[218] See below, § 319.

The so-called Drago[219] doctrine, which asserts the rule that intervention is not allowed for the purpose of making a State pay its public debts, is unfounded, and has not received general recognition, although Argentina and some other South American States tried to establish this rule at the second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. But this Conference adopted, on the initiative of the United States of America, a "Convention[220] respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts." According to article 1 of this Convention, the contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to its nationals. This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, renders the settlement of the compromis impossible, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award.—It must be emphasised that the stipulations of this Convention concern the recovery of all contract debts, whether or no they arise from public loans.

[219] The Drago doctrine originates from Louis M. Drago, sometime Foreign Secretary of the Republic of Argentina. See Drago, "Cobro coercitivo de deudas publicas" (1906); Barclay, "Problems of International Practice, &c." (1907), pp. 115-122; Moulin, "La Doctrine de Drago" (1908); Higgins, "The Hague Peace Conferences, &c." (1909), pp. 184-197; Scott, "The Hague Peace Conferences" (1909), vol. I. pp. 415-422; Calvo in R.I. 2nd Ser. V. (1903), pp. 597-623; Drago in R.G. XIV. (1907), pp. 251-287; Moulin in R.G. XIV. (1907), pp. 417-472; Hershey in A.J. I. (1907), pp. 26-45; Drago in A.J. I. (1907), pp. 692-726.

[220] See Scott in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 78-94.

Admissibility of Intervention in default of Right.

§ 136. In contradistinction to intervention by right, there are other interventions which must be considered admissible, although they violate the independence or the territorial or personal supremacy of the State concerned, and although such State has by no means any legal duty to submit patiently and suffer the intervention. Of such interventions in default of right there are two kinds generally admitted and excused—namely, such as are necessary in self-preservation and such as are necessary in the interest of the balance of power.

(1) As regards interventions for the purpose of self-preservation, it is obvious that, if any necessary violation committed in self-preservation of the International Personality of other States is, as shown above (§ 130), excused, such violation must also be excused as is contained in an intervention. And it matters not whether such an intervention exercised in self-preservation is provoked by an actual or imminent intervention on the part of a third State, or by some other incident.

(2) As regards intervention in the interest of the balance of power, it is likewise obvious that it must be excused. An equilibrium between the members of the Family of Nations is an indispensable[221] condition of the very existence of International Law. If the States could not keep one another in check, all Law of Nations would soon disappear, as, naturally, an over-powerful State would tend to act according to discretion instead of according to law. Since the Westphalian Peace of 1648 the principle of balance of power has played a preponderant part in the history of Europe. It found express recognition in 1713 in the Treaty of Peace of Utrecht, it was the guiding star at the Vienna Congress in 1815 when the map of Europe was rearranged, at the Congress of Paris in 1856, the Conference of London in 1867, and the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The States themselves and the majority of writers agree upon the admissibility of intervention in the interest of balance of power. Most of the interventions exercised in the interest of the preservation of the Turkish Empire must, in so far as they are not based on treaty rights, be classified as interventions in the interest of balance of power. Examples of this are supplied by collective interventions exercised by the Powers in 1886 for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey, and in 1897 during the war between Greece and Turkey with regard to the island of Crete.

[221] A survey of the opinions concerning the value of the principle of balance of power is given by Bulmerincq, "Praxis, Theorie und Codification des Völkerrechts" (1874), pp. 40-50, but Bulmerincq himself rejects the principle. See also Donnadieu, "Essai sur la théorie de l'équilibre" (1900) where the matter is exhaustively treated, and Dupuis, "Le principe d'équilibre et le concert européen" (1909), pp. 90-108, and 494-513. It is necessary to emphasise that the principle of the balance of power is not a legal principle and therefore not one of International Law, but one of International policy; it is a political principle indispensable to the existence of International Law in its present condition.

Intervention in the interest of Humanity.

§ 137. Many jurists maintain that intervention is likewise admissible, or even has a basis of right, when exercised in the interest of humanity for the purpose of stopping religious persecution and endless cruelties in time of peace and war. That the Powers have in the past exercised intervention on these grounds, there is no doubt. Thus Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened in 1827 in the struggle between revolutionary Greece and Turkey, because public opinion was horrified at the cruelties committed during this struggle. And many a time interventions have taken place to stop the persecution of Christians in Turkey. But whether there is really a rule of the Law of Nations which admits such interventions may well be doubted. Yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that public opinion and the attitude of the Powers are in favour of such interventions, and it may perhaps be said that in time the Law of Nations will recognise the rule that interventions in the interests of humanity are admissible provided they are exercised in the form of a collective intervention of the Powers.[222]

[222] See Hall, §§ 91 and 95, where the merits of the problem are discussed from all sides. See also below, § 292, and Rougier in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 468-526.

Intervention de facto a Matter of Policy.

§ 138. Careful analysis of the rules of the Law of Nations regarding intervention and the hitherto exercised practice of intervention make it apparent that intervention is de facto a matter of policy just like war. This is the result of the combination of several factors. Since, even in the cases in which it is based on a right, intervention is not compulsory, but is solely in the discretion of the State concerned, it is for that reason alone a matter of policy. Since, secondly, every State must decide for itself whether vital interests of its own are at stake and whether a case of necessity in the interest of self-preservation has arisen, intervention is for this part again a matter of policy. Since, thirdly, the question of balance of power is so complicated and the historical development of the States involves gradually an alteration of the division of power between the States, it must likewise be left to the appreciation of every State whether or not it considers the balance of power endangered and, therefore, an intervention necessary. And who can undertake to lay down a hard-and-fast rule with regard to the amount of inhumanity on the part of a Government that would justify intervention according to the Law of Nations?

No State will ever intervene in the affairs of another if it has not some important interest in doing so, and it has always been easy for such State to find or pretend some legal justification for an intervention, be it self-preservation, balance of power, or humanity. There is no great danger to the welfare of the States in the fact that intervention is de facto a matter of policy. Too many interests are common to all the members of the Family of Nations, and too great is the natural jealousy between the Great Powers, for an abuse of intervention on the part of one powerful State without calling other States into the field. Since unjustified intervention violates the very principles of the Law of Nations, and since, as I have stated above (§ 135), in case of a violation of these principles on the part of a State every other State has a right to intervene, any unjustifiable intervention by one State in the affairs of another gives a right of intervention to all other States. Thus it becomes apparent here, as elsewhere, that the Law of Nations is intimately connected with the interests of all the States, and that they must themselves secure the maintenance and realisation of this law. This condition of things tends naturally to hamper more the ambitions of weaker States than those of the several Great Powers, but it seems unalterable.

The Monroe Doctrine.

§ 139. The de facto political character of the whole matter of intervention becomes clearly apparent through the so-called Monroe doctrine[223] of the United States of America. This doctrine, at its first appearance, was indirectly a product of the policy of intervention in the interest of legitimacy which the Holy Alliance pursued in the beginning of the nineteenth century after the downfall of Napoleon. The Powers of this alliance were inclined to extend their policy of intervention to America and to assist Spain in regaining her hold over the former Spanish colonies in South America which had declared and maintained their independence, and which were recognised as independent Sovereign States by the United States of America. To meet and to check the imminent danger, President James Monroe delivered his celebrated Message to Congress on December 2, 1823. This Message contains two quite different, but nevertheless equally important, declarations.

[223] Wharton, § 57; Dana's Note No. 36 to Wharton, p. 36; Tucker, "The Monroe Doctrine" (1885); Moore, "The Monroe Doctrine" (1895), and Digest, VI. §§ 927-968; Cespedès, "La doctrine de Monroe" (1893); Mérignhac, "La doctrine de Monroe à la fin du XIX^e siècle" (1896); Beaumarchais, "La doctrine de Monroe" (1898); Redaway, "The Monroe Doctrine" (1898); Pékin, "Les États-Unis et la doctrine de Monroe" (1900).

(1) In connection with the unsettled boundary lines in the north-west of the American continent, the Message declared "that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European Power." This declaration was never recognised by the European Powers, and Great Britain and Russia protested expressly against it. In fact, however, no occupation of American territory has since then taken place on the part of a European State.

(2) In regard to the contemplated intervention of the Holy Alliance between Spain and the South American States, the Message declared that the United States had not intervened, and never would intervene, in wars in Europe, but could not, on the other hand, in the interest of her own peace and happiness, allow the allied European Powers to extend their political system to any part of America and try to intervene in the independence of the South American republics.

(3) Since the time of President Monroe, the Monroe doctrine has been gradually somewhat extended in so far as the United States claims a kind of political hegemony over all the States of the American continent. Whenever a conflict occurs between such an American State and a European Power, the United States is ready to exercise intervention. Through the civil war her hands were to a certain extent bound in the sixties of the last century, and she could not prevent the occupation of Mexico by the French army, but she intervened[224] in 1865. Again, she did not intervene in 1902 when Great Britain, Germany, and Italy took combined action against Venezuela, because she was cognisant of the fact that this action intended merely to make Venezuela comply with her international duties. But she intervened in 1896 in the boundary conflict between Great Britain and Venezuela when Lord Salisbury had sent an ultimatum to Venezuela, and she retains the Monroe doctrine as a matter of principle.

[224] See Moore, VI. § 957.

Merits of the Monroe Doctrine.

§ 140. The importance of the Monroe doctrine is of a political, not of a legal character. Since the Law of Nations is a law between all the civilised States as equal members of the Family of Nations, the States of the American continent are subjects of the same international rights and duties as the European States. The European States are, as far as the Law of Nations is concerned, absolutely free to acquire territory in America as elsewhere. And the same legal rules are valid concerning intervention on the part of European Powers both in American affairs and in affairs of other States. But it is evident that the Monroe doctrine, as the guiding star of the policy of the United States, is of the greatest political importance. And it ought not to be maintained that this policy is in any way inconsistent with the Law of Nations. In the interest of balance of power in the world, the United States considers it a necessity that European Powers should not acquire more territory on the American continent than they actually possess. She considers, further, her own welfare so intimately connected with that of the other American States that she thinks it necessary, in the interest of self-preservation, to watch closely the relations of these States with Europe and also the relations between these very States, and eventually to intervene in conflicts. Since every State must decide for itself whether and where vital interests of its own are at stake and whether the balance of power is endangered to its disadvantage, and since, as explained above (§ 138), intervention is therefore de facto a matter of policy, there is no legal impediment to the United States carrying out a policy in conformity with the Monroe doctrine. This policy hampers indeed the South American States, but with their growing strength it will gradually disappear. For, whenever some of these States become Great Powers themselves, they will no longer submit to the political hegemony of the United States, and the Monroe doctrine will have played its part.

VII INTERCOURSE

Grotius, II. c. 2, § 13—Vattel, II. §§ 21-26—Hall, § 13—Taylor, § 160—Bluntschli, § 381 and p. 26—Hartmann, § 15—Heffter, §§ 26 and 33—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 60-64—Gareis, § 27—Liszt, § 7—Ullmann, § 38—Bonfils, Nos. 285-289—Despagnet, No. 183—Mérignhac, I. pp. 256-257—Pradier-Fodéré, I. No. 184—Rivier, I. pp. 262-264—Nys, II. pp. 221-228—Calvo, III. §§ 1303-1305—Fiore, I. No. 370—Martens, I. § 79.

Intercourse a presupposition of International Personality.

§ 141. Many adherents of the doctrine of fundamental rights include therein also a right of intercourse of every State with all others. This right of intercourse is said to contain a right of diplomatic, commercial, postal, telegraphic intercourse, of intercourse by railway, a right of foreigners to travel and reside on the territory of every State, and the like. But if the real facts of international life are taken into consideration, it becomes at once apparent that such a fundamental right of intercourse does not exist. All the consequences which are said to follow from the right of intercourse are not at all consequences of a right, but nothing else than consequences of the fact that intercourse between the States is a condition without which a Law of Nations would not and could not exist. The civilised States make a community of States because they are knit together through their common interests and the manifold intercourse which serves these interests. Through intercourse with one another and with the growth of their common interests the Law of Nations has grown up among the civilised States. Where there is no intercourse there cannot be a community and a law for such community. A State cannot be a member of the Family of Nations and an International Person, if it has no intercourse whatever with at least one or more other States. Varied intercourse with other States is a necessity for every civilised State. The mere fact that a State is a member of the Family of Nations shows that it has various intercourse with other States, for otherwise it would never have become a member of that family. Intercourse is therefore one of the characteristics of the position of the States within the Family of Nations, and it may be maintained that intercourse is a presupposition of the international Personality of every State. But no special right or rights of intercourse between the States exist according to the Law of Nations. It is because such special rights of intercourse do not exist that the States conclude special treaties regarding matters of post, telegraphs, telephones, railways, and commerce. On the other hand, most States keep up protective duties to exclude or hamper foreign trade in the interest of their home commerce, industry, and agriculture. And although as a rule they allow[225] aliens to travel and to reside on their territory, they can expel every foreign subject according to discretion.

[225] That an alien has no right to demand to be admitted to British territory was decided in the case of Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, L.R. (1891), App. Cas. 272.

Consequences of Intercourse as a Presupposition of International Personality.

§ 142. Intercourse being a presupposition of International Personality, the Law of Nations favours intercourse in every way. The whole institution of legation serves the interest of intercourse between the States, as does the consular institution. The right of legation,[226] which every full-Sovereign State undoubtedly holds, is held in the interest of intercourse, as is certainly the right of protection over citizens abroad[227] which every State possesses. The freedom of the Open Sea,[228] which has been universally recognised since the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the right of every State to the passage of its merchantmen through the maritime belt[229] of all other States, and, further, freedom of navigation for the merchantmen of all nations on so-called international rivers,[230] are further examples of provisions of the Law of Nations in the interest of international intercourse.

[226] See below, § 360.

[227] See below, § 319. The right of protection over citizens abroad is frequently said to be a special right of self-preservation, but it is really a right in the interest of intercourse.

[228] See below, § 259.

[229] See below, § 188.

[230] See below, § 178.

The question is frequently discussed and answered in the affirmative whether a State has the right to require such States as are outside the Family of Nations to open their ports and allow commercial intercourse. Since the Law of Nations is a law between those States only which are members of the Family of Nations, it has certainly nothing to do with this question, which is therefore one of mere commercial policy and of morality.

VIII JURISDICTION

Hall, §§ 62, 75-80—Westlake, I. pp. 236-271—Lawrence, §§ 93-109—Phillimore, I. §§ 317-356—Twiss, I. §§ 157-171—Halleck, I. pp. 186-245—Taylor, §§ 169-171—Wheaton, §§ 77-151—Moore, II. §§ 175-249—Bluntschli, §§ 388-393—Heffter, §§ 34-39—Bonfils, Nos. 263-266—Rivier, I. § 28—Nys, II. pp. 257-263—Fiore, I. Nos. 475-588.

Jurisdiction important for the position of the States within the Family of Nations.

§ 143. Jurisdiction is for several reasons a matter of importance as regards the position of the States within the Family of Nations. States possessing independence and territorial as well as personal supremacy can naturally extend or restrict their jurisdiction as far as they like. However, as members of the Family of Nations and International Persons, the States must exercise self-restraint in the exercise of this natural power in the interest of one another. Since intercourse of all kinds takes place between the States and their subjects, the matter ought to be thoroughly regulated by the Law of Nations. But such regulation has as yet only partially grown up. The consequence of both the regulation and non-regulation of jurisdiction is that concurrent jurisdiction of several States can often at the same time be exercised over the same persons and matters. And it can also happen that matters fall under no jurisdiction because the several States which could extend their jurisdiction over these matters refuse to do so, leaving them to each other's jurisdiction.

Restrictions upon Territorial Jurisdiction.

§ 144. As all persons and things within the territory of a State fall under its territorial supremacy, every State has jurisdiction over them. The Law of Nations, however, gives a right to every State to claim so-called exterritoriality and therefore exemption from local jurisdiction chiefly for its head,[231] its diplomatic envoys,[232] its men-of-war,[233] and its armed forces[234] abroad. And partly by custom and partly by treaty obligations, Eastern non-Christian States, Japan now excepted, are restricted[235] in their territorial jurisdiction with regard to foreign resident subjects of Christian Powers.

[231] Details below, §§ 348-353, and 356.—The exemption of a State itself from the jurisdiction of another is not based upon a claim to exterritoriality, but upon the claim to equality; see above, § 115.

[232] Details below, §§ 385-405.

[233] Details below, §§ 450-451.

[234] Details below, § 445.

[235] Details below, §§ 318 and 440.

Jurisdiction over Citizens abroad.

§ 145. The Law of Nations does not prevent a State from exercising jurisdiction over its subjects travelling or residing abroad, since they remain under its personal supremacy. As every State can also exercise jurisdiction over aliens[236] within its boundaries, such aliens are often under two concurrent jurisdictions. And, since a State is not obliged to exercise jurisdiction for all matters over aliens on its territory, and since the home State is not obliged to exercise jurisdiction over its subjects abroad, it may and does happen that aliens are actually for some matters under no State's jurisdiction.

[236] See below, § 317.

Jurisdiction on the Open Sea.

§ 146. As the Open Sea is not under the sway of any State, no State can exercise its jurisdiction there. But it is a rule of the Law of Nations that the vessels and the things and persons thereon remain during the time they are on the Open Sea under the jurisdiction of the State under whose flag they sail.[237] It is another rule of the Law of Nations that piracy[238] on the Open Sea can be punished by any State, whether or no the pirate sails under the flag of a State. Further,[239] a general practice seems to admit the claim of every maritime State to exercise jurisdiction over cases of collision at sea, whether the vessels concerned are or are not sailing under its flag. Again, in the interest of the safety of the Open Sea, every State has the right to order its men-of-war to ask any suspicious merchantman they meet on the Open Sea to show the flag, to arrest foreign merchantmen sailing under its flag without an authorisation for its use, and to pursue into the Open Sea and to arrest there such foreign merchantmen as have committed a violation of its law whilst in its ports or maritime belt.[240] Lastly, in time of war belligerent States have the right to order their men-of-war to visit, search, and eventually capture on the Open Sea all neutral vessels for carrying contraband, breach of blockade, or unneutral services to the enemy.

[237] See below, § 260.

[238] See below, § 278.

[239] See below, § 265.

[240] See below, §§ 265-266.

Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners in Foreign States.

§ 147. Many States claim jurisdiction and threaten punishment for certain acts committed by a foreigner in foreign countries.[241] States which claim jurisdiction of this kind threaten punishment for certain acts either against the State itself, such as high treason, forging bank-notes, and the like, or against its citizens, such as murder or arson, libel and slander, and the like. These States cannot, of course, exercise this jurisdiction as long as the foreigner concerned remains outside their territory. But if, after the committal of such act, he enters their territory and comes thereby under their territorial supremacy, they have an opportunity of inflicting punishment. The question is, therefore, whether States have a right to jurisdiction over acts of foreigners committed in foreign countries, and whether the home State of such an alien has a duty to acquiesce in the latter's punishment in case he comes into the power of these States. The question must be answered in the negative. For at the time such criminal acts are committed the perpetrators are neither under the territorial nor under the personal supremacy of the States concerned. And a State can only require respect for its laws from such aliens as are permanently or transiently within its territory. No right for a State to extend its jurisdiction over acts of foreigners committed in foreign countries can be said to have grown up according to the Law of Nations, and the right of protection over citizens abroad held by every State would justify it in an intervention in case one of its citizens abroad should be required to stand his trial before the Courts of another State for criminal acts which he did not commit during the time he was under the territorial supremacy of such State.[242] In the only[243] case which is reported—namely, in the case of Cutting—an intervention took place according to this view. In 1886, one A. K. Cutting, a subject of the United States, was arrested in Mexico for an alleged libel against one Emigdio Medina, a subject of Mexico, which was published in the newspaper of El Paso in Texas. Mexico maintained that she had a right to punish Cutting, because according to her Criminal Law offences committed by foreigners abroad against Mexican subjects are punishable in Mexico. The United States, however, intervened,[244] and demanded Cutting's release. Mexico refused to comply with this demand, but nevertheless Cutting was finally released, as the plaintiff withdrew his action for libel. Since Mexico likewise refused to comply with the demand of the United States to alter her Criminal Law for the purpose of avoiding in the future a similar incident, diplomatic practice has not at all settled the subject.

[241] See Hall, § 62; Westlake, I. pp. 251-253; Lawrence, § 104; Taylor, § 191; Moore, II. §§ 200 and 201; Phillimore, I. § 334.

[242] The Institute of International Law has studied the question at several meetings and in 1883, at its meeting at Munich (see Annuaire, VII. p. 156), among a body of fifteen articles concerning the conflict of the Criminal Laws of different States, adopted the following (article 8):—"Every State has a right to punish acts committed by foreigners outside its territory and violating its penal laws when those acts contain an attack upon its social existence or endanger its security and when they are not provided against by the Criminal Law of the territory where they take place." But it must be emphasised that this resolution has value de lege ferenda only.

[243] The case of Cirilo Pouble—see Moore, II. § 200, pp. 227-228—concerning which the United States at first were inclined to intervene, proved to be a case of a crime committed within Spanish jurisdiction. The case of John Anderson—see Moore, I. § 174, p. 933—is likewise not relevant, as he claimed to be a British subject.

[244] See Westlake, I. p. 252; Taylor, § 192; Calvo, VI. §§ 171-173; Moore, II. § 201, and "Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case" (1887); Rolin in R.I. XX. (1888), pp. 559-577. The case is fully discussed and the American claim is disputed by Mendelssohn Bartholdy, "Das räumliche Herrschaftsgebiet des Strafgesetzes" (1908), pp. 135-143.

CHAPTER III RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES

I ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN GENERAL

Grotius, II. c. 21, § 2—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 6, § 12—Vattel, II. §§ 63-78—Hall, § 65—Halleck, I. pp. 440-444—Wharton, I. § 21—Moore, VI. §§ 979-1039—Wheaton, § 32—Bluntschli, § 74—Heffter, §§ 101-104—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 70-74—Liszt, § 24—Ullmann, § 39—Bonfils, Nos. 324-332—Despagnet, No. 466—Piedelièvre, I. pp. 317-322—Pradier-Fodéré, I. Nos. 196-210—Rivier, I. pp. 40-44—Calvo, III. §§ 1261-1298—Fiore, I. Nos. 659-679, and Code, Nos. 591-610—Martens, I. § 118—Clunet, "Offenses et actes hostiles commis par particuliers contre un état étranger" (1887)—Triepel, "Völkerrecht und Landesrecht" (1899), pp. 324-381—Anzillotti, "Teoria generale della responsabilità dello stato nel diritto internazionale" (1902)—Wiese, "Le droit international appliqué aux guerres civiles" (1898), pp. 43-65—Rougier, "Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens" (1903), pp. 448-474—Baty, "International Law" (1908), pp. 91-242—Anzillotti in R.G. XIII. (1906), pp. 5-29 and 285-309—Foster in A.J. I. (1907), pp. 5-10—Bar in R.I. 2nd Ser. I. (1899), pp. 464-481.

Nature of State Responsibility.

§ 148. It is often maintained that a State, as a sovereign person, can have no legal responsibility whatever. This is only correct with reference to certain acts of a State towards its subjects. Since a State can abolish parts of its Municipal Law and can make new Municipal Law, it can always avoid legal, although not moral, responsibility by a change of Municipal Law. Different from this internal autocracy is the external responsibility of a State to fulfil its international legal duties. Responsibility for such duties is, as will be remembered,[245] a quality of every State as an International Person, without which the Family of Nations could not peaceably exist. Although there is no International Court of Justice which could establish such responsibility and pronounce a fine or other punishment against a State for neglect of its international duties, State responsibility concerning international duties is nevertheless a legal responsibility. For a State cannot abolish or create new International Law in the same way as it can abolish or create new Municipal Law. A State, therefore, cannot renounce its international duties unilaterally[246] at discretion, but is and remains legally bound by them. And although there is not and never will be a central authority above the single States to enforce the fulfilment of these duties, there is the legalised self-help of the single States against one another. For every neglect of an international legal duty constitutes an international delinquency,[247] and the violated State can through reprisals or even war compel the delinquent State to comply with its international duties. It is only theorists who deny the possibility of a legal responsibility of States, the practice of the States themselves recognises it distinctly, although there may in a special case be controversy as to whether a responsibility is to be borne. And State responsibility is now in a general way recognised for the time of war by article 3 of the Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which stipulates: "A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to make compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."

[245] See above, § 113.

[246] See Annex to Protocol I. of Conference of London, 1871, where the Signatory Powers proclaim that "it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement."