One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.

Questions by Sokrates — Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous?

After your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have only one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.58 You have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness, &c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote distinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to virtue, different names for one and are the same thing? Prot. — They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue. Sokr. — Are these parts like the parts of the face, — eyes, nose, mouth, ears — each part not only distinct from the rest, but having its own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold, homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in magnitude? Prot. — The former. Sokr. — Then some men may possess one part, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one part, should possess all? Prot. — By no means necessary. Some men are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent. Sokr. — Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of virtue? Prot. — They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the parts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each of them has its own peculiar property.59

Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, “If you please”.

Sokr. — Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these parts is. Tell me — is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion?60 Prot. — Yes. Sokr. — Now this thing which you call justice: is it itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you say?61 Prot. — I think so too. Sokr. — Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called holiness, itself holy or unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should reply — Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness itself be not holy. Would you say the same? Prot. — Unquestionably. Sokr. — Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy — do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? Prot. — I do not altogether admit that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment: if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. Sokr. — Not so:62 I do not want the debate to turn upon an “If you please“: You and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best without “Ifs”. Prot. — I say then that justice and holiness are indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point of analogy between white and black,63 hard and soft, and between many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally. Sokr. — Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? Prot. — Not exactly so: but I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the other. Sokr. — Well then! since you seem to follow with some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.64

Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary.

Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are identical with each other (σοφία and σωφροσύνη). The proof which he produces, elicited by several questions, is — that both the one and the other are contrary to folly (ἀφροσύνη), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have more than one single contrary.65

Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.

Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:66 though we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the maxim — that nothing can have more than one single contrary — Plato seems to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different senses. Because the term folly (ἀφροσύνη), is used sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation (σωφροσύνη), sometimes the opposite of intelligence (σοφία), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are the same thing.67 Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of the other point, viz.: That holiness and justice are the same, or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is assumed to form the proof, viz.: That holiness is holy, and that justice is just — is either tautological, or unmeaning; and cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile, that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore little has been done to elucidate the important question to which Sokrates addresses himself — What is the extent of analogy between the different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist?

Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.

But though little progress has been made in determining the question mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man, so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion which — whether conclusively proved or not — is proved in a manner binding upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing reluctance,68 and is at last so provoked as to break out of the limits imposed upon a respondent.

Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity.

Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that justice (δικαιοσύνη) and moderation (σωφροσύνη) are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the affirmative, though many people say so. Sokr. — It is indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the questioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at the same time.69 You answer then (though without adopting the opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation, or with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in committing injustice. Prot. — Be it so. Sokr. — You admit too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? Prot. — By Zeus, I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to men (replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).70 Sokr. — Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any man, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call these latter good also? Prot. — Not at all: but there are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and heterogeneous.71

Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart.

Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the hearers.72 Upon this Sokrates replies, “I am a man of short memory, and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers.” Prot. — What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? Do you mean shorter than the case requires? Sokr. — No, certainly not. Prot. — But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? Sokr. — I have understood that you profess to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech: what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect me to follow you. Prot. — Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any reputation at all. Sokr. — Be it so: in that case I must retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make long speeches, nor follow them.73

Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.

Claim of a special locus standi and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.

This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose — if not the main purpose — of Plato in the dialogue. “Sokrates acknowledges the superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric: if Protagoras acknowledges the superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied.”74 An express locus standi is here claimed for dialectic, and a recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground. Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short speech: but in the last he must recognise a superior.

Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him.

Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as long as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance of those around, to accede to this proposition.75

Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.

For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of Simonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.76 Sokrates intimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other, and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.77 The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus; who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,78 with disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the song, but without promise of any result — Sokrates offers to give an exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled — complete mastery of the works of the poets.79

Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.

He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had represented that the sophistical art was ancient:80 and that the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium of the name, and professed a different avocation with another title. Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well as male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy them and acquire the like eminence:81 that they pretended to devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic — a pretence whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short and emphatic speech — epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and thoroughly prostrating an opponent.82 The Seven Wise Men, among whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme excellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him. Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different passages.83 As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias84 compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on the same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and the rest beg him to postpone it.

Character of this speech — its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech.

No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and more than half as long as the second, which contains a large theory — nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced — so violent in distorting the meaning of the poet — so evidently predetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince85 — that if such an exposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest perversions by the Sophists.86 It appears as if Plato, intending in this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras, and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by Sokrates — having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own accomplishment — has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par. And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans) — we must remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a rhetorician.

Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering.

Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of poetical lore (περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸς), he at the same time claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things without rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and the Ion) — or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets. Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of instruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men, and even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be embodied and discoverable87 — only that they are given in an obscure and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts (ὑπονοίας):88 distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between εἶναι and γενέσθαι), and principles of Platonic Ethics (οὐδεὶς ἕκω κακός) — he proceeds to point out passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning and verbal structure.89 But though Sokrates accepts, when required, the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them according to his own point of view — yet he presently lets us see that they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted shall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent. “To debate about the compositions of poets” (says Sokrates), “is to proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls. Noble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so much wine.90 Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by singers nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a close.”91

Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose.

In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the discussion by saying — “Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of us together can do more in this way than any one singly.92

“We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought, word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it. Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose, especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communication on these very subjects?”93