Subjects of cession.
§ 214. Since cession is a bilateral transaction, it has two subjects—namely, the ceding and the acquiring State. Both subjects must be States, and only those cessions in which both subjects are States concern the Law of Nations. Cessions of territory made to private persons and to corporations[408] by native tribes or by States outside the dominion of the Law of Nations do not fall within the sphere of International Law, neither do cessions of territory by native tribes made to States[409] which are members of the Family of Nations. On the other hand, cession of territory made to a member of the Family of Nations by a State as yet outside that family is real cession and a concern of the Law of Nations, since such State becomes through the treaty of cession in some respects a member of that family.[410]
[408] See above, § 209, No. 2.
Object of cession.
§ 215. The object of cession is sovereignty over such territory as has hitherto already belonged to another State. As far as the Law of Nations is concerned, every State as a rule can cede a part of its territory to another State, or by ceding the whole of its territory can even totally merge in another State. However, since certain parts of State territory, as for instance rivers and the maritime belt, are inalienable appurtenances of the land, they cannot be ceded without a piece of land.[411]
The controverted question whether permanently neutralised parts of a not permanently neutralised State can be ceded to another State must be answered in the affirmative,[412] although the Powers certainly can exercise an intervention by right. On the other hand, a permanently neutralised State could not, except in the case of mere frontier regulation, cede a part of its neutralised territory to another State without the consent of the Powers.[413] Nor could a State under suzerainty or protectorate cede a part or the whole of its territory to a third State without the consent of the superior State. Thus, the Ionian Islands could not in 1863 have merged in Greece without the consent of Great Britain, which exercised a protectorate over these islands.
[412] Thus in 1860 Sardinia ceded her neutralised provinces of Chablais and Faucigny to France. See above, §207.
Form of cession.
§ 216. The only form in which a cession can be effected is an agreement embodied in a treaty between the ceding and the acquiring State. Such treaty may be the outcome of peaceable negotiations or of war, and the cession may be one with or without compensation.
If a cession of territory is the outcome of war, it is the treaty of peace which stipulates the cession among its other provisions. Such cession is regularly one without compensation, although certain duties may be imposed upon the acquiring State, as, for instance, of taking over a part of the debts of the ceding State corresponding to the extent and importance of the ceded territory, or that of giving the individuals domiciled on the ceded territory the option to retain their old citizenship or, at least, to emigrate.
Cessions which are the outcome of peaceable negotiations may be agreed upon by the interested States from different motives and for different purposes. Thus Austria, during war with Prussia and Italy in 1866, ceded Venice to France as a gift, and some weeks afterwards France on her part ceded Venice to Italy. The Duchy of Courland ceded in 1795 its whole territory to and voluntarily merged thereby in Russia, in the same way the then Free Town of Mulhouse merged in France in 1798, the Congo Free State in Belgium in 1908, and the Empire of Korea in Japan in 1911.
Cessions have in the past often been effected by transactions which are analogous to transactions in private business life. As long as absolutism was reigning over Europe, it was not at all rare for territory to be ceded in marriage contracts or by testamentary dispositions.[414] In the interest of frontier regulations, but also for other purposes, exchanges of territory frequently take place. Sale of territory is quite usual; as late as 1868 Russia sold her territory in America to the United States for 7,200,000 dollars, and in 1899 Spain sold the Caroline Islands to Germany for 25,000,000 pesetas. Pledge and lease are also made use of. Thus, the then Republic of Genoa pledged Corsica to France in 1768, Sweden pledged Wismar to Mecklenburg in 1803; China[415] leased in 1898 Kiaochau to Germany,[416] Wei-Hai-Wei and the land opposite the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain,[417] and Port Arthur to Russia.
[414] Phillimore, I. §§ 274-276, enumerates many examples of such cession. The question whether the monarch of a State under absolute government could nowadays by a testamentary disposition cede territory to another State must, I believe, be answered in the affirmative.
[415] See above, § 171, No. 3. Cession may also take place under the disguise of an agreement according to which territory comes under the "administration" or under the "use, occupation, and control" of a foreign State. See above, § 171, Nos. 2 and 4.
[416] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXX. (1904), p. 326.
[417] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXII. (1905), pp. 89 and 90.
Whatever may be the motive and the purpose of the transaction, and whatever may be the compensation, if any, for the cession, the ceded territory is transferred to the new sovereign with all the international obligations[418] locally connected with the territory (Res transit cum suo onere, and Nemo plus juris transferre potest, quam ipse habet).
[418] How far a succession of States takes place in the case of cession of territory has been discussed above, § 84.
Tradition of the ceded Territory.
§ 217. The treaty of cession must be followed by actual tradition of the territory to the new owner State, unless such territory is already occupied by the new owner, as in the case where the cession is the outcome of war and the ceded territory has been during such war in the military occupation of the State to which it is now ceded. But the validity of the cession does not depend upon tradition,[419] the cession being completed by ratification of the treaty of cession, and the capability of the new owner to cede the acquired territory to a third State at once without taking actual possession of it.[420] But of course the new owner State cannot exercise its territorial supremacy thereon until it has taken physical possession of the ceded territory.
[419] This is controversial. Many writers—see, for instance, Rivier, I. p. 203—oppose the opinion presented in the text.
[420] Thus France, to which Austria ceded in 1859 Lombardy, ceded this territory on her part to Sardinia without previously having actually taken possession of it.
Veto of third Powers.
§ 218. As a rule, no third Power has the right of veto with regard to a cession of territory. Exceptionally, however, such right may exist. It may be that a third Power has by a previous treaty acquired a right of pre-emption concerning the ceded territory, or that some early treaty has created another obstacle to the cession, as, for instance, in the case of permanently neutralised parts of a not-permanently neutralised State.[421] And the Powers have certainly the right of veto in case a permanently neutralised State desires to increase its territory by acquiring land through cession from another State.[422] But even where no right of veto exists, a third Power might intervene for political reasons. For there is no duty on the part of third States to acquiesce in such cessions of territory as endanger the balance of power or are otherwise of vital importance.[423] And a strong State will practically always interfere in case a cession of such a kind as menaces its vital interests is agreed upon. Thus, when in 1867 the reigning King of Holland proposed to sell Luxemburg to France, the North German Confederation intervened, and the cession was not effected, but Luxemburg became permanently neutralised.
Plebiscite and option.
§ 219. As the object of cession is sovereignty over the ceded territory, all such individuals domiciled thereon as are subjects of the ceding State become ipso facto by the cession subjects[424] of the acquiring State. The hardship involved in the fact that in all cases of cession the inhabitants of the territory lose their old citizenship and are handed over to a new Sovereign whether they like it or not, has created a movement in favour of the claim that no cession shall be valid until the inhabitants have by a plebiscite[425] given their consent to the cession. And several treaties[426] of cession concluded during the nineteenth century stipulate that the cession shall only be valid provided the inhabitants consent to it through a plebiscite. But it is doubtful whether the Law of Nations will ever make it a condition of every cession that it must be ratified by a plebiscite.[427] The necessities of international policy may now and then allow or even demand such a plebiscite, but in most cases they will not allow it.
[424] See Keith, "The Theory of State Succession, &c." (1907), pp. 42-45; Cogordan, "La Nationalité" (1890), pp. 317-400; Moore, III. § 379.
[425] See Stoerk, "Option und Plebiscite" (1879); Rivier, I. p. 204; Freudenthal, "Die Volksabstimmung bei Gebietsabtretungen und Eroberungen" (1891); Bonfils, No. 570; Despagnet, No. 391; Ullmann, § 97.
[426] See Rivier, I. p. 210, where all these treaties are enumerated.
[427] Although Grotius (II. c. VI. § 4) taught this to be necessary.
The hardship of the inhabitants being handed over to a new Sovereign against their will can be lessened by a stipulation in the treaty of cession binding the acquiring State to give the inhabitants of the ceded territory the option of retaining their old citizenship on making an express declaration. Many treaties of cession concluded during the second half of the nineteenth century contain this stipulation. But it must be emphasised that, failing a stipulation expressly forbidding it, the acquiring State may expel those inhabitants who have made use of the option and retained their old citizenship, since otherwise the whole population of the ceded territory might actually consist of aliens and endanger the safety of the acquiring State.
The option to emigrate within a certain period, which is frequently stipulated in favour of the inhabitants of ceded territory, is another means of averting the charge that inhabitants are handed over to a new Sovereign against their will. Thus article 2 of the Peace Treaty of Frankfort, 1871, which ended the Franco-German war, stipulated that the French inhabitants of the ceded territory of Alsace and Lorraine should up to October 1, 1872, enjoy the privilege of transferring their domicile from the ceded territory to French soil.[428]
[428] The important question whether subjects of the ceding States who are born on the ceded territory but have their domicile abroad become ipso facto by the cession subjects of the acquiring State, must, I think, be answered in the negative, unless special treaty arrangements stipulate the contrary. Therefore, Frenchmen born in Alsace but domiciled at the time of the cession in Great Britain, would not have lost their French citizenship through the cession to Germany but for article 1, part 2, of the additional treaty of Dec. 11, 1871, to the Peace Treaty of Frankfort. (Martens, N.R.G. XX. p. 847.) See Bonfils, No. 427, and Cogordan, "La Nationalité, &c." (1890), p. 361.
Hall, §§ 32-34—Westlake, I. pp. 96-111, 119-133—Lawrence, § 74—Phillimore, I. §§ 236-250—Twiss, I. §§ 118-126—Halleck, I. p. 154—Taylor, §§ 221-224—Walker, § 9—Wharton, I. § 2—Moore, I. §§ 80-81—Wheaton, §§ 165-174—Bluntschli, §§ 278-283—Hartmann, § 61—Heffter, § 70—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 255-266—Gareis, § 70—Liszt, § 10—Ullmann, §§ 93-96—Bonfils, Nos. 536-563—Despagnet, Nos. 329-399—Mérignhac, II. pp. 419-487—Pradier-Fodéré, II. Nos. 784-802—Rivier, I. pp. 188-197—Nys, II. pp. 47-108—Calvo, I. §§ 266-282—Fiore, II. Nos. 841-849, and Code, Nos. 1054-1067—Martens, I. § 90—Tartarin, "Traité de l'occupation" (1873)—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 155-187—Heimburger, "Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit" (1888), pp. 103-155—Salomon, "L'occupation des territoires sans maître" (1889)—Jèze, "Étude théorique et pratique sur l'occupation, &c." (1896)—Macdonell in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, I. (1899), pp. 276-286—Waultrin in R.G. XV. (1908), pp. 78, 185, 401.
Conception of Occupation.
§ 220. Occupation is the act of appropriation by a State through which it intentionally acquires sovereignty over such territory as is at the time not under the sovereignty of another State. Occupation as a mode of acquisition differs from subjugation[429] chiefly in so far as the conquered and afterwards annexed territory has hitherto belonged to another State. Again, occupation differs from cession in so far as through cession the acquiring State receives sovereignty over the respective territory from the former owner State. In contradistinction to cession, which is a derivative mode of acquisition, occupation is therefore an original mode. And it must be emphasised that occupation can only take place by and for a State;[430] it must be a State act, that is, it must be performed in the service of a State, or it must be acknowledged by a State after its performance.
Object of Occupation.
§ 221. Only such territory can be the object of occupation as is no State's land, whether entirely uninhabited, as e.g. an island, or inhabited by natives whose community is not to be considered as a State. Even civilised individuals may live and have private property on a territory without any union by them into a State proper which exercises sovereignty over such territory. And natives may live on a territory under a tribal organisation which need not be considered a State proper. But a part or the whole of the territory of any State, even although such State is entirely outside the Family of Nations, is not a possible object of occupation, and it can only be acquired through cession[431] or subjugation. On the other hand, a territory which belonged at one time to a State but has been afterwards abandoned, is a possible object for occupation on the part of another State.[432]
Although the Open Sea is free and is, therefore, not the object of occupation, the subsoil[433] of the bed of the Open Sea may become the object of occupation through driving mines and piercing tunnels from the coast.[434]
[434] When, in 1909, Admiral Peary reached the North Pole and hoisted the flag of the United States the question was discussed whether the North Pole could be the object of occupation. The question must, I believe, be answered in the negative since there is no land on the Pole. See Scott in A.J. III. (1909), pp. 928-941, and Balch in A.J. IV. (1910), pp. 265-275.
Occupation how effected.
§ 222. Theory and practice agree nowadays upon the rule that occupation is effected through taking possession of and establishing an administration over the territory in the name of and for the acquiring State. Occupation thus effected is real occupation, and, in contradistinction to fictitious occupation, is named effective occupation. Possession and administration are the two essential facts that constitute an effective occupation.
(1) The territory must really be taken into possession by the occupying State. For this purpose it is necessary that the respective State should take the territory under its sway (corpus) with the intention to acquire sovereignty over it (animus). This can only be done by a settlement on the territory accompanied by some formal act which announces both that the territory has been taken possession of and that the possessor intends to keep it under his sovereignty. The necessary formal act is usually performed either by the publication of a proclamation or by the hoisting of a flag. But such formal act by itself constitutes fictitious occupation only, unless there is left on the territory a settlement which is able to keep up the authority of the flag. On the other hand, it is irrelevant whether or not some agreement is made with the natives by which they submit themselves to the sway of the occupying State. Any such agreement is usually neither understood nor appreciated by them, and even if the natives really do understand the meaning, such agreements have a moral value only.[435]
[435] If an agreement with natives were legally important, the respective territory would be acquired by cession, and not by occupation. But although it is nowadays quite usual to obtain a cession from a native chief, this is, nevertheless, not cession in the technical sense of the term in International Law; see above, § 214.
(2) After having, in the aforementioned way, taken possession of a territory, the possessor must establish some kind of administration thereon which shows that the territory is really governed by the new possessor. If within a reasonable time after the act of taking possession the possessor does not establish some responsible authority which exercises governing functions, there is then no effective occupation, since in fact no sovereignty of a State is exercised over the territory.
Inchoate Title of Discovery.
§ 223. In former times the two conditions of possession and administration which now make the occupation effective were not considered necessary for the acquisition of territory through occupation. In the age of the discoveries, States maintained that the fact of discovering a hitherto unknown territory was sufficient reason for considering it as acquired through occupation by the State in whose service the discoverer made his explorations. And although later on a real taking possession of the territory was considered necessary for its occupation, it was not until the eighteenth century that the writers on the Law of Nations postulated an effective occupation as necessary,[436] and it was not until the nineteenth century that the practice of the States accorded with this postulate. But although nowadays discovery does not constitute acquisition through occupation, it is nevertheless not without importance. It is agreed that discovery gives to the State in whose service it was made an inchoate title; it "acts as a temporary bar to occupation by another State"[437] within such a period as is reasonably sufficient for effectively occupying the discovered territory. If such period lapses without any attempt by the discovering State to turn its inchoate title into a real title of occupation, such inchoate title perishes, and any other State can now acquire the territory by means of an effective occupation.
[436] See Vattel, I. § 208.
[437] Thus Hall, § 32.
Notification of Occupation to other Powers.
§ 224. No rule of the Law of Nations exists which makes notification of occupation to other Powers a necessary condition of its validity. But as regards all future occupations on the African coast the Powers assembled at the Berlin Congo Conference in 1884-1885 have by article 34 of the General Act[438] of this Conference stipulated that occupation shall be notified to one another, so that such notification is now a condition of the validity of certain occupations in Africa. And there is no doubt that in time this rule will either by custom or by treaty be extended from occupations on the African coast to occupations everywhere else.
[438] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. X. p. 426.
Extent of Occupation.
§ 225. Since an occupation is valid only if effective, it is obvious that the extent of an occupation ought only to reach over so much territory as is effectively occupied. In practice, however, the interested States have neither in the past nor in the present acted in conformity with such a rule; on the contrary, they have always tried to attribute to their occupation a much wider area. Thus it has been maintained that an effective occupation of the land at the mouth of a river is sufficient to bring under the sovereignty of the occupying State the whole territory through which such river and its tributaries run up to the very crest of the watershed.[439] Again, it has been maintained that, when a coast line has been effectively occupied, the extent of the occupation reaches up to the watershed of all such rivers as empty into the coast line.[440] And it has, thirdly, been asserted that effective occupation of a territory extends the sovereignty of the possessor also over neighbouring territories as far as it is necessary for the integrity, security, and defence of the really occupied land.[441] But all these and other fanciful assertions have no basis to rest upon. In truth, no general rule can be laid down beyond the above, that occupation reaches as far as it is effective. How far it is effective is a question of the special case. It is obvious that when the agent of a State takes possession of a territory and makes a settlement on a certain spot of it, he intends thereby to acquire a vast area by his occupation. Everything depends, therefore, upon the fact how far around the settlement or settlements the established responsible authority that governs the territory in the name of the possessor succeeds in gradually extending the established sovereignty. The payment of a tribute on the part of tribes settled far away, the fact that flying columns of the military or the police sweep, when necessary, remote spots, and many other facts, can show how far round the settlements the possessor is really able to assert the established authority. But it will always be difficult to mark exactly in this way the boundary of an effective occupation, since naturally the tendency prevails to extend the sway constantly and gradually over a wider area. It is, therefore, a well-known fact that disputes concerning the boundaries of occupations can only rarely be decided on the basis of strict law; they must nearly always be compromised, whether by a treaty or by arbitration.[442]
[439] Claim of the United States in the Oregon Boundary dispute (1827) with Great Britain. See Twiss, I. §§ 126 and 127, and his "The Oregon Question Examined" (1846); Phillimore, I. § 250; Hall, § 34.
[440] Claim of the United States in their dispute with Spain concerning the boundary of Louisiana (1803), approved of by Twiss, I. § 125.
[441] This is the so-called "right of contiguity," approved of by Twiss, I. §§ 124 and 131.
[442] The Institute of International Law, in 1887, at its meeting in Lausanne, adopted a "Projet de déclaration internationale relatif aux occupations de territoires," comprising ten articles; see Annuaire, X. p. 201.
Protectorate as Precursor of Occupation.
§ 226. The growing desire to acquire vast territories as colonies on the part of States unable at once to occupy effectively such territories has, in the second half of the nineteenth century, led to the contracting of agreements with the chiefs of natives inhabiting unoccupied territories, by which these chiefs commit themselves to the "protectorate" of States that are members of the Family of Nations. These so-called protectorates are certainly not protectorates in the technical sense of the term designating the relation that exists between a strong and a weak State through a treaty by which the weak State surrenders itself into the protection of the strong and transfers to the latter the management of its more important international relations.[443] Neither can they be compared with the protectorate of members of the Family of Nations exercised over such non-Christian States as are outside that family,[444] because the respective chiefs of natives are not the heads of States, but heads of tribal communities only. Such agreements, although they are named "Protectorates," are nothing else than steps taken to exclude other Powers from occupying the respective territories. They give, like discovery, an inchoate title, and are preparations and precursors of future occupations.
Spheres of influence.
§ 227. The uncertainty of the extent of an occupation and the tendency of every colonising State to extend its occupation constantly and gradually into the interior, the "Hinterland," of an occupied territory, has led several States which have colonies in Africa to secure for themselves "spheres of influence" by international treaties with other interested Powers. Spheres of influence are therefore the names of such territories as are exclusively reserved for future occupation on the part of a Power which has effectively occupied adjoining territories. In this way disputes are avoided for the future, and the interested Powers can gradually extend their sovereignty over vast territories without coming into conflict with other Powers. Thus, to give some examples, Great Britain has concluded treaties regarding spheres of influence with Portugal[445] in 1890, with Italy[446] in 1891, with Germany[447] in 1886 and 1890, and with France[448] in 1898.[449]
[445] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XVIII. p. 558.
[446] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XVIII. p. 175.
[447] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XII. p. 298, and XVI. p. 895.
[448] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXIX. p. 116.
[449] Protectorates and Spheres of Influence are exhaustively treated in Hall, "Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown," §§ 92-100; but Hall fails to distinguish between protectorates over Eastern States and protectorates over native tribes.