The student who turns to the investigation of immigration conditions within the United States at once finds himself hindered by a serious lack of material. As has been stated above, the Immigration Bureau furnishes practically no data concerning our alien residents after it bids them farewell at the immigration station. The Census Bureau furnishes certain valuable data, and the Immigration Commission has recently collected a vast amount of useful information. Occasional articles appear in the periodicals, and there are a few books touching on the subject. But there is a great need for more concrete, exhaustive, and sympathetic studies of single racial groups of immigrants, such as has been made by Miss Emily G. Balch in regard to the Slavs. There ought also to be a number of conscientious studies of different phases of immigrant life in this country—what might be called transverse sections of the problem, as the other studies are longitudinal sections. A number of valuable studies of the latter sort have been made by the Immigration Commission in its reports upon immigrants in industries, immigrants in cities, immigrants as charity seekers, etc. Other topics which might well be considered in a similar manner will be suggested by the following subjects: housing conditions among immigrants, the food of immigrants, the problem of assimilation, family life of the immigrants, religious life of the immigrants, etc. Until more work of this sort has been done most general conclusions must be admittedly tentative and subject to revision. Nevertheless, knowledge grows from the general to the particular, as well as in the reverse order, and it will not be without profit to review the data which are already at hand, and establish as many conclusions with a fair degree of certainty as may be possible.

At the time of the census of 1900 the population of the United States numbered 76,303,387. Of these 10,460,085 were foreign-born. In 1910 out of a total population of 91,972,266 there were 13,515,886 foreign-born. Out of about forty-five different groups, designated by the country of origin, the following are the most important:

When we remember the remarkable homogeneity of the inhabitants of the United States at the time of the Revolution, we seem justified in saying that one conclusion, at least, is established beyond any doubt, viz. that immigration to the United States since 1820 has resulted in a decided mixture of racial stock. For good or ill, the racial unity of the American people is a thing of the past.

There is another conclusion which might be drawn from the above figures, and which is in fact assumed by many writers, and in most popular discussions of the subject, which is not so well supported by facts. This is, that these foreign-born residents of the country, amounting to one seventh of the total, constitute a net addition to the population; in other words, that immigration has increased the total population of the country by an amount approximately equal to the number of immigrants, allowing, of course, for removals and deaths.

At first glance this may seem almost a self-evident proposition. That it is not, however, is evidenced by the strikingly large number of the deeper thinkers on the subject who hold the opposite view. Of these, the best known in this connection is General Francis A. Walker. In his discussion of this problem he says: “Space would not serve for a full statistical demonstration of the proposition that immigration, during the period from 1830 to 1860 instead of constituting a net reënforcement to the population, simply resulted in a replacement of native by foreign elements; but I believe it would be practicable to prove this to the satisfaction of every fair-minded man.”^[180] Mr. Prescott F. Hall, who quotes this passage, holds firmly to the same opinion himself, and cites a number of other writers who are more or less positive in their statements of the causal relation between immigration and the diminishing native birth rate.

Mr. F. A. Bushee, whose authority on matters of population is well recognized, says, “The multiplication of foreign peoples has seriously checked the growth of the old American stock.”^[181] Mr. Robert Hunter is a pronounced advocate of this view, and says, “The immigrants are not additional inhabitants. Their coming displaces the native stock.”^[182] Professor John R. Commons supports this position throughout his discussions of the subject. An extreme but convincing opinion is that expressed by Mr. S. G. Fisher in the Popular Science Monthly for December, 1895. After a careful statistical survey of the growth of population in the United States he states his conviction that “immigration has not materially increased, but, on the contrary, has somewhat decreased the American population.... All the immigrants and all their increase cannot make up for the loss of the old rate of increase of the natives.”

In view of this imposing weight of authoritative opinion, it is perhaps surprising that the popular mind still holds so tenaciously and universally to the belief that immigration directly increases population. The explanation probably lies in ignorance of the facts of the case and of the fundamental laws of population and in the somewhat abstruse nature of the reasoning by which the expert conclusions are reached. For it must be admitted frankly that this is not a proposition which can be demonstrated in an absolutely conclusive mathematical way, which will leave no further ground for argument. The factors affecting population are many and complicated, including not only immigration, but war, vice, hard times, marriage customs, the growth of cities, and a host of other things. It is far beyond the present power of social science to define positively the relative importance of each of the forces involved in producing a certain phenomenon.

The line of argument by which, in general, all writers such as those to whom reference was made above have reached their conclusions is as follows. The population of the United States at the time it became a nation was almost wholly of native origin. It was a homogeneous people, of one stock, one language, and one set of traditions, customs, and beliefs. For the first forty years of our national life the increase of population was phenomenal, doubling every twenty-two or twenty-three years. Malthus chose the North American colonies as an example of the extreme possibilities of increase under favorable conditions, and the rate continued for many years after they ceased to be colonies. Between 1790 and 1830 the population increased from less than 4,000,000 to nearly 13,000,000, or 227 per cent in forty years. An estimate made in 1815, based on the first three censuses, reckoned the probable population of the United States in 1900 at 100,235,985. The fact that it was, instead, only 76,303,387, in spite of the incoming of 19,115,221 aliens since 1820, shows that there must have been a tremendous falling-off in the native birth rate. Careful study reveals the fact that the birth rate first began to decline appreciably about 1830, just the period when the effects of immigration first began to be strongly felt in this country, and that it diminished progressively with the swelling volume of the immigration current. Moreover, it was in just those sections where the immigrants congregated most thickly that the fall in the native birth rate was most pronounced, even down to such minor divisions as counties. New England, which, at the time of the Revolution, held the most homogeneous population in the country, and had the highest birth rate, has now the greatest proportion of foreigners and, as far as the natives at least are concerned, the lowest birth rate. To such an extent has this decline gone, that at the present time the native stock in large sections of New England is not even maintaining itself. Coincidences of time and place between the phenomena of immigration and those of the declining birth rate are so numerous and so striking that, in the words of General Walker, they “constitute a statistical demonstration such as is rarely attained in regard to the operation of any social or economic force.”

This line of argument has been so thoroughly and convincingly expounded by a number of writers that it need not be dwelt upon further here. Its great weakness is that which has been anticipated—it lacks mathematical positiveness. An opponent might readily claim that the appalling decline in the native birth rate (the existence of which no one would care to deny) was due to some one or other of a variety of different causes, or to several operating together. The sections where the birth rate is the lowest are not only those where immigration has been the heaviest. They are also to a large extent those which are characterized most distinctively by manufacturing industry, or where the population is the densest. Why not assign the falling birth rate to one of these causes?^[183]

The best answer to this counterargument is to strengthen the original position by another and wholly different course of reasoning. This may be done very effectively by applying the fundamental and accepted laws of population to the question in hand, and seeing how they would work out in such a case. If the conclusion thus reached coincides with that resulting from the other method of proof, it will furnish a demonstration amounting almost to a certainty.

For this purpose we must go back to the set of doctrines first consistently expounded by Malthus, and known by his name. Though they are now more than a century old, they still stand as one of the profoundest contributions to human knowledge. These doctrines are so familiar to all students of social subjects that the merest summary will serve the present purpose. This may be given in the following words.

Under favorable circumstances, the reproductive power of the human species is very great.^[184] Actual cases of doubling of population in from twenty to twenty-five years have been known, and this may be taken as a maximum standard. But man is dependent for his existence on the food supply, and, owing to the actual conditions of production, there is no ground for the hope that the amount of subsistence of the world or of any nation can ever be increased at a rate corresponding to the possible increase of mankind. Consequently, the growth of the species is always limited by the possibilities of the increase of the food supply, and as the strength of the reproductive instinct is very great, population will always be pressing hard on the limits of subsistence. The only means of providing for a greater population is by increasing the amount of productive land, or, by improvements in the arts, by making the land already under cultivation produce more food. Briefly stated, in any society, population tends to increase up to the supporting power of the soil. The forces which retard the growth of population, however, are something more than starvation in the strictest sense of the word. They are enumerated by Malthus in a list of what he calls checks. These naturally fall under two heads: First, the positive checks, which increase the death rate, viz. war, famine, pestilence, vice, etc.; these all produce misery and arise whenever population becomes too dense. Second, the preventive checks, which limit the birth rate, such as deferred marriage, celibacy, and voluntary restriction of births, vicious or otherwise; these are under the control of the human reason and will, and while they too entail a degree of suffering, it is not comparable to that caused by the other class of checks. All civilized societies have come more and more to employ the preventive checks, particularly that which is known as moral restraint.

The basic principles of Malthusianism remain as unassailable as when they were first propounded. But there have been certain modifications made necessary by the changing conditions of human society. As already suggested the preventive checks hold a much larger place than formerly, and great weight is now attached to what are known as the institutional checks, such as the demands of education, late marriages, social obligations, the “emancipation” of women, and a host of other customs and conventions which tend more or less imperceptibly to limit the number of births. Still more important, in the place of a bare subsistence as the limit upon which population is always pressing, has been substituted the standard of living. This includes all those necessaries, comforts, and even luxuries which are customary in the social group in which the individual or family finds itself placed. The limits of the family group are not now determined by the amount of bare necessaries which are essential for the preservation of life—probably they never were absolutely—but rather by the amount of advantages which are required to keep the family in the social stratum to which it belongs or to which the parents aspire, either for themselves or for their children. Particularly is this true in a democratic country like the United States, where social position depends not so much on rank or birth, as on wealth and education, both of which are attainable by effort and sacrifice. It is the desire for the “concentration of advantages” of this sort which leads to the restriction of the size of families.

With this set of laws in mind, let us seek to determine the effect which might reasonably be expected to follow the introduction of a large number of immigrants from European countries into the American body politic. In the first place, it will be conceded that the great bulk of our immigrants represent a much lower standard of living than is customary among native American workmen in the occupations into which they go.^[185] Observation of conditions in the countries from which the immigrants come, and in the communities in which they settle after they arrive, establishes this fact beyond the necessity of proof. In fact, this difference, as has been shown, is the underlying reason for their coming.^[186] Undoubtedly many of the immigrants raise their standard of living somewhat after their arrival in this country, but not nearly up to the American level.

Since the immigrant has a lower standard than the native, he can afford to work for lower wages, and since the amount of alien labor is so abundant and so easily available, the standard of wages in the occupations into which the immigrants go is set by the amount for which they are willing to work. This amount is lowered still further by the fact that the immigrant is generally quite willing to add to the income of his family by putting his children to work as soon as the law allows—or earlier if possible—whereas the native ordinarily prefers to keep his children at home and in school as long as possible.^[187] Thus large families become a source of revenue for one, and an item of expense for the other. It is obviously impossible for the native to support the same-sized family in the same degree of comfort on the new scale of wages as on the old. He is compelled to choose between two alternatives. Either he may lower his standard of living and keep the same-sized family, or limit the size of his family for the sake of the standard of living. But the lowering of the standard of living is something which every people—particularly the Americans—resist strenuously. If it is a question of the possibility of raising the standard, people often prefer larger families. This is instanced by the very significant fact that immigrants to this country do, as a rule, raise their birth rate very considerably. The foreign-born birth rate in Massachusetts in 1895 was 50.40, which is from 12 to 20 higher than in most European countries.^[188] But if it is a question of lowering the standard of living, the opposite course is taken. The standard of living is a matter of custom, and, when once established, has a tremendous tenacity. The American laborer chooses the other alternative. He limits the size of his family.

Multiplied by tens of thousands, this expedient results in seriously checking the growth of population. This decrease in the number of native children destined to enter certain occupations makes a greater demand for alien labor, which is promptly supplied. Thus the invasion of the American standard goes on progressively, and gradually these occupations come to be resigned more and more to foreign labor. Already certain classes of work are commonly known as “Dago labor,” others as “Hunkie labor,” etc., and a self-respecting American parent shudders at the thought of having his child enter them.

This very fact is sometimes used as an excuse for the whole procedure. It is claimed that the natives are not displaced, but are simply forced into higher occupations. Those who were formerly common laborers are now in positions of authority. While this argument holds true of individuals, its fallacy when applied to groups is obvious. There are not nearly enough places of authority to receive those who are forced out from below. The introduction of five hundred Slav laborers into a community may make a demand for a dozen or a score of Americans in higher positions, but hardly for five hundred. Furthermore, in so far as this process does actually take place, it must result in a lowering of the native birth rate, for it is a well-known fact that in all modern societies the higher the social class, the smaller is the average family.

What has been said thus far refers to the limitation of families after marriage. The same influences work to produce the same result in another way. The increased difficulty in earning enough to support a family, due to immigration, leads countless American young men to postpone marriage for many years, and perhaps an equal number to give up marrying altogether. Both result in a great decrease in the birth rate for society as a whole.^[189]

The processes sketched above are mainly volitional. There is a variety of other influences, which work unconsciously, but perhaps none the less powerfully, to accomplish the same result. General Walker asserted that the shock produced on the American mind by the miserable class of immigrants in the thirties and forties, in itself, had a profoundly detrimental effect on the natural rate of reproduction. Immigration has the effect of vastly increasing congestion of population, and congestion limits its growth. Furthermore, in an average group of immigrants, the males exceed the females by more than two to one.^[190] The introduction of such an unnatural element into the population must limit its reproductive power.

It is thus apparent that the laws of population would lead us to expect exactly the result which the statistical data indicate—a decided fall in the native birth rate, due to the enormous and ever increasing immigration into this country. The conclusion thus reached is corroborated and verified by a host of social workers, who testify from their own experience and observation. As an example, note the words of Rev. Walter A. Rauschenbusch, whose keen insight into social questions has placed him in the front rank of American thinkers: “The natives, who suffer by the competition of the immigrants and who feel the tightening grip of our industrial development, refuse to bring children into a world which threatens them with poverty.”^[191] Whether this decline in the native birth rate has been sufficient to offset the high birth rate of the foreign-born, and produce an actually smaller population than we would have had without any immigrants since 1820, is impossible of proof. It seems wholly probable that it has. The second generation of immigrants themselves feel the effect of the newcomers, and our foreign population shows a sharp decline in its birth rate after a generation of American life.^[192] At least, if immigration has not positively lessened our population, we may be certain that it has failed to increase it to any considerable extent. Its net result, as far as size of population is concerned, has been to substitute a very large foreign element, from various sources, for a native element which would otherwise have come into being.

The size and diversity of this foreign element in the United States is constantly increasing. The representatives of different foreign nationalities are becoming ever more numerous and more important in the life of the country. In them is embodied the “problem of the immigrant.”

One of the most essential factors conditioning this problem is the distribution of these foreign residents. The importance of this aspect of the situation is becoming more and more felt, and will manifest itself in the succeeding pages. There are two main sources of official information on this point. The first of these, the immigration reports, has already been considered, and its data taken for what they are worth.^[193] The other is the reports of the Bureau of the Census, which give the actual distribution of the foreign-born, at ten-year intervals. According to this authority, the per cent distribution of the foreign-born among the various territorial divisions in 1900 was as follows:

According to the division adopted in the census of 1910, 84.8 per cent of the foreign-born were in the North, 5.4 per cent in the South, and 9.7 per cent in the West.

The distribution shown by these figures accords closely with the statement of destinations made by the immigrants at the time of their arrival.^[195] Whereas 88.4 per cent of the immigrants in 1910 gave their destination as either the North Atlantic or North Central divisions, in 1900 the census enumerators found 86.2 per cent of the foreign-born residents actually residing in those divisions, and in 1910, 84.8 per cent in the North.

There is a marked difference, however, in the distribution of the various races. This is shown by the following table, which gives the proportional distribution of some of the leading races of the foreign-born among the divisions:

The most striking fact exhibited by this table is the exceptionally large proportion of the Germans and Scandinavians who have settled in the North Central division. It also illustrates further the minor part that the Southern and Western divisions have played in the immigration of all races. The same general showing is made by the figures for 1910. Thus 74.1 per cent of the foreign-born from Austria, 86.8 per cent of those from Hungary, 69.3 per cent of those from Italy, and 72.9 per cent of those from Russia were in the Middle Atlantic and East North Central divisions. But 35.2 per cent of the foreign-born from Denmark, 17.1 per cent of those from Germany, 49.2 per cent of those from Norway, and 32.1 per cent of those from Sweden were in the West North Central division alone.^[197]

The significance of these figures can be fully comprehended only by taking into consideration the questions of area and density. The statement is often made that the density of population in the United States is so small that we still have ample room for an indefinite number of immigrants. It is pointed out that the average density of population in the United States is only 25.6 per square mile (1900), as against 400, 500, or even more in European countries. If the immigrants were evenly distributed over the entire territory of the United States, this argument would have some weight. But we see that they are not. This is one of the cases where an average is misleading. The immigrants are really being concentrated in the most thickly populated portions of the country. This becomes more evident if we examine the conditions in certain states. Thus in 1907, according to the Immigration Report, 6.5 per cent of the immigrants were destined to Massachusetts, which in 1900 had a density of 348.9; 30 per cent of the immigrants were destined to New York, with a density of 152.6; 17.9 per cent to Pennsylvania, with a density of 140.1; 8.1 per cent to Illinois, with a density of 86.1; 5.5 per cent to New Jersey, with a density of 250.3; while little Rhode Island, with a density of 407, was credited with .9 per cent. It thus appears that these six states, containing only 5.6 per cent of the total area of the United States, and with a density in each case far above the average, received 68.9 per cent of the total immigration for the year.

It is thus apparent that our foreign-born residents tend irresistibly to congregate in the most densely settled portions of the country, and in the most densely populated states. But this is not all. They also tend to congregate in the largest cities, and in the most congested sections of those cities. In 1890, 61.4 per cent of the foreign-born population of the United States were living in cities of at least 2500 population. In 1900 the percentage had increased to 66.3, while 38.8 per cent of the entire foreign-born population were huddled into the few great cities having a population of over 100,000. In the same year only 36.1 per cent of the native-born population were living in cities of over 2500. This tendency appears to be increasing in strength, and is more marked among the members of the new immigration than among the older immigrants.^[198] Thus in 1910 the percentage of foreign-born living in cities of the specified size had risen to 72.2.

The reasons for this tendency of the foreign-born to congregate in the most densely settled districts may be briefly summarized as follows. (1) They land, almost without exception, in cities, and it is often the easiest thing for them to stay there. It takes some capital, knowledge, and enterprise to carry the immigrant any distance from the port of arrival, unless he has a definite connection in some other place. Yet it is claimed that, land them where you would, about the same number of immigrants would find their way to New York within a few weeks. (2) Economic opportunities are much more abundant and varied in the cities than in the country. (3) Such occupations as are obtainable in the city require much less capital than the characteristic country occupations. With a few dollars, an immigrant in the city can set himself up in some independent business, depending on turning over his capital rapidly to make a living. There are so many people in the city, that if one can manage to serve the most trivial want satisfactorily, he can get along. But any independent business in the country requires a larger outlay of capital than the average immigrant can hope for. The only country occupation open to him is common farm labor, and there are other reasons which make him ill adapted for this. (4) In the cities, the newly arrived immigrant can keep in close touch with others of his own race and tongue. In the compact colony of his fellow-countrymen, he may be sure of companionship, encouragement, and assistance when needed. It is the most natural thing in the world for an immigrant to want to settle where there are numbers of others of his immediate kind. (5) Knowledge of the English language is much less essential in the city than in the country. The presence of others who can speak the same tongue makes it possible for an immigrant to make a living without knowing a word of the language of his adopted country, as many of them do for year after year. In the rural districts, however, it is almost impossible for a newly arrived immigrant to get along at all without a knowledge of the English language, either in independent business, or as an employee, unless he settles in a farm colony of people of his own race, of which there are, of course, many to be found. (6) Not only is there more chance of friendly relief from fellow-countrymen, in case of necessity, in the cities, but public relief agencies and private benevolences are much more available there than in the country. (7) The excitement and novelty of American city life is very attractive to many immigrants—just as it is to the natives. Trolley cars, skyscrapers, and moving picture shows are wonderfully alluring features. In fact, in addition to the considerations which are peculiar to himself, the immigrant has all the general incentives to seek the city, which operate upon the general population, and which have produced so decided a change in the distribution of population within the last few decades.^[199]

The matter of distribution has been treated thus at length because it is one of the most important aspects of the entire situation. Many, if not most, of the practical problems of immigration hinge directly upon the matter of distribution. Upon it depends the question whether the immigrant and the economic opportunity, which is his justification for being in the country, shall come together. The question of assimilation, which is largely a question of contact between the newcomer and the native-born population, is primarily a matter of distribution. Crime, pauperism, disease, the standard of living, morality, education—all, to a greater or less extent, are dependent upon distribution. No practical program for the treatment of immigrants, which is not calculated directly to improve distribution, can hope for any considerable measure of success.