To lessen the absolute power of the American representatives in the Philippines, and in order to fulfill the promise of the Philippine plank in the Democratic platform of 1912 which had declared for an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose “to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government” could be established, Mr. Jones of Virginia introduced a bill in the House of Representatives in August, 1914. The bill which passed the House besides providing for a more popular and autonomous form of government, contained a preamble to the effect that it was and always had been “the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government could be established therein.”

When the bill was presented to the Senate, however, the preamble was slightly changed. Independence, according to the Senate bill was to be granted when, in the judgment of the United States it would be “to the permanent interests of the Philippine Islands.” The question thus naturally arose when the bill was under discussion whether the new proposal really paved the way for independence.

Suppose [asked Senator Cummings of Iowa] that I believe it would be better for the people of the Philippine Islands to remain permanently attached to the United States as a state, with all the privileges of a state or otherwise, would I not fulfill the promise or assurance of the preamble in voting to retain the Philippine Islands as a part of the territory of the United States?

To this question. Senator Hitchcock who was supporting the new preamble candidly replied, “I presume the Senator would.”

Interest was thus aroused by this sudden revelation that the preamble as now worded did not explicitly pledge independence after all. To put an end to this uncertainty, and in order to show the seriousness of the pledge which the Administration wished to give the Filipinos, Senator Clarke of Arkansas introduced an amendment authorizing the President of the United States to definitely “withdraw and surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, and sovereignty” over the Philippine Islands and requiring that the transfer of possession and sovereignty be made absolute in not less than two nor more than four years. The proposed measure also authorized the President to acquire land sites desired by the United States for naval and coaling stations in the Philippines.

So strong was the feeling in the Senate in favor of Philippine autonomy that this unexpected proposal, grave and far-reaching as it was meant to be, was successfully carried. When the final vote was taken the measure was accepted, the vote being fifty-two against twenty-four, the Democrats solidly voting for it and carrying six Republican ballots as well. Never had the Filipinos been as near their goal as on this occasion. It was certainly the most decisive step ever taken by a branch of the American Congress.

When the news was cabled to the Philippines, the Filipinos greeted their triumph with enthusiasm and hopes that the House would likewise vote favorably on the bill. It will be remembered that ever since the American occupation of 1898 neither House of Congress had made a definite statement of America’s policy. When the bill, as amended, was brought before the House, however, it suffered another change.

It was found necessary to hold a conference between the committees of the two Houses in order to reconcile the varying views regarding the liberty to be granted the Filipinos. As finally passed and enacted into law by both Houses, the Jones Bill made the statement that “it is and always has been the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein.” In order to speedily accomplish this purpose the new law also granted immediately a larger share of self-government in matters of domestic concern. The importance of this measure, however, which had the approbation of both Houses, lay in the pledge which for eighteen years a Republican administration had been able to avoid. Now, however, not only was America’s word given, but a test had also been provided—that of a stable government. The problem of the future must therefore be limited to the question whether the Filipinos had succeeded in establishing a stable government.

In accordance with the spirit of the new law, Governor Francis Burton Harrison who had succeeded Cameron Forbes in 1913 immediately began to place Filipinos in charge of the administration as rapidly as possible, until the American Governor General, the Vice-Governor, the Secretary of Public Instruction, the Insular auditor and a few minor officials were the only Americans left in office. But the theoretical sovereignty of the American people still remained, a sovereignty based on force and certainly not sanctioned or even acquiesced in by the Filipino people.

It would entail an endless array of facts and figures to recount the progress and missteps of the new régime. But a brief survey of the most undisputed facts would show beyond a doubt that the Filipinos were not forgetting what had been taught them by the “self-sacrificing” Americans. Take the matter of schooling and education. Under the Forbes administration the attendance in public schools had reached 440,000, but in 1921, when Governor Wood came to assume his duties he found that the Filipinos had provided accommodations for over 1,100,000. Only 7,512,000 pesos had been spent annually for education in 1913 when Governor Forbes left; in 1921 over 22,000,000 pesos were employed to provide for the increased attendance in schools. Of course the number of schools rose in proportion as well, from 2,934 in 1913, to 5,944 in the course of Filipino administration, while the number of Filipino teachers kept pace accordingly—from 7,671 to 17,575.

In the field of transportation the material progress effected was just as convincing. First class roads increased from a total mileage of 2,035 kilometers in 1913 to 4,698, or an increase of over 100 per cent in eight years. So with inter-island coastwise traffic,—from 680 vessels with a net tonnage of 54,396, the number rose to 3,044 with a net tonnage of 99,376.

In 1913 there were no public dispensaries giving free medical treatment but within eight years the Filipinos established over 800 such institutions. There were then also only two insular and six provincial hospitals, but that was increased under Filipino “misgovernment” to eleven insular and eleven provincial hospitals. There was only one organization for infant welfare when the Filipinos took charge unhampered by an American Governor General. Here was clearly a large field for improvement as infant mortality in the Islands had in the past been unusually heavy. They proved themselves equal to the task, however, for by 1921 there were 615 institutions functioning for this purpose. Death rates thus fell from 32.28 per thousand for the periods of 1908–13, to 28.62 from 1914–19, despite the fact that an epidemic of influenza had ravaged the Islands in 1918.

During this significant period of Philippine autonomy, of course mistakes were made as mistakes always are made by even the best of all governments. We do not seek to excuse them or to place responsibility for them upon the shoulders of the American Governor General who was on the ground and who was responsible in numerous instances for unwise appointments. Suffice it to say that marked progress was made during this period of trial, how marked will be shown by the report of the investigation made by leading Republicans—of which more anon.

It was no doubt in view of these marked advances and the evident capacity of the Filipinos to manage their own interests that President Wilson finally informed Congress that the Filipinos had fulfilled the required condition set before them.

Allow me to call your attention to the fact [he told the Houses of Congress on December 7, 1920] that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as the precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands, by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.

If the future of the Philippine Islands had been without regard to party fortunes in the United States such a recommendation would undoubtedly have resulted in definite action. But another political party assumed power on March of the following year and the New Republican President, Mr. Harding, almost immediately sent a commission of his own to the Philippines there to make a study of the situation in order to inform the new administration. In this action is clear proof of the difficulties that attend the efforts of impartial Americans to learn the exact state of affairs in the Islands, because each administration in Washington views the problem from a different angle and refuses to trust the findings of the party which preceded it.

Two eminent Republicans, both of whom were well-known to be against Philippine independence, were the chosen investigators. It might properly have occurred to the President that impartial men should have been sent, or that at least one member of the commission should have been in favor of independence. As it was both General Wood and Governor Forbes who had never changed their views in regard to Philippine independence were made final arbitrators. No one need question the honest purposes of both men, as they stood high in the estimation of their own fellow-citizens, but men are human and when they have for years maintained a certain point of view they cannot approach the subject anew with an open or judicial mind. The Filipinos, however, hoped that they might after a more careful investigation change their outlook.

The Wood-Forbes mission spent some six months in the Islands. They brought back a report recommending the continuance of American control. The commission stated that they had found marked progress in the Islands, but recommended nevertheless that the hour for independence had not yet come as the people needed more time “to absorb and master the powers already in their hands.”

The field of government service was in particular the one in which the greatest progress had been made.

We find [said the commission] that many Filipinos have shown marked capacity for government service and that the young generation is full of promise; that the civil service laws have been in the main honestly administered⁠[1]. In many positions they have shown marked capacity and have done better than could reasonably be expected of an inexperienced and untried people. There are many holding high positions in the judicial, executive and educational departments who would be a credit to any government. They are proud as they may well be, of the advance they have made since the beginning of American control of the Islands, for it can be safely stated that no people under the friendly tutelage of another have made so great a progress in so short a time⁠[2].

We find [said the commission] that the legislative chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of representative men⁠[3].

These statements having been made by men known to have been opposed to Philippine independence should be interpreted in the strongest light possible. Can they be applied also to most of the state legislatures in America?

Nevertheless, the commission finally concluded by submitting the following recommendations:

1. We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.
2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor General, have authority commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted by the Governor General under act of Congress No. 240 known as the Jones Bill.
3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments the President of the United States be authorized to make and render the final decision.

The first general recommendation naturally meant retention for another indefinite period of years,—a continuation of the Taft policy. The other two meant the diminishing of powers already in the hands of the Filipinos. The American Congress has not acted on either of the latter, but when General Wood was appointed governor shortly after the submission of this report it was evident to all that he would to a large extent be influenced in the exercise of his powers by the recommendations which he himself had made. Many there were, therefore, who feared that a clash between him and the native legislators was inevitable.

To put it mildly the attitude of the new Governor was that the Chief Executive being the representative of American sovereignty was entitled to exercise an authority over the Philippines equal to or even more than that of the President of the United States over his own people, inasmuch as the Governor’s veto is practically final, whereas that of an American president may be and is in fact frequently overridden by a legislature. Nay, more, as we have seen that the American auditor appointed by the Governor was to have final authority over the Philippine expenditures.

The claim of the Filipinos on the other hand may be gathered from the words of one of its greatest leaders. Senator Osmenà. Speaking before the Philippine barristers, he expressed Filipino sentiment in these words:

The Filipinos know that theirs is now an autonomous régime; that they and not the Governor General, are being subjected to a test; that they and not the Governor General are in duty bound to establish a stable government here, and that they and only they are committed to the task of hastening the day for the granting of their independence. They, therefore, have the right to follow and be guided by their own leaders and to expect that their control in the government of their own country be real, ample and effective.... To surrender our present lease of governmental power or our control over internal affairs for one reason or another, is not only sheer cowardice; it is downright desertion of duty—treason against the Nation⁠[4].

Here then were two conflicting positions—the Governor claiming for himself greater power as an executive than that wielded by an American president, and the Philippine legislature asserting that in matters of domestic concern they, as representatives of the people and responsible to them, should be the ones to decide the local problems of the day.

The legislative session of 1922–23 left little doubt in the minds of men that the conflict would not be long delayed. Following the resignation of the Philippine Cabinet and the Council of State because, as the Filipino leaders alleged, the Governor General was overriding the clear law, the Filipinos decided to appeal their case to the American people. Knowing how impossible it is for the Filipinos to arouse the interest of Americans in these matters, they hoped, nevertheless, that they might succeed in laying their case before Congress. For that purpose they sent a commission to Washington headed by Speaker Roxas of the Philippine House of Representatives.

The Commission came to state that Governor General Wood had been guilty of illegal and arbitrary acts and that the irritation caused by his course had led various Philippine leaders to resign their official positions.

This event, [added the Filipino spokesman] grave and serious as it is, once more demonstrates that the immediate and absolute independence of the Philippines which the whole country demands, is the only complete and satisfactory settlement of the Philippine problem.

About the time when this delegation took its headquarters in Washington there was a bill pending before the Committee on Insular Affairs favoring Philippine independence. The Boston Globe of March 9, 1924, reported the progress of this bill in these terms:

The United States House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs has this week voted to report out a bill favoring Philippine independence by a vote of eleven to five. The Filipino representatives in this country were jubilant. They felt that there is a strong sentiment in the present Congress.... Just as the rejoicing was highest ... President Coolidge dropped a bombshell upon their festival of hope.

Now, what was this bombshell with which the President could defeat Filipino aspirations without consulting Congress? It was an open letter from the President addressed to the Filipino delegates in reply to their list of grievances growing out of the intolerable situation in the Islands. The President’s letter was written along familiar lines, but it must be considered carefully, bearing in mind that it was published just as the Insular Committee was proposing to report a bill to grant the Islands their independence and, in the language of the New York Times of March 14, “blocked any such bill in Congress,” and was intended to do so.

Said the President to the head of the Philippine Commission:

The extent to which the grievances which you suggest are shared by the Filipino people has been a subject of some disagreement. The American Government has information which justifies it in the confidence that a very large proportion, at any rate, and possibly a majority of the substantial citizenry of the Islands, does not support the claim that there are grounds for serious grievances.

But does a general statement of this sort carry conviction? From whom did the information come? What is meant by “substantial citizenry?” What did the President mean by “the American Government”? Lincoln said it was a “government by the people,” but the people had not received such information nor had Congress, their chosen representatives. If there was any reliable information why did not the President make it known to the people or to Congress? Surely, if the President would not rely upon the unanimous voice of the Philippine legislature, a legislature which, in the opinion of the Wood-Forbes Report is “composed of representative men,” it was imperative that the President give the people the information which he had received, in order that they might judge its value. The question is a question for the people—not for Mr. Coolidge alone.

The President went on to say also that, “a considerable section of the Filipino people is further of the opinion that at this time any change which would weaken the tie between the Filipinos and the American nation would be a misfortune to the Islands.” What is this considerable section? What is the evidence of such a feeling? The President has no right to act upon information which he will not disclose.

It has been years since the desire for independence by Filipinos was firmly established. Every year since the organization of the Philippine Legislature in 1916, and before that the Philippine Assembly in 1907, a resolution has been adopted unanimously asking the Congress of the United States to grant independence. There is not a single dissenting vote in the Houses when this matter is brought up. All political parties in the Islands are for immediate independence and they vie with each other in their efforts to secure their country’s freedom. There is not a single man in the Philippines who can be elected to office if he does not advocate independence. Even the Wood-Forbes Report substantiated this attitude, for they “found everywhere, among the Christian Filipinos (which compose ninety per cent of the population) the general desire for independence.” If the President, therefore, had evidence to the contrary upon which he could safely rely, it should have been published. It is a familiar rule of law that “fraud lurks in general statements”—“Dolus latet in generalibus.”

But the President went on instead to speak of the altruism of the United States in helping the Filipinos.

A great responsibility came unsought to the American people [he said] referring to the period of 1898. It was not imposed upon them because they had yielded to any designs of imperialism or of colonial expansion. The fortunes of war brought American power to your Islands, playing the part of an unexpected and welcome deliverer.

This claim that the Islands came to the United States unsought by the fortunes of war has been dealt with in earlier chapters of this volume.

It was not to be wondered, however, that the President should have again alluded to this period of the conquest in such a high-handed manner. This method was adopted by McKinley twenty-seven years before and it has since been handed down intact and accepted by the American people, because they have always been too busy to look at the sources of information or to even examine with a grain of salt these statements though made by men presenting their side of the case and defending the policies for which they are responsible.

But the most naïve suggestion in the President’s letter was his statement to the commission and, through them to the Filipino people, that they would “do well to consider most carefully the value of their intimate association with the American nation.” These were Governor Taft’s words nineteen years before when he expressed the hope that the Filipinos would learn to value their connection with the United States, while the United States would then also appreciate this “pearl of the Oriental tropics.” Do not both these suggestions look toward permanent retention?

Is it not also safe and reasonable to assume that ever since 1898 the Filipinos have carefully considered the possible value of a permanent or even an indefinite connection with the United States? Is it not clear that having so considered it they have unequivocally expressed for the last twenty-five years their ardent desire to terminate these relations? What, therefore, did the President expect to gain by urging them to reconsider a question which they have already studied and on which their attitude has never varied?

Even with the presence of the American flag in the Islands today the archipelago is one of the most poorly protected lands in the world. Any considerable force can easily overthrow the scanty representation of American arms in the Islands, and it is absurd to believe that the American people would permit a President or a Secretary of War to send the forces necessary to protect eleven millions of “inferior” people. Nor have the Filipinos forgotten that when their peace was last endangered during the World War, orders were given to the American military and naval forces to leave the Islands in the event of a threatened attack.

What respect does the President pay to the solemn promise made by the government of the United States in the Jones Law that as soon as the Filipinos had established a stable government they should be granted their independence? Here is a promise and a test to decide when independence should be granted. The Filipinos have contended that this test has been satisfied by them. President Wilson upheld this contention and President Coolidge added some support to this when he said in his letter that:

In education, in cultural advancement, in political conceptions and institutional development, the Filipino people have demonstrated a capacity which cannot but justify high hopes for their future.

But the President stated his conclusion, nevertheless, that

there had not been thus far a full realization of the fundamental ideals of Democratic government. There have been evidences of a certain inability or unwillingness to recognize that this type of governmental organization rests upon the theory of complete separation of the legislative, executive and judicial functions. There have been many evidences of a disposition to extend the functions of the legislature and thereby curtail the proper authority of the executive,

which under the veil of generality means that the Governor General and the Philippine legislature have disagreed. Such disagreements are not rare in the realm of American national and state government, but it has never been suggested that they were proof of political incapacity on the part of the legislatures or of infallibility on the part of the President. Is the President entitled to make this opinion of his, with no statements of the facts on which he relies, binding on two nations? Are not his fellow-citizens entitled to weigh the “evidences” to which he refers?

In a word, therefore, we find the President brushing aside the test of a stable government made by Congress in 1916 and substituting in its place several tests of his own, such as a legislature acting in entire harmony with a Governor appointed by him but paid out of the taxes raised from the Filipino people. Wherein does the President get the authority to make this test? How many independent nations in the world today can establish the clear recognition of the separation of powers which the President wants the Filipinos to achieve before independence is granted them? Even in the United States the relative weight of each department in the Federal government varies from time to time and in no other country in the world does the American experiment prevail—and yet they are all independent.

Suppose the President’s test is applied to himself. Where does our constitution give him the power to determine the future of eleven millions of men and their relations with the United States? Who gives him the right to decide whether their government corresponds with the American ideals or not? Did not the Supreme Court of the United States unequivocally declare that the “Constitution of the United States did not follow the flag” into the Philippines, as it does in the American territories? Did not even McKinley himself announce from the beginning of the occupation that America had no intention of applying her own theories of government in the Islands, but intended rather to insure the welfare of the Filipinos with due respect for even their “prejudices if necessary”?⁠[5] The powers which the President now exercises are not executive. They are legislative and the President usurped them to prevent Congress from exercising its legitimate right to decide the Philippine issue.

The relations of the United States with the Philippines are peculiarly a subject to be dealt with by Congress. This was asserted at the outset of the occupation and has never been questioned. What right has the President to interfere with their deliberations and seek to impose his opinion upon them? History repeats itself, and as the Islands were acquired and held and a war declared by the President, without consulting Congress, so now the Executive usurps the function of Congress and would continue the occupation of the Islands because he approves it.

This new and impossible test set by the President really meant and will continue to mean unless changed, that the promise made by an American Congress in 1916 can be treated as “a scrap of paper” in order to give place to a policy which gives the Filipinos no hope of independence as long as an excuse may be found by the President for holding that the government of the Islands is not what it should be, or that it does not correspond with his ideals. Apply such tests to the American cities and which would be left to govern itself?

For the sake of clarity let us again state the problem in the Philippines as it arose in 1923 and as it exists today. General Wood and the Filipinos have been and continue to be at issue, the latter asserting that the Governor’s course has been arbitrary and lawless. History has invariably shown that when a military officer is placed in civil authority he is apt to irritate the people over whom he is placed. Here was an issue—is it not reasonable to suppose that an impartial tribunal should have settled the problem? The least partial tribunal to which the Filipinos could state their case was Congress, but the President took it into his own hands, and has assumed to decide it without action by Congress.

It is a fundamental fact in the government of one people by another that the governing power stands by its own representatives, believes in them and is determined to sustain them. And so the President sustained his representative on this occasion. He told the complaining Filipinos that he had “full confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness and sincerity” of General Wood, and pronounced him, “a hard working, painstaking and conscientious administrator,” finding no evidence that he had “acted with any other than the purposes of best serving the real interests of the Filipino people.”

What do these words mean? Only that the President approves his appointee. But General Wood may have had one idea as to the “real interest” of the Filipinos, and the Filipinos a very different one. He may have sincerely adopted what he considered the proper means, and yet in the judgment of others they may have been improper. A man may be “hard working, painstaking and conscientious” in the pursuit of what he thinks is good for a population, and yet be an unsuccessful administrator lacking sympathy, wisdom and tact.

Are there not in the United States differences and deadlocks between “conscientious, painstaking and hard working” Presidents and Congresses; between Governors of “ability, good intentions and fairness” and state legislatures, and between mayors and councils in the most progressive cities of America? When a President is tried on articles of impeachment as was Andrew Johnson, when members of a Cabinet are forced to resign because of blundering stupidity or dishonesty, when elected governors are sent to the state penitentiaries for dishonest practices, do such catastrophes prove that the country is not fit for self-government?

No one need question the honest purposes of the President or of General Wood, but the principles on which the American government was founded are eternal, and consistently with them the fate of a nation cannot be decided by a few men. The New York Times of March 14, 1924, gives a glaring example of the practice which in 1898 permitted a few men to conquer the Islands. The dispatch in question came from Washington and described a “conference in the office of the Secretary of War” which, the paper said, “may have an important hearing on Philippine independence as several American business men who have interests in the Philippines attended.” A list of these business men was given. One had “extensive interests in the Islands,” another was “a member of the Chamber of Commerce,” a third had “large sugar plantations” and a fourth was a “hemp importer.” With these were joined Secretary Weeks, General McIntyre and Ex-Vice-Governor Gilbert, the latter being one of the strongest advocates of indefinite control. Here were a few Americans with private interests at stake met to advise the Secretary of War as to what should be done in the Philippines, and although there were several Filipino officials in Washington at that time, not one was present.

Is it not wiser and safer to leave the question in the hands of the representatives of the American people, and let the issue be settled after open debate in Congress, rather than permit the President to dispose of the Islands according to the counsel of men whom he believes “able to give the best advice” but whom he does not name, or by secret meetings between the Secretary of War and interested American business men?

Just as President McKinley deliberately settled the fate of the Islands without consulting Congress in accordance with the desires of a few selfish Americans who believed in trade expansion, President Coolidge in March, 1924, blocked favorable action by Congress in behalf of the Filipinos and, at the behest apparently of a few American capitalists, undertook to settle the future of the Philippines for many years to come. The letter of the President was but one step in this well-conceived scheme to hold the Islands permanently, or at least until the interest of these trade expansionists no longer warrants the maintenance of “a door to the commercial markets of the Far East.” The plan will succeed, unless the American people realize in time what “benevolent assimilation” really means.