas, the American minister at London, his lordship said that while he regretted the secession, he was not in a position to bind the British government to any particular course of action.

Immediately upon becoming secretary of state, Mr. Seward sent a second circular to the United States ministers abroad, repeating with renewed emphasis the instructions of his predecessor, and urging them to “the exercise of the greatest possible diligence and fidelity on your part to counteract and prevent the designs of those who would invoke foreign intervention to embarrass or overthrow the republic.” He also suggested that it would be greatly to the advantage of foreign nations for the Union to be preserved, and that the revolt, should it break up the Union, “might tend by its influence to disturb and unsettle the existing systems of government in other parts of the world and arrest that progress of improvement and civilization which marks the era in which we live.” Mr. Seward also expressed his confidence that these with other considerations would prevent foreign governments “from yielding to solicitations to intervene in any unfriendly way in the domestic concerns of our country.” “You will be prompt,” continued Mr. Seward, “in transmitting to this department any information you may receive on the subject of the attempts which have suggested this communication.”⁠[2]

When this dispatch was communicated to Lord Russell, he replied that the government was in no hurry to recognize the secession as final, but that he thought the matter not ripe for decision one way or the other.⁠[3]

His lordship also declined to discuss the subject further at that time. No words of sympathy were uttered, no good wishes for the preservation of the Union were extended, but only an answer which said in substance that England was ready to acknowledge Confederate independence whenever it was expedient to do so. Lord Russell’s answer did not even assure the United States that England meant to observe that absolute neutrality which international obligation would impose.

Most answers from other countries in response to Mr. Seward’s circular were quite different from that which England gave. It will be sufficient to notice three of them. Prussia “from the principle of unrelenting opposition to all revolutionary movements would be the last to recognize any de facto government of the disaffected states of the American Union.”⁠[4] Austria “was not inclined to recognize de facto governments anywhere.”⁠[5] Spain “would have nothing to do with the rebel party in the United States, in any sense.”⁠[6] Very favorable responses were received also from most other countries. Russia, Italy and Switzerland sent assurances of the warmest sympathy for the cause of the Union. Individual expressions from great men outside England were not wanting in the beginning of the struggle. On September 10, 1861, Garibaldi, the Italian patriot, addressed a letter to the United States consul at Antwerp, in which he expressed an intention to come to America and enlist in the Federal army, if circumstances would permit him to do so.

When Charles Francis Adams became the American minister to England, he was instructed to take a still more decided stand against the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States. Said Mr. Seward in his letter of instructions to Mr. Adams: “You will in no case listen to any suggestions of compromise by this government under foreign auspices, with its discontented citizens. If, as the president does not at all apprehend, you shall unhappily find her majesty’s government tolerating the application of the so-called seceding states, or wavering about it, you will not leave them to suppose for a moment that they can grant that application and remain the friends of the United States. You may even assure them promptly in that case that if they determine to recognize, they may at the same time prepare to enter into an alliance with the enemies of this republic. You alone will represent your country at London, and you will represent the whole of it there. When you are asked to divide that duty with others, diplomatic relations between the government of Great Britain and this government will be suspended, and will remain so until it shall be seen which of the two is most strongly intrenched in the confidence of their respective nations and of mankind.”⁠[7]

At another time when referring to the matter of recognizing Confederate independence, Mr. Seward said: “I have never for a moment believed that such a recognition could take place without producing immediately a war between the United States and all of the recognizing powers. I have not supposed it possible that the British government could fail to see this, and at the same time I have sincerely believed the British government must, in its inmost heart, be as averse from such a conflict as I know this government to be.”⁠[8]

English sympathy for the South was manifested at first not only by expressions of opinion from the press and public men of that country, but also by efforts to have the independence of the Confederacy immediately recognized.

On March 4, 1861, while the ceremonies of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration were being conducted at Washington, Mr. Gregory, member of parliament for Galway, arose in his place in the House of Commons and gave notice of a motion to recognize the independence of the Confederate States of America.⁠[9] At that date the organization of the Confederate government had been perfected only three weeks, and Mr. Gregory’s knowledge of the matter had been received certainly not more than ten days before the notice of his motion was given. The notice was renewed on April 16, 1861. The matter was brought before the house several times during the session, but it was finally postponed indefinitely because the Commons thought it inexpedient to act upon it at that time.

While the matter was before the house, Mr. Gregory published a letter in the London Times in which he stated the reasons for immediate recognition of the Confederacy. He thought it would do much toward breaking up the slave trade which he asserted was “mainly carried on by ships sailing from northern ports, and floated by northern capital, that it would ameliorate the condition of slavery, secure peace and freedom of trade.” He also regarded it as a just retaliation against the North for having enacted the Morrill tariff, and as a vindication of the right of a people to assert their independence. Mr. Gregory concluded his letter with the strong conviction that the recognition of the Confederacy by both England and France just then “would cause the war party in the North to pause before plunging their countrymen deeper into the sad struggle.”⁠[10]

It is evident from the facts already presented, and the opinions referred to, that it was neither the righteousness of the northern cause nor lack of sympathy for the South that prevented an early recognition of the Confederacy by England. It was thought to be inexpedient, and perhaps not quite safe to recognize the independence of the Confederate States, otherwise there would have been no hesitation in doing it.

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.

1. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861.

2. Notice Book House of Commons, 1861.

3. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause.

4. Senate Ex. Doc.: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I.

5. Seward’s Works, Vol. V.