Danger, was, however, creeping up to Egypt from the south. A vast, vaguely limited country, extending from Assouan to the Equator, and known as the Soudan, had been claimed as Egyptian territory by Ismail, who had appointed the famous Gordon Governor-General. On Ismail's fall in '79, Gordon was recalled and the Soudan fell a prey to local bandits. The reconstituted Egyptian Government was incapable of interference, and towards the end of '82 a Mussulman, Mohamed Ahmed, raised the standard of religious reform and rebellion against the distant and incapable Egyptian authorities. The Mahdi, or Messiah, as he called himself, took El Obeid and made himself master of Kordofan by the end of January, '83. In the summer of the same year seven thousand Egyptian troops, under the command of Hicks Pasha, a retired officer of the Indian army, who had entered the service of the Khedive, were dispatched against him by the Egyptian Government. Granville was careful to formally disengage the responsibility of the English Cabinet in this measure. It is certain, however, that he could have prevented this action of the Khedive's Ministers, and, as he was perfectly well aware through the information of Colonel Stewart, who had been associated with Gordon's administration, of the utter impossibility of Hicks's task, it is difficult to acquit him of moral responsibility. "The faith in the power of phrases to alter facts," says Lord Milner in his England in Egypt, "has never been more strangely manifested than in this idea, that we could shake off our virtual responsibility for the policy of Egypt in the Soudan by a formal disclaimer." On November 5, the Egyptian force was cut to pieces near Shekan, about two days' journey from El Obeid, by the Mahdi at the head of forty thousand men, and Hicks and his staff died fighting at hopeless odds. On the advice of Sir Evelyn Baring, who had just arrived in Egypt from India, where he had filled the post of Financial Minister to Lord Ripon's Government, the English Cabinet recognised at last their responsibility. It was decided that the Soudan must be abandoned and that the Mahdi must be induced to allow the Egyptian garrisons, amounting to about forty thousand men, still remaining there, to retire.
Mr. Labouchere wrote to Mr. Chamberlain as follows on December 15, 1883: "I hope that we are not going to undertake the reconquest of the Soudan. The difficult position in which we are comes from not having broken entirely with the Conservative policy in Egypt. They might have annexed the country: we cannot, so we give advice which is not taken, try to tinker up an impossible financial situation, and make ourselves responsible for every folly committed by a gang of corrupt and silly Pashas. The result is that we are now told that we have a new frontier somewhere in the direction of the Equator, and that our honour is concerned, etc., etc. If the French are so foolish as to wish to acquire influence in the Soudan, I cannot conceive why we should seek to acquire it in order to prevent them. I believe that the Khedive and his friends are delighted at what has occurred, because they hope that our evacuation will be put off; so long as we retain one soldier there, or indeed assume the part of bailiffs for the locusts who make money out of the country, something will always occur to force us to remain."
Mr. Chamberlain replied on December 18: "I do not think there is the slightest intention of engaging in any operations in the Soudan. The utmost we are likely to do is to undertake the defence of Egypt proper, and I hope there is no fear of that being attacked. I wish we could get out of the whole business, but I have always thought that, at the time we interfered, we really had no possible alternative. I am not Christian enough to turn the other cheek after one has been slapped, and we had unfortunately put ourselves in a position in which the first slap had already been administered. It is, however, a warning and a lesson to look a little more closely into the beginnings of things."
On the 20th Labouchere wrote again to Mr. Chamberlain: "From all I hear, matters are in a mess in Egypt. Tewfik is a weak creature, and he and his entourage intrigue against us, and yet intrigue to keep us there, as they are afraid of what may happen when we go. If the fellahs have any opinion, it is dislike of Tewfik as the puppet of 'foreigners.' The Mahdi will never attack Egypt proper, which is the valley of the Nile and the Delta. If we send more troops there, it will be the more difficult to evacuate. As long as we retain a corporal's guard, it will be the object of Tewfik and all the locusts to get up disturbances in order to compromise us. Surely it would be easy to come to an arrangement by which Egypt would be neutralised and left to itself: the reply always is that interest of the debt would not be paid and that, in consequence of the Law of Liquidation, some Power would interfere for the benefit of its Egyptian bondholders. But these worthy people must be comparatively few in numbers, and except as a pretext, no Power would think of taking up the cudgels for them, any more than they did for Peruvian bondholders. The whole thing is a mere bugbear. Even if France did go there we should not suffer." To which Mr. Chamberlain replied on December 22: "I think I agree with you on all points of Egyptian policy, but my hands are so full just now that I have to let foreign affairs work themselves out, and to content myself with occasionally giving a push in the right direction."
Public opinion in England was deeply stirred by the disaster at Shekan, and one of those popular cries that are so often and so disastrously interpreted as heavenly voices went up all over the land. The nation called for Gordon. The question of Gordon's mission has been exhaustively discussed from every point of view. The responsibility for his failure and tragic death is apportioned by Lord Cromer between Gordon himself and the Government who overruled his (Cromer's) objection to employing him, and went on to make every mistake they could. Gordon misinterpreted his orders, and the Government was then made responsible for the consequences of a policy of which they had never dreamt. He thus placed himself in a situation from which it was impossible to extricate him in time. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, on the other hand, places the responsibility of the tragedy principally at the door of Cromer. I am not here concerned with this delicate controversy. Of this at least there is no doubt, Gordon's mission was understood by the country and Parliament to be of a purely peaceful nature. Its avowed object was one which approved itself to Liberal ideas, i.e. the disengaging of British responsibility from a purely Egyptian matter and the rescue of the Egyptian garrisons. Radicals understood that these purposes were to be achieved by purely peaceful means. The Mahdi was presumably to be approached by recognised methods of negotiation. It is well known that when Gordon got to Khartoum, these instructions went by the board. He had been nominated, while on his way, at Cairo, Governor-General of the Soudan, and the Government left, by means of supplementary clauses in their instructions, a considerable latitude to Baring under whose orders, at his (Baring's) request, Gordon was placed. Lord Cromer has told the world in his Modern Egypt of the difficulties of the situation. Gordon was a mystic and suffered chronically from "inspirations," which changed a dozen times a day. He does not seem to have made any attempt to carry out his mission by diplomatic methods. He soon came to conceive of that mission as a sort of rival "Mahdism." He became the Angel of the Lord fighting with Apollyon. All this must have been inexpressibly disconcerting to the prudent homme d'affaires at Cairo, and no less so to his nominal superior in Downing Street.
Mr. Labouchere's attitude in the matter was simple and consistent. On February 14, four days before Gordon started, the Opposition moved a vote of censure on the Government in consequence of the Hicks disaster, and were supported by several Radical members. Sir Wilfrid Lawson was supported by Mr. Labouchere in an amendment to Sir Stafford Northcote's motion: "That this House, whilst declining at present to express an opinion on the Egyptian policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued during the last two years with the support of the House, trusts that in future British forces may not be employed for the purpose of interfering with the Egyptian people in their selection of their own Government."[16] On February 25, by which time news of the conquest of Tokar by Osman Digna, the ablest of the Mahdi's lieutenants, had reached England, Mr. Labouchere asked the Secretary for War whether it was within the discretion of General Graham to advance beyond Suakim against Osman Digna. Hartington replied oracularly that that appeared to him a question highly undesirable to answer and that the general object of Graham's instructions had been already stated to the House.
Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's Diary for April 4, 1884, records the following conversation with Mr. Labouchere: "Lunched with Labouchere. He is more practical, and we have discussed every detail of the policy to be suggested to Gladstone. He will feel the ground through Herbert Gladstone, which is his way of consulting the oracle. He told me the history of Gordon's mission. Gordon's idea had been to go out and make friends with the Mahdi, and to have absolutely nothing to do with Baring or the Khedive, or with anybody in Egypt. He was going to Suakim straight, where he counted upon one of the neighbouring Sheiks, whose sons' lives he had saved or spared, and his mission was to be one entirely of peace. But the Foreign Office and Baring caught hold of him as he passed through Egypt, and made him stop to see the Khedive, and so he was befooled into going to Khartoum as the Khedive's lieutenant. Now he had failed altogether in his mission of peace, and the Government had recalled him more than once in the last few days, but he had refused to come back. Gladstone had decided absolutely to recall all the troops in Egypt when Hicks' defeat was heard of, and was in a great rage. The expedition to Suakim had been forced upon him by the Cabinet, and Hartington had taken care to give Graham no special instructions, so that he might fight without orders. This Graham, of course, had done, and Gladstone, more angry still, had gone down to sulk at Coombe. Now he would stand it no longer, and he had let Hartington in by the speech he had made last night. Nobody expected it. Labouchere thought the moment most favourable for a new move."[17] And on May 19 Mr. Labouchere asked in the House: "Whether, for the satisfaction of those who believe that it has never been brought to the knowledge of the Mahdi and of the Soudanese who are engaged in military operations what the object of the mission of General Gordon is, he will consider the feasibility of conveying to them that Her Majesty's Government, in sending an English General to the Soudan, only desired to effect by peaceful means the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, employés, and other foreigners who many wish to leave the country, and whether he will take steps to enter into diplomatic relations with the Mahdi, or whomsoever else may be the governing power in the Soudan, in order to prevent if possible all further effusion of blood, to establish a fixed frontier between Egypt and the Soudan, and to effect an arrangement by which General Gordon and those who may wish to accompany him will be enabled peaceably to withdraw from the Soudan."[18] Mr. Gladstone replied to Mr. Labouchere's question, finishing his remarks with these words: "Whatever measures the Government take will be in the direction indicated by the question—to make effective arrangements with regard to putting all the difficulties at an end."
Mr. Labouchere, to whom, as a Radical and a Nationalist, the position of the Mahdi appealed, did not confine himself to work in Parliament. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt was attempting to negotiate with Mr. Gladstone to stop the war, which had followed Gordon's death, and had taken Mr. Labouchere into his confidence. Mr. Labouchere wrote to Mr. Blunt on February 20, 1885, as follows:
DEAR BLUNT,—I had a talk with H(erbert) G(ladstone) last night. He wants to know what evidence can be given—that the man who came to me was Arabi's Minister of Police at Cairo, and what was his name—and that the Mahdi's man is the Mahdi's man. It is clear that so far he is right. If the latter has no credentials he should get them. Let us assume that he either has them or can get them. Then there must be a basis of terms. I would suggest then that the Soudan, with the exception of the Port of Suakim, be recognised as an independent state under, if wished, the suzerainty of the Sultan, and that all Egyptian Pashas who wish to leave it be allowed to leave it.
If the credentials hold water, and if these terms are agreed to, then the Mahdi's man should write them out and say that he will agree to them.
But it is very essential that nothing should be known about the matter. I should have to work others in the Cabinet, and, if necessary, to appeal to Parliament. Clearly we could not send a mission to the Mahdi, but if an agreement were come to, an emissary from the Mahdi and one from our Government might meet for details. What I want is to establish a discussion with the Mahdi—the rest would follow.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
P.S.—You see, if something is to be done to stop this war, we must leave the vague, and come to hard and fast facts.
In elucidation of the above letter Mr. Blunt writes to me on February 20, 1913: "The person referred to in your uncle's letter of February 20, 1885, is clearly Ismail Bey Jowdat, who acted as Prefect of Police at Cairo during the war of 1882.... Later he came to London in connection with negotiations I was attempting to get entered into by Gladstone with the Mahdi, through Sezzed Jamal ed Din, as to which I was in communication with your uncle.... I had, no doubt, sent Jowdat to your uncle, and, at one time, it seemed as if we were likely to succeed in getting a mission sent or negotiations of some kind entered into to stop the war.... Jowdat was never himself an agent of the Mahdi, but he was for the time with Jamal ed Din, who was in communication with Khartoum...."
Communication with the Mahdi was apparently not easy, for we find Mr. Labouchere writing again to Mr. Blunt the following month (March 4, 1885):
It appears to me that there will be a pause in our Soudan operations. It might therefore be desirable to take advantage of this in order to learn on what terms an agreement might be come to between us and the Soudanese. Those in Parliament who, like myself, see no reason why we should interfere in the internal affairs of that country would be greatly strengthened, were we to know the precise views of the Mahdi.
I would therefore suggest to you that, if possible, his agent should let us know definitely, and after conversation with the Mahdi, whether the latter would agree to the following terms:
1. The recognition on the part of England of the independence of the Soudan, and of the Mahdi as its ruler.
2. The Northern frontier of the Soudan to be drawn at or near Wady Halfa; the Eastern frontier to exclude Suakim and the coast.
3. The Mahdi to pledge himself not to molest any Soudanese who have taken our side, and to allow all who wish to leave the country to do so.
4. The Mahdi to receive a Consular and Diplomatic Agent at Khartoum; to allow all foreigners to carry on their business unmolested in the Soudan.
5. The establishment of some sort of Consular Courts.
6. If possible some clause with regard to the export of slaves forbidding it.
It is our object to meet the assertion of the Government that the Mahdi is a religious fanatic with whom it is impossible to treat, because he does not regard himself, alone, as the temporal ruler of the Soudan, but as a spiritual leader of Islam against Christianity—a species of Oriental Peter the Hermit. What we want to show is that he is the proper ruler of the Soudan, and that, whilst it will be open to any one outside that country to regard him as a prophet, he seeks to establish no temporal sway beyond the Soudan. If the Mahdi would declare his assent to the above terms, I am convinced that popular feeling here, and the real wishes of the members of the Government, would soon bring this war to a close, and that in a very short time we and the Mahdi would be the best of friends.
It seems unlikely that the terms laid down in this letter were suggested by Mr. Labouchere without consultation with Mr. Herbert Gladstone.
He missed no opportunity in Parliament of fighting the good fight of Radical principles. At one moment he is pointing out the two cardinal heresies in the policy of the Government—one political and the other financial: "The political heresy is that we insist on putting up the Khedive and maintaining him in power against his subjects. The result is that we are absolutely hated in Egypt, and wherever we are not hated we are regarded with contempt." The financial heresy is that "we always insist in our treatment of Egyptian finance that the payment of interest on the debt should come first, and the expenses of administration second. The result of this policy is over-taxation, the postponement of reform, and a deficit."[19] The policy of the Liberal Government was in reality, though not in profession, he asserted, Jingo policy, and the Radicals who had worked for Mr. Gladstone's return to power, relying on his Midlothian speeches, had been jockeyed. If only Mr. Gladstone would take his (Labouchere's) advice. No doubt the Prime Minister when thinking the matter over would say—Why did I not follow the member for Northampton? I should not have been in such a mess as I am now. For his own part Mr. Labouchere stood by the policy of the Midlothian campaign, when the Prime Minister denounced the Jingo policy of annexation and war. If any one had then said: "You will acquire power and become the most powerful Minister England has had for many a day; you will bombard Alexandria; you will massacre Egyptians at Tel-el-Kebir and Suakim, and you will go on a sort of wild-cat expedition into the wilds of Ethiopia in order to put down a prophet" the right honourable gentleman would have replied in the words of Hazael to the King of Syria—"Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?"[20]
This kind of sword-play went on day after day in the House, and it is impossible to doubt that, although Mr. Labouchere was unquestionably sincere in deploring the policy of the Government, he must have greatly enjoyed the opportunity which it afforded him of displaying his wit and humour. Mr. Gladstone did not always appreciate these qualities, and on one occasion, when Mr. Labouchere was attempting to divide the House against the Government, his object being, as he said, "not adverse to the Government, but to strengthen the good intentions of the Prime Minister in future," that much enduring statesman turned and solemnly rebuked him for making an "inopportune and superficial speech."[21]
The case against the Government from the Radical point of view was, of course, very obvious and easy to put, nor was there anything particularly original about Mr. Labouchere's arguments. He rang the changes incessantly on three points: the essential injustice of our position in Egypt towards the Egyptians—the underlying venality of the Government's position owing to their connection with the bondholders—and the monstrous expense to the British taxpayer of British military intervention. It was not the matter of his charges, but the manner in which he made them that delighted the House. Sometimes he would lay aside his dialectical weapons and let the facts speak for themselves. One day he asks the Secretary for War if his attention has been drawn to the following statements in the Times of May 7:
Daylight broke almost imperceptibly. We were nearer the village of Dhakool, when the friendly scouts came running in with the news that the inhabitants were at prayer, and that if we attacked at once we should catch them. General Graham pushed on with a troop of the Bengal Lancers.... The enemy fled on camels in all directions, and the Mounted Infantry and Camel corps, coming up, gave chase. Some two hundred attempted to stand, and showed a disposition to come at us, but evidently lost heart and disappeared, not before having at least twenty men killed.... It was curious to witness the desperate efforts of the enemy to drive their flocks up the steep mountain side, turning now and again to fire on the Bengal Lancers. The "Friendlies" tried to cut off the flocks, and succeeded in catching some thousands of animals.... The village was looted and burnt.... We also destroyed the well with gun-cotton.... But, for our being unaware of the existence of some narrow hillock walks up which the enemy retired, we might have exterminated them. Our loss has been hitherto only two Mounted Infantry men wounded.... We have done the enemy all the harm we could, thus fulfilling the primary object of war.
Lord Hartington could find nothing to say, but that such incidents were unfortunately inseparable from war.[22]
It may be doubted, however, whether Mr. Labouchere's advocacy did very much for his cause, or for his own reputation as a serious politician. The British public (and the House of Commons is a sort of microcosm of the British public) finds it hard to believe in sincerity accompanied by banter and persiflage. Not so are Englishmen wont to express their conscientious convictions. Mr. Labouchere was, of course, not an Englishman. He was a Frenchman and, as I have said before, in his mentality a lineal descendant of Voltaire. He could hardly hope to succeed where John Bright had failed.
That Mr. Labouchere's attitude on the subject of Egypt was appreciated by the Egyptians is proved by a perusal of the letters he received from Arabi in exile, long after the subject had ceased to be a stone on which the Radical axe could be ground. I append some of these, and another letter from Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt on the subject of the Exiles.
COLOMBO, September 15, 1891.
MY DEAR SIR,—I beg the liberty to trouble you with this in the hope of your being able to learn more of the state of our health than you have been hitherto. One of the most eminent medical practitioners in Ceylon, Dr. Vandort, left for England in the last week in the German mail steamship Preussen. I have asked him to call on you and Sir William Gregory and inform you of the actual state of such of us as he has attended on. By the death of Dr. White we lost our best evidence, and it pleased those in authority not to heed at all the opinion of our regular medical advisers and to rely on that of gentlemen who, whatever their high standing and attainments, had but one opportunity of seeing us. Had they questioned also those who attended on us and our families for years they might have been better able to form an opinion.
I am now suffering very much from my eyes, being scarcely able to read anything, and am waiting until an oculist from Madras could examine them and tell me what I may expect.
Pray forgive me for troubling with this letter. We have so few of your kind feelings and position to look up to—and if we are too importunate we would only beg to be pardoned.
In the hope that you are in the enjoyment of the blessing of health, and begging the kind acceptance of all respectful regards—I remain, yours most obediently,
A. ARABI, the Egyptian.
COLOMBO, December 9, 1891.
MY DEAR SIR,—I had the great pleasure to receive your kind letters of the 2d and 8th October, and should have replied earlier but for having had to communicate with my brethren in exile, and for there being time before the next meeting of Parliament. We beg your kindly acceptance of our grateful thanks.
We have been officially informed of the decision of H.M.'s Government on our memorial to Lord Salisbury, but for which we were prepared by yourself and Sir William Gregory; and also by Lord de la Warr, who very kindly sent to me copies of the papers (Egypt, No. 1, 1891), printed for both Houses of Parliament, in March last, and of his speeches and Lord Salisbury's reply in May and June last. I now send copies as requested of the medical certificates had by Toulba Pasha and the late Abdulal Pasha since the memorial, also the Colonial Secretary's letter to us and my reply. [All these were enclosed with this letter.]
You will permit me to ask your notice of Riaz Pasha's Memorandum of July 9, 1890, to the Foreign Office concluding with: "H.M's Government should in any case remember that the exiles were pardoned and allowances granted to them on the express condition that they should remain at some distant spot, such as the island of Ceylon." On this rather qualified assertion it would quite do to refer to Mr. Broadley's book How we Defended Arabi and his Friends, where the terms of the arrangement which put an end to the proceedings in connection with our "trial" will be found. Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier could not, as I cannot, in honour reveal more than they have done, but my steadfast friend, Mr. Blunt, was not so constrained to be reticent, and his communications to the Pall Mall Gazette showed what even the great noble-minded General Gordon believed the nature and extent of our exile to be.
We should not perhaps however complain of our not being permitted to end our days in the land of our birth, although what harm that, or our being in Cyprus, could now do I cannot conceive. That none of us have desired or sought in the least to be disloyal to our parole the testimony of Sir Arthur Gordon to our conduct should be sufficient. If all my correspondence, family and other, for the last nine years were read, or any of the hundreds of my visitors, from every part of the world, were questioned, nothing would there be to show the least wish to disturb or stay the progress of my loved native land since my poor efforts failed.
If you would kindly refer to Mr. Broadley's book you will find Lord Dufferin's scheme in 1883 for the reorganisation of my country, and my views on Egyptian reform in 1882. After nine years, when almost the whole of that scheme and so many of my humble views have been successfully carried out, is it possible that any one beyond my personal enemies in my own country could deem me capable of even dreaming of doing anything to see her in misery again? My greatest trust is yet what it was when I wrote to the Times from my prison in 1882: "I hope the people of England will complete the work which I commenced. If England accomplishes this task, and thus really gives Egypt to the Egyptians, she will then make clear to the world the real aim and object of Arabi the Rebel" (Mr. Broadley's book, p. 349). I cannot hope to see the time, but it must come under such auspices when Egypt will cease to be a "reproach to the nations," Islam although she be.
My fellow exiles and I have considered much on the subject of the parole you suggest in regard to Cyprus. Our simple parole was all that Lord Dufferin required of us when exiled. We gave it, and he was satisfied. We have honourably kept our word, and it is only now, when we find our place of sojourn proving so increasingly injurious to the health of most of us and our families, that we pray for a change to a more congenial climate. In every other respect we could not dream nor hope for a better home of exile. We leave everything to your judgment. If you think a repetition of our parole necessary, or of any use, we shall gladly give it again, although our first, religiously observed, has been so slighted; and we shall send it to you as soon as you may desire it. You have done much for us, and our return for it all could only be gratefully felt, not expressed; and you will permit us to leave it to you to do for us whatever more in your judgment may be expedient, and, whatever that may be, permit us to assure you of our fullest trust.
If any prospect of the change of residence we seek is hopeless, and Lord Salisbury should adhere to his wish to keep us here, I may but beg your best endeavour to obtain the increase of allowance I have applied for in my letter to the Colonial Secretary, to enable me to have the benefit of such change as the variable climate of this island could in some degree afford.
I had the pleasure last week of two kind visits by Mr. J. R. Cox, M.P., on his return home from Australia in the Orizaba. He mentioned your request and his promise to see me if he came to Colombo, and your desire that he should learn from me all I had to say; and he asked me to give him a statement, which I have done to the best of my ability both by word of mouth and in writing. He said he had been long away, and had not seen the papers Lord de la Warr sent me until then. I need not say how deeply gratifying it was to hear from him of your interest in us and of your exertions on our behalf, and of the wide feelings of sympathy you have raised for us.
You will forgive me for trespassing on your time and work with this long letter; and if I have been led to say anything that I have troubled your attention with before, I may only beg the extension of your indulgence for it. Placed as I am now, able to think only of the past, and with no hope for life's future on earth, and deprived more and more of my greatest solace, study, by the growing weakness of sight, I fear that my communications to you and to those who have likewise generously extended sympathy to us in our strait are of too melancholy a tinge. As any prospect of better days seems all but closed to us, we may but bow in humble resignation and submission to the Divine Will. When this letter comes to you it will be your great season of joy and peace. Permit me and my family to offer you our best regards and wishes for many a happy enjoyment together and return of the things to you and all dear to you.—And believe me, yours most gratefully and sincerely,
AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.
5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Feb. 1, 1893.
MY DEAR BLUNT,—Jingoism under Rosebery reigns supreme. I will, however, see if anything can be done about Arabi. Your details are very interesting respecting the late events in Egypt. Cannot the Khedive be induced to do this?: Get his Chamber to pass a resolution declaring that Egypt wishes for independence of all European intervention, and trusts that the British occupation will cease. If it did this we should be able to meet the persistent statements that the Fellaheen wants us and loves us. The Turkish Pashas might agree so as to spite us, but if once the country were left to itself, the Chamber could assert (?) itself.
It is difficult to say how long the Government will last. Probably through the session.—Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
[1] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt.
[2] I have taken this account of the Cyprus Convention and its results at the Berlin Congress from Mr. Blunt's Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt. He says in a footnote (op. cit., p. 277): "I have given the story of the arrangement made with Waddington as I heard it first from Lord Lytton at Simla in May, 1879. The details were contained in a letter which he showed me written to him from Berlin, while the Congress was still sitting, by a former diplomatic colleague, and have since been confirmed to me from more than one quarter, though with variations. In regard to the main feature of the agreement, the arrangement about Tunis, I had it very plainly stated to me in the autumn of 1884 by Count Corti, who had been Italian Ambassador at the Congress. According to his account, the shock of the revelation to Disraeli had been so great that he took to his bed, and for four days did not appear at the sittings, leaving Lord Salisbury to explain matters as he best could. He said that there had been no open rupture with Waddington, the case having been submitted by Waddington to his fellow-ambassadors, who agreed that it was not one that could possibly be publicly disputed: Il faut la guerre ou se taire. The agreement was a verbal one between Waddington and Salisbury, but was recorded in a despatch subsequently written by the French Ambassador in London in which he reminded Salisbury of the Convention conversation held in Berlin, and so secured its acknowledgment in writing."
[3] Herbert Paul, A History of Modern England, vol. iv., p. 247.
[4] Herbert Paul, A History of Modern England, vol. iv., p. 247.
[5] Hansard, May 12, 1882, vol. 269.
[6] Vote of credit for forces in the Mediterranean.
[7] Hansard, July 27, 1882, vol. 272.
[8] Hansard, October 30, 1882, vol. 274.
[9] Truth, October 5, 1882.
[10] Truth, October 12, 1882.
[11] Truth, December 7, 1882.
[12] Hansard, February 15, 1883, vol. 276.
[13] Hansard, March 2, 1883, vol. 276.
[14] Ibid., June 11, 1883, vol. 280.
[15] Herbert Paul, A History of Modern England, vol. iv.
[16] Hansard, February 14, 1884, vol. 284.
[17] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Gordon and Khartoum.
[18] Hansard, May 19, 1884, vol. 288.
[19] Hansard, March 26, 1885, vol. 295.
[20] Ibid., Feb. 27, 1885, vol. 294.
[21] Hansard, April 13, 1885, vol. 296.
[22] Hansard, May 8, 1885, vol. 298.
Before dealing further with the part played by Labouchere in Irish legislation, it will be necessary to consider his view of English politics as a whole. He had not at first been an enthusiastic partisan of Home Rule. He had even gone the length at Northampton of saying that he himself was no Home Ruler. Yet, in point of fact, no English member was a more zealous advocate of Irish claims than he. Why was this? His motives, as I have been able to gather them from many conversations with him on the subject, were twofold: His Radical soul was disgusted by what, in the face of the Irish attitude, was the only alternative to Home Rule, namely coercion, and he realised that the only effective way to "dish the Whigs," whom he hated even more than the Conservatives, was to use the Irish vote.
The second motive was by far the stronger. He had a definite conception of Radical government to which he would undoubtedly have sacrificed hecatombs of Irish patriots if necessary. As a matter of fact, the Irish patriots happened to be a useful means towards his end, the establishment of such a government. Hence his alliance with them. When Mr. Gladstone and his Whig-Radical Government were faced in 1880 with the Irish question in so acute a form, Labouchere saw a real possibility ahead of establishing a Radical as distinguished from a merely Liberal Government. The protagonist of his scheme was Mr. Chamberlain, already a member of the Cabinet, and, in the natural course of events, the almost certain successor of the already venerable statesman whose name had become the war-cry of English Liberalism.
With Mr. Chamberlain as Prime Minister almost anything might happen: the Lords and the Church might go, England might become, in all save the name, a republic. Mr. Chamberlain was the one statesman with whom he found himself in complete agreement as to the articles of the Radical faith, and in his future he saw the future of the party and of England. He wrote to him on July 3, 1883: "I was caught young and sent to America; there I imbibed the political views of the country, so that my Radicalism is not a joke, but perfectly earnest. My opinion on most of the institutions of this country is that of Americans—that they are utterly absurd and ridiculous. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to see you leader of the House of Commons, with a Parliament pledged to the most drastic reforms. This is the aim of my humble endeavours, but, in the nature of things, a member below the gangway has not the same responsibilities as a Minister, and, if he is a Radical, necessarily is more advanced than a composite Cabinet. He has, too, to make motions or to hold his tongue. For instance, my amendment yesterday evening on titles was regarded in the House of Commons as a joke. But go to any meeting of even Liberals, and you would find that it was essentially a popular one. The real trouble in the House of Commons is that the Radicals below the gangway are such a miserable lot, and seem ashamed of their opinions. The Whigs, on the contrary, out of office act solidly together. This leads the public to suppose that your views are in a small minority in the House of Commons. If the Whigs are ready to pull a coach half way to what they consider a precipice, they must be greater fools than I take them to be. They do not act openly, but they conspire secretly. So long, however, as they consent to work in harness, they ought to be encouraged. You have told them the goal, and I am certain that this declaration has done more to strengthen radicalism than anything that has happened for long. So I am perfectly contented, and quite ready to leave well alone."
Alas for the schemes of mortals! The very element on which Labouchere relied for the strengthening of the Radical cause in the Cabinet was to prove to Mr. Chamberlain himself the parting of the ways. The statesman who was to reach the highest power on the shoulders of Irish voters, when it came to the point, would have none of such support. The corner-stone fell out of the grandiose edifice that Labouchere had planned, the palace of Armida crumbled in the dust. Bitter, indeed, was his disappointment. It was characteristic of him in these circumstances to lose his head and throw up the game. The reader will remember how, as a boy, he described his own character at the gaming-table: "In playing even I failed because, although I theoretically discovered systems by which I was likely to win, yet in practice I could command myself so little that, upon a slight loss, I left all to chance." He lacked the patience or the industry of mind to reconstruct his schemes, and when Mr. Chamberlain was lost to the Radical party, Labouchere's constructive imagination seems never to have recovered the blow. He continued the war with abuse of privilege, absurdity consecrated by tradition, and the other heads of the hydra with which his party fought, but the tone of his attacks was not the same as before the Home Rule split. Too often they degenerated into mere party criticism, the note of personal invective, one might almost say of spite, becoming more prominent in them. He had lost faith in success, because the combination by which he had hoped to win had failed, and he could not, or would not, think out another. It was this consciousness of failure—of personal failure as he saw it, so closely had he identified himself with his hopes—that inspired the peculiar bitterness with which, in and out of season, he attacked the statesman whom he held responsible for the altered situation. He did not, as his correspondence will show, give up hope for some time of Mr. Chamberlain's return to the party, but, when he had at last given up all such hope, nothing was too bad for "Joe." In the pages of Truth, in the Reform Club, in the lobby of the House of Commons, he constantly held forth to all who would read or listen on the "crimes" of the man who had divided the Liberal party against itself. He manifested no such bitterness against Bright or Hartington; but when Mr. Chamberlain fell from grace, he fell as no private individual, but as the symbol of the Radical party. With him, according to Labouchere, the party fell, and with the party his immediate hopes for the regeneration of England. Those hopes had, with ample justification for their existence, run high when Messrs. Chamberlain and Dilke joined Mr. Gladstone's administration in 1880. Labouchere based his scheme on the permanence of Mr. Chamberlain's Radicalism, and upon the fact that, in the natural course of events, a successor would very shortly have to be found for Mr. Gladstone. Both these, at the time, reasonable previsions were falsified by destiny. Mr. Gladstone remained for another fourteen years leader of the party, and Mr. Chamberlain became a Liberal Unionist. The years between 1880 and 1887 were, in so far as his political life was concerned, the most important of Labouchere's life. Until he saw that his game was finally spoiled by a totally unexpected fall of the cards, he did not for one instant relax his efforts to reach the end towards which he had planned to work. His patience was remarkable, his foresight uncanny, except in the all-important direction from which the blow that finally shattered his hopes descended.
It is interesting, in the light of subsequent events, to read the article which he wrote for the February number of the Fortnightly Review in 1884, in which he set forth with characteristic freedom of expression his views upon Radicals as differing from Whigs. "A Radical," he declares early in the article, "has been defined as an earnest Liberal," and he goes on to describe, in uncompromising terms, the faith of the earnest Liberal—or true Radical. "The Government Bill," he wrote, "assimilating the County to the Borough Franchise is to be encouraged, although it does not go far enough, to the extent, i.e., of Adult manhood suffrage. It will be for Radicals to take care strenuously to oppose every scheme which is a sham and not a reality. Let us all who are good Liberals labour to obtain a good suffrage Bill and a good redistribution Bill. This will strengthen our Parliamentary position, and we may fairly anticipate that Manhood Suffrage, electoral districts, triennial Parliaments, and payment of members will follow." The following extract shows very clearly Mr. Labouchere's opinions on what may be called the technique of legislation:
"The life of a Parliament is too long. Three years is the maximum period for which it should be elected. At the end of this time it is out of touch with the electorates. Promises and pledges made at the hustings are evaded, because each member thinks they will be forgotten before he has again to seek the suffrages of his electors; whilst Ministers are too apt to put off, until the period for a fresh election approaches, any drastic legislation to which they are pledged as leaders of their party. It is probable that, were the duration of Parliament limited to three years, as much political legislation would take place in this period as is now the case in the five or six years which is the average life of a Parliament. The fear of a speedy reckoning with electors would be ever before the eyes of Ministers and members. The 'Can't you leave it alone?' of Lord Melbourne would be replaced by 'We must do much and do it speedily, for the day of reckoning is near at hand.' Long Parliaments are as fatal to sound business as long credits are to sound trade. It is questionable, indeed, whether three years is not too long for the duration of a Parliament. We should move in all probability more quickly, were the nation to insist upon an annual stocktaking."
The arguments, from the democratic point of view, in favour of the payment of members are thus set forth:
"The payment of members would do more to democratise our legislature, and consequently our legislation, than any other measure that can be conceived. At present, members, as a rule, are rich men. Many of them mean well, but they fatally take a rich man's view of all matters, and are far too much inclined to think that everything is for the best in a world where, although there may be many blanks, they at least have drawn a prize in life's lottery. So long as the choice of the poor men is between this and that rich man, so long will our legislation run in the groove of class prejudice. The poor man will not be the social equal of the rich man, and our laws will be made rather with a view to the happiness and interests of the few than of the many. All who are Conservative in heart know this, and for this reason the payment of members, which is the natural outcome of a recognition that a labourer is worthy of his hire, finds in them such bitter opponents. If a Minister is paid for being a Minister, it is only logical that a member should be paid for being a member. People must live. To refuse payment to members is to limit the choice of electorates to those very men who are not likely to see things with the same eyes as the majority of the men who constitute the electorates. Parliaments should be composed of rich men and of poor men. No one would advocate the exclusion of rich men. Why, then, should a condition of things continue which practically results in the exclusion of the poor man?"
Never has the Radical view of the House of Lords and the Crown been more forcibly expressed than in the following:
"The Whigs seem to know that —— is in favour of the abolition of a House of hereditary legislators. Let us hope that they are correct. We are frequently told that the people love, honour, and respect the House of Lords. Let any one who entertains this notion allude to this assembly at a popular political gathering in any part of the country, and he will find his illusion rudely dispelled. There are earnest Radicals who hold that there ought to be two legislative Chambers, and not one; although why they think so, it is difficult to say, for in every country where the two-Chamber system prevails, either one of them has become a mere useless court of registration, or the two are engaged in perpetual disputes, to the great detriment of public business. No Radical, however, is in favour of our existing Upper Chamber. If he were, he would not be a Radical. What an hereditary legislator ought to be is well described by Burke in his letter to the Duke of Bedford. What our hereditary legislators are we know by bitter experience. They almost all belong to one particular class—that of the great landlords. When any attempt is made to deal with the gross absurdities of our land system, they rally almost to a man to its defence, not from natural depravity, but from the natural bias of every one to consider that what benefits him must be for the best. The majority of them are Conservatives; even those who call themselves Liberals are the mildest of Whigs. When a Conservative Administration is in power they are harmless for good or evil. When a Liberal Administration is in power they are actively evil. Such an administration represents the deliberate will of the nation. Before bringing in a Bill, however, it has to be toned down, lest it should meet with opposition in the Lords. Nevertheless it does meet with opposition there. The Lords do not throw it out, but emasculate it with amendments; then when it comes back to the Commons a bargain is struck that, if the Commons will agree to some of these amendments, the Lords will not insist upon the others. Thus, no matter what may be the majority possessed by a Liberal ministry in the House of Commons, it can never legislate as it wishes, but in a sense between what it wishes and what the Conservative majority in the Lords wish. In great and important questions it almost always obeys its Leader like a flock of sheep, and thus one man is able to provoke a dissolution, not only when he thinks that this is in the interests of the country, but when he imagines it to be in the interests of his party. It is asserted that the House of Lords is useful because its rejection of a Bill is an appeal to the country against a House of Commons which is acting in opposition to the popular will. It is not easy to understand on what grounds the Lords are supposed to know what the popular will is; and, indeed, they never do, for there is not one single case on record where, when the Lords have appealed to the country against a decision of the House of Commons, the verdict has gone in favour of the former. Although rich, the peers are not independent. They are, in fact, remarkable for their abnormal greed. Because they are by the chance of birth legislators, they insist upon decorations, distinctions, and salaries being showered upon them and their relations. In the Financial Reform Almanack for this year there is an interesting calculation of the amounts that living dukes, marquises, and earls, and their relations, and those that have died since 1850, have received out of the public exchequer. The dukes figure for £9,760,000, the marquises for £8,305,950, and the earls for £48,181,292; total £66,247,242. The voracity of a vestryman is nothing to compare with that of the British nobleman. Eighty-three peers are privy councillors; 55 have received decorations; 192 are connected with the army and navy; 62 are railway directors; their total rental is £11,872,333, and they possess 14,251,132 acres; yet in pay and pensions they absorb annually £639,865, and whenever there is a change of administration they clamour for well-paid sinecures about the Court, and other such sops, like a pack of hungry hounds. Les soutiens de l'État indeed! Comme une corde soutient un pendu! The greater number of them are obscure thanes, who never take an active part in legislation or attend in their seats; and they are summoned to London by their party leader whenever it is necessary to vote down some Liberal enactment, which has been passed after long and careful consideration by the elected representatives of the nation, and for this service to the State they generally insist upon receiving an equivalent—a ribbon, a Lord Lieutenancy, or an office for a relative or a dependent....
"Radicals are essentially practical, and are not accustomed to waste or misdirect their energies. They do not approve of the fuss and feathers of a Court, and they regard its ceremonies with scant respect, for they are inclined to think that they conduce to a servile spirit, which is degrading to humanity. They admit, however, that the scheme of a monarch who reigns but does not rule has its advantages in an empire such as ours, where a connecting link between the mother country and the colonies is desirable. Their objection to the present state of things is mainly based upon financial grounds. Admitting that there is to be a hereditary figure-head, they cannot understand why it should cost so much, why funds which are voted to the monarch should be expended in salaries to noblemen for the performance of ceremonial service, or why the children of the monarch should receive such enormous annuities." He quoted an occasion when the disloyalty of Radicals was supposed to have been amply proved. One of them had voted for an amendment of Sir Charles Dilke when Lord Beaconsfield's Government had proposed an allowance of £25,000 per annum to the Duke of Connaught. "It would have been more to the purpose to show," he said, "why this young gentleman should receive so very ample a pension for condescending to be the son of his parents. Nothing has conduced more to shake that decent respect for the living symbol of the State, which goes by the name of royalty, than the ever-recurring rattle of the money-box. Radicals do not perceive why the children of the monarch should be made public pensioners any more than the children of the Lord Chancellor. They know that Her Majesty lives in retirement, and that she has a wholesome contempt for the costly ceremonies of a Court; they are aware that as a necessary consequence she has sufficient accumulations to keep her children in comfort. They ask, therefore, why their maintenance should be thrown on the country, and why, if so, this should be on so very costly a scale. They consider, it is true, that Her Majesty has too large a Civil List; yet although they are not deceived by the 'pious fraud' which assumes that the monarch is the owner of the Crown domains and surrenders them on accession to the throne in consideration of a money equivalent for what they produce, they have no burning desire to interfere with existing arrangements during the lifetime of the present incumbent, for they have a sincere respect for the Queen, not only as the constitutional head of the State, but also on account of her excellent personal qualities. They are of opinion, however, that when provision is asked for the eldest son of the Prince of Wales, this will be a fitting opportunity to inaugurate an entire change in the financial relations of the Crown with the country."
The Established Church, education, and the Land Laws are thus drastically treated.
"The income of the Establishment is close upon £5,000,000 per annum. It is the Church of a minority. The greater portion of its revenues were acquired by confiscation. Its division of them amongst its clergy is in defiance of all rule and justice. Cures of souls are matters of public barter. Only the other day the secretary of a race-course company bought the next presentation to a living in order to ensure that the views of the next pastor should be sound on the question of racing. In every country except this the principle has been recognised that so-called ecclesiastical property is national property. In some countries this principle has been pushed to its ultimate consequences, in others it has received a more restricted application. Were we all members of the Established Church there might be some plea for our devoting a portion of our property to the maintenance of the Church's employés. But the majority of us are not churchmen. Why then should we perpetuate so invidious an application of national funds? The vested rights of living incumbents should be respected, and perhaps it would be only fair that the Church should retain those funds that she has received from the liberality of private donors within the last few years. On an excessive estimate this would amount to £1,000,000 per annum. We require the remaining £4,000,000 per annum for educational purposes, and we mean to have them....
"Whilst all Radicals are agreed that our land system requires a thorough reform, all are perhaps not in accord as to the details of that reform. Some are followers of Mr. George and demand the nationalisation of land; others—and these are the wiser—whilst admitting that it is to be regretted that the paramount proprietorship of the community has been almost entirely ignored, hardly see their way to resume it absolutely, nor do they admit that a person who has acquired a legal title to a freehold can be divested of it without fair compensation. All, however, are agreed that real estate has, in contradistinction to personal estate, certain inherent qualities: it is limited in quantity, and it is a natural instrument; consequently, the State has a right to regulate the conditions of its tenure, and its transmission from one individual to another. We would legislate to break up and destroy all huge domains; to make the occupier to all practical intents the master of the soil which he cultivates, and to secure to him not only fixity of tenure and independence of a landlord's rules and caprices, but the enjoyment of these rights at a fair and reasonable price. A long succession of landlord legislatures have, in the words of Mr. Cobden, 'robbed and bamboozled the people for ages.' All our laws affecting land have been made in order to perpetuate its tenure in the hands of the few from generation to generation; to render its purchase difficult and expensive; to free its owners from taxes and obligations, in consideration of which their predecessors acquired lordship over it from the State; and to give it an artificial value by securing to its possessors social and political pre-eminence. That there should be few Radicals amongst landlords is less surprising than that any one who is not a landlord should remain outside the Radical pale. To suppose that when Radicals have the power to place our land laws in harmony with the good of the greatest numbers, or to imagine that they will allow the imperia in imperio of huge domains to continue, is to suppose that they will take to their heart of hearts their 'robbers and bamboozlers.' Landlords are a mistake socially, politically, and economically. The only true proprietary rights in land are a reasonable interest on sums spent in rendering it more productive, and this only so long as the outlay continues to produce this result; to talk of any other natural proprietary rights is as absurd as it would be to talk of a man having a natural property in the air that we breathe. It is too late now, however, to revert to first principles. We must accept facts and endeavour to make the best of them. This we propose to do, and, as a preliminary step, we demand the renewed imposition of the land-tax at four shillings in the pound upon the full true yearly value at a rack rent; that there should be no more subventions in aid of local taxation from imperial funds largely derived from taxation on food and drink; and that landlords who will not use their land themselves should be made to give it up to those who are ready and anxious to use it."
Towards the end of the article Mr. Labouchere delivers himself somewhat tentatively on the Irish question as follows:
"It was said in the first session of the present Parliament—and no one was more fond of using this argument than Mr. Gladstone—that the limited number of Mr. Parnell's Parliamentary followers proved that the majority of the constituencies was not with him. Later on, when the error of this estimate of his strength was perceived, it was alleged that his influence was alone secured by terrorism. Slowly it had dawned upon the English mind that the vast majority of Irishmen, rightly or wrongly, cordially and truly sympathise with him. No one now questions that he will sweep Ireland at the next General Election. On the doctrine of probabilities, this will make him the arbiter between parties at St. Stephen's. How is this to be met? The only suggestion put forward as yet has been that both parties should agree that the Irish vote is not to count on a party division. But does any sane human being imagine that such a scheme is practicable? The 'ins' would always assent to it, but the 'outs' would defer their assent until they became the 'ins.' It is indeed becoming every day more and more clear that we must either allow the Irish votes to reckon as other votes, or that we must boldly assert that Ireland shall no longer be represented in Parliament, because we disagree with the representatives that it chooses. There is no middle course; and, if we accept the former, we shall have to allow Ireland hereafter to decide as she best pleases on matters that only locally regard her. Most Radicals would be of opinion that one Parliament for the entire United Kingdom is a better system that one for Great Britain and another for Ireland. But they would go a long way to establish a fair modus vivendi between the two islands, and nothing that Mr. Parnell has ever said can be adduced to show that he does not entertain the same desire. Most of his views recommend themselves to Radicals, especially those in regard to land.... If the Irish wish for Home Rule why should they not have it? It surely would be easy to conceive a plan in which that island would have a representative assembly that would legislate upon all matters, except those reserved to the Imperial Parliament. These reservations might be precisely the same as those which the American Constitution reserves to Congress in her relations with State Governments. Mr. Gladstone seemed inclined to accept this solution in 1882, for, in a speech during the session of that year, he asked the Irish members to submit their plan to the House of Commons, whilst the only objection that occurred to him was, that it might be difficult to find an arbiter between the Imperial and the Irish legislature in case of any conflict of jurisdiction—a difficulty which a cursory glance at the American Constitution would have solved. The Irish are sound upon almost every question; they are even more democratically inclined than we are. We want their aid and they want our aid. Irish, English, and Scotch Radicals should coalesce. Mutual concessions may be necessary, but this is always the case in political alliances. That the Irish should not love the English connection is hardly surprising. We are only now beginning to do them justice, and we have accompanied this modicum of justice with a Coercion Act, aimed not only at crime, but at legitimate political agitation. If we remove their grievances, if we make Irishmen the true rulers of Ireland, and if we cease to meddle in matters that concern them and not us, there is no reason to suppose that they would wish to separate from us any more than our colonies. Separation would, indeed, be as disadvantageous to them as to us."
A year or two later he gave clear expression to the same Radical faith in the House of Commons in a speech which he made on his own amendment to the motion that Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair: "That in the opinion of this House it is contrary to the true principles of representative Government, and injurious to their efficiency, that any person should be a member of one House of the Legislature by right of birth, and it is therefore desirable to put an end to any such existing rights." "It has been pointed out to him," he said, "that these words might include Her Majesty, which, of course, was not intended ... they had been engaged in democratising, as far as they could, the Commons branch of the Legislature; but all their efforts would be abortive, all their efforts at Parliamentary reform would be illusory, if they allowed side by side with that House a Legislative Assembly to exist, which, in its nature, was aristocratic, and which had a right to tamper with and veto the decisions of the nation, which were registered by the House of Commons.... Members of the House of Lords were neither elected nor selected for their merits. They sat by the merits of their ancestors, and, if we looked into the merits of some of those ancestors, we should agree that the less said about them the better. The House of Lords consisted of a class most dangerous to the community—the class of rich men, the greater part of whose fortune was in land. It was asserted of them that the House of Lords was recruited from the wisest and best in the country—that the Lords were so wise and good that, in some mysterious way, they were able to transmit their virtues to future generations in secula seculorum. The practice in the selection of those gentlemen was not quite in accordance with this theory. They consisted generally of two classes—of those who were apparently successful politicians, and of those who were undoubtedly successful money-grubbers. He would take a few examples, and, as he did not wish to be invidious, he would take them from both sides of the House. They all knew and appreciated Sir R. Assheton Cross, Mr. Sclater Booth, Sir Thomas Brassey, and Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen. What did they think of these gentlemen? As members of this House everybody respected and liked them; but they were looked upon as decent sort of mediocrities of the ordinary quality, which was converted, in course of time, into administrative Ministers. Take another class. Why were brewers selected as peers? Simply because they, of late, had accumulated very large fortunes by the sale of intoxicating liquors, and for no other reason. The names of Guinness, Bass, and Allsopp had been long household words in every public house in the country, but who ever heard of them as politicians? Yet these gentlemen were considered to be the very best men in the country to be converted into hereditary peers. Another class who made money were the financiers. Lord Rothschild inherited a large fortune, and had increased that fortune, and no doubt spent his money in the most honourable way; but Lord Rothschild did nothing in the House of Commons in any way to distinguish himself. With brewers, when one was made a peer another must be made a peer for advertisement. So with financial houses; when a Rothschild was made a peer, it was necessary to fish up some one of the name of Baring, and one was converted into Lord Revelstoke—a gentleman who, though probably eminent in city circles, was hardly known to any one in that House, and who had never taken part in politics. So much for the composition of the House of Lords.... Deducting representative peers from Scotland and Ireland, and deducting members of the Royal family, and deducting bishops and archbishops, he found 470 peers sitting as hereditary peers in the House of Lords. He found that those peers had annually distributed among them £389,163, amounting on an average to £820 each (salaries from appointments under Civil List)—these rich men who would, with one accord, protest against the payment of members of the House of Commons. These were the rich men who were found at public meetings denouncing members from Ireland as a wretched crew, because, being mainly poor men, they received enough to enable them to live from their constituents. The peers were almost as careful of their relations as of themselves. In a valuable publication he saw it put down that, from 1874 to 1886, no fewer than 7000 relatives of peers had had places of emolument under the Government.... In the other House there were 120 Privy Councillors, of whom he ventured to say the majority had never heard. Orders had to be found for these gentlemen. Almost every one of them had a decoration. There were three decorations which were absolutely made for peers and for no other body—the Garter, the Order of St. Patrick, and the Thistle. Walpole had declined a decoration 'because,' he said, 'why bribe myself?' Lord Melbourne said of the Garter that its pleasing feature was that there was 'no nonsense of merit about it.' An impression existed that private Bill legislation was more independent in the House of Lords than in that House. He did not think it was.... No men looked better after the class interests of those to whom they belonged than the peers. They were great landowners; 16,000,000 acres belonged to them. Yet our Land Laws were a disgrace to the country and tainted with feudalism.... This House of Lords was not collectively any worse than any six hundred men would be. They were ex necessitate a Tory House and a House of partisans. The assertion that they subordinated public interests to their private class and party interests was merely tantamount to saying that they were human beings. A House of Artisans would act on similar principles.... His amendment went to the root of the evil. He at first thought of including bishops, but he struck them out on the principle of de minimis non curat lex. If the hereditary principle were done away with, what the honourable member for Birmingham called 'the incestuous union between the spiritual and the political world' would cease of itself. His amendment would not prejudice the question of whether there ought to be two Chambers or one only. Personally he was in favour of one, but those who voted with him need not necessarily support him on that particular point. Other countries which had two had simply followed our example, and it was a mere result of chance that we happened to have two. If they agreed, the second was useless; if they disagreed, the second was pernicious. If the functions of an Upper Chamber were to be properly fulfilled by those who soared above party and class interest, we must not look for its members in this world, but we must bring down angels from Heaven; but, as that would be difficult, there was one other alternative. The Conservatives at their meetings always shouted, 'Thank God we have a House of Lords!' Radicals had no intention to remain any longer supinely like toads under the harrow of the House of Lords. They intended to agitate until they could say: 'Thank God we have not an hereditary House of Lords!'"