10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, May 16, 1882.
DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—I enclose Bill with Healy's amendments. He says that what he means in the suggested changes in the Intimidation Clause is, that only a person who actually threatens a person with injury should come under the provisions of the Bill. What he objects to is constructive intimidation.
I went through the Bill thus amended with Parnell. He agrees with them in the main, but would like to have the opinion of a lawyer with regard to them. Like Healy, his chief objection is to constructive intimidation. He says that if the Government will meet him and his party in the conciliatory spirit of the amendments, he will promise that the opposition to the Bill shall be conducted on honest Parliamentary lines, and that there shall be no abstention. He specially urges that the Bill shall only be in operation until the close of next session; he puts this on two grounds: (1) That the Tories may possibly come in at the end of that time. (2) That he may be able to advise the Irish to be quiet in the hopes of no renewal of the Bill.
He says that he is in a very difficult position between the Government and the secret societies. The latter, he says, are more numerous than are supposed; that most of those connected with them only wish to be let alone, but that he greatly fears that if they are disgusted they will commit outrages. The late murders, he seems to think, were, when agrarian, the acts of men who had a grudge against a particular individual, and, when political, the acts of skirmishers from America. I really think that he is most anxious to be able to support the Government; he fully admits that a Bill is necessary on account of English opinion, but he does not wish to have it applied to himself, and he doubts whether it will be really effectual against the outrage mongers.
Healy goes so far as to say that if the Prime Minister or you were to administer the Bill it would do no harm, and that he is not greatly afraid of it in the hands of Lord Spencer, but that it would be a monstrous weapon of oppression in the hands of Jim Lowther. I am sure that with conciliation you can now, for the first time, get the Parnellites on your side.
This letter Mr. Chamberlain sent to Mr. Gladstone, promising to bring the draft of the Bill to the House that afternoon.
Mr. Labouchere continued to Mr. Chamberlain on the following day:
He (Healy) points out that even the Conservative newspapers are against the Newspaper Clause, and he wants it made applicable only to newspapers printed out of Ireland. With regard to the Search Clause, he will make a fight for nominative warrants, and he also wants an amendment securing an indemnity in case of injury done to property by the searchers. He points out that there ought to be a right of appeal from the County Court Judge to the Queen's Bench. With respect to the Intimidation Clause, he seems to approve of cutting out the definition clause, but is very anxious for some restriction in the terms of the clause, so that there may be no crime of constructive intimidation.
There is to be a private meeting at one to-morrow of himself, Parnell, T. P. O'Connor, and Sexton. He will say to them that he thinks that Government will agree to the County Court Judges and to the period of the Bill being shortened. He will, however, before the meeting, go further into details as regards the position with Parnell. He is most desirous that there should be no plea for saying that there is a bargain of any kind. I have told him that, in the Prime Minister, they have a friend, but that they must take into consideration his position as the leader of a Government where possibly all are not as well disposed, and as the head of a country where there is a popular outcry for stringent measures.
On May 22, he wrote again, after a further interview with Parnell:
This is about the sum total of what Parnell took an hour to tell me. He does not in the least complain of you, and really is most anxious to get on with the Government if possible. He wants me to let him know as soon as possible to-morrow whether he is to consider that there is to be no concession.
Parnell says: That the Arrears Bill has been very well received in Ireland, and that, if it be followed by one making certain modifications of no very important character in the Land Bill, he is convinced that the situation will greatly improve, provided that concessions be made in the Coercion Bill.
He suggests that the Coercion and the Arrears Bill move forward pari passu, and that only small progress be made with the Coercion Bill before Whitsuntide, in order to give time for the passions to cool, and for persons to see by experience that the condition of Ireland is not so bad as is supposed.
If urgency is to be voted on the Coercion Bill, he asks that it should be voted by a simple majority, and that it should be stated that it will be used whenever any Legislative measures in regard to Ireland are brought forward during the Session and obstructed by the Conservatives.
He greatly regrets the speech of Davitt, but says that he (Davitt) has no intention to go to Ireland, and that his land scheme is a little fad of his own.
He says that he is most anxious for a modus vivendi, and believes that if the present opportunity for establishing one be let pass, it is not likely to recur. He and his friends, he says, are incurring the serious risk of assassination in their efforts to bring it about, and he thinks that his suggestions ought to be judged on their merits, but that, with the Coercion Act as it is, there will be so much anger and ill-feeling in Ireland, that all alliance with the Liberal party will be impossible.
He points out, not as a matter of bargain, but as a fact, that the Liberals may—if only there be concessions on the Coercion Bill, and a few modifications in the Land Bill—count on the Irish vote, as against the Conservatives, and suggests that this will make the Government absolutely safe, even though there be Whig defections.
Mr. Labouchere continued, as will be seen by the following letters to Mr. Chamberlain, to press the views of the Irish leaders upon the Government.
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, June 3, 1882.
DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—We have done our best during your absence to hold our own against Harcourt. The only important issue yet raised has been the exclusion of treason and treason felony from the Bill.
On Thursday I went to Grosvenor from Parnell to ask that the debate should be adjourned. Gladstone said that Parnell ought to consider that after Harcourt's "no surrender" speech the Government would not be able to give in the next day, and that the division if taken would be larger on Thursday than on Friday, and that the matter might be reconsidered in Report. I said that if Government would give any private assurance, or if Gladstone would say in the House, that the exclusion would be favourably considered on Report, he could have the division at once. This latter he was afraid to do, for Harcourt, as sulky as a bear, was glaring at him. He therefore agreed to consent "with regret" to the adjournment. When, however, Parnell moved it, our idiots and the Conservatives shouted so loudly "no," that a division had to be taken. Then Healy moved it, on which Gladstone did hint at the Report, but said nothing definite, except that it would be impossible to consult at once with the Irish Executive. The next day, Grosvenor wrote to me to say that he spoke without prejudice and held out no hope, but would I call "Parnell's attention to one sentence in one of Gladstone's concluding speeches, which was to the effect that it was impossible to call the attention of the Irish Government to the question of omitting treason and treason felony, between last night and this day, and therefore it would be better to bring up the question again on Report. Please ask Parnell to consider this fact."
On Friday morning the Irish held a meeting, and they agreed to keep what they did secret, decided that if treason were retained, at least treason felony should be eliminated.
On the House meeting Trevelyan tackled me, and said: "I am opposed to the insertion of treason and treason felony, and I am disposed to make large concessions. You know that I am a person of strong will. I now understand the Bill, and you will see how I shall act."
Grosvenor also said that I need not believe him, as he quite agreed with me, but that Harcourt was the difficulty. I asked him whether he would agree that if Lord Spencer said that treason and treason felony were not needed, they should be struck out on Report. He replied that the onus could not be thrown on Spencer, but that it must be the act of the Cabinet.
So after seeing Parnell it was agreed that the division should be taken at 7.30.
Why Parnell is making such a fight over this, and will make a fight over the Intimidation Clause, is that unless concession be made, he will find it difficult to hold his own. Egan, he says, wants to carry on the agitation from Paris, in which case it will be illegal; he wants to carry it on in Dublin, in which case it will be legal. If concessions are made he will have his way; if not, Egan will remain the master in Paris.
Grosvenor quite admits that it is most desirable to aid Parnell to remain leader.
Parnell says:
"I ask, in order to put an end definitely to the land agitation: that a clause should be introduced into the Arrears Bill, allowing small tenants in the Land Court to pay on Griffiths' valuation until their cases are decided: that there should be an expansion of the Bright Clauses next year if not this; and that a Royal Commission be appointed to keep the agricultural labourers quiet by taking evidence. Then I propose to ask for a fair and reasonable measure of local self-government, such as an English Government can grant," and he assures me that in all questions between me and the Conservatives and the Liberals, the latter shall have the Irish vote. I believe that he is perfectly sincere, and that he is thoroughly frightened by threats of assassination; indeed he told me that he never went about without a revolver in his pocket, and even then did not feel safe.
I write you all this for your private information, as you may wish to know the exact situation at present.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
REFORM CLUB, June 8, 1882.
DEAR CHAMBERLAIN—Parnell says that it is absolutely necessary that something should be understood, and that if no concession be made on the Intimidation Clause, he considers that things revert to where they were under the Forster regime, and that they will fight until urgency is voted and then fight on urgency until a coup d'état is carried out. Allowing for some exaggeration, a simple consideration of his position towards his party shows that this programme is necessarily forced upon him.
Surely we have a right to see the clause as Government will agree to it, before passing a portion of it.
I believe that this would be agreed to: that intimidation shall mean any threats, etc., to violence, any boycotting which involves danger such, for instance, as a doctor refusing to attend a sick man, or a refusal to supply the necessaries of life, and any specific act that is set out in the Bill, but nothing more.
C. Russell, Bryce, and Davy are trying their hands at this and hope to be able to frame a clause on these lines. You will no doubt see that, if something cannot be done to-morrow, the fat will be in the fire. Would it not therefore be well to leave the clause until the other clauses are passed, and then bring it on?—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, June 9, 1882.
DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—I wrote you a line in a great hurry last night, but after the House had adjourned I again saw Parnell.
He is most anxious that Mr. Gladstone should not think that obstruction arises from any ill-feeling towards him, and that he does not, in his own interests, wish it to be thought that anything in the nature of a bargain is to be made.
But he wants Mr. Gladstone to know facts. He says that there are two sections in the Land League. The funds of the League are at Paris, where a large sum is invested in securities. Egan wishes to trench on these securities, but Parnell and Davitt have been able to stop this, and at present nothing is expended but the weekly contributions. Egan and his section of the League are furious at the idea of the League being converted into a moderate tenant right Association, with its headquarters in Dublin. This he desires. Every day the ultras of his party are telling him that nothing is gained by conciliation. If the Bill is to be passed in its present shape, he declares that neither he nor his friends can have anything to do with a moderate policy, and, as they absolutely decline to associate themselves with Egan and his desperate courses, they must withdraw.
The result, he says, will be that the Fenians will be masters of the situation, that they will have funds, and that there will be assassinations and outrages all over Ireland. So soon as he withdraws, he considers that his own life will not be worth a day's purchase.
If he is able to head the tenant right Association, he considers that he can crush out the Fenians—more especially if something is done in the Arrears Bill to meet the difficulty of the small tenants, who are waiting for their cases to be decided on in the Land Courts, being evicted, before their cases come on, for non-payment of excessive rents. If nothing be done in this matter, and if he be allowed to have his tenant right Association, this he says will be his great difficulty next winter. He wishes Mr. Gladstone to observe that Davitt has not made any speeches in Ireland, and he says that he obtained this pledge from him in order to show the result of conciliation. He disagrees entirely with Davitt's "nationalisation" of land scheme, and says that the Irish tenants do not themselves desire it.
He again suggests whether it would not be possible to insert limitations in the Intimidation Clause? And he would suggest that, if possible, it would be desirable to leave the clause as it stands, without any definition section, and to say that, as there is no desire to prevent an orderly and legal tenant right Association, additions will be made to the clause on Report, defining all this.
As regards the tribunal, he hopes that Mr. Gladstone will agree to a proviso, making the Court consist of a magistrate and a barrister. This he thinks will render it more easy to accept the intimidation clause with the limitations that he suggests, for many of the resident magistrates are half-pay captains, who have been appointed by interest, and who are hand in glove with the landlords, and some of them are certain to act foolishly.
If this be accepted, if unlawful associations are made there which the Lord Lieutenant declares to be unlawful; if it be made a crime to not attend an unlawful assembly, but to riot at, or to refuse to retire if called upon to do so from an unlawful assembly, I do not think that he attaches very great importance to the duration of the Act, although he still says that he does, but he would be satisfied if the duration of the Act were for three years with the proviso that the Lord Lieutenant has to prolong it (if it is prolonged) by a proclamation at the end of each year. He is anxious for this, because he thinks that he could do much for the cause of law and order, if he were able to point out that possibly the Act would not run for the whole three years, if the Irish are quiet and peaceable.
His main anxiety at the present moment seems to be, that Mr. Gladstone should understand the position of the Land League and of its leaders. He wishes most sincerely to fight with the Government against all outrages, and he complains that his good intentions are met every moment by a non possumus of lawyers, who seem to regard it as a matter of amour propre not to listen to him, and he says (and I am sure he believes it) that the result will be murders and outrages which will end in martial law.—Yours truly, H. LABOUCHERE.
P.S.—With regard to supply, he says that he thinks it a little hard, that he should be asked not to obstruct one Bill, because the Conservatives will obstruct another, and he suggests that Supply might be taken before the Report on the Bill now under discussion, with some sort of understanding that the Irish would not put down notices on going into Committee of Supply. But on this matter, he says that he is certain that if Mr. Gladstone will fairly look into his suggestions, he will see their force, and he still hopes that all obstruction, etc., etc., may be avoided.
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, June 10, 1882.
DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—As it seems to be understood that Harcourt had stated in the House his readiness to accept the amendment which I gave you yesterday, Healy has put it down.
As regards "unlawful," which was negatived last night, I explained to Healy that it was impossible to make the limitation on account of legal and technical difficulties, and he fully accepted this explanation.
With regard to the two limitations which stand in Parnell's name, and which they ask for, I told Healy that the wording of the limitations could not be used, as it would have a bad effect to say in an Act that the non-payment of rent is not an offence. To this he assented, and is quite ready to accept any words, taken from the Act of '75 or from anywhere else, which will cover the limitations. Would it not be as well to have the words ready, and to let Parnell have them, or at least to be ready with the substituted words when Parnell's amendment comes on?
There is a clause about exclusive dealing. When the suggestions which I submitted to you were being discussed by Parnell and Healy, they were very anxious to include Davy's amendment in regard to exclusive dealing, substituting for "dealing with"—"buying," by which they would have excluded a refusal to buy from Boycotting. I got them to say that this was not to be pressed if Government declined to accept the amendment, so I did not trouble you with it. Late last evening Parnell wanted to insist on it, so I appealed to Healy. He said that they were bound not to insist on more than had been submitted to you, as this would not be honourable, and therefore all trouble on this head is avoided.
Of course they will in the House divide on some amendment in regard to exclusive dealing, as a protest, and they may make one or two speeches, but there will be no obstruction, and I see no reason why the Bill should not be through Committee (notwithstanding Goschen's gloomy prognostications) in a few days.
It would, I think, very much tend to aid matters if Harcourt could in the course of discussion state, that in all cases a barrister will sit with a residential magistrate. He has already said that there will be an appeal to Quarter Sessions, which in Ireland means an appeal to the County Court Judge. But some of the residential magistrates are very foolish persons, and all are regarded as men in the landlords' camp.
Also, is it not possible to arrive at some clear definition as to what is an unlawful association? Parnell says that it is left now to any residential magistrate to decide the matter. He suggests that only such associations shall be unlawful, for the purpose of the Act, which are proclaimed as such by the Lord Lieutenant. But provided that there be a clear definition, he does not care for any particular wording.
Parnell and Healy request me to say that they are very grateful to Mr. Gladstone for meeting them half-way, and they seem only now anxious about "treason felony." As Herschell told me that he thinks everything necessary will be covered by the word "treason," I hope that this matter will also be settled satisfactorily.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
P.S.—Parnell would not like any one but you and Mr. Gladstone to know about his dispute with Egan, and the embargo on the League funds, except in a very general way.
10 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, June 24, 1882.
DEAR CHAMBERLAIN,—I saw Parnell, and spoke to him as you wished.
His answer is practically this:
"I acknowledge that Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain have acted fairly, and so far as I can I should always be ready to meet their wishes. But I deny that we have obtained the concessions that we expected. I am not prepared to go back to Ireland and engage in bringing the agitation within constitutional limits, on the mere chance of Lord Spencer not arresting me. The Fenians want one thing: the Ladies' League another: the people in Paris (Egan) another: and I another. Therefore I shall limit my action to Parliament and leave the Government and the Fenians to fight it out in Ireland. The Cabinet do not seem to realise that the Crimes Bill is a very complex one, and very loosely drawn up. There has been no obstruction in the proper sense of the word, although I admit that the Irish have repeated again and again the same arguments on amendments. But this I cannot help, unless I tell them that they will get something by holding their tongues. When the Conservatives threatened obstruction on Procedure, this was met by telling them that the majority resolution would not be pressed if they would facilitate business. Why should not the same arrangement be made with us? Let us know what amendments will be accepted in future. I am most anxious to carry out what I understood was the contemplated policy when I was released from Kilmainham, and to work with the Government in bringing the active phase of Irish agitation to a close. But this I cannot do if I am suspected of ulterior objects, and if I cannot show that something is gained for my party."
He then suggested that if the Government would take their November Session for alterations in the Land Act, he would do his best to facilitate business now in regard to the Crimes, and the Arrears Bill, and the Procedure Resolutions, provided that the majority Resolution were maintained.
I asked him what he really wanted under the term of alterations in the Land Act?
He said: "To go back to the system of reductions in rent which was acted on before the Stuart Donleathcase, and to extend the Bright clauses in the sense of W. H. Smith's resolution."
Finally, I again urged him to remember what Mr. Gladstone and you had done for him already, and to see whether he could not manage to bring the Committee Stage of the Bill to an end within a reasonable time.
On Monday, Sexton proposes to cut Chaplin out by bringing forward a resolution about the suspects. Parnell says that this is absolutely necessary, because he and his friends are blamed for only caring for their own release. But Sexton will say that he only does this, because it is a choice between his resolution and Chaplin's, and there will be no talking to hinder the Government from getting their money, or with the object of obstructing.
I have got to go to Northampton on Monday, so I shall not be in the House until late.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
When the Crimes Act was finally passed, Mr. Labouchere expressed himself in Truth as follows:
When Mr. Parnell was released from Kilmainham, it was understood that the Land Act would be amended, that evictions would be stopped by an Arrears Bill, and that the leaders of the land movement would be permitted to agitate within fair legal limits in favour of the political and social changes desired by their countrymen. Had this understanding been carried out, the breach between the Parnellites and the Liberals would have been healed.
Mr. Forster was the first to perceive that as a result of a modus vivendi he would have to disappear with his policy of coercion. He therefore resigned, in the hope that this would render it impossible to carry out the Kilmainham compact. Then followed the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish. The horror which this created was skilfully used by the Whigs in the Cabinet, and they succeeded in promoting a Bill, not so much aimed at outrages as at the Kilmainham compact. This Bill is a complete codification of arbitrary rule. It places the lives, liberties, and property of the Irish in the hands of the Executive, and seeks to suppress every species of political agitation.
Unfortunately, Mr. Trevelyan was awaiting his re-election when it was introduced, and it was left to Sir William Harcourt to carry it through the House of Commons. Of course, as Sir William is the head-centre of the Whigs, he delighted in his task. Not only did he refuse every modification of the Bill, except those which were rendered absolutely necessary by the absurd way in which it was drawn, but almost every day he envenomed discussion by transpontine outbursts against the Irish members. I do not blame him. I blame no one who plays his cards to his own best advantage. This is human nature. Sir William knew that if the English Radicals and the Irish were allied, he and his Whigs would lose all influence, whilst of Ireland he knew absolutely nothing.
The result, therefore, has been that the Whigs triumph, and that several weeks have been wasted in passing a Bill which will do nothing to hinder outrages, but which will simply increase the ill-feeling between England and Ireland.
If the leaders of the land movement are wise, they will not endeavour to hold meetings. They should declare that public meeting has been rendered impossible by the Crimes Act; and they should, as an act of charity, collect funds to aid all who have been evicted, no matter from what cause, and thus band the Irish tenants together in a friendly society. At the same time, they should devote all their energies to increase their numbers in the next Parliament, and they should submit test questions to every Liberal standing for an English constituency where there are Irish voters, and make these votes dependent upon the manner in which the questions are answered. If Mr. Parnell can hold the balance in Parliament between the rival aspirants for the Treasury Bench, he may be certain that any just demand that he may make will be granted. The democracy of England and Ireland, with Mr. Gladstone at their head, would make short work of Conservative and Whig obstructive trash. The landlords in Ireland and the Whigs in England stand in the way of peace and tranquillity in the former island, and of mutual good feeling in both.[8]
To quote Mr. Labouchere's views on Ireland during the dark and gloomy period which followed the introduction of the Prevention of Crimes Bill is to quote Mr. Chamberlain's, for, as is seen by their constant correspondence, the two were one in their views on Irish discontent. Mr. Chamberlain made a speech at Swansea in February, 1883, in which he asked his audience how long they supposed Englishmen with their free institutions would tolerate the existence of an Irish Poland so near to their own shores. Was separation the only alternative? He thought not. Separation, in his opinion, would "jeopardise the security of this country, and would be fatal to the prosperity and happiness of Ireland." He, like Labouchere, was prepared to relax the bond, even by conceding what was then known as Home Rule, which would not include an independent Parliament or a separate executive.[9]
However, in 1883 and 1884, Englishmen had other things to occupy their minds than the rights and wrongs of Ireland. In order to follow the political career of Mr. Labouchere we must for a time leave the Irish question and consider "the policy of Gladstone's Government in Egypt."
[1] Northampton Mercury, March 27, 1880.
[2] Hansard, Jan. 27, 1881, vol. 257.
[3] Hansard, Feb. 25, 1881, vol. 258.
[4] To their credit, be it said, they generally were amused.
[5] Hansard. Feb. 25, 1881, vol. 258.
[6] R. Barry O'Brien, Life of Parnell.
[7] Hansard, May 14, 1881.
[8] Truth, July 6, 1882.
[9] S. H. Jeyes, Mr. Chamberlain.
Lord Morley has commented on the irony of fate which imposed on Mr. Gladstone the unwelcome task of Egyptian occupation. "It was one of the ironies," he says, "in which every active statesman's life abounds." Disparity between intentions and achievements is indeed inevitable in all departments of activity, but nowhere more so than in cases of what may be called creative policy. Destruction is easy. But a constructive policy which shall bring about a new and more favourable state of things, and may, therefore, in this sense be called creative, is strangely apt either to overshoot its mark or to deviate into unexpected channels, with results wholly unlooked for by the statesman responsible for its conduct.
Certainly this ironic force of circumstances was peculiarly apparent in the case of Mr. Gladstone's Egyptian policy. The problem of Egypt was not of his seeking, but was a legacy from the Tories. In 1875 Disraeli, against the advice of Lord Derby, his Foreign Minister, and without consulting the other members of his Cabinet, arranged with the London Rothschilds to purchase Khedive Ismail's shares in the Suez Canal for four millions sterling. Ismail, whose absolute reign of eighteen years had cost Egypt[1] no less a sum than four hundred millions sterling, had been driven by his preposterous extravagance, and the consequent exhaustion of both his legitimate and illegitimate methods of procuring revenue, to look abroad for financial assistance. France, besides being crippled by the war of 1870, was regarded with suspicion in the matter of the canal, and the only alternative to France was England. A trifle like four millions was very far from what Ismail really required to give any sort of financial stability to his government, and, after the loan with Rothschild had been negotiated, the British Cabinet sent out a series of commissioners to study the state of affairs on the spot, and to see what could be done in the interests of Egyptian rule and, incidentally, of the foreign bondholders. Eventually a settlement of Ismail's affairs, known as the Goschen-Joubert arrangement, was made, by which the enormous yearly payment of nearly seven millions sterling was charged on the Egyptian revenue. Greek usurers attended the tax-gatherers on their rounds, and the ruined fellaheen were forced to mortgage their lands to meet these amazing demands. Even such methods failed of success owing to the famine of the two preceding years. The obviously juster course was now to let Ismail become bankrupt and abandon the Goschen-Joubert arrangement, but the foreign bondholders were naturally opposed to this, and pointed out reasonably enough that the English Government had guaranteed the loan. The moment was favourable to their views. Dizzy had succeeded in converting his colleagues, with the exception of Derby, who retired and was succeeded by Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary, to his neo-Imperialism in which an Asiatic Empire under British rule was an element. About this time, too, the secret convention relating to the lease of Cyprus was signed with the Porte. When, a month later, the Berlin Congress was called together, such was the suspicion with which the plenipotentiaries regarded each other that each ambassador was obliged, before entering the Congress, to affirm that he was not bound by any secret engagement with the Porte. Disraeli and Salisbury both gave the required declaration. "It must be remembered," says Mr. Blunt indulgently, "that both were new to diplomacy." A few weeks later the Globe published the text of the Cyprus Convention, bought by that journal from one Marvin, an Oriental scholar, who had been imprudently employed as translator of the Turkish text. In London the authenticity of the document was denied, but the truth had to come out at Berlin. The discovery almost broke up the Congress. Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian representative, and M. Waddington, the Ambassador of France, both announced that they would withdraw at once from the sittings, and Waddington literally packed his trunks. It needed the cynical good offices of Bismarck to reconcile the English and the French plenipotentiaries.[2] There were two very significant points on which agreement was reached:
1. "That as a compensation to France for England's acquisition of Cyprus, France should be allowed on the first convenient opportunity, and without opposition from England, to occupy Tunis."
2. "That in the financial arrangements being made in Egypt, France should march pari passu with England."
This was the source of the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt.
Sir Rivers Wilson, who was then acting in Egypt as English Commissioner, received instructions to see that France should be equally represented with England in all financial appointments made in connection with his inquiry. Wilson's appointment as English Commissioner on the nominally International Commission of Inquiry was almost the first signed by Lord Salisbury on taking over the Foreign Office from Lord Derby. He was a man from whom much was expected. In 1878 he was appointed Finance Minister in Egypt. His predecessor, Ismail Sadyk, had been treacherously murdered by the Khedive Ismail, but this fact did not dash his confidence. He had great faith in Nubar, Ismail's Prime Minister. His French education would, he thought, enable him to preserve the Anglo-French character of the Ministry. He also had behind him the full interest and power of the house of Rothschild, whom he had persuaded to advance the loan of nine millions, known as the Kedival Domains Loan. But his brief career as Finance Minister (the Nubar Ministry was overthrown in the February of 1879) was a failure. It is the opinion of Mr. Blunt, and no one would have been more likely to know the true state of affairs, that the Khedive himself intrigued against him and that the internal policy of the country was entirely in the hands of Nubar, who, as a Christian, was at a disadvantage in governing a Mohammedan country, and in whose political value Wilson seems to have been greatly mistaken. The loan which he had negotiated did not relieve the taxpayer, but went in paying the more immediately urgent calls. His suggestion of a scheme which would have involved the confiscation by the Government of landed property to the value of fifteen millions disturbed the minds of the land-owners, and the mistakes of the Ministry reached their climax when the native army, including 2500 officers, was disbanded without receiving their arrears of pay.
The fall of Nubar was brought about by the émeute of February, 1879, skilfully engineered by the Khedive, and Sir Rivers's position as Finance Minister became very difficult. The Consul-General Vivian (afterwards Lord Vivian) was a personal enemy of his and refrained from smoothing his path, and when, in March, the crafty Ismail arranged a little incident at Alexandria similar to that of February, the Foreign Office, instead of backing his demand for redress, advised him to resign, which he accordingly did. Soon, however, he was able to take a crushing revenge on the perfidious Ismail. On his return from Egypt he went straight to the Rothschilds and explained to them that their money was in great danger, as the Khedive intended to repudiate the debt, sheltering himself behind the excuse of constitutional government. The Rothschilds brought financial pressure to bear first on Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Their efforts in these quarters being in vain, they applied to Bismarck, who was, perhaps, not sorry to have an excuse to state the intention of the German Government to intervene in the bondholders' interests in case the French and English Governments were unable to do so. German intervention would have been a quite unendurable solution, and the Sultan was at once approached from London and Paris and begged to depose his vassal. European pressure was too much for him, and, in spite of the many millions which he had paid in bribery to the Porte, Ismail received a curt notice from Sir Frank Lascelles, then acting English diplomatic agent in Egypt, that a telegram had reached him from the Sultan announcing that his viceregal duties had passed to his son Tewfik. Ismail cleared the treasury of its current account and retired with a final spoil of some three millions sterling. No one hindered his departure.
For a few months after Mr. Gladstone formed his second administration things seemed to have quieted down in Egypt. The new Khedive was a weak character and the country was practically governed by French and English Ministers in the Cabinet. Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) and M. de Blaquières worked together in perfect harmony. Sir Evelyn Baring had originally come to Egypt as Commissioner of the Debt, and had worked so successfully towards a new settlement that when the question of the appointment of an English controller to advise the Khedive's Ministers arose, he was the person naturally indicated for the post. "Thus," as he says, "the various essential parts of the State machine were adjusted. A new Khedive ruled. The relations between the Khedive and his Ministers were placed on a satisfactory footing. A Prime Minister (Riaz Pasha) had been nominated who had taken an active part in opposing the abuses prevalent during the reign of Ismail Pasha. The relations between the Sultan and the Khedive had been regulated in such a way as to ensure the latter against any excessive degree of Turkish interference. The system which had been devised for associating Europeans with the Government held out good promise of success, inasmuch as it was in accordance with the Khedive's own views. Lastly, an International Commission had been created with full powers to arrange matters between the Egyptian Government and their creditors."[3] But, suddenly, as it seemed to those who had not been watching events on the spot, across this peaceful sky flashed the red meteor of rebellion, massacre, and arson.
It is no easy matter to estimate the character of Arabi Pasha. He seems, from even so friendly an account as that of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, not to have been particularly intelligent or particularly brave. It appears likely that he, at least, connived at the burning and loot of Alexandria. All this, however, would not have prevented his being a true patriot according to his lights. As Mr. Herbert Paul observes: "How far Arabi was a mutinous soldier guided by personal ambition and how far he was an enthusiastic patriot burning to free his country from a foreign yoke, would admit of an easier answer if one alternative excluded the other."[4] One thing, however, is certain. The movement he led was far more than the merely military revolt which Mr. Gladstone and everyone in England at first thought it; it was in fact a genuine Nationalist movement directed rather against the alien Turk than against the alien Englishman. That the truth of this is now generally admitted is principally due to Mr. Blunt and in a lesser degree to Mr. Labouchere and the group of extreme Radicals of which he was already beginning to be the unofficial leader in Parliament. During the spring and summer of 1882, Mr. Labouchere's first observations in the House of Commons on Egyptian affairs were of a thoroughly orthodox nature. On May 12 we find him asking the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles Dilke) "whether any steps are being taken by Her Majesty's Government in view of the critical state of affairs in Egypt to maintain our influence in that country."[5] On July 27 he replies in a vein at once serious and sarcastic to Mr. McCarthy, who had made a speech in Arabi's favour. He thought that Mr. McCarthy had drawn on his imagination for the character of Arabi Pasha. They knew perfectly well that the most eminent men in the world were frequently great patriots; and they also knew that military adventurers always called themselves patriots in order to advance their own ends. They knew little of the career of Arabi Pasha, but they did know that he had designedly massacred Europeans in Alexandria, and had deliberately burnt down one of the noblest cities of his native land. What would be the effect of the vote[6] they proposed to give if it were successful? The English nation would have to withdraw entirely from their present position in Egypt, and the result would be that we should have behaved in a contemptible manner in the face of Europe. India would not be worth one year's purchase. He was not a great believer in prestige; but if we were to retire after our men had been massacred our Empire in the East would not be worth a year's purchase. This speech, occupying eight columns of Hansard, aims at cutting away the relations between England and Turkey (which shows that even at so early a date Mr. Labouchere realised something of the true nature of the grievance of the Egyptian Nationalists) and upholding British intervention.[7] Labby among the prophets indeed!
After the retirement of Arabi from Alexandria, he issued a proclamation stating that "irreconcilable war existed between the Egyptians and the English, and all those who proved traitors to their country would not only be subjected to the severest penalty in accordance with martial law, but would be for ever accursed in the next world." Three more towns were plundered and the European inhabitants massacred. British public opinion was now thoroughly aroused, and probably no Government could have stayed in power without taking some overt action. The action taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government was very definite. On July 22 the Prime Minister obtained, by a majority of 275 to 19, a vote of £2,300,000. A force of 6000 men was sent to Egypt from India; 15,000 men were despatched to Cyprus and Malta. Sir Garnet (afterwards Viscount) Wolseley was placed in command in Egypt, "in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and the existing international engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that country."
The French Government, while declining to co-operate with the British troops, assured Lord Granville of their moral support. In the month of September the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, in which the Egyptian army was completely routed, was fought. By this event British intervention was justified in the eyes of the world, and what became in the long run hardly distinguishable from British rule was established on the banks of the Nile. It was the battle of Tel-el-Kebir that convinced Mr. Labouchere of what would be, and in fact what came to be, the end of the course on which the Government was embarked, for he very soon sold his Egyptian shares. "They fell off his back like Christian's burden in Pilgrim's Progress, and Labby became an honest politician," said Mr. Wilfrid Blunt to me. The following letter to Sir Charles Dilke very clearly expresses his new views on Egyptian policy:
REFORM CLUB, October 10, 1882.
DEAR DILKE,—The great ones of the earth who, like you, live in Government Offices, never really understand the bent of public opinion. This is probably a dispensation of Providence by means of which Ministers are not eternal.
Personally, I should be glad to see the Liberal Party, after passing a Franchise Bill, sent about their business, and the country divided between Conservatives and Radicals. I speak, therefore, from the Radical standpoint, and viewing the matter from that point, I see that the dissatisfaction against your Egyptian policy is growing.
Arabi (like most patriots) was "on the make." His force consisted in siding with the Notables in their legitimate demands.
Now that the war is over, it is really impossible for Radicals to accept a policy based upon administering Egypt, partly for the good of its inhabitants, but mainly for the good of the bond-holders. I am a bondholder, so it cannot be said that I am personally prejudiced against such a policy. But I am sure that it will not go down, and indeed that our whole course of action has been so tainted with it, that there will be great disaffection in the Radical ranks throughout the country unless the tree be now made to bend the other way.
You are now the man in possession in Egypt, so you can make terms with Europe. I would therefore humbly suggest that you should, after insisting upon an amnesty, call together the Notables and hand the country over to them, stipulating alone that there should be Ministerial responsibility, and the control of the purse. The International Obligation of Egypt to pay its bondholders was bon à professer, when the Expedition had to be defended, but it is in reality a pure fiction. Moreover, if it were not, we cannot decently join in a holy alliance to maintain Khedives, and to deprive nations of what is the very basis of representative government.
Having handed Egypt over to the Notables, you can then go before Europe with a clean bill of health—propose that the connection of the country with Turkey shall be a purely nominal one and that, henceforward, no European power shall directly or indirectly interfere with its internal affairs.
At the same time, you ought to take advantage of your being in Egypt to establish yourself in some vantage post on the Suez Canal. This once done, Egypt separated from Turkey, and all European powers warned off, we remain in reality absolute masters of the position. Very probably the Egyptians will make a muddle of these finances, but this will no more affect us than the mistakes of Spanish finances affect our tenure of Gibraltar.
Controllers, a swarm of foreign bureaucrats, European administrators, Khedives ruling against the wishes of their subjects, an English army of occupation or an army commanded by my esteemed friend, Baker, composed of black ex-slaves, Ottoman cut-throats, and Swiss cowboys, are abominations, only equal to that of concerning ourselves with the payment of interest on a public debt. To attempt these things will be to keep open a perpetual Radical sore, and in the end will only land us in another expedition.
Pray excuse the observations of a humble admirer. The Jingoes, it is true, are not so hostile as they were, but you do not suppose that they would vote for the present Government, whilst on the other hand the Radicals will sulk and not vote so long as Radical principles are ignored in Egypt. Government has not yet announced its policy, so at present no great harm is done, but the appointment of Baker, the handing over of Arabi to the Khedive, the reign of Generals and diplomatists, the absence of any appearance of consulting the Egyptians, and various other similar things are producing distrust. You will say, "What can a fellah know of politics?" To this I can only answer, "What does a Wiltshire peasant know about them?"—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Labouchere soon began to put forward his reformed views in Parliament. On October 30 we find him asking Sir Charles Dilke whether "Her Majesty's Government is a party to any treaty, alliance, or compact with any foreign power which would oblige it to prevent the Egyptians from exercising that control over their taxation, expenditure, and administration which is enjoyed by the inhabitants of the independent or semi-independent States which formerly were integral parts of the Ottoman Empire,"[8] and demanding information as to the cruelty and insults to which it was alleged the Egyptian prisoners had been subjected. Mr. Labouchere wrote a long article in Truth under the heading: "Egypt was glad when they departed" (Psalm cv., 38), the following extracts from which put the situation very clearly as he conceived it.
"That a small body of English troops should remain for a brief time in Egypt at the expense of that country is, perhaps, a necessity of the position. But what I contend is, that during their stay the Notables ought to be called together, that every place of emolument ought to be filled up by an Egyptian, that the bag and baggage policy ought to be adopted towards the Turkish officials, who are as objectionable to the natives as were the Turkish officials to the Bulgarians, and that a free constitutional government ought to be established, based on the two corner stones of all constitutional liberty—Ministerial responsibility and the right of taxpayers over the purse. In order to carry out this programme—distasteful alike to professional diplomatists and to professional soldiers—we ought at once to send to Egypt a stalwart and experienced Liberal, who has graduated in the school of Parliamentary Government, and not in those of the Horse Guards, of the Foreign Office, or of the India Office. Looking round, I see no man better able to fill the post than Mr. Shaw Lefevre. He is able, he is a skilled and successful administrator, he is untainted with the creed that all Orientals are made to be bondsmen for Europeans, and his political principles are exceptionally sound.
What our diplomacy has to do is, to discover some means to render the high road to India through the Canal secure. Obviously we cannot do in this matter precisely as we should like, which would be to say that in time of peace all war vessels may pass through the Canal, and in time of war only ours. I hardly see how we can go beyond making the passage neutral in times of peace, and excluding from it in times of war the ships of belligerents. If Egypt were left to herself, I believe that she could very safely be left in charge of the Canal. Her people would be glad to be clear of all European complications, and, in case of war, she would occupy Port Said, and notify belligerents that their ships would not be allowed to pass."
On the question of India he expressed himself thus:
I am not at all of the "Perish India" school of politics. If it could be proved that our Empire would perish if we did not establish ourselves in Egypt, I am by no means certain but what I should be in favour of our establishment. But I am a believer not only in the justice, but in the expediency of an alliance with the people of a country, and not with its ruler against the people. Any intermixture in the internal affairs of Egypt on our part is not only opposed to Liberal principles, but opposed to English interests. To what has it already led? To a most costly military expedition; to our being arrayed against rights without which there can be no true liberty or sound government; to the slaughter of Englishmen and Egyptians with all the "pomp and pride of glorious war"; and lastly to our soldiers acting as retrievers, to hunt down and hand over to punishment to an Ottoman potentate, men many of whom—whether they were ambitious and whether they were ill-advised—had unquestionably a perfect right to fight in support of the principle that the only authority of their nation ought to be its representatives.[9]
A correspondent at once asked him: "How is it that you were in favour of the control and in favour of the Expedition, and yet now tell your readers that the control ought to cease, and that having by means of the Expedition established a firm foothold in Egypt, our next step ought to be to evacuate the country?" The following number of Truth delivered itself in reply as follows:
The Control, when first established, simply meant that Egypt should go into liquidation, and pay so much in the pound to its creditors, a couple of European controllers with half a dozen clerks, being appointed by the Egyptian Government to receive the composition from the Egyptian Treasury, and to hand it over to the various classes of bondholders. To this there could have been no sort of objection; but, little by little, this simple and semi-private arrangement was converted into a so-called international obligation on the part of the Egyptians to remain eternally divested from all control over their own expenditure, and to allow their entire financial administration to be placed in the hands of about 1300 Europeans, with salaries amounting to nearly £400,000 per annum, whilst the Controllers themselves had seats in the Cabinet, with a veto upon everything proposed by their Egyptian colleagues. France and England were the executive officers of this scheme. If the Egyptian officers had assented to it, nothing further was to be said, except that they were singularly and curiously wanting in patriotism. However we find now that they did not, and that we have been under an illusion. The Notables and the entire country were—to their credit be it said—opposed to it. Arabi took advantage of this feeling. He sided with the country, and at the same time made his bargain. "I," he practically said to the Notables, "support you in your rights; as a quid pro quo you must support me in what I am pleased to call the rights of the army—that is to say, that it shall be increased by 18,000 men." Without the army the Notables were powerless; they accordingly accepted the terms. We therefore find ourselves in the position that we were fully justified in asserting that Arabi was a self-seeking military adventurer, but that he was also the exponent of the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people. The Control had become political—it was no longer a reasonable financial arrangement, but an unreasonable and improper attempt to deprive the Egyptians of their rights, in order to secure high salaries for a swarm of European locusts, and certainty of interest to European bond-holders. Those, therefore, who had regarded it in its natural original conception, as fair and useful, have a perfect right to assert that this original conception had been so perverted that it had become a monstrous instrument for the suppression of all national vitality.
We, however, were tied to France. If we had not interfered, France probably would have done so. Moreover, we foolishly had pledged ourselves to maintain the Khedive in his position. The only way, therefore, to get out of the complication was to cut the Gordian knot; but, in order to do this, we were necessarily obliged to adopt the theory that Arabi was a mere military adventurer, who was attempting for his own ends to coerce not only the Khedive but the Egyptian people.
Our expedition, as was to be anticipated, has proved successful. Our troops hold Egypt. What then ought we to do? Obviously to hand it over to the Notables, who are the representatives of the Egyptian people, and to inform these Notables that we have no intention of repeating our previous error, but that, experience having shown us the fatal results of allowing ourselves little by little to be dragged into an attempt to manage other people's finances with a view to public creditors being paid interest, we shall leave Egypt and Egypt's creditors to settle their conflicting interests as they best please. This is the logical consequence of our having acted upon the assumption that Arabi was terrorising the Egyptians....
It is evident to me, therefore, that the only policy which an English Liberal Ministry can adopt is to go before Europe with a proposal to make Egypt an Eastern Belgium, and to base our suggestion upon our own renunciation of interference in its internal affairs. I hear it said that the Liberal party is popular owing to its successes in Egypt. It may, perhaps, be for the nonce popular—or, to put it more correctly, not quite so unpopular—as it was with Jingoes, but these same Jingoes will not cease to vote for Conservatives....
How then about the Canal? Well, I should base my policy upon that pursued in like cases by the United States. I should explain to Europe that the Canal is the connecting link between Great Britain and India, and that consequently the exigencies of geography and an enlightened self-interest render it absolutely necessary for us to be paramount there. There might be a little grumbling, but no one would go to war to hinder this, because its plain common-sense would be too obvious.[10]
In the meantime Arabi was lying in prison at Cairo awaiting his trial, and Mr. Labouchere took up his case energetically in the House of Commons. A military tribunal was to be charged with the trial, and it was no secret that the Khedive was determined that the death penalty should be inflicted on the heads of the rebellion. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt wrote, on September 1, a long letter to Mr. Gladstone, stating his intention of providing Arabi with an English counsel at his own expense and that of his friends, and hoping that "every facility will be afforded me and those with me in Egypt to prosecute our task." Mr. Gladstone, who was deeply hostile to Arabi, replied through his secretary, that "all that he can say at the present moment is that he will bring your request before Lord Granville, with whom he will consult, but that he cannot hold out any assurance that it will be complied with."
Mr. Labouchere continued to enquire into the Government's intentions towards Arabi in the House of Commons. A timely question on October 31 to Sir Charles Dilke secured the intervention of the press at the trial, and further questions on the following days forestalled the attempts of the Khedive to wriggle out of the conditions that Mr. Blunt's advocate had obtained from Mr. Gladstone. Arabi was, on December 4, condemned to death, and in spite of Mr. Gladstone's being at first inclined to let the law take its course, the sentence was commuted to banishment to Ceylon. Mr. Labouchere commented in Truth as follows: "The farce of the rebel's condemnation to exile with retention of his rank and with a handsome allowance, is a fitting conclusion to the trial. I see it stated that Arabi will be invited to take up his residence in this or that portion of British territory. It need hardly be said that he may reside in any part of the world, outside Egypt, that he pleases. There is no existing law which enables us to detain an Egyptian in deference to the wishes of an Egyptian Khedive; and it is not likely that we shall ever consent to convert any portion of our territory into an international gaol, where all who are in disfavour with foreign rulers are to be deported, and restrained in their liberty."[11]
When Parliament met after Christmas, Mr. Labouchere seconded Sir Wilfrid Lawson's amendment to the Reply to the Speech from the Throne to the effect that no sufficient reason had been shown for the employment of British forces in reconstituting the Government of Egypt. It was certain, he said, that Arabi was supported by the entire Egyptian nation. He could quite understand why the Opposition did not challenge the policy of the Government. The Government were practically dragged into the war by the acts of the Opposition when in power. Anyone who read the Blue Books must see that. A great many Liberals and all the Radicals in the country regretted the Government plunging into the war. There could be no doubt that it was entered into for the sake of the bondholders and for that reason only. We were going to place the Egyptian army under an English General and a financier at the side of the Khedive, and then tell Europe that the Khedive was an independent ruler and that we had nothing to do with the Government of Egypt. Why were we there? For the single object of collecting the debts of the bondholders.[12]
He wrote to Mr. Chamberlain on January 9, 1883:
You people do not seem to have a very clear policy in Egypt. I cannot understand why you do not settle the French by adopting the line of "Egypt for the Egyptians" and convert the country into a sort of Belgium. If you can establish the principle that no one is to interfere, you have got all that you want. To do this only two things are necessary:
1. Fair Courts of Justice where "meum and tuum" is recognised.
2. A Representative Assembly with a right to vote the Budget.
As regards the debt there are three loans, secured by special mortgages; two on land, and one on the railroads. Let the mortgagees take these securities, when the loans would be converted into companies, and the interest on them not be dependent upon any political arrangement. Rothschild has always told me that the domains, on which his loan of £400,000,000 is secured, are worth £400,500,000. By handing over to him the security, £500,000 would therefore be obtained.
As regards the General Debt (the United), it is a swindle, but without going into this it might be regarded as the general debt of the country, and the Egyptians, like any other nation, would be left to pay or not as they pleased.
The main swindle of the Goschen-Rivers-Wilson scheme was that the fellahs had paid £17,000,000 to free the land from a portion of the land tax after 1886. The law which partially liberated the land was abrogated, and, instead of the fellahs being treated like bondholders, although they had paid cash, whereas the latter had really paid about 20% on the value of the bonds, they were told that as a quid pro quo they would receive 1% on their £17,000,000 for fifty years. The Canal question is nonsense. If we hold the Red Sea we hold the Canal, in the sense that we can stop all traffic. If we are at war with a maritime power, either we should have the command of the Mediterranean or we should not. In the latter case, we should still by our hold on the Red Sea be able to close the Canal; in the former case we should be able not only to close it to others, but to use it for our own powers. Protocols and treaties are waste paper, they never hold against the exigencies of a belligerent; and, if we were at war with one maritime power, we should not have the others interfering to maintain our treaty rights, for, differing on many things, all continental powers regard us as the bullies of the ocean. An English garrison at Port Said is a reality; as we are not likely to have one there, our best plan is to leave things alone, and, in the event of a serious maritime war, at once to occupy Port Said.
The interests of the Egyptian exiles also claimed Mr. Labouchere's attention. We find him in March putting searching questions as to their precise legal status, demanding satisfactory evidence of their support being adequately provided for, and enquiring why the Egyptian Government had unlawfully deprived Arabi of his title of Pasha.
In the debate of March 2 on a supplementary estimate of £728,000 "for additional expenditure for army services consequent on the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Egypt," he spoke with his accustomed frankness. He would like to know where the money was to come from. He had seen it stated in the papers and other organs that it was to be raised by an increase on the Income Tax. For his part, he should like to see it raised in one of two ways—one, by raising it from the landed interest—or, since he was afraid the Government would not accept that plan—in default, by a general tax on every individual in the country poor or rich. Let every one of those shrieking Jingoes who went out calling on the Government to go to war, now here and now there, understand that they would have to pay for the cost of those wars. Then he thought they would be less inclined than now to advance the Jingo policy which he was sorry to see had been adopted by the Government, and which they had inherited from gentlemen on the other side of the House. He believed that the war had been a mistake all through. If we went to Egypt at all we ought to have installed Arabi instead of the Khedive. He believed that as long as British troops supported the Khedive and supported him against his own subjects, England was absolutely responsible for what was going on in Egypt. No doubt Lord Dufferin did his best to procure trustworthy information, but he was necessarily very much in the hands of the Europeans and of the Ministers and friends of the Khedive. He did not gather from the dispatches that Lord Dufferin had consulted the people of Egypt. Sir George Campbell, the member for Kirkcaldy, said that he had read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested Lord Dufferin's scheme of government. For his own part, although he had read, marked, and learned it to a certain degree he could not digest it because it was objectionable to a Radical stomach. Lord Dufferin's scheme was a perfect sham of constitutional government. If any species of representative government were established in Egypt it must be based on control of the purse. But when anything was said to the noble Lord, the Under-secretary, on this subject, he vaguely alluded to representative government and international obligations. Was Lord Dufferin prevented from doing what he thought desirable for the country by any obligations which the Egyptians were supposed to be under to pay the interest on their debt? If there was any obligation on their part it was not our business to go there to carry it out.... He denied that the people of Egypt were bound by any such thing, but, supposing they were, it was not England's business to deprive them of the most elementary and necessary basis of representative government—the government of the purse.[13]
On June 11, he proposed the reduction of Lord Wolseley's grant from £30,000 to £12,000. What, he said, had Lord Wolseley done in Egypt? He went to Ismailia and from thence marched his men to Cairo. He took the straight road, and on the road he found a lot of miserable Arabs entrenched; he advanced and the Arabs marched away. That was the whole history of the exploit in Egypt.[14]
Lord Dufferin left Egypt in May, 1883, He was pleased with the success of his mission. To use his own words—"the fellah like his own Memnon had not remained irresponsive to the beams of the new dawn." He left Sir Edward Malet as Consul-General, and resumed his normal functions at Constantinople. He departed under a shower of compliments, and he left Egypt apparently prosperous. Arabi was an exile in Ceylon. Sherif Pasha was the Khedive's loyal and obedient Minister. Sir Archibald Alison was in command of the British garrison. The Egyptian army, about six thousand in number, was under the fostering care of Sir Evelyn Wood. Colonel Scott-Moncrieff directed the work of irrigation, and another Briton, Sir Benson Maxwell, superintended the native tribunals. Hitherto the British Government had made no mistakes, and Egypt had reaped only benefit from the intrusion of the foreigner. The false position in which England stood with full authority, ample power, and no legal right, had not yet led to any consequences of a serious and practical kind.[15]