CHAPTER V.

Hurrekee Ghât—Chain Bridles—Sir Thomas Dallas—Victory of Sir Harry Smith at Aliwal—Umballa—Preparations of the Sikhs—Capture of Dhurmkote—Loodianna—Runjoor Singh—Buddiwal—Sirdar Ajeet Singh—Invalids at Loodianna—The Pattiala Rajah—Alarm at Loodianna—Siege-train in Danger—Convoy inadequately protected—Sikh Artillery at Aliwal—Major Lawrenson—Singular Formation of the Sikh Infantry at Aliwal—16th Lancers—Desperation of the Sikhs—Colonel Cureton—Charge of Lancers—Marshal Marmont's Opinion—Sikhs evacuate Buddiwal—Rapid Movements of the Sikhs—Brigadiers Godby and Hicks.

The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief inspected the 9th Lancers on the morning of the 21st of January. An incessant report of guns of a heavy calibre was heard all day, from the other side of the river. This afternoon I rode in company with my commanding officer to the Hurrekee Ghât, near which was our picquet, to enquire about two boats, said to have been captured by the enemy. We, however, saw only a couple of old boats and a great many unarmed people near them.

On the 23rd a false alarm caused the Commander-in-Chief to order us out, and we all stood to our horses at the head of our lines, from twelve till four o'clock, P.M.

On the 25th several of our officers had chain reins made for their regimental bridles, because in the last action the enemy had cut some of the bridles of the 3rd Light Dragoons, with their swords, by which their riders became powerless, having lost all command over their horses.

This brings to my recollection an anecdote told me of the late Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Dallas, of the Madras Cavalry, well known in the wars with Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan, as the best horseman and most experienced swordsman, in the Madras army, having often proved himself the victor in single combat, and killed his man. One of the enemy was noted for possessing a scimitar of the first quality; Sir Thomas, then a Captain, and this man made an agreement to this effect, that they were to fight together, and that the native was not to cut the Captain's reins, nor he to use his pistols. After a long encounter the man violated the engagement and cut the Captain's reins, which were not of steel, upon which the latter drew his pistol and shot his opponent dead on the spot.

In a country like India every officer should go on service, furnished with a chain rein, for without it many a man has lost his life; besides, it is neither heavy nor inconvenient. The dragoons and troopers should also be supplied with them. The natives use them as well as coats of chain armour, and many of the Sikhs, as I myself witnessed, wore even breast plates and back pieces of steel. I picked up a steel helmet in the Sikh camp at the battle of Sobraon, which now serves to decorate my father's dining-room.

On the 28th of January, the Royal Lancers were in readiness the whole day to turn out at a moment's notice, as the Sikhs shewed themselves in great force, and appeared as if bent upon mischief.

January 29th. Intelligence was received in Camp of the splendid victory gained by Major-General Sir Harry Smith over the Sikhs under the command of Runjoor Singh, at Aliwal, on the 28th. The force under Sir Harry having captured the whole of the enemy's guns, forty-eight in number, and put to rout their army of 24,000 men, our whole line turned out at sunrise, when a royal salute was fired in honour of the day. After the salute, the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief passed up the line, and the former addressed each regiment separately. These addresses are not unusual in India.

The battle of Ferozeshah, it will be remembered, was fought on the 21st and 22nd of December, 1845, so that about five weeks had elapsed since the last feat of arms. More troops were now advancing to the frontier, and several hundred hackeries, laden with shot, shells, powder, and stores of all kinds, were coming up. Engineer officers, too, were in great request; for it now became known that our assiduous enemy was fortifying Sobraon, on the left bank of the Sutlej, between Loodianna and Ferozepore. In fact the Sikhs were working hard at their entrenchments day and night.

We had not as yet received our military stores and supplies from Delhi. A well-stocked magazine, was apparently much needed. Many considered that Umballa was the most advantageous spot for establishing such a depôt, being 150 miles from Ferozepore, and seventy-one from Loodianna. Ferozepore was thought too isolated; delay, therefore, was imperative, and it was of no use to anticipate events.

The reader may easily conclude that the Sikhs, seeing our additional troops, guns and stores moving up to the army, did not remain idle, for they had a great game at stake, being no less than the future fate of a kingdom. They were buoyed up by their success at Buddiwal; the whole army under Tej Singh had re-crossed the Sutlej. The bridge-head, which secured so important an advantage, was enlarged; and, in the very face of the British army, they unremittingly carried on their warlike preparations. They seemed confident of victory, and ready to carry war and destruction into the very heart of their enemy's country, when our unlooked-for and glorious victory at Aliwal, proved to them that they were not invincible.

The announcement in our camp, on the 29th, of Sir Harry Smith's victory at Aliwal, caused considerable sensation. As for myself, I must confess that it was a great disappointment to me not to have taken a part in this engagement. I had written just before to Sir Harry Smith, who, as I have already observed, had been in the Rifle Brigade with my father, during the Peninsular war, expecting that he would have some fighting, and asking to be employed as his aide-de-camp. It was now too late. The news of the brilliant victory came, and put an end to all chance of my witnessing a battle in that quarter.

The object of Sir Harry in moving from our camp was doubtless to prevent the Sikhs from marching towards Delhi and intercepting our supplies. He succeeded in taking the little town and fort of Dhurmkote, which was filled with grain, and thus secured the regular supplies of the army. Having accomplished the reduction of the place, he received intelligence from head-quarters, that Runjoor Singh had crossed the Sutlej with 40,000 Sikhs, and had taken up a position on the road to Loodianna, for the purpose of intercepting our supplies from that town, which he threatened with an attack. This was accompanied by an order to Sir Harry Smith to proceed immediately to Loodianna.

Four regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and eighteen guns composed the whole of the detachment under the command of this brave general, when on the 21st of January he proceeded to Buddiwal, a small garrison close to Loodianna, which was occupied by Runjoor Singh, and 10,000 of his men. Sir Harry Smith endeavoured by a détour to reach Loodianna, and effect a junction with the Brigade stationed there, before undertaking any engagement with the Sikhs. The latter, however, relying upon their superior numbers, provoked an attack by a brisk fire from their formidable artillery. A severe contest followed, and the British General after sustaining heavy losses, deemed it prudent to fall back upon Loodianna. This he effected by a very skilful evolution, and succeeded in holding the place.

Dr. M'Gregor, in his history of the Sikhs,[23] states that Runjoor Singh, younger brother of Lena Singh Mujetheea,[24] commanded the division of the Sikh army destined to act against Loodianna, as well as to seize the siege-train in progress to join our army, which were the two objects to be held in view by Sir Harry Smith. Dr. M'Gregor says: "Had he (Sir Harry) stopped to return the fire of the Sikhs at Buddiwal, all fear for Loodianna might have been removed; but then there was the risk, that if discomfited, Runjoor Singh might have crossed the country, and captured the siege train, which was escorted by only a Native Infantry regiment, and the 11th Light Cavalry, with a few Artillerymen. The condition of Sir Harry Smith was such, that he could not hope effectually to drive Runjoor Singh across the Sutlej that day, and he probably considered—like a good general, brought up in the school of Wellington, and disciplined in a corps like the immortal old 95th—that half measures were worse than useless. Besides, though making a great sacrifice of baggage, and even of lives, there was the hope that his forbearance would be construed into fear by the Sikhs, who might, in consequence, be induced to meet him in a fair field, where he would have an opportunity of accomplishing the two objects which he had in view; namely, the defence of Loodianna, and the safety of the train, closing all, perhaps, with the entire discomfiture of the Sikhs, when his troops should be a little refreshed." The whole of the Sikh force was not, it was believed, at Buddiwal, therefore the apprehension of Sir Harry Smith, doubtless, was that the other division might get to Loodianna. Buddiwal was at the time in the possession of Sirdar Ajeet Singh, a chief under our protection, who, after the operations at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, burnt a portion of the barracks of H.M. 50th Foot, at Loodianna, and then took possession of Buddiwal, where he made prisoner Assistant-Surgeon R.G.D. Banon, 62nd Foot (now Surgeon of the 96th Foot), and kept him in confinement for twenty-five days,—twelve of which in irons. The Sikhs in vain tried to induce him and the other Europeans who were in the fort, to join their army. They were released after the battle of Sobraon.

It is said, that though Sir Harry Smith was ordered not to fight before he had made a junction with Colonel Wheeler's detachment, yet that as the Sikhs had been moving to the south of Buddiwal, an action must inevitably have ensued, to prevent their advance towards our convoy. There were said to be three roads from Buddiwal to Loodianna. Buddiwal lies to the south-east of Aliwal and between it and Sirhind. Runjoor Singh's force was double that of Sir Harry Smith, besides which he had a large number of guns.

The fort at Loodianna contained all the sick of H.M. and the H.C. troops, which had marched from thence to join the army, as well as the ladies, women, and children belonging to those regiments. The only troops left there were the two Goorkha corps, the Nusseeree and Sirmoor Battalions,[25] but they were afterwards increased by the arrival of the 30th Native Infantry, the 1st Light Cavalry, and about 1,500 of the Pattiala Horse. The Pattiala Rajah was under our protection, and was one of those chiefs who early rendered assistance to our army, both in men, money, and supplies. He died very suddenly, soon after the battle of Ferozeshah, not without suspicion of having been poisoned, which is by no means an unusual method of securing the succession to a Rajahship. It is not impossible that he may have been killed by some of the true Sikhs, for his strenuous support of the British. A mystery hangs over this affair; and if we were to discard mystery from the records of Indian narratives, we should have little left to relate. The deceased Rajah's successor more than fulfilled the expectations of the Governor-General, and was, at the close of the campaign, confirmed in the possession of his estates, and invested by Lord Hardinge with the style and title of Maharajah, in consideration of his important services.

The alarm at Loodianna was natural, for a Sikh force having burnt down part of the cantonments, the appearance of a second, and more powerful force would be conclusive in the minds of most persons as to the fate of the station. It fama per urbes Subathoo et Simla. At Umballa the alarm was still greater. Dr. M'Gregor, in his History of the Sikhs, p. 136, writes: "We may smile at the fears which prompted this fugacious movement,[26] but had Sir Harry Smith not advanced to Loodianna, there is every reason to believe that the siege-train might have been lost, Loodianna pillaged and burnt, the hill stations destroyed, and Umballa, and even other places in the Provinces, sacked and occupied; so that the movement of the 1st division was one of the utmost importance, and not only prevented such sad disasters, but was followed by one of the best managed actions on record." That the train was in some danger is evident, from the fact that the Commander-in-Chief despatched for its security the 3rd Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Taylor, towards Dhurmkote, which lies to the west of Aliwal, and about half way between Loodianna and Ferozepore. On the 30th of January, this Brigade returned to camp.

Now, if we look at the map we shall see, that on the 28th, the day of the battle of Aliwal, the convoy would have been but a short distance south-west from Dhurmkote, perhaps twenty miles. And, again, if we suppose a line to be drawn from Dhurmkote, in a direction twenty miles to the south-east, which extreme point is called Bussean, we shall find that the Sikh troops at Buddiwal were very near to the convoy, on the night of the 27th of January. The escort for the convoy was extremely weak; for a corps of Native Infantry, and another of Native Cavalry, would not (after the late actions), have been above 1,200 men strong. This convoy was very inadequately protected, and such as our brave Commander-in-Chief would not have sent. Until joined by Taylor's brigade, from the neighbourhood of Kurnaul, it was in imminent danger. Had the Sikhs seized the convoy, the battle of Sobraon could not have taken place when it did; moreover, from delay, the season would have been sickly; and great loss must have ensued from this cause alone.

There are some circumstances which occurred at the battle of Aliwal, deserving of prominent notice. The enemy had a great many guns, which were playing with considerable effect upon the British troops. Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Lawrenson, C.B., who commanded the Brigade of Horse Artillery, finding his men and horses falling, to save the delay of waiting for orders, instantly galloped up his brigade of guns to within a short distance of the Sikhs, wheeled round, unlimbered, and, by a brisk cannonade soon forced their gunners to quit their guns for a time. Had the cavalry charged at the same moment, I am assured they would have taken the guns. It was one of those exhibitions of decision and promptitude in war, which well merits, and did receive its reward. It was probably the suddenness of the movement which prevented the immediate support by troops.

The Sikhs made a singular disposition of their infantry in this battle for receiving the charges of the British cavalry. Instead of forming in squares they were arranged into triangles, the apex being in front and opposed to the British, the men also in the rear, or base line, knelt down, so that when the 16th Lancers broke through the front face they were received by fixed bayonets. The French system was followed in these dispositions; and a few French officers were alone wanting to animate the enemy with hopes of success, however futile such hopes must have proved. For, opposed to a force commanded by one of our ablest and most experienced generals, nothing but ruin and utter destruction could, under any circumstances have fallen to the lot of our rash, though brave foe.

The 16th Lancers suffered greatly, for the Sikhs fought with the most obstinate bravery. Preferring a voluntary death, even when all hope of resistance was at an end, they determined that their lives should be purchased at a high cost. Captain Bere of that gallant regiment was most successful in his efforts, having been seen to charge through the wedge of Sikhs, and back again more than once. And cordially do I congratulate a brother officer, Lieutenant T.J. Francis, on having had the good fortune to be present in this glorious action. He had but lately returned from England, and, at the commencement of the campaign, was on his way to the upper provinces with a detachment of recruits. Being anxious not to lose the opportunity of seeing service with Sir Harry Smith's division, Lieutenant Francis hastened up, and arriving opportunely for the battle, obtained permission to accompany the 16th Lancers to the field. After the action, Brigadier Cureton, who commanded the cavalry, thanked Lieutenant Francis for his valuable services, which commendation I had the pleasure of reading from a copy of an extract from the brigade orders a day or two after.

The late Colonel Cureton of the 16th Lancers, who was unfortunately killed at Ramnuggur, had been known to say that Lancers should never be employed in charges with the enemy in less than a squadron, and from the results of this battle many cavalry officers have questioned whether the lance is the best weapon for cavalry in India. In the charges at Aliwal the Sikhs have been known to receive the point into their bodies and then to kill their adversary by cutting him down. The Sikh could not extract the lance, nor had the Lancer time to draw his sword.

There is no doubt that Lancers should never charge in small parties. Nothing less than a wing should attempt to break squares of infantry.

The charge in line, of a broken enemy is another thing. Marshal Marmont, in his "Esprit des Instructions Militaires," p. 45-50, says: "Cavalry should have one pistol; heavy cavalry, with lances and sabres and some few carbines, should be employed to fight infantry, the light cavalry to finish. The hussar or light cavalry soldier will, single-handed, beat the lancer. Cuirassiers should be armed with the lance and straight sword. The first rank should charge with the lance couched, and the second rank with the sabre in hand. As soon as the shock is effected, and the ranks are mingled, the sabres must do their duty. Lancers are equally successful against cavalry in line, especially if the enemy have only sabres. The cavalry in line should have lances chiefly, the sabre as an auxiliary."

Though Marmont was educated as an artillery officer, his great military experience entitles his opinion to be received with due respect, no matter to which branch of the profession he may refer. The Lancers were not employed in the Peninsular war, nor yet at Waterloo, consequently the 16th is the first Lancer regiment which has had the honour of testing the lance in open conflict, and against bodies of hostile infantry.

After the engagement at Buddiwal on the 22nd of January 1846, the Sikh troops under Runjoor Singh suddenly evacuated that place, and proceeded in the direction of Loodianna, keeping close to the river, where they secured a number of boats with the apparent intention of re-crossing to the right bank to join the main army. Whether this was a feint, or whether Runjoor Singh, having received intimation of the advance of reinforcements with whom his forces might not be equal to cope, desired to secure the means of a hasty retreat; or, whether he was following the example of Tej Singh, and acting a double part, remains uncertain. However this may be, Sir Harry Smith lost no time in taking possession of the place which had been evacuated by the Sikhs, who were soon after joined by a large reinforcement of their own body. The troops under Runjoor Singh, amounting to between 15,000 and 16,000 men, were immediately on the move, and preparing for fresh aggressions.

Sir Harry Smith saw that a collision was inevitable, and his own strength having been reinforced from head-quarters, he proceeded, on the morning of the 28th to reconnoitre the enemy's troops, and, if compelled, to give him battle. Sir Harry encountered them near the village of Aliwal, on their way to Jugraon, with the intention of occupying that town. The Sikhs, finding that Sir Harry was about to out-flank them, suddenly changed their position, and drew up along a ridge with their right flanking the village of Aliwal, and their left resting on their own entrenched camp. With the extraordinary agility and rapidity of action which characterized the Sikhs throughout their engagements with the army of the Sutlej, the centre division of the Khalsa troops instantly threw up entrenchments, behind which they hastily placed their strong artillery, and opened a murderous fire upon the British.

Sir Harry's force amounted to only 11,000 men, being a fourth less than that of the enemy, but like an able tactician, knowing that by the superior activity and disposition of his troops he could bring more men into action against the different salient points of attack, than the enemy who opposed him, he overcame the odds of numbers.

Notwithstanding the sharp fire of the Sikhs, he ordered a halt while he took a rapid survey of the nature of the country, and the position of the troops. His quick eye instantly recognised and decided on the mode of attack. He saw that by carrying the village of Aliwal, he should be able to throw himself upon the enemy's left and centre. This was effected with great promptitude and valour, by Brigadiers Godby and Hicks, who captured two guns. The general then made a skilful and effective charge upon the right wing, where the enemy was worsted; but the contest with the left was for some time doubtful, and the onslaught deadly. Three times did our British Lancers charge into the midst of the closely serried ranks of their brave opponents, whom they literally cut to pieces. To the very last their indomitable spirit did not forsake the Sikhs, they fell back in a body to a distance of a few paces, discharged a full volley into the faces of their conquerors, and then retreated towards the ford on the Sutlej. Although beaten, they were not dismayed; and although their leader, Runjoor Singh, was the first to fly and basely quit the field, leaving his brave followers to conquer or die, their courage never quailed. Again they rallied and made one last and vigorous effort. Though defeat had made them desperate, and they fought like men who jeoparded all, it was a defeat, and they were compelled to give way.

It was a magnificent and hard-fought battle: as ably conducted as it was skilfully planned.

CHAPTER VI.

Richard Bond, the Messman—Sikh Grass-cutters—Choice of Camps—General Lloyd's Opinions—Lieut.-Colonel Irvine and Sir H. Maddock—Position at Sobraon—Brigadier E. Smith's Plan—Colonel Irvine's Plan—Goolab Singh's Policy—Sir Robert Dick's Division—Major-General Gilbert's Division—Sir Harry Smith's Division—Brigadier A. Campbell—Sir Joseph Thackwell—Brigadier Scott—British Batteries—Rockets—Sikh Batteries—Assault on the Sikh Entrenchments—Brigadier Stacey—Captain Cunningham's Account—The 10th Foot—Lieut.-Colonel Franks—Sikh Entrenchments stormed—Sirdar Sham Singh destroys the Pontoon—Sikh Retreat cut off—Great Loss of the Sikhs—Peace Principles inapplicable to India—Sikhs driven across the Sutlej—Tej Singh.

On the 30th of January, 1846, about noon, we moved out and proceeded a distance of two miles, expecting to meet the Sikh cavalry, who were encamped by the bridge of boats, but after having waited for two or three hours we were doomed to be again disappointed.

On the 1st of February, our mess-waiter, Richard Bond, died, he had been for some weeks past in bad health, yet, being anxious not to be separated from his regiment, in which he had served for many years, the poor man accompanied us from Cawnpore, and though apparently of an Herculean frame, an insidious malady gained upon him; and on the 1st of February poor Bond was numbered among those who have been. Mors sola fatetur quantula sint hominum corpuscula. He was an old and meritorious servant: and as a member of the Mess Committee at this period, I feel happy in paying this passing tribute to his memory.

Whilst on an out-line picquet on the 2nd, I heard most distinctly the Sikh drums from the camp in our right front, about six o'clock in the afternoon. During the day also my patrols brought in five grass-cutters in the employ of the enemy. After having questioned them I released them with a warning not to appear near our camp again. This was by no means an uncommon ruse de guerre, while pretending to cut grass they were in fact spying out the land.

On the 7th of February, our regiment again changed ground, from the right to the extreme left. The whole army was encamped in a line nearly parallel to the river Sutlej, from which it was distant not more than a mile and a quarter, and in some parts even less. It is a rule in forming a camp, not to make it within reach of the fire of the enemy's guns; and at the same time to shew as extended a front as possible, both for the purpose of overawing the adversary, and of watching his movements. The same rule applies on having crossed a river, to avoid exposure to the fire of the enemy who occupies the bank which you have quitted.

In reference to the choice of camps, I may perhaps be excused if I again refer to the able and very scarce work on the Art of war by the well known author of the "Seven Years' War in Germany."

"The choice of camps," he says, "depends on two principles: the one geometrical and the other the effect of genius. The first consists in calculating the distance relative to the number and species of troops which compose the army; the other in seeing all the combinations that may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the choice of that precise combination which is most advantageous. This unacquirable and sublime talent is much superior to the other, and independent of it. Great geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge; they see at once the cause and its effect, with the different combinations which unite them—they do not proceed by common rules successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps. No, the whole with all its circumstances and various combinations is like a picture, all together present to their mind: these want no geometry, but an age produces few of this kind of men; and, in the common run of Generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid gross errors.

"The perfection of our art would be, no doubt, to find a construction or an order of battle equally proper for all kinds of ground. But this being impossible, the only thing remaining for them to do is to find such a construction and such a formation of the troops as may, with the greatest simplicity, and, consequently velocity, be adapted to those numberless circumstances which occur. This should be the constant subject of their studies, but can never be obtained without geometry."

map

POSITIONS of the BRITISH and SIKH CAMPS on the 4^th Feb. 1846

February the 8th. Sunday. Dined at half-past six, with my brother officers, at the mess of the 3rd Light Dragoons. They are encamped on our right, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile. As in the field, so at the mess-table, the Lieutenant-Colonel of this fine corps, Colonel White, C.B. (now aide-de-camp to the Queen), appeared to be beloved by his officers; indeed they have no small reason to be proud of one, so universally esteemed and respected by the cavalry division of the army of the Sutlej.

The battle was at hand: already were preparations making to meet those gallant men, the Sikhs, in mortal combat. On the evening of the 9th, Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, of the engineers, came into the camp, having been sent to the frontier at the recommendation of Sir Herbert Maddock, Deputy-Governor of Bengal. Troops had been detached from the army to meet the large convoy coming from Delhi, with ammunition and stores; for the operations against the enemy at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had exhausted the greater part of our gun ammunition. Indeed, as I have already observed, that on the 22nd of December, 1845, when Tej Singh came before Ferozeshah, the British had no shot left. The force under Brigadier Campbell, however, brought up 4,300,000 rounds of musket ball cartridges, and twelve 12-pounders, with shot and other missiles, otherwise my gallant friend, Sir Harry Smith, would not have had the means of fighting the splendid battle of Aliwal.

And now we come to the 10th of February, the day on which the memorable battle of Sobraon, the crowning battle of the Sikh campaign of 1845-46 was fought, and which most persons expected would be the last.

The fate of the Punjaub seemed to hang by a thread; from the 22nd of December, 1845, to the 28th of January, 1846, no military operations had occurred till Sir Harry Smith gained the battle of Aliwal. The Sikhs' strongly entrenched position at Sobraon still remained to be taken; defended as it was by 30,000 regular troops, besides being equally strong by nature and art. By nature, as situated on the banks of the river, in the form of a half moon, having many and great impediments in its front; by art, the triple form of the entrenchments, bristled with a triple row of guns, which must be silenced before an entrance could be effected; a bridge of boats in its rear, by which the besieged might retire if they chose; and, moreover, batteries commanding the rear of the flanks of the entrenchment, which enabled them to fire upon any troops attempting to storm the works: added to which, the men could come over the pontoon bridge to assist in serving the guns in the works; and this they actually did.

Major-General, Sir Harry Smith, after the battle of the 28th of January, in which he had lost 589 killed and wounded, joined His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, on the 8th of February. It was judged expedient to wait for his arrival before the attack on Sobraon could be safely made. Part of the siege train, too, had arrived, to ensure the safety of which, it may be recollected, was the principal object in detaching Sir Harry Smith.

A plan had been proposed by the late Brigadier E. Smith, C.B., Chief Engineer, but when the nature of the proposed attack was explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, a senior officer, who had been sent by Sir T. Herbert Maddock, to join the army, which he had only reached on the 9th, the day before the battle, he is said to have taken a different view.

It is recorded, that in the year 1776, Sir W. Howe, in a despatch on the American entrenchments, wrote: "If I could have made approaches I could easily have taken the enemy's entrenchments."[27]

Whether Colonel Irvine proposed to make approaches I cannot say; certain it is, that it was agreed to follow the plan laid down by Brigadier Smith, Colonel Irvine being of opinion that it would be better to leave the conduct of the affair in the hands of the officer who had formed a digested plan. Had Brigadier Smith been superseded, a delay of two or three days at least must have ensued. Now, without knowing the exact cause for the delay, it is stated in the "Blue Book" that certain proposals had been made by the Lahore Durbar, or by some of the principal chiefs. Some say, that the celebrated Goolab Singh of Cashmere had made certain offers, to which an answer was required in three days. An officer of artillery remarked to the Commander-in-Chief, that the remainder of the supplies, stores, etc., from Delhi, would reach camp in two days. Lord Gough, in his Despatch of the 13th of February, says:—"Part of my siege train having come up with me, I resolved, on the morning of the 10th, to dispose our mortars and battering guns," etc.[28] This waiting of two days or more would have consumed more time than it was thought politically right to expend. We must remember that an answer was required in three days. Now, if Goolab Singh was the real proposer of these terms, it would seem that it could not answer to grant them. Perhaps he undertook to pay us the expenses of the war, to reduce the Sikh army, and to accept a British Resident at Lahore; these conditions, or something like them, must have been proposed.

Such offers could not have satisfied the government of India, because, when after the treaty of 1846, we took a slice of the Punjaub (Jullundur), and allowed the Sikh Durbar to keep up an army of 32,000 men, they raised more, either openly or covertly; hence, if they acted thus under our own eye, while holding the reins of government at Lahore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they would follow up the plan in extenso in our absence, for a Resident would have been no adequate check.

Goolab Singh was evidently playing a game for himself: if he could be the means of saving the country, then Cashmere ought to be his reward; but, when affairs went in a contrary direction, he was forced to be no longer an actor on the scene. But, distrusting Goolab Singh, and supposing him to have been a traitor to his country, yet might he not be meditating the destruction of the English? He had his own troops with which he could turn the scale against us. Thus, whatever were the terms, or the nature of the terms, they were clearly less than we could accede to.

Colonel Irvine, as I have remarked, instead of acting as Chief Engineer, became an aide-de-camp, and partly a spectator.

The reader will doubtless imagine, and justly so, that we had more shot and shell on the road to join us; but time—that important element in our lives, which when once lost cannot be recalled—time, in military matters is everything. This was a well-known saying of Napoleon's, and the truth of it is evident to less able soldiers. The old plan, therefore, and not the new mode of attack, was the order of the day.

Owing to the peculiar form of the enemy's entrenchment, it was decided that the battering-train and disposable field-artillery should be put in position in an extended semi-circle, embracing within its fire the works of the Sikhs. On the morning of the 10th, a heavy mist prevented the intended cannonade from beginning at daybreak as was proposed. It must be borne in mind, that, strictly speaking, the attack on a strong entrenched position is usually made in the same way as upon a fort or outwork: for forts are, sometimes, surrounded by entrenchments, thus making the fort a kind of citadel, as it were, though it may not be so called technically.

This mist, though unfavourable for artillery is often favourable for troops, for enabling them to form under cover near such works and entrenchments.

Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division was placed on the margin of the river Sutlej, ready to commence the assault. The 7th Brigade belonging to this division, and led by Brigadier Stacey, was to head the attack, supported by the 6th Brigade of the same division, at a distance of two hundred yards. A reserve which was entrenched at the village of Rodawalla, was in readiness to move forward if required.

In the centre, Major-General Gilbert's division was deployed for support or attack, with its right resting on Little Sobraon. With regard to this division, it has been stated by an officer of an infantry corps, that it was not intended that it should attack in the first instance, but it so happened that Major-General Gilbert[29] with that decided conduct which marked all his actions, finding that the left attack on the enemy's right had not succeeded, determined at once to make his attack in front.

As I have before observed, there were impediments in the front, of which we were ignorant; they were in the nature of an embankment, and when our troops came up, this embankment, lying between them and the entrenchment, prevented the British from easily mounting it and entering the enclosure; the only means, therefore, by which they could effect this, was by moving to the right and left of this impediment. It will not be a matter of surprise therefore, that a little confusion occurred, and that our troops were in some slight degree jammed together. But we must defer the result to its proper place, and proceed with the order for the movements of the other troops.

Major-General Sir Harry Smith's Division was formed near the village of Guttah, with its right thrown up towards the Sutlej. It was determined to threaten by feigned attacks, the enemy's horse, under Rajah Lall Singh Misr, which was stationed on the other side of the river. There was a ford at Hurrekee Ghât at which were drawn up the 16th Lancers, who would thus have been enabled to cross over and attack the Sikh cavalry, if circumstances had called for aid. Besides, as there was a ford there, the enemy might have thought of crossing himself, for the purpose of attempting to turn our left flank.

Brigadier A. Campbell took up an intermediate position, between the divisions of Major-General Gilbert's right, and Major-General Sir Harry Smith's left. Campbell's brigade was to the rear of Sir Harry's division, the better to effect this object, for it is desirable, on occasions like these, not to place the cavalry within reach of cannon shot.

Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. commanding the cavalry division, had under him Brigadier Scott, C.B.,[30] who held a reserve in the first brigade on our left, ready to act as circumstances might render necessary. Brigadier Scott, as well as the Major-General, had commanded cavalry in the Affghan campaign, when Ghuznee was taken, in July 1839, and proceeded to Cabool; so that, should the presence of Sir Joseph Thackwell have been required in any other part of the field of action, he had as his second in command, an officer whom he well knew, and in whom he could place the most implicit confidence, for it must always be recollected that it is of great advantage to have an officer in the field, who has had experience in Indian warfare. It cannot be supposed that an officer just come from Europe can all at once, be prepared to command a brigade composed of Lancers, Dragoons, and native Cavalry. Surely a little experience is requisite. Besides in India, from the nature of the service, a Lieutenant-Colonel often commands a Brigade; while in Europe that command would generally devolve upon a Major-General.

Our battery of 9-pounders, twelve of which had been reamed up to 12-pounders, opened their fire near Little Sobraon, a village a short way in advance, between Major-General Gilbert's and Major-General Sir Harry Smith's divisions. Our artillery was thus placed,—five 24-pounder howitzers on our right, three 12-pounders (reamed) on the right of the 29th Foot, No. 19 battery on the left of Major-General Gilbert's right brigade; then between General Gilbert's left and the 62nd Foot there were six 8-inch howitzers, and six 5½-inch howitzers; on the left of the 62nd Foot there were eight 8-inch howitzers and five 18-pounders flanked by the 9th Foot and the 26th regiment of Native Infantry. On the extreme right there were forty-eight guns and howitzers, besides twelve guns, etc. on the right and left of Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division. In fact Major-General Sir Harry Smith's division was wheeled up to its left, so as to throw a flanking fire into the enemy's left. Also, Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division on the left, wheeled up to its right, so as to fire into the enemy's right.

Owing to the mist before mentioned, it was half-past-six A.M. before the whole of our artillery fire was brought into full play; the object of this fire was to silence the enemy's guns and to destroy their works before we assaulted the place. There was also a rocket battery. It must be remembered that the enemy had upwards of a hundred guns to fire against our sixty-two guns and the rocket battery. Rockets, the reader must be aware, were formerly much used in Indian warfare among the native armies. They were tried at Hattrass in 1817, with the force under the command of the late Major-General Sir W.S. Whish, K.C.B., but there was too much wind. On the present occasion the wind was not unfavourable. As the enemy's camp on the other side of the river was set on fire, the means by which that important service was effected may be disputed.

We must bear in mind that the Sikh guns were like those of a fortress, protected by walls, not en barbette, i.e. open all round. Besides this there was a triple line of trenches. The Sikhs also had two batteries on the other side of the river. When these batteries were silenced, the gunners came over by the bridge of boats, to the works on our side, to aid and to replace the gunners who had been killed or wounded. The bridge was said to be mined in case of accident, that is to say, if they were pursued in the retreat they could have blown it up to prevent our pursuing them.

It is clear that the mist had delayed the practice of the batteries, but still the artillery played upon the enemy's works for two hours. A more powerful battery would have been desirable; and it is said that this was Colonel Irvine's reason for proposing the delay. However, in all battles, there are two main points of consideration; first the military delays, and then the political delays, we know are sometimes dangerous. No doubt a casual observer would have exclaimed, "Why not wait for more guns? Recollect Ferozeshah; you tarried fifty days for this attack, during which time the enemy strengthened his position. You have more guns, more shot and shell coming up. Recollect also, you fell short of shot on the 22nd of December at Ferozeshah!" The late Captain J.D. Cunningham, of the Engineers, who was present at the battles of Aliwal and Sobraon, wrote thus: "The officers of artillery naturally desired that their guns, the representatives of a high art, should be used agreeably to the established rules of the engineers; or that ramparts should be breached in front and swept in flank, before they were stormed by defenceless battalions; but such deliberate tediousness of process did not satisfy the judgment or the impatience of the commanders, and it was arranged that the whole of the heavy ordnance should be planted in masses opposite particular points of the enemy's entrenchments, and, that when the Sikhs had been shaken by a continuous storm of shot and shells, the right, or weakest part of the position, should be assaulted in line, by the strongest of the three investing divisions, which, together mustered nearly 15,000 men," the enemy being 30,000 men.[31]

A military friend of mine, Major W. Hough, of the Bengal establishment, formerly a deputy Judge-Advocate, and author of some most valuable works on Military Law, and other subjects, has suggested that the attack in column is the more usual mode of assault, and has adduced many proofs that such a system has been at different periods acted upon, both in ancient and modern warfare.

Now let us look at the other side of the picture. Proposals had been made by the Sikh Sirdars, some say by Goolab Singh, which were refused. Had Goolab Singh's troops mutinied and refused to obey his orders, he would have said that he was helpless; it was possible that these same troops might be anxious to join Sham Singh in the entrenchments, a movement which it was the great object of the British chiefs to prevent.

As to the artillery, which is not surpassed by any artillery in the world, in celerity of movement, in precision of fire, or in any of the qualities which render this branch of the service illustrious, they could not perform impossibilities. They were deficient in that indispensable desideratum, shot. To have continued firing till all our shot was expended, and thus have exposed our want of it to the enemy, would have been very unwise; for, had the infantry failed in the attack, they might have retired, and our artillery resumed their fire. Hence it was that the British artillery ceased for a while to send forth its missives of death.

After two, or two and a half hour's firing, and at about nine o'clock, Brigadier Stacey's Brigade, supported on either flank by two batteries of Foot and a troop of Horse Artillery, moved to the attack in good order, with Brigadier Stacey at their head. This gallant officer was armed with sword and buckler, the most effective weapons for such an attack, where you may come into personal contact with men who, after the custom of their country, are armed in this peculiar manner.

'Ἁμφἱ σἁρ 'ὡμοισιν βἁλετο ξἱφος ἁργυρὁηον,
——αὑτἁρ ἑπειτα σἁκος μἑγα τε στιβαρὁν τε.
Homer. Iliad III. lines 334-5.

The troops marched in line. Captain Cunningham[32] says:—

"The left division of the British army, advanced in even order, and with a light step to the attack; but the original error of forming the regiments in line instead of in column, rendered the contest more unequal than such assaults need necessarily be. Every shot from the enemy's lines told upon the expanse of men, and the greater part of the division was driven back by the deadly fire of muskets and swivels and enfilading artillery.

"On the extreme left, the regiments effected an entrance amidst the advanced banks and trenches of petty out-works, where possession could be of little avail, but their comrades on the right were animated by the partial success; they chafed under the disgrace of a repulse, and forming themselves instinctively into wedges and masses, and headed by an old and fearless leader, they rushed forward in wrath." Major-General Sir Robert H. Dick, K.C.B. and K.C.H., was mortally wounded close to the trenches whilst cheering on his men; but we must reserve to a future page a further mention of this brilliant and noble officer.

The artillery took up positions to aid these divisions at a gallop. Brigadier Stacey's Brigade drove the Sikhs in confusion before them, within the area of their encampment. The 10th Foot, headed by their dauntless leader, Lieut.-Colonel T.H. Franks, entered; and here the work of carnage commenced, for now it was that hundreds of our indomitable foe fell under the withering fire of this gallant corps, Lieut.-Col. Franks having particularly cautioned his men not to fire until within the works of the enemy.

Let the reader pause and imagine the thunder of 120 guns on both sides reverberating for a length of time

"As if the clouds their echo did repeat,"

and he will have but a very faint conception of the mighty grandeur of those awe-inspiring sounds. Never shall I forget the majesty of the whole scene.

"No pen can write, no pencil trace the sound."

Seeing that Brigadier Stacey's Brigade might incur the whole weight of the attack, the centre and right divisions were ordered to advance. The centre division experienced great difficulty, for the mound in front was a very serious impediment. The Sikhs, sword in hand, strove to regain the points of the entrenchments which they had lost: it was not until the cavalry of the left wing under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell advanced and dashed into the entrenchments, in single file, through the openings effected by the pioneers in the mound, re-forming as they passed; and finally the full weight of three divisions of infantry with every available field-gun had been brought to bear against the resolute enemy, that victory crowned our efforts. The work was gloriously achieved. The insult offered to the British arms was avenged; and England stood triumphant.

For the important services which Brigadier Scott rendered in this action in leading his brigade into the enemy's entrenchment, he was honoured with the gratifying distinction of being appointed aide-de-camp to Her Majesty the Queen. At the taking of Ghuznee, July 23rd, 1839, Sir Joseph Thackwell and Brigadier Scott were employed in destroying the enemy who had escaped from the fort; they were, therefore, not novices at their work.

At Sobraon, our cavalry could not pursue the enemy as he retreated across the river; and, to have proceeded by Hurrekee Ghât, the nearest ford, would have been too late. The veteran Sirdar, Sham Singh, who commanded in the entrenchments, was engaged at his devotions when he first heard of the attack. As he must have known that our stores had not all arrived, for the Sikhs had accurate intelligence of our movements, he did not anticipate an attack from us so soon. Summoning his chiefs, Sham Singh reminded them of the great stake at issue, and bade them fight nobly and exterminate the infidel Feringhees (English). He assured his officers and men that the way of glory lay before them; and, to prevent their retreating, boldly commanded the two centre boats of the bridge to be cut away, so that his army could not pass over the pontoon. The order was obeyed; and, when forced to fly, the enemy in vain attempted the bridge, and were constrained to take to the river. Encumbered with arms, many attempted to swim across the river, which had risen seven or eight inches a day or two before; but all their efforts were unavailing. Hundreds and hundreds were drowned, or fell under the fire of our guns.

The press in England have condemned this general slaughter of our defenceless foe; but the answer, in extenuation, is, I believe, that the Sikhs had cruelly and relentlessly cut to pieces our wounded men at Ferozeshah.

If we regard the morality of the measure, we must not, at the same time, overlook the consequences which would have ensued from our sparing this resolute foe; for, at this time, we had yet to cross this river; and we were by no means certain but that we should have to fight another battle.

Messrs. Cobden and Co. must discover some golden rule for keeping the peace in India; for it would be a hard matter to find a single Sikh chief who is not ready to fight. The Rajpoot would laugh and say: "Sirs, it is my trade, as the calico line is yours; we were born soldiers." This universal Peace Association is, I have no doubt, a very amiable fraternity; yet let not its members, being deceived themselves, try to deceive others. The world still lieth in wickedness. Some divines understand the words of our Saviour, when he said, "I came not to send peace upon the earth, but the sword," to signify, there are very many religions in the world, and these will give rise to fighting. The Sikh would say: "You English have come and conquered the best and fairest portions of India, and now you are trying to annex the rest of the country; can you wonder that every man's hand is lifted up against you?"

Even Mr. Cobden must allow that to fight pro aris et focis, is not a very despicable employment. Until all nations and lands are prepared to join the league—until the time that all standing armies shall be dispensed with—and until right and might can keep their place—away with such empty talk! We must fraternize at home before we can hope to do so abroad. The natives of India do not understand those fine-drawn distinctions of our European policy. They know that the strongest will attack them if they can, and that the only plan of defence is to maintain armies.

The continent of Europe may be likened to India in one respect. Comprising various sovereignties, as in India, there are many independent princes. The native chief, like Alexander the Great, sighs when no more conquests are to be made! India, besides, is not a commercial country, like Europe; and all its inhabitants cannot plough or work at a trade. India has been, for centuries, the arena of strife. From the year 1187, when Delhi was seized by a Mahomedan conqueror, to the present year, anarchy, rapine, and war, have been stalking over the land. Thrice three thousand times blessed will be that period when every man of every nation shall have "turned his sword into a ploughshare, and his spear into a pruning-hook!" Until then, in order to ensure peace, let us be armed for war.

In Europe a sovereign loses a portion of his dominions, when it is taken by a monarch more powerful than himself. The league of the Holy Alliance contracted by four kings, in 1815, has not been able to preserve peace. The principle of uti possidetis, or, "as you are," of 1815, is not recognised in 1854. The Russians and Austrians have attacked Hungary, and Hungary has fought for her independence. The Neopolitans have sent an expedition to Sicily, and the Sicilians have sighed for independence. The French are masters of Rome, and Rome has longed for a republic, and thus we might multiply examples. Independence, the natural right of all countries, cannot generally be obtained except by war.

But revenons à nos moutons, the Sikhs again succumb. The battle of Sobraon has been fought and lost by them: at noon on the 10th of February, not a living Sikh remained on the left bank of the Sutlej.

At about two o'clock P.M., I rode leisurely through the enemy's entrenchments, and witnessed the horrible slaughter that had taken place; even at that time, a few determined artillerymen occasionally sent a ball across the river, to the dismay of our plundering camp followers. A mine, too, would now and then explode, and hurl the heedless and inquisitive into eternity, for the entrenchment was completely undermined; and during the following night and morning, explosions were every now and then heard in the camp.

During the action, the 9th Lancers advanced at about eleven o'clock A.M., under a heavy fire, in two lines, for the purpose of charging the enemy, when I commanded the left troop of the second squadron; after a time, however, as no opportunity to charge was allowed, we again fell back. The 9th Lancers left their camp at four o'clock A.M., and returned to it between five and six o'clock P.M., not a little tired, as the reader may imagine.

Thus the day, which rose so bright upon the landscape, after the mists of the early morning had been dispelled by the brilliant rays of the sun, was darkened by a battle and slaughter and death, ere the shades of evening closed upon it. The indomitable Sikhs, whose bravery was but the more aroused by the defeat at Aliwal, and whose feelings had been harrowed by the sight of the corpses of their unavenged comrades slain in that battle, who were still borne along the stream, and who had entered upon the contest with the resolve to conquer or die, these brave fellows were now lying in hundreds, or rather in thousands upon thousands, on the field of carnage, or floating along the sweeping flood of the Sutlej, while others fled in wild confusion before their victorious foe. But where were now their leaders?—the men who had instigated the revolt, and who with dastardly duplicity sought their private interests by simulated friendship with both parties? Where was Tej Singh, the chief commander of the Sikh forces? When the British opened the assault, Tej Singh commanded the entrenchment, but as soon as we had effected breaches in the mound, and the fire from his batteries began to slacken, when his followers were falling thick around him, when the British, led on by their gallant commanders, fought resolutely for every inch of ground, Tej Singh, instead of manfully leading on fresh troops, and animating them by his example, like a base traitor, again deserted his post; he fled at the first brush, and, as at the battle of Ferozeshah, abandoned his troops, and, in their destruction, sought, and effected his own escape; Goolab Singh, who had played his cards so well, was at the side of the Maharannee, counselling the adoption of such measures as would virtually promote his own interests; while the intriguer, Lall Singh, lay with his cavalry higher up the river in a careless, unmilitary position, conscious of being closely watched by the English.

Far different was the conduct and deportment of Sirdar Sham Singh, of Attaree. In accordance with the vow so solemnly made to his men that he would die in the conflict, and thus offer up himself as a propitiatory sacrifice for his country's weal to appease the wrath of Govind, he clothed himself in a white garment, as one who had devoted himself to death, and calling upon all around to follow him, he unflinchingly led on his rapidly thinning ranks, with the assurance of the Gooroo's eternal reward to those who should fall in defence of their country; and, at last, covered with wounds, the fine old veteran sunk down a lifeless corpse, amidst the slaughtered bodies of his brave followers.

The Commander-in-Chief estimated the loss of the Sikhs in this decisive battle at from 12,000 to 15,000 men; while that on the side of the British was, 320 killed, and 2,063 wounded, making our total loss 2,383.[33]