A fair estimate of the strained relations existing between Filipino and American in 1900 is easily gathered from the account of what had gone before. On the part of the Filipinos it may safely be said that there was never any faltering, any concealment of what they wanted. They knew what they were struggling for, and at all times and places, by proclamation, by acts, and otherwise, they had made it plain that independence was the goal to attain which they had pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor⁠[1].

The policy of the Washington administration, on the other hand, had been so vague and so evasively expressed that the public itself did not know what it was. Those officials who had been most solicitous with regard to the welfare of the Filipinos and the benevolent aims of the American people were the first to combat any attempt to express by Congressional action what these purposes were to be.

In deference to the state of American public opinion, therefore, and in preparation for the coming presidential elections of 1900, Mr. McKinley sent two commissions to the islands. One went early in 1899 and arrived there only to find that the war of conquest was on. The second commission headed by Mr. Taft arrived a year later, while the American forces were still giving Aguinaldo a chase through the mountain fastnesses of Luzon. This commission was charged with the duty of laboring for the peace and prosperity of the Islands, “in the firm hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila.”

Both of these commissions were appointed by the President, without asking Congress to authorize either, to define its duties or to fix the commissioners’ salaries. They were, therefore, the representatives of Mr. McKinley, responsible to him, and paid out of the public funds as he saw fit. This has been the sad feature of this phase of the Philippine venture. The commissions went to the Islands, not for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the Paris Peace Commission and thus righting any wrongs that had been committed, but to represent President McKinley who in the approaching elections was definitely committed to the justice of the policy which had taken the Islands for the benevolent purposes so vaguely expressed two years before.

This policy of President McKinley was based on the assumption that Filipinos were unfit for self-government. It was a pity, therefore, that such an able person as Mr. Taft should have come, not to decide on the Filipino’s capacity for independence, but rather as an advocate of the President. “Well, we are in it, and now we must do the best we can.” Of all stages in this long conquest of the Islands, this has been the most deplorable, for all dealings with the Filipinos have been based on the proposition that they are unfit to take care of themselves. Consequently all measures of self-government granted to them by an altruistic Congress are mere “privileges,” and so become a standing affront to the intelligence of the native. And the more power and latitude given to the Filipinos to assert themselves, the more dissatisfaction is there bound to occur in their dealings with a sovereign power which assumes to make such grants on the grounds of benevolence alone. As an American observer has aptly put it,

government and governed thus get wider apart as the years go by, and the raison d’être of the former being the mental deficiencies of the latter, it must, in self defense, assert those deficiencies the more offensively, the more vehemently they are denied⁠[2].

Now the hope of the administration in Washington was to prove that the stubborn resistance of the Filipinos was not as great as was claimed by the military authorities. From the beginning, therefore, the Taft Commission tried to reconcile the subjugation of the Philippines with the liberation of Cuba. Surely no more difficult task could have faced them. Nevertheless, they hoped with all the ardor and benevolence of the President himself that the Filipinos were in fact praying for American sovereignty. And the wish became father to the thought, with the result that friction between Mr. Taft and the military authorities who had for two years been pouring powder and lead into the enemy’s camps and receiving a goodly amount in return, now began to threaten.

Mr. Taft’s message of optimism and good-will regarding the Philippine situation is still well-known. “A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the supremacy of the United States,” he reported to the Secretary of War in November, 1900⁠[3]. Said report was naturally circulated immediately throughout the length and breadth of these United States to the glory and triumph of the President’s administration. But it so happened that the Secretary of War during those hectic days was also receiving official reports from the military men in the field of battle which led him to admit four years later, when no further harm would result from it, that in 1900 (sixteen days after the Taft Commission arrived in Manila), “over 70,000 American soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy in check”⁠[4].

General MacArthur was the official most apprehensive of the true warlike conditions existing in the Islands. While Mr. Taft was crying, “Peace! peace! the Filipinos want peace,” General MacArthur was cabling an entirely different story to Washington.

Wherever throughout the archipelago there is a group of insurgent army [he wrote to the Secretary of War], it is a fact beyond dispute that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other words, towns regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities.... Indeed it is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio; a manœuver quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful citizen⁠[5].

Further cold military facts concerning the stubbornness of Filipino resistance are contributed by the General.

The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion. Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex organization⁠[6].

Secretary of War Root knew of this side of the picture also, but he took care not to reveal it to the voting public, at least not until the elections of 1900 had been safely met. Yet he did not ignore these ominous warnings. In reply to General MacArthur’s request that nothing be done to diminish his armed forces unless absolutely necessary, he sent his assurances through the Adjutant General in the following convincing dispatch:

Secretary of War directs (that) no instructions from here be allowed (to) interfere or impede (the) progress (of) your military operations which he expects you (to) force to successful conclusion⁠[7].

And as if these precautionary measures were not sufficient there followed shortly after this grim inquiry to General Wood in Cuba:

Wood, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can give your consent to the immediate withdrawal (of the) Tenth Infantry from Cuba. Imperative that we have (the) immediate use of every available company we can lay our hands on for service in the Philippines.

Signed: Corbin⁠[8].

Thus it was that while the American people were being happily and successfully pacified with Mr. Taft’s optimistic reports endorsed by the Secretary of War, the latter was also acting in full coöperation with the military representatives in the Islands urging MacArthur to force the natives to really plead for peace by employing the more customary and efficacious arguments—powder and lead.

In the light of these events, therefore, it was but natural to suppose that the question of imperialism would be the main issue in the presidential campaign of 1900. Everything had pointed that way. It is therefore interesting to compare the attitude of the Republican party at the beginning of the campaign with the attitude adopted a year before in order to secure acquiescence in the treaty. Attention has been called to Senator Lodge’s argument for ratification that the treaty only gave the American people power to determine the fate of the Philippines, but did not commit them to any policy. This position was accepted and endorsed by the President and his Cabinet. In pursuance of this he told the American people ten days after the ratification that,

The whole subject is now with Congress; and Congress is the voice, the conscience, and the judgment of the American people. Upon their judgment and conscience can we not rely?... Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag.

Secretary Long also sought to emphasize this compliance of the President with the laws of the land by saying that if the treaty had been rejected it would

have taken out of the hands of the people and put into the hands of one man, the President, absolute authority over the Philippines, limited only by the indefinite scope of what is called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding a naked sword. Think of that for imperialism. It is a great credit to the President [he concluded] that, like Julius Cæsar and George Washington, he has refused this offer of a “kingly crown.” On the contrary, the good old democratic plan has been adopted of putting the disposition of these Islands into the hands of the American people who will duly express their will through their representatives in Congress assembled. I have no doubt the President is delighted to have the elephant off his hands and on theirs⁠[9].

These were indeed fine words yet the events which followed after they were uttered showed how little was meant by them. For after the treaty was ratified Congress was not consulted as to what should be done with the Philippines. No extra session was called to consider this very important question. Nay more, when the next regular session of Congress convened on December 5, 1899, the President said in his message:

It does not seem desirable that I should recommend at this time a specific and final form of government for these islands. When peace shall be restored, it will be the duty of Congress to construct a plan of government which shall establish and maintain freedom and order and peace in the Philippines. The insurrection is still existing; and, when it terminates, further information will be required as to the actual condition of affairs before inaugurating a permanent scheme of civil government.... As long as the insurrection continues, the military arm must necessarily be supreme.

This was a distinct invitation to Congress to leave the “elephant” on his hands, and the invitation was accepted. But it will be observed that the question of holding the islands—the question upon which the Senate divided equally, the question which the treaty left open—was treated by the President as settled. His words were: “The Islands lie under the shelter of our flag. They are ours by every title of law and equity. They cannot be abandoned.”

Who settled this question? Not Congress which had never considered it. It was the President by his proclamation of December 21, 1898, six weeks before the treaty was ratified. Thus did the President assume the “kingly crown” which his Secretary had praised him for declining. With this “crown” the President sanctioned a war without the authority of Congress, he refused to parley, and he told Congress that the question was not open for their consideration and would not be until the conquest by arms had been completed. What wearer of a “kingly crown” could more despotically have dealt with a question of such vital importance to two nations? The voice, the conscience and the judgment of the American people had thus been stifled, and now the President was brought to judgment.

Senator Lodge had also forgotten his words employed during the debate for ratification. Gone were the Senator’s honeyed phrases about the good judgment and sense of the American people in giving the Filipinos their just dues.

We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others, [he now told the members of the National Convention]. While we regard the welfare of these people as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first. We believe in trade expansion.

Although these dreams of military glory and commercial advantage were still dazzling the eyes of men, however, the leaders were not sure that the voting public would sanction such sentiments as those of Senator Lodge. It was well-known that in the ranks of the ruling party itself, there were strong dissenters, such as Senators Hoar and Bacon, and men like Boutwell, Hepburn, Henderson, Harrison, Edmunds, Reed and many others prominent in Republican circles. The list of eminent citizens opposed to a policy of colonization, furthermore, was to say the least full of potential power as the campaign which they led had gained a marked number of supporters. To name only a few of the more noted leaders there were Carl Schurz, Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Jane Addams, Wayne McVeagh, Champ Clarke, Thomas Mott Osborne, Jacob Gould Schurman and a host of others.

Therefore, when the moment came to openly announce their platform, the Republican leaders adopted this sugar-coated promise with regard to the Philippines:

Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority; to put down armed insurrection and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued people. The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured by law.

The real issue of permanent or indefinite retention was thus evaded. However, it was really not necessary to openly assert it, for inasmuch as the Islands were said now by the President to be unconditionally annexed to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Peace without any reservation whatsoever, a mere continuation of the present status really held no promise of ultimate freedom to the Filipinos.

Wise Republicans had realized this and they made the best use of it. By thus stating their policy, they were placed on the defensive with regard to the imperialist issue. Instead of openly having to assert it they merely had to check any attempt or movement to alienate the possession of the Islands, which they declared had been unconditionally annexed to the nation by the terms of the treaty of Paris.

We can understand this situation better by comparing the status of the Filipinos in the eyes of the Republican party with that of the Cubans. In 1900 American control in Cuba was, it will be remembered, still in effect. The control of the government was not delivered to the Cuban people until May 20, 1902. But in the meantime the Cubans were from the very start “free and independent” and a truly sovereign people,—the presence of American control being merely temporary for the purpose of “pacification.” The Filipinos were, on the other hand, to remain subjects of the Americans for how long no one knew,—or at least no one would tell. In the meantime they were to be given only the “largest measure of self-government which shall be consistent with their welfare and our duties.” The “our duties” here referred to the duties, so-called, of an absolute, sovereign power vested in the tender hands of an alien Congress sitting ten thousand miles away and in no way representative of, or responsible to the people whose liberties and rights lay in their hands.

The platform, therefore, connoted absolute ownership—ownership secured through a treaty with Spain. Hence to them there was no such thing as a war going on against the Filipinos. The fighting going on under the tropical skies was but “an armed insurrection” against the “legal authority” of the United States. As the President himself had described it a few months before: “There is a rebellion in one of the Islands now, but it will be put down as we put down all rebellions against the United States”⁠[10].

When the time came for the Democrats to summon their forces, however, they failed to meet the situation. True it is that the Convention proclaimed imperialism to be “the paramount issue of the campaign.” Their platform with regard to the Philippines was also particularly clear. Besides condemning and denouncing the Philippine policy of the McKinley administration it further added these significant proposals:

We favor an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to give to the Filipinos:

1. A stable form of government.
2. Independence.
3. Protection from outside interference such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.

The first two proposals certainly were reasonable enough if we are to believe that America’s mission in the Philippines was purely to aid the Filipinos, and yet such a declaration has never been made by the Republican party to this day.

The failure to meet the issue of 1900 is found in Mr. Bryan’s insistent demands that the silver question be also injected in the Democratic banner. This clouded the issue and weakened their forces, for instead of giving combat on the clean cut issue of imperialism which they could have easily shown was of transcendant importance, Mr. Bryan diverted an undue amount of attention to a discussion of monetary standards. Further than this, the injection of the latter question meant the loss of full support by the gold Democrats as well as anti-imperialist Republicans who, though vehemently condemning the Philippine policy of their President were unwilling to see their country adopt a false and dangerous system of currency. Prominent leaders of the campaign, therefore, urged Mr. Bryan to change his views but he stood firm⁠[11].

And thus the issue was obscured. To the conservative men of the country at large it seemed a choice between free silver and an undecided Philippine policy with full assurances on the part of the Republicans that God who moved mysteriously had placed the Islands in American hands in the interests of civilization and humanity.

We must not forget also the spectacular campaign of misrepresentation that swept the country from the printed page and the stump. This is what the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, told a gaping public about the beginning of the war. Said he:

On the night of February 4, the day before the Senate approved the treaty, an army of Tagalogs, a tribe inhabiting the central part of Luzon, under the leadership of Aguinaldo, a Chinese half-breed, attacked in vastly superior numbers our little army in possession of Manila, and after a desperate and bloody fight was repulsed in every direction⁠[12].

And again:

The day was not then, but it came on the 4th of February when a body of Filipino troops marched under cover of night, swiftly and silently, through our lines, regardless of the sentry’s challenge, and, when he fired, volleys of musketry and roar of cannon upon every side commenced the proposed destruction of our little army.

Compare such flagrant statements with the official reports of General Otis given in a previous chapter (Chapter VI) and preserved in the archives of the War Department and we have an idea how far this defender of the administration deviated from the truth.

Here again is General Otis’s report:

An insurgent approaching the picket [of a Nebraska regiment] refused to halt or answer when challenged.

The candidate for the vice-presidency, Mr. Roosevelt, also contributed a picture.

The reasoning which justifies our having made war against “Sitting Bull” [said the exponent of a strenuous life] also justifies our having checked the outbreaks of Aguinaldo and his followers, directed, as they were against Filipino and American alike.... To grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo [he continued] would be like granting self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief.

It was indeed a bold man who would say such libelous words, and yet they were not uttered on the spur of the moment at some political rally. They are to be found verbatim in Roosevelt’s letter of acceptance of his nomination for the vice-presidency. Such a carefully prepared document naturally went all over the country and helped form the opinions of many who were only too glad to believe ill of the people with whom their country was at war.

But we must not forget the President. What did he have to say relative to the Philippine war?

The American people [he said] are asked by our opponents to yield the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines to a small fraction of the population—a single tribe out of eighty or more inhabiting the archipelago. We are asked to transfer our sovereignty to a small minority in the islands without consulting the majority, and to abandon the largest portion of the population which has been loyal to us to the cruelties of the guerrilla insurgent bands, and to this end repress the opposition of the majority.

It would have struck a disinterested inquirer as singular that “a single tribe out of eighty,” a small portion of the population, had been able to wage war so long against a powerful American army and the “largest portion of the population which had been loyal to us”.

These so-called Philippine tribes have been receiving such notoriety to this day that we might as well pause now and see how much weight should be given to these statements. The existence of tribes has been decided by ethnologists, who claim to see among the brown-skinned natives certain differences which stamp them into the category of tribesmen. Now, even as early as 1901, men like Governor Taft were vehemently maintaining that these differentiations were purely theoretical and of little value.

The word “tribe” [he said], gives an erroneous impression. There is no tribal relation among the Filipinos. There is a racial solidarity among them undoubtedly. They are homogeneous. I cannot tell the difference between an Ilocano and a Tagalog or a Visayan.... To me all Filipinos are alike.

Mr. Schurman, President of the first Philippine commission, representing McKinley in 1899, was just as earnest in his convictions.

Nothing could more unhappily describe ... these people than the word “tribe” [he said]. Let us drop so misleading a term, and speak of them as communities, and let us call the aggregate of these communities the Philippine nation.

In 1903 a census of the Philippines was taken by the American officials, and in comparing the tables of this census with that of the United States, we find these American representatives saying, “Those of the Philippine census are somewhat simpler, the differences being due mainly to the homogeneous character of the population of the Philippine islands”⁠[13].

A report made by Senator Lodge himself, the staunchest supporter of the administration, was also procurable at the time the President made these statements. This report, “Senate Document 171, 56th Congress, First Session,” had been prepared for the Committee on the Philippines. What did it show?

The inhabitants of the Philippines [said the report] belong to three sharply distinct races—the Negrito race, the Indonesian, and the Malayan race. It is universally conceded that the Negritos are the disappearing remnants of a people which once populated the entire archipelago [while now] but a few scattered and numerically insignificant groups of them remain.... It is believed that not more than 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) of them exist in the entire archipelago, and the race seems doomed to early extinction.

The report also gave a table of eighty-four tribes, so-called, by the scientists to whom we must owe obedience. But these tables showed that twenty-one of this number belonged to the Negritos, so that one quarter of the President’s eighty tribes were described in the official report as “a few scattered and numerically insignificant groups” of a race “doomed to early extinction.” Both numerically and otherwise they were and they continued to be as insignificant a part of the population as are the Norridgewock Indians in Maine or the Mashpees in Massachusetts. But could these facts be gathered from the President’s statements?

Taking now the next group, the Indonesian, we find that Senator Lodge’s report confined this race to the island of Mindanao. Sixteen tribes are classified under it, one fifth of the President’s eighty, and the whole number was estimated also at 250,000. Thirty-seven of the eighty tribes, therefore, contained only 275,000 out of a population of over 7,000,000 people. But to turn to the report. The rest of the tribes, forty-seven in number, were Malays, and of these eight, including the Moros who were given as 100,000, numbered 6,350,000 people, leaving for the other thirty-nine tribes about 375,000. We therefore, find that out of the eighty-four tribes in the report, seventy-six contained only about 650,000. “Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men.”

Of the rest, the six million three hundred and fifty thousand, all were Malays, all were Catholics softened by three centuries of intimate contact with Spain, and they lived chiefly in Luzon and the Visayan Islands, where the war was waging in full vigor. From these official reports, and those of Mr. McKinley’s own witnesses, Taft, Schurman and Lodge, what must we say of the President’s language?

In spite of these spirited pictures, however, the campaign proved to be less exciting than that of 1896⁠[14]. Because of the confusing issues, party dissenters were numerous, and on both sides also many more thousands, though faithfully following the party banner gave it only a half hearted support. Other thousands refrained from voting⁠[15].

With the elections of 1900 out of the way, however, and the novelty of the possession having waned, came America’s second sober thought. The changing mind of the American people could not long endure the logic of the arguments which both friend and foe of the administration now put forward with somewhat friendly moderation. Power, commerce, and military glory ceased to be invoked as the arguments for the indefinite retention of the Philippines. The administration now defended its Philippine policy on other grounds—namely, philanthropy. It was urged that the duty of educating the Filipinos, of teaching them the rudiments of self-government and leading them out into the bright sunlight of western civilization was the mission of the American representatives in the Philippines.

But there were also those who though happy in feeling that the wave of imperialism was on the wane nevertheless realized, that at bottom the mischief was the same.

It is a significant concession to public opinion [said Senator Carmack] that we no longer hear the argument of greed and avarice and the hunger for other men’s possessions openly and defiantly proclaimed. I cannot help thinking [he added] that something has been yielded and something gained when the President of the United States no longer talks of seizing “points of vantage” and no longer defends our Philippine venture by glorifying England’s despotic rule over subject races and her bloody march to empire across the bodies and through the blood of slaughtered people. It may not signify any change of heart or of purpose, but it shows a realization of the fact that the public conscience is awake, and it shows that the authors of this policy begin to understand that they cannot justify “criminal aggression” by pointing to the profits of the crime. It is a cheering sign that the second sober thought has come, that the better nature of the American people is again in the ascendant, when the party responsible for a bucaneering war is compelled to veil the grossness of its designs⁠[16].

This second sober thought of America also brought a marked innovation into the local problems of the archipelago. Prior to 1901 the seed of greedy imperialism among the Americans in the Islands had already blossomed into full bloom. Those then, were the days when men talked of “the Empire.” Life was gay and irresponsible for the white man, and many there were indeed who felt and acted like petty kings. Into this paradise of power and prestige now came Mr. Taft as Civil Governor to recognize the rights of the Filipino. Mr. Taft brought with him into that new field something which Filipinos had never seen to any marked degree among the American civilians and military officers with whom they had come in contact. He brought sympathy, courtesy and friendly understanding. He gathered around him those Filipino insurgents in 1901 who, having realized the futility of their efforts to combat the American forces, had bowed to the inevitable and had resolved to dedicate their efforts towards making the best of the situation.

This was a great concession to the Filipinos and they appreciated it. The new governor gained popularity as the days went by, for as each revolting province was whipped into submission Mr. Taft followed in the wake of the army to institute civil government and promise the natives that if they threw down their arms they would have peace and local self-government. Thus it was that his resounding battle cry of “The Philippines for the Filipinos” gained in power as well as in volume as the new governor went about quietly conquering the population with words rather than with swords. And in so doing he began a new programme which meant, when carefully analyzed, a permanent colonial system, maintained by the absolute power of the United States until the Filipinos become contented subjects. It meant and it means today Philippine independence—never. To that matter attention must now be directed.