It has been observed already that the great argument for immigration during the past half century has been the economic one. The main defense for immigration has rested upon the claim that it has decidedly increased the industrial efficiency of the American people, and has facilitated the development of our resources, and the expansion of industry, at a rate which would not have been possible otherwise. The facts in regard to the age, sex, and physical soundness of the immigrants are mustered to establish them as a peculiarly efficient industrial body.

This contention rests upon two assumptions. First, that our alien residents constitute a net addition to the total population of the country; second, that if there had been no immigration, and the population, particularly that part of it which constitutes the labor supply, had been smaller, that there would have been no inventions and improvements in the way of labor-saving machinery which would have permitted the same amount of work to be accomplished with a smaller amount of labor.

In the light of what has been said in regard to the relation between immigration and the growth of population in Chapter XI, the first of these claims, at the very least, is open to serious question. While the proposition, as has already been stated, is absolutely incapable of mathematical proof, there nevertheless is every reason to believe that our immigrants have not meant a gain in the labor supply, but the substitution of one labor element for another. Not only have the immigrants in general displaced the natives, but the newer immigrants have displaced the older ones in a wide variety of industries and occupations. This latter process has gone on before our very eyes; it is manifest and perfectly comprehensible. A careful consideration of it may make it easier to understand how the same result, in a more subtle way, has been accomplished in the case of the native-born.

The displacement of the English, Irish, Welsh, and German miners in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania by Italians and Slavs is a familiar fact.^[307] The Italians are being driven out of the boot-blacking business, and other of their characteristic trades, by the Greeks. The Irish laborers on the railroads have been largely supplanted by Italians, Slavs, and Greeks. The “Bravas,” or black Portuguese, have forced the Poles, Italians, and, in large measure, the Finns from the cranberry bogs of Massachusetts.^[308] Granite City and Madison, Illinois, have witnessed a succession of English, Irish, German, Welsh and Polish, Slovak and Magyar, Roumanian, Greek, and Servian, Bulgarian and Armenian laborers in their industries.^[309]

In these cases it is plain that while some of the displaced individuals have gone into other, very likely higher, occupations, the real substitution has been the concomitant of a cessation of immigration from the older sources. The north Europeans, being unwilling to meet the competition of races industrially inferior to them, have either ceased emigrating in large numbers, or else are going elsewhere. At any rate they do not come here. The diminution of the supply of native labor has been brought about in an analogous way, though in this case the restrictive forces operate upon the principles of reproduction instead of immigration.

Even though it be granted that the numerical supply of labor has been somewhat increased, there has been an undeniable decrease in the efficiency of the individual laborer, as is attested by the uniformly superior earnings received by the native-born as compared with the foreign-born, or the old immigrant as compared with the new. As Dr. Peter Roberts has pointed out,^[310] there seems to be a sort of Gresham’s law which operates in the field of labor. The fittest to survive in an unregulated economic competition of races is the one least advanced in culture, the one whose demands in respect to comforts and decencies are lowest, even the one, it sometimes seems, whose industrial productiveness per individual is lowest. It is this fact which gives so dark an aspect to the industrial future of the United States under unregulated immigration.^[311]

In regard to the second assumption—that a smaller labor supply would not have been offset by an increase in invention—we are again confronted with an impossibility of proof, one way or the other. The economists tell us that one of the great incentives to invention is a scarcity of labor, and also that many of the greatest inventions have been made by men who are working daily with machines, and consequently are in a position to discover improvements that may be made. There is at least some reasonable basis for the belief that if the absence of immigration to this country had resulted in a smaller laboring force, the greater pressure on employers to secure machinery, and the greater intelligence of the machine worker, would together have brought about such a betterment of labor-saving machinery as would have resulted in a total production equal to what we have actually witnessed.

It is inconceivable that in America, of all countries, any needed work should have to be neglected because of the lack of a foreign labor element, or because of a shortage of labor in general.^[312] It is hard to see how in a nation the majority of whose citizens are healthy and intelligent there can be any real shortage of labor. What there can be, is a shortage of labor at a given wage. In a prosperous community there may be industries into which a sufficient number of laborers will not go, at the wages which the promoters are originally willing to pay. But if there is an actual social need for those industries, wages will rise to a point high enough to attract a sufficient number of workers, however irksome or disagreeable the employment. No self-respecting community ought to expect industries to be carried on within its borders for which it is not willing to pay such a price as will enable the workers to subsist in reasonable comfort and decency. If there are any industries carried on in the United States which, in the absence of a foreign labor supply, would have to be abandoned, because the native-born laborers or their children would refuse to go into them, it simply means that society is not yet ready to pay a fit price for the products of those industries.

This brings us to the question of the effect of immigration on the amount and distribution of wealth in the United States. It is frequently pointed out that we receive yearly a net increase of half a million or so of able-bodied laborers, for whose upbringing and education we, as a nation, have expended nothing. It is stated that it is cheaper to import laborers than to raise them. The truth of this assertion depends first of all on the quality of the laborer. It may be cheaper in the long run to rear laborers of the American type than to import Portuguese, Russians, and East Indians. Furthermore, while we do not pay directly for the laborers, we pay a great deal for their residence in this country. The estimated amount of money sent abroad by aliens in 1907, $275,000,000, is probably higher than the total for an average year. Suppose $200,000,000 be taken as an average amount.^[313] These remittances do not represent commercial payments for imports, but are savings actually withdrawn from the wealth of this country and sent abroad to be expended there. So that for each able-bodied alien laborer who enters the country something like $400 goes out. In a sense a good deal of this money might be considered as actual payment for the importation of the laborers, since much of it goes for traveling expenses, debts incurred to provide for emigration, etc.^[314]

Whether immigration has increased either the total or per capita wealth of the nation may be open to question. One thing, however, is certain—it has profoundly affected the distribution of wealth in the country. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that the successive waves of immigration have represented an ever cheapening labor supply. As the country has grown in wealth and prosperity the employers of labor have found that they could secure their workers at relatively, if not absolutely, lower rates decade after decade. Whenever conditions became such that the native laboring force, if left to themselves, might have successfully demanded better conditions or higher remuneration, there has appeared an inexhaustible supply of foreign laborers, ready and willing to take what was unsatisfactory to the natives, or less. The workman already in the country, whether native or foreign, has been continually robbed of his advantage. Thus the gap between capital and labor, between the rich and the poor, has grown ever wider. Not only have wages been kept from rising, but conditions of labor have persisted and been tolerated which an American laboring force would never have submitted to. The accounts of terrible accidents in mines and foundries arouse sincere feelings of sympathy in our breasts for the poor foreigners who have to suffer so. They would incite a storm of indignant protest which would not be stilled until remedies were provided, if those who are subjected to such conditions were our own kin brothers.^[315]

There is still another characteristic feature of our economic life, between which and the immigration movement a close and peculiar connection can be traced. This is the frequent recurrence of economic depressions, or crises. The causal relation between these events and the variations in the volume of the immigration current has already been mentioned. There is also a causal relation between these conditions and the fluctuations in the outgoing stream of aliens. This fact has received no little attention of late years, and it has been frequently pointed out that a period of depression in this country is followed by a large exodus of the foreign-born.

The popular interpretation of this fact is that this emigration movement serves to mitigate the evils of the crisis by removing a large part of the surplus laborers, until returning prosperity creates a demand for them again. The Italian, who displays the greatest mobility in this regard, has been called the safety valve of our labor market. Thus the movements of our alien population are supposed to be an alleviating force as regards crises.

The question arises, however, in this connection, whether there is not a converse causal relation; in other words, whether the conditions of immigration are not, partly responsible for the recurrence of these periods. Professor Commons takes this view of the matter, and in his book, Races and Immigrants in America, demonstrates how immigration, instead of helping matters, is really one of the causes of crises. His conclusion is that “immigration intensifies this fatal cycle of ‘booms’ and ‘depressions,’” and “instead of increasing the production of wealth by a steady, healthful growth, joins with other causes to stimulate the feverish overproduction, with its inevitable collapse, that has characterized the industry of America more than that of any other country.”^[316]

The few pages which Professor Commons devotes to this topic are highly suggestive, and show careful study of the subject. The author, however, at the time this book was written, was handicapped by the lack of data regarding the departures of aliens, which, as we have seen, have since become available. The fact that within the period since the collection of these figures began, the United States has experienced, and recovered from, a severe depression, makes the study of this matter at the present time particularly profitable.

First of all, it will be desirable to see just what the facts of immigration and emigration during this period are; then we shall be prepared to attempt their interpretation. The accompanying table (p. 349) gives the number of aliens admitted to and departed from the United States, and the net increase or decrease of population resulting therefrom, by months, from January, 1907, to December, 1910 (with the exception of the figures of departures for the first six months of 1907, which are not available).

The figures for arrivals given in this table include both immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens, a distinction which has been observed with some care since 1906. The column of departures also includes emigrant and nonemigrant aliens.^[317]

It is not necessary to take account of these discriminations for the purposes of the present study.

Turning then to the table, we observe that the monthly average of arrivals during the first six months of 1907 was a high one. Following a large immigration during the last six months of the preceding year, this made the fiscal year ending June 30, 1907, the record year for immigration in the history of the country. For the next four months the stream of immigration continued high, considering the season, and the number of departures was moderate. Early in October, however, there were signs of disturbance in the New York Stock Exchange. On the sixteenth there was a crash in the market, and within a week the panic had become general. It reached its height on October 24, and continued for many weeks after.^[318] The response of the alien population to this disturbance was almost immediate, and manifested itself first in the emigration movement. In November the number of departures almost doubled. But the immigrants who were on the way could not be stopped, and in spite of the large exodus, there was a net gain of 38,207 during the month. The next month, December, however, saw a marked decrease in the stream of arrivals, which, accompanied by a departure of aliens almost as great as in November, resulted in a net decrease in population of 11,325 for the month. During the first six months of 1908 the number of arrivals was small, and the departures numerous, so that, with the exception of March, each month shows a net loss in population. During July the number of departures began to approach the normal (compare the months in 1908 with 1907 and 1910), but the arrivals were so few that there was still a decrease for the months of July and August. In September, 1908, the balance swung the other way, and from that time to the present every month with the exception of December, 1911, has shown a substantial increase in population through the movement of aliens.

Thus we see that the period during which the number of alien laborers in the United States was decreasing was confined to the months December, 1907, to August, 1908, inclusive.^[319] By the end of July, 1908, the effects of the crisis were practically over as far as departures are concerned. It is evident, then, that the effects of the crisis on emigration were immediate, but not of very long duration. During the months of November and December, 1907, when the distress was the keenest, there were still large numbers of aliens arriving. But when the stream of immigration was once checked, it remained low for some time, and it was not until about January, 1909, that it returned to what may be considered a normal figure. The reasons for this are obvious. The stream of immigration is a long one, and its sources are remote. It takes a long time for retarding influences in America to be thoroughly felt on the other side. The principal agency in checking immigration at its source is the returning immigrant himself, who brings personal information of the unfortunate conditions in the United States. This takes some time. But when the potential immigrants are once discouraged as to the outlook across the ocean, they require some positive assurance of better times before they will start out again.

Now what catches the public eye in such an epoch as this is the large number of departures. We are accustomed to immense numbers of arrivals and we think little about that side of it. But heavy emigration is a phenomenon, and accordingly we hear much about how acceptably our alien population serves to accommodate the supply of labor to the demand. But if we stop to add up the monthly figures, we find that for the entire period after the crisis of 1907, when emigration exceeded immigration, the total decrease in alien population was only 124,124—scarcely equal to the immigration of a single month during a fairly busy season. This figure is almost infinitesimal compared to the total mass of the American working people, or to the amount of unemployment at a normal time, to say nothing of a crisis.^[320] It is thus evident that the importance of our alien population as an alleviating force at the time of a crisis has been vastly exaggerated. The most that can be said for it is that it has a very trifling palliative effect.

The really important relation between immigration and crises is much less conspicuous but much more far-reaching. It rests upon the nature and underlying causes of crises in this country. These are fairly well understood at the present time. A typical crisis may be said to be caused by speculative overproduction, or overspeculative production. Some prefer to call the trouble underconsumption, which is much the same thing looked at from another point of view. Professor Irving Fisher has furnished a convenient and logical outline of the ordinary course of affairs.^[321] In a normal business period some slight disturbance, such as an increase in the quantity of gold, causes prices to rise. A rise in prices is accompanied by increased profits for business men, because the rate of interest on the borrowed capital which they use in their business fails to increase at a corresponding ratio. If prices are rising at the rate of two per cent annually, a nominal rate of interest of six per cent is equivalent to an actual rate of only about four per cent. Hence, doing business on borrowed capital becomes very profitable, and there is an increased demand for loans.

This results in an increase of the deposit currency, which is accompanied by a further rise in prices. The nominal rate of interest rises somewhat, but not sufficiently, and prices tend to outstrip it still further. Thus the process is repeated, until the large profits of business lead to a disproportionate production of goods for anticipated future demand, and a vast overextension of credit. But this cycle cannot repeat itself indefinitely. Though the rate of interest rises tardily, it rises progressively, and eventually catches up with the rise in prices, owing to the necessity which banks feel of maintaining a reasonable ratio between loans and reserves. Other causes operate with this to produce the same result. The consequence is that business men find themselves unable to renew their loans at the old rate, and hence some of them are unable to meet their obligations, and fail. The failure of a few firms dispels the atmosphere of public confidence which is essential to extended credit. Creditors begin to demand cash payment for their loans; there is a growing demand for currency; the rate of interest soars; and the old familiar symptoms of a panic appear. In this entire process the blame falls, according to Professor Fisher, primarily upon the failure of the rate of interest to rise promptly in proportion to the rise in prices. If the forces which give inertia to the rate of interest were removed, so that the rate of interest would fluctuate readily with prices, the great temptation to expand business unduly during a period of rising prices would be removed. It may well be conceived that there are other factors, besides the discrepancy between the nominal and real rates of interest, that give to business a temporary or specious profitableness, and tend to encourage speculative overproduction. But the influence of the rate of interest resembles so closely that resulting from immigration, that Professor Fisher’s explanation is of especial service in the present discussion.

The rate of interest represents the payment which the entrepreneur makes for one of the great factors of production—capital. The failure of this remuneration to keep pace with the price of commodities in general leads to excessive profits and overproduction. The payment which the entrepreneur makes for one of the other factors of production—labor—is represented by wages. If wages fail to rise along with prices, the effect on business, while not strictly analogous, is very similar to that produced by the slowly rising rate of interest. The entrepreneur is relieved of the necessity of sharing any of his excessive profits with labor, just as in the other case he is relieved from sharing them with capital. It would probably be hard to prove that the increased demand for labor results in further raising prices in general, as an increased demand for capital results in raising prices by increasing the deposit currency. But if the demand for labor results in increasing the number of laborers in the country, thereby increasing the demand for commodities, it may very well result in raising the prices of commodities as distinguished from labor, which is just as satisfactory to the entrepreneur. This is exactly what is accomplished when unlimited immigration is allowed. As soon as the conditions of business produce an increased demand for labor, this demand is met by an increased number of laborers, produced by immigration.

In the preceding paragraph it has been assumed that wages do not rise with prices. The great question is, is this true? This is a question very difficult of answer. There is a very general impression that during the last few years prices have seriously outstripped wages. Thus Professor Ely says, “Wages do not usually rise as rapidly as prices in periods of business expansion.”^[322] R. B. Brinsmade stated in a discussion at a recent meeting of the American Economic Association that “our recent great rise of prices is acknowledged to be equivalent to a marked reduction in general wages.”^[323] Whether this idea is correct, and if correct, whether this effect had transpired in the years immediately previous to 1907, cannot be definitely stated. The index numbers of wages and prices given in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, for 1909 (p. 249), seem to show that during the years 1895 to 1907 money wages increased about pari passu with the retail prices of food, so that the purchasing power of the full-time weekly earnings remained nearly constant.

But whether or not money wages rose as fast as prices in the years from 1900 to 1907, one thing is certain, they did not rise any faster. That is to say, if real wages did not actually fall, they assuredly did not rise. But the welfare of the country requires that, in the years when business is moving toward a crisis, wages should rise; not only money wages, but real wages. What is needed is some check on the unwarranted activity of the entrepreneurs, which will make them stop and consider whether the apparently bright business outlook rests on sound and permanent conditions, or is illusory and transient. If their large profits are legitimate and enduring, they should be forced to share a part of them with the laborer. If not, the fact should be impressed upon them. We have seen that the rate of interest fails to act as an efficient check. Then the rate of wages should do it. And if the entrepreneurs were compelled to rely on the existing labor supply in their own country, the rate of wages would do it. Business expands by increasing the amount of labor utilized, as well as the amount of capital. If the increased labor supply could be secured only from the people already resident in the country, the increased demand would have to express itself in an increased wage, and the entrepreneur would be forced to pause and reflect. But in the United States we have adopted the opposite policy. In the vast peasant population of Europe there is an inexhaustible reservoir of labor, only waiting a signal from this side to enter the labor market—to enter it, not with a demand for the high wage that the business situation justifies, but ready to take any wage that will be offered, just so it is a little higher than the pittance to which they are accustomed at home. And we allow them to come, without any restrictions whatever as to numbers. Thus wages are kept from rising, and immigration becomes a powerful factor, tending to intensify and augment the unhealthy, oscillatory character of our industrial life. It was not by mere chance that the panic year of 1907 was the record year in immigration.

Against this point of view it may be argued that the legitimate expansion of business in this country requires the presence of the immigrant. But if business expansion is legitimate and permanent, resting on lasting favorable conditions, it will express itself in a high wage scale, persisting over a long period of time. And the demand so expressed will be met by an increase of native offspring, whose parents are reaping the benefit of the high standard of living. A permanent shortage of the labor supply is as abhorrent to nature as a vacuum. Expansion of any other kind than this ought to be hampered, not gratified.

There is one other way in which immigration, as it exists at present, influences crises. In considering this, it will be well to regard the crisis from the other point of view—as a phenomenon of underconsumption. Practically all production at the present day is to supply an anticipated future demand. There can be no overproduction unless the actual demand fails to equal that anticipated. This is underconsumption. Now the great mass of consumers in the United States is composed of wage earners. Their consuming power depends upon their wages. In so far as immigration lowers wages in the United States, or prevents them from rising, it reduces consuming power, and hence is favorable to the recurrence of periods of underconsumption. It is not probable, to be sure, that a high wage scale in itself could prevent crises, as the entrepreneurs would base their calculations on the corresponding consuming power, just as they do at present. But a high wage scale carries with it the possibility of saving, and an increase of accumulations among the common people. It is estimated at the present time that half of the industrial people of the United States are unable to save anything.^[324] This increase in saving would almost inevitably have some effect upon the results of crises, though it must be confessed that it is very difficult to predict just what this effect would be. One result that might naturally be expected to follow would be that the laboring classes would take the opportunity of the period of low prices immediately following the crisis to invest some of their savings in luxuries which hitherto they had not felt able to afford. This would increase the demand for the goods which manufacturers are eager to dispose of at almost any price, and would thereby mitigate the evils of the depressed market. It is probably true that the immigrant, under the same conditions, will save more out of a given wage than the native, so that it might seem that an alien laboring body would have more surplus available for use at the time of a crisis than a native class. But the immigrant sends a very large proportion of his savings to friends and relatives in the old country, or deposits it in foreign institutions, so that it is not available at such a time. Moreover, our laboring class is not as yet wholly foreign, and the native has to share approximately the same wage as the alien. Without the immense body of alien labor, we should have a class of native workers with a considerably higher wage scale, and a large amount of savings accumulated in this country, and available when needed.

On the other hand, it may be argued that if the desire to purchase goods in a depressed market should lead to a large withdrawal of cash from savings banks and similar institutions, it might tend to augment rather than alleviate the evils of a money stringency. There seems to be much force to this argument. Yet Mr. Streightoff tells us that in a period of hard times the tendency is for the poorer classes to increase their deposits, rather than diminish them.^[325] On the whole, it seems probable that a large amount of accumulated savings in the hands of the poorer classes would tend to have a steadying influence on conditions at the time of a crisis, and that by preventing this, as well as in other ways, immigration tends to increase the evils of crises.

In closing this discussion, it may be interesting to note what are the elements in our alien population which respond most readily to economic influences in this country, and hence are mainly accountable for the influences we have been considering. As stated above, the annual reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration give very complete data as to the make-up of the incoming and outgoing streams by years. Thus in the fiscal year 1908 there were 782,870 immigrant aliens and 141,825 nonimmigrant aliens admitted. Of the nonimmigrant aliens, 86,570 were individuals whose country of last permanent residence and of intended future residence were both the United States; that is, they were alien residents of this country who had been abroad for a brief visit. These are the birds of passage in the strictest sense, in which we shall use the term hereafter. In the same year there was a total exodus of 714,828 aliens, of whom 395,073 were emigrants and 319,755 nonemigrants. The former class includes those who have made their fortune in this country and are going home to spend it, and those who have failed, and are going home broken and discouraged—a very large number in this panic year. The latter class includes aliens who have had a permanent residence in the United States, but who are going abroad to wait till the storm blows over, with the expectation of returning again—true birds of passage outward bound. There were 133,251 of these. The balance were aliens in transit, and aliens who had been in this country on a visit, or only for a short time. In 1909 there were 751,786 immigrant aliens and 192,449 nonimmigrant aliens. Of the nonimmigrants 138,680 were true birds of passage according to the above distinction—a large number and almost exactly equal to the number of departing birds of passage in the previous year. The storm is over, and they have come back. The departures in that year numbered 225,802 emigrant and 174,590 nonemigrant aliens. These numbers are considerably smaller than in the previous year, but are still large, showing that the effects of the crisis were still felt in the early part of this fiscal year. The number of birds of passage among the nonemigrant aliens, 80,151, is much smaller than in the previous year. In 1910 there were 1,041,570 immigrant aliens and 156,467 nonimmigrant aliens. In the latter class, the number of birds of passage, 94,075, again approximated the corresponding class among the departures of the previous year. The departures in 1910 were 202,436 emigrant aliens and 177,982 nonemigrant aliens, of whom 89,754 were birds of passage. This probably comes near to representing the normal number of this class. A careful study of these figures confirms the conclusion reached above. While a crisis in this country does undoubtedly increase the number of departing aliens, both emigrant and nonemigrant, and eventually cuts down the number of arrivals, the total effect is much smaller than is usually supposed, and taken in connection with the fact that the stream of arrivals is never wholly checked, the influence of emigration in easing the labor market is absolutely trifling.

Comparing the different races in regard to their readiness to respond to changes in economic conditions, it appears that the Italians stand easily at the head, and the Slavs come second. In 1908, in the traffic between the United States and Italy, there was a net loss in the population of this country of 79,966; in 1909 a net gain of 94,806. In the traffic between this country and Austria-Hungary there was a loss in 1908 of 5463; in 1909 a gain of 48,763. In the traffic with the Russian Empire and Finland there was a gain of 104,641 in 1908 and a gain of 94,806 in 1909. This shows how unique are the motives and conditions which control the emigration from the two latter countries. The emigrants from there, particularly the Jews, come to this country to escape intolerable conditions on the other side, not merely for the sake of economic betterment. They prefer to endure anything in this country, rather than to return to their old home, even if they could.

Hand in hand with the economic disparity caused by immigration has come an increasing social stratification.^[326] This is based partly on wealth, partly on race. Already certain occupations are regarded as the special province of certain nationalities, and native parents recoil from the prospect of having their children enter them to work side by side with the aliens. Only the beginnings of these changes are as yet manifest, and no one can foretell what the outcome will be. But even the beginnings must give us pause. There can be no more pernicious social classification in a nation than one based on race. Distinctions resting on wealth, religion, or education can be overcome, potentially at least. Distinctions of birth affect only a small proportion of a society, and exist only in nations long habituated to them. But distinctions of race affect the entire population are fundamental, and can never be obliterated except as assimilation is so perfect that race is forgotten. No effort of the individual can blot out his racial identification. The most familiar example yet developed in the United States is that of the Hebrews. However sincerely we may admire their fine racial traits, however closely we may associate with individuals of the race, we cannot deny that they constitute a separate body in our population in many respects.^[327] Summer hotels are closed to them, or else other people avoid those resorts. Americans move out of the sections of cities where they are moving in. Select clubs are closed to them. It is an indictment against the American people that these things are so. We, who pose as the friends of all races, however downtrodden and despised, should be ready to take them into equality with us when they seek refuge on our shores. Both Hebrews and Americans may resent the bald statement of such facts. Can we deny their truth?

Nor is it only in high society, nor only among Americans, that this friction is felt. In the slums of our cities bitter feeling exists between the Italians and the Jews.^[328] Nor is racial antagonism confined to any two or three races.^[329] Employers of labor find it wholly expedient to arrange their workers in groups of the same nationality.^[330] Austria-Hungary is an example of the conditions that may result when too many jarring nationalities are included within a national territory. But the racial groups in Austria-Hungary do not compare in diversity with those which are gradually forming in the United States.

In the political aspects of the immigration situation there has been a peculiar reversal of public opinion in the last three quarters of a century. In the days of the Native Americans and the Know nothings, the uneasiness was mainly due to the fear that too many aliens would acquire the rights of citizenship. Then it was the naturalized foreigner who was the undesirable. Nowadays, the fear is that the foreigners will ignore the privileges of citizenship, and a high percentage of naturalization is a test of desirability in any foreign group. This change may be attributed to a change in the situation of the United States, and to a difference in the character and causes of immigration. During the first half of the nineteenth century the United States was essentially a new country. Political questions were predominant, and the memory of the men who fell in the fight for freedom was still fresh in the minds of their sons. The immigrants of the period, on the other hand, were actuated to a large extent by the desire for political freedom, and were keen to secure all the power possible in this country. At the present time, the predominating interests are wholly economic, and even the political questions of the day have an economic flavor. At the same time, the motives of the immigrants are almost wholly economic. So the jealousy between native and foreigner now concerns itself mainly with the industrial relations, and anything which indicates an inclination on the part of the alien to ally himself permanently with the interests of the country is welcomed. The temporary immigrant was an almost unknown quantity in the old days.

The naturalization laws of the United States have undergone only slight modifications in the past hundred years.^[331] The main provisions of the present laws are as follows: In order to become a citizen of the United States an alien must follow out the following method of procedure: At least two years before he is admitted he must file a preliminary declaration of intention. To do this he must be at least eighteen years old. This declaration shall state that it is his bona-fide intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce all other allegiance to a foreign power, and shall set forth his name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, date of arrival in the United States, name of the vessel, if any, by which he came, and present place of residence in the United States. Not less than two years nor more than seven years after he has made application, he shall present a petition in writing, signed in his own handwriting, stating the essential facts about himself, including his declaration of allegiance to the United States, and disclaiming belief in anarchy, or belief in or practice of polygamy.

This petition shall be verified by at least two credible witnesses, who are citizens of the United States, who shall state that they have known the applicant to be a resident of the United States for a period of at least five years continuously, and of the state or territory at least one year immediately preceding, and that they have personal knowledge of his good moral character and general fitness to become a citizen of the United States.

With this petition is filed a certificate from the Department of Commerce and Labor, stating the date, place, and manner of his arrival, and also his declaration of intention. He shall swear in open court his allegiance to the United States and renounce all other allegiance.

In accordance with a recent law, no alien can now be naturalized without an ability to speak the English language, unless he has made entry upon the public lands of the United States. No person may be naturalized within thirty days preceding the holding of a general election in the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Chinese are not admissible to citizenship.

A woman who is married to a citizen of the United States is herself a citizen, provided she herself might be legally naturalized. This provision has been the subject of considerable attention lately on account of the practice of women engaged in the white slave traffic marrying a citizen in order to avoid deportation. The Commissioner General in his report for 1910 recommended that a more definite statement be made of this clause, admitting of no doubt as to its interpretation.

Children of naturalized citizens who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of the naturalization of their parents, if dwelling in the United States, are considered citizens, as are children of citizens, born outside of the United States.

If any alien who has received a certificate of citizenship shall, within five years thereafter, go to the land of his nativity or to any other foreign country, and take up permanent residence therein, it shall be deemed evidence of his lack of intention to become a permanent citizen of the United States at the time of filing his application, and warrants the canceling of his certificate.

According to the regulations of September 15, 1910, clerks of courts are instructed not to receive declarations of intention or file petitions for naturalization from other aliens than white persons, and persons of African nativity or of African descent.

Jurisdiction to naturalize aliens is conferred on the following courts: United States circuit and district courts in any state, United States district courts for the territories, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and the United States courts for the Indian territory; also all courts of record in any state or territory, having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in controversy is unlimited.

Since the establishment of the division of naturalization by the act of June 29, 1906, the business of naturalization has been in the hands of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.

The statistics of naturalization for the five years 1908–1912 are as follows: