The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue.

After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the argument as it stood when interrupted. Sokr. — You, Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness, courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own. Do you still adhere to that opinion? Prot. — I now think that the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is, that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.94 Sokr. — Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? Prot. — I consider it in the highest degree fine and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.95

Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack.

Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men, forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a dishonourable thing, if they were reckoned courageous.96 Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence?97 Protagoras declines to admit this, drawing a distinction somewhat confused:98 upon which Sokrates approaches the same argument from a different point.

Identity of the pleasurable with the good — of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate.

Sokr. — You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? Prot. — No. Sokr. — But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? Prot. — I think so. Sokr. — To live pleasurably therefore is good: to live disagreeably is evil. Prot. — Yes: at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.99 Sokr. — What! do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? Prot. — That is my opinion. Sokr. — But are not all pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? Prot. — To that question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply affirmatively — that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful things evil. I think it safer — with reference not merely to the present answer, but to my manner of life generally — to say, that there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are not good — some painful things which are evil, others which are not evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.100 Sokr. — You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? Prot. — Unquestionably. Sokr. — When I ask whether pleasurable things are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable — I ask in other words, whether pleasure itself be not good? Prot. — As you observed before, Sokrates,101 let us examine the question on each side, to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.

Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.

Sokr. — Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question.102 What is your opinion about knowledge? Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something else — passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear — all or any of which overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?103 Or do you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge — his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?104 Prot. — The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs.

Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.

Sokr. — You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by pain. Prot. — Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment, as they say many other things besides.105 Sokr. — When they say that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations, will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future?106 Most men would reply, I think, that they called these things evil not on account of the present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their ulterior consequences — poverty and disease being both of them distressing? Prot. — Most men would say this. Sokr. — It would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of pleasure.107 Prot. — Certainly. Sokr. — Again, when it is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no one will say that these things are good because of the immediate suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of health, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus, these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.108 Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? Prot. — No other end can be indicated.

Pleasure is the only good — pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future — resolves itself into pleasure and pain.

Sokr. — It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you think evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil? If there be any other between reason, or any other end, tell us what it is.109 Prot. — There is none whatever. Sokr. — The case is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when you call pain good, tell us what it is. Prot. — You speak truly. Sokr. — If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain what is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof hinges upon this point — whether there is any other good than pleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without pains.110 If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure: that is, under the overpowering influence of good.111 How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It never can be wrong, except in this case — when the good obtained is of smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity — greater or less, more or fewer?112 If an objector tells me that there is a material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply, Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures and the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it. Prot. — The objectors could have nothing to say against this.113

Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly — all the security of our lives depend upon it.

Sokr. — Well then — I shall tell them farther — you know that the same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression?114 Would not the latter lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? Prot. — They would acknowledge it. Sokr. — Again, If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less, whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic? Prot. — They would concede to you that also. Sokr. — Well then, my friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on the right choice of pleasure and pain — between the more and fewer, greater and less, nearer and farther — does it not come to a simple estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other words, to mensuration, art, or science?115 What kind of art or science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it is science.

To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.

For when we (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing else — you (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our principles, what that mental affection was, which people called, being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasures and pains — that is, in the choice of good and evil things — go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge, is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.116

Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable.

Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? (All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.) Sokr. — You all agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good, and that the painful is evil:117 for I take no account at present of the verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the pleasurable, the delightful, and the enjoyable. If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable?118 (In this, all persons present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than ignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom. Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly, no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he believes to be evil; nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the greater when he might take the less.119 (Agreed to by all three.) Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other things are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to be an evil, — and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)120

Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible.

Sokr. — Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were tolerably similar; but that courage differed greatly from all of them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage; yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? Prot. — That is impossible, as you have shown just now. Sokr. — No one will enter upon that which he believes to be terrible, — or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself — and this, as we have agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the same.121 Prot. — How can this be? The things which the timid and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not. Sokr. — Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? Prot. — Honourable. Sokr. — If it be honourable, it must also be good:122 for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that all honourable things were good. Prot. — You speak truly.123 I at least always persist in thinking so. Sokr. — Which of the two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? Prot. — The cowards. Sokr. — But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? Prot. — Certainly that has been admitted.124 Sokr. — Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? Prot. — We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding admissions. Sokr. — What about the courageous man? does not he affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? Prot. — It cannot be denied. Sokr. — Courageous men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are afraid, are honourable and good — not dishonourable or bad: and whose confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and good?125 On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? Prot. — Agreed. Sokr. — When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible — that cowardice consists? Lastly,126 — courage being the opposite of cowardice — is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists?

Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras.

Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.127 Sokr. — Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? Prot. — Finish the exposition by yourself. Sokr. — I will only ask you one more question. Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? Prot. — You seem to be obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with your wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it appears to me impossible. Sokr. — I have no other motive for questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.128 To determine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you and I first debated at length:— I, affirming that virtue was not teachable — you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every thing rather than knowledge: on which supposition it would be hardly teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up;129 and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation — First, what Virtue is, — Next, whether it is teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted to have you as a coadjutor.130 Prot. — I commend your earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I think myself not a bad man in other respects: and as to jealousy, I have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance — decidedly more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you became one day illustrious for wisdom.