From the very moment when secession began to be contemplated by the southern leaders, it was evident that they confidently expected foreign aid, both moral and material, in their efforts to establish their independence. A comparatively large and mutually profitable commerce had been carried on for many years between the South and the nations of western Europe. An exaggerated idea of the importance of this trade had impressed itself upon the minds of the secession leaders. They evidently believed that England would aid them in a war for independence rather than sustain the loss and inconvenience which would be caused by a destruction of the cotton trade.

While secession was under consideration, Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, United States senator from Louisiana and afterward Confederate secretary of state, addressed a letter to the British consul at New York in which very strong bids were made for English aid and sympathy. Mr. Benjamin gave it as his opinion that, under certain conditions, the southern states might be induced to secede and resume their former allegiance to the British crown as a dependent province.⁠[1]

South Carolina was the first state to summon a secession convention, and in the discussion which took place while that body was in session, one of the delegates said: “We have it on high authority that the representative of one of the imperial powers of Europe, in view of this prospective separation from the Union, has made propositions in advance for the establishment of such relations between it and the government about to be established in this state as will insure to that power such a supply of cotton for the future as an increasing demand for that article will require.”⁠[2]

After the secession of Georgia, Mr. Iverson, a United States senator from that state, said in his farewell speech to the senate: “You may have ships of war and we may have none. You may blockade our ports and lock up our commerce. We can live, if need be, without commerce. But when you shut out our cotton from the looms of Europe, we shall see whether other nations will not have something to say and something to do on that subject. Cotton is king, and it will find means to raise your blockade and disperse your ships.”⁠[3]

Senator John Slidell, of Louisiana, after the secession of his state, made a speech in the senate before his withdrawal, in which he said: “How long, think you, will the great powers of Europe permit you to impede their free intercourse with their best customers for their various fabrics and to stop the supplies of the great staple which is the most important basis of their manufacturing industry, by a mere paper blockade?”⁠[4]

One of the first things done by the Confederate congress after its organization at Montgomery in February, 1861, was to adopt resolutions that steps be immediately taken to send agents abroad for the purpose of presenting the cause of the new Confederacy to the governments of Europe. Very soon, therefore, after Jefferson Davis was installed in office, he appointed as foreign agents Messrs. William L. Yancey, of Alabama; Dudley Mann, of Virginia; P. A. Rost, of Louisiana, and T. Butler King, of Georgia. Early in March these gentlemen proceeded to their destination by way of New Orleans and Havana. They were empowered to secure the recognition of Confederate independence by European nations and to conclude treaties of amity and commerce with them. Yancey and Mann were to operate chiefly in England; Rost and King in France, although other countries were to be visited.

None of these men appear to have possessed any ability as diplomatists. Mr. Yancey was the leading spirit among them. He was a brilliant and polished speaker, ready and dexterous in controversy, sarcastic beyond expression, and extremely unscrupulous. He wrote a letter for publication in June, 1859, in which he declared that the will of the slave-holding states themselves and not the Federal government should determine whether the African slave trade should be carried on or not. He also added that the matter ought to be submitted to that kind of a tribunal only and by its decision alone should the southern people abide. He was one of the first men in the South to counsel secession. At a speech made early in January, 1860, he said: “But in the presidential contest a black Republican may be elected. If this dire event should happen, in my opinion, the only hope for safety for the South is a withdrawal from the Union before he shall be inaugurated—before the sword and the treasury of the Federal government shall be placed in the keeping of that party.” Mr. Mann was only a dull statistician whose ability was very limited. Mr. King was a typical southern planter, the owner of a large number of slaves. Mr. Rost was a French adventurer who had drifted to Louisiana in early life, married a wealthy woman, studied law and was elected to a place on the bench of the supreme court of his state. All of these men had been noted for craft and duplicity in the management of affairs in their own limited spheres at home, but none of them possessed any of the requisites of a real diplomat. They failed to obtain any official recognition either for themselves or for their government.

Early in May, 1861, Mr. Dallas, the American minister at London, said in a communication to Mr. Seward: “He (Lord Russell) told me that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were here, that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so unofficially.”⁠[5]

Two days later his lordship received Messrs. Yancey, Rost and Mann in an unofficial way and listened to their appeal for recognition. They entered into an exhaustive discussion of the causes which led the South to secede and presented the advantages for commerce which a recognition of their independence would secure to England. They called special attention to the fact that the Federal government levied a high tariff on all imports, while the constitution of the Confederate States entirely prohibited all protective duties. They said that about three-fourths of the annual imports from England were bought by the South. They also emphasized the fact that their constitution prohibited the African slave trade.

Lord Russell replied that he did not then deem it expedient to consider the question of recognition, that the Confederacy must first demonstrate its ability to maintain its position as an independent state, and that it must be shown in what manner relations were to be maintained with foreign nations.

On August 14, 1861, the same commissioners addressed a long communication to Lord Russell, in which extended reasons were given for the immediate recognition of the Confederacy by her majesty’s government. To this communication his lordship returned a reply that was unsatisfactory to the Confederate agents.

When Mr. Seward learned, through Mr. Dallas’s communication, of Lord Russell’s proposed unofficial reception of the commissioners, he took very strong grounds against it. In a letter to Mr. Adams, who had in the meantime succeeded Mr. Dallas as minister to England, Mr. Seward said: “The president regrets that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British government and the missionaries of the insurgents. Intercourse of any kind with the so-called commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless, if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse, and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed unofficial intercourse has as yet actually begun. Your antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official, with the British government so long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country. When intercourse shall have been arrested for this cause, you will communicate with this department and receive further instructions.”⁠[6]

In response to a complimentary toast offered at a dinner of the Fishmonger’s Society in London early in November, 1861, Mr. Yancey, acting as spokesman for the Confederate agents, said: “In defense of their liberties and sovereign independence, the Confederate States and people are united and resolute. They are invaded by a power numbering twenty millions, yet for eight months has the Confederate government successfully resisted, aye, repelled invasion along a military frontier of a thousand miles. Though cut off by blockade from all foreign trade, their internal resources have been adequate to the equipment and maintenance in the field of an army of over 250,000 troops. Can all this be and yet these six millions of whites be divided? The idea is preposterous.

“They can maintain their independence intact by their own strength. As to their recognition by the powers of the world, that of course they desire. They are a people, a nation, exhibiting elements of power which few states of the world possess. But they have no reason to complain, nor do they feel aggrieved because these great powers see fit to defer their formal recognition and reception into the great family of nations. However they may differ from them as to the period when their recognition shall take place, they fully understand that such action is purely a question to be determined by those countries each for itself and with reference to its own interests and views of public policy.”⁠[7]

Strenuous efforts were made to secure recognition in other European countries, especially in France. Mr. King’s operations were confined chiefly to that country. In June, 1861, he addressed a long communication to the French minister of commerce in which the commercial claims of the Confederacy to direct relations with Europe were set forth. It was in the form of a pamphlet printed in French and addressed to the minister of commerce. The real intent, however, was to prepare a document for universal circulation in Europe in order to gain friendship and sympathy for the southern cause, especially among the wealthier classes of manufacturers and merchants. Neither sound logic nor honest argument were exhibited in this address. Facts and figures were woven together in such a way as to appear like a complete argument of justification, and it doubtless made many friends for the South among those whose information was not broad enough to enable them to see its fallacies and ingenious falsehoods. Mr. King practiced whatever of duplicity he thought would be of advantage to himself and his cause. Thus, he acted while in Europe as a commissioner from the state of Georgia, yet it has been proved conclusively from captured correspondence of his that he was a sort of general assistant to the whole band of Confederate agents abroad.

Concerning the labors of these representatives, Jefferson Davis has said: “Our efforts for the recognition of the Confederate States by the European powers, in 1861, served to make us better known abroad, to awaken a kindly feeling in our favor, and cause a respectful regard for the effort we were making to maintain the independence of the states which Great Britain had recognized, and her people knew to be our birthright.”⁠[8]

It was well, perhaps, for the peace of Europe in 1861, and certainly most fortunate for the interests of the northern states, that the sophistries of the southerners did not induce any European nation to recognize the independence of the Confederate States, and open a direct communication with them. This would have been an interference in American domestic affairs which the Federal government would not have tolerated even though it had led to a war between the United States and the recognizing power. Mr. Seward meant as much when he said that if England determined to recognize, she might as well prepare to enter into an alliance with the insurgents. Indeed, it is highly probable that one of the chief motives which induced the Confederate government to seek recognition abroad with such persistance and determination was a hope that the United States would become involved in a foreign war as a consequence. It was doubtless thought that such a result would enable them to form a foreign alliance—a measure which would have greatly improved their prospects for independence.

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.

1. American Annual Cyclopedia, 1861.

2. Congressional Globe: Part I, 2d Session 36th Congress.

3. Davis, Jefferson: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.

4. Diplomatic Correspondence with Great Britain, 1861.

5. Draper, J. W.: History of the American Civil War.

6. Foote’s War of the Rebellion.

7. London Globe, Nov. 12, 1861.

8. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America.

9. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion.

10. Senate Ex. Doc.: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I.

11. Victor, O. J.: History of the Southern Rebellion.