Particulars,
doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 29;
the one in the many, and many in one, aim of philosophy, 407;
Herakleitean flux true of, but not of Ideas, iii. 320;
universals amidst, 257;
and universals, different dialogues compared, ib.;
difficulties about one and many, 339;
natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340;
illustration from speech and music, 342;
explanation insufficient, 343;
no constant truth in, iv. 3 n.;
fluctuate, 50;
ordinary men discern only, 49,
51;
see Phenomena.
Pascal,
on King Nomos, i. 381 n.;
Cartesian theory, ii. 401
n.;
justice, i. 231
n.;
authority, iv. 232.
Πάθη, must be known after οὐσία, ii. 243 n.
Pathology of Plato, compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, iv. 260.
Pausanias, the gods jealousy, iv. 164 n.
Peloponnesian war, iii. 406.
Pentateuch,
allegorical interpretation of, iv. 157 n.;
relation to Greek schemes, 256.
Pentathlos,
the, ii. 114;
expert of Plato and Aristotle, 119 n.
Percept
and concept, relative, iii. 75;
prior to the percipient, 76 n.
Perception,
doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26;
Empedokles, 44;
Theophrastus, 46
n.;
Anaxagoras, opposed to Empedokles, 58;
Diogenes of Apollonia, 62;
Demokritus, 77;
Plato, iii. 159;
different views of Plato, 163;
sensible, province wider in Politikus than Theætêtus,
256;
knowledge is sensible, 111,
113, 154, 173 n.;
identified with Homo Mensura, 123, 162 n.;
sensible perception does not include memory, 157;
argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time,
ib.;
knowledge lies in the mind’s comparisons respecting sensible perceptions,
161;
difference from modern views, 162;
objects of conception and of, comprised in Plato’s ens,
229, 231.
Pergamus, library of, i. 270 n., 280 n.
Περιέχον
of Herakleitus, i. 35
n.;
compared with Nous of Anaxagoras, 56 n.
Perikles,
upheld the claims of intellect, ii. 373;
rhetorical power, 370,
371.
Peripatetic
school at the Lykeum, i. 269;
change after death of Theophrastus, 272;
loss of library, 270;
see Lykeum.
Persian
and Spartan kings eulogised, ii. 8;
and Athens compared, iv. 312;
invasion, 311,
313;
customs blended with Spartan in Cyropædia,
i. 222;
government, 235.
Phædon the Eretrian, i. 148.
Phædon, the,
authenticity, i. 334
n.;
first dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds, 288;
date,
309-313, 315,
ii. 377 n.;
affirmative and expository, 377;
much transcendental assertion, iii. 56;
purpose, ii. 382
n.;
antithesis and complement of Symposion, iii. 22;
scenery and interlocutors, ii. 377;
Sokrates to the last insists on freedom of debate, 379;
value of exposition, 398;
no tripartite soul, antithesis of soul and body, 384;
life a struggle between soul and body, 386, 388, 422;
emotions, a degenerate appendage of human nature, iii. 389;
death emancipates, ii. 386,
388;
yet soul may suffer punishment, inconsistency, 415;
philosophy gives partial emancipation, 387;
purification of soul, 388,
i. 159;
inseparable conjunction of pleasure with pain, iii. 38-9, 71.;
pleasures to be estimated by intelligence, 375;
pleasures of intelligence more valuable than of sense,
ib.;
courage of philosopher and ordinary citizens, different principles, ii.
308 n.;
the soul a mixture, refuted, 390;
soul’s pre-existence admitted, ib.,
iii. 122;
soul is essentially living and therefore immortal,
ii. 413;
proof of immortality includes pre-existence of all animals, and
metempsychosis, 414;
depends on assumption of Ideas, 412;
metempsychosis of ordinary men only, 387, 415, 425;
Plato’s demonstration fails, iii. 16;
not generally accepted, ii. 426;
Sokrates’ intellectual development, 391;
turned on different views as to a true cause, 398;
illustration of Comte’s three stages of progress, 407;
Sokrates’ early study, 391;
genesis of knowledge,
ib.;
first doctrine of Cause, rejected,
ib., 399;
second doctrine, from Anaxagoras, 393, 401, 403;
doctrine laid down in Philêbus, 407 n.;
Anaxagoras did not carry out his principle, 394, 407;
Anaxagoras’ nous, as understood by
Sokrates, 402
n.;
causes efficient and co-efficient, 394, 400;
third principle, assumption of Ideas as separate entia, 396, 403, 407, iv. 239 n.;
multitude of ideas, ii. 410;
the only causes, 396;
truth resides in ideas, 411;
discussion of hypothesis, and of its consequences, distinct, 397, 411;
ultimate appeal to extremely general hypothesis,
ib.;
Sokrates’ equanimity before death, 416, 417;
Sokrates’ soul — islands of the blest, 416;
Sokrates’ last words and death, 417;
burial, 416;
compared with Apology, i. 422 n.,
ii.
419-21;
Symposion, 382,
iii. 16-19;
Menon, ii. 249;
Phædrus, ib.,
iii.
16-19;
Politikus, 262,
265 n.;
Republic, ii. 383, 412, 414 n.;
Timæus, 383, 407 n.,
411-12.
Phædrus, its
date, i. 263,
304-10, 313-4, 315,
319, ib.
n., 323,
326 n.,
327, 330, ii. 227, 228 n.,
iii. 36 n.,
38;
ancient criticism on, i. 319
n.;
considered by Tennemann as keynote of series, 302;
assumptions of Schleiermacher inadmissible, 319, 329 n.;
much transcendental assertion, iii. 56;
Eros differently understood, necessity for definition, 29;
derivation of ἔρως, 308 n.;
of μαντικὴ and
οἰωνιστική,
310 n.;
Eros, a variety of madness, 11;
Eros disparaged, then panegyrised, by Sokrates, ib.;
mythe of pre-existent soul, 12,
14 n.;
soul’s κνῆσις
compared to children’s teething, 399 n.;
reminiscence of the Ideas, 13,
17, iv. 239 n.;
operation of pre-natal experience on man’s intellectual
faculties, iii. 13;
reminiscence kindled by aspect of physical beauty, ii. 422, iii. 4, 14;
debate on Rhetoric, 26;
Sokrates’ theory, all persuasion founded on a knowledge of
the truth, 28;
writing and speaking, as art, 27;
is it teachable by system, 28;
Sokrates compares himself with Lysias, 29;
Lysias unfairly treated in,
47-8, 408, 410 n.,
411 n.;
Sokrates’ reason for attachment to dialectic, 258 n.;
the two processes of dialectic, 29,
39;
exemplified in Sokrates’ discourses, 29;
essential to genuine rhetoric, 30,
34;
rhetoric as a real art, is comprised in dialectic, 30, 34;
analogy to medical art, 31;
includes a classification of minds and discourses, and their mutual
application, 32,
41, 45;
books and lectures useless, 33,
34, 49, 51,
53-5;
may remind, 33,
50;
rhetorician must acquire real truth, 33, 34;
theory more Platonic than Sokratic, 38;
rhetorician insufficiently rewarded, 33;
dialectician alone can teach, 37;
idéal, cannot be realised, 51;
except under hypothesis of pre-existence and reminiscence, 52;
dialectic teaches minds unoccupied, rhetoric minds pre-occupied, 40;
Plato’s idéal a philosophy,
not an art, of rhetoric, 45;
unattainable, 42,
46;
comparison with the rhetorical teachers, 44;
charge against rhetorical teachers not established, 47;
compared with Republic, Gorgias,
Euthydêmus, ii. 229;
Menon, 249;
Phædon, ib.,
423, iii.
17-8, iv. 239
n.;
Symposion, iii. 1, 11, 15,
17-19;
Sophistês, 257;
Politikus,
ib., 265 n.;
Philêbus, 398;
Timæus and Kritias, 53;
Leges, iv. 324.
Phenicians,
iv. 330 n.,
352;
appetite predominant in, 38.
Phenomena,
early Greek explanation of, by polytheism, i. 2;
doctrine of Xenophanes, 18;
Parmenides, 20,
24, 66;
of Parmenides, the object of modern physics, 23 n.;
of Parmenides contain only probability, not truth, 24;
doctrine of Zeno, 93;
Leontine Gorgias, 104
n.;
Herakleitus, 29;
Anaxagoras, 59
n.;
Demokritus, 68;
Kyrenaics, 197;
the Ideas not fitted on to, iii. 78;
Aristotle, i. 24
n.;
see Particulars.
Philêbus,
authenticity, iii. 369
n.;
date, i. 307-9,
311-3, 315,
iii. 369 n.;
peculiarity, 382;
illustrates logical partition, 254, 344;
merit as a didactic composition, 365, 368 n.;
method contrasted with Theætêtus,
335 n.;
recent editions, 365
n.;
reading in p. 17a, 341
n.;
subject and persons, 334;
protest against Sokratic elenchus, 335;
happiness and good used as correlative terms,
ib.;
good, object of universal desire,
ib., 371, 392 n.;
what mental condition will ensure happiness, 335;
is it pleasure or wisdom,
ib., 337;
pleasures, and opposite cognitions, unlike each other, 336, 396;
is good intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338;
or intelligence without pleasure or pain, 339;
such a life conceivable, at least second-best, 349;
Plato inconsistent in putting the alternative, 372;
emotions, a degenerate appendage of human nature, 389;
contrast with other dialogues, 398;
good a tertium quid, 339, 361;
pleasure, of the infinite, intelligence a combining cause, 347;
intelligence the determining, pleasure the indeterminate, 348, iv. 221;
intelligence postulated by the Hedonists, iii. 374;
analogy of intelligence and pleasure,
360;
intelligence more cognate to good than pleasure is, 348, 361;
pain, disturbance of system’s fundamental harmony, pleasure
the restoration, 348;
pleasure pre-supposes pain, 349;
except in the derivative pleasures of memory and expectation,
ib.;
desire presupposes a bodily want and memory of previous satisfaction, 350;
true pleasures attached to true opinions, 351;
can pleasure be true or false, 286 n.,
351, 352, 356, 380,
ib.
n., 382;
false pleasures are pleasures falsely estimated, 353, 369 n.;
to Plato the absolute the only real, 385;
true pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, acquisition of
knowledge, &c., 356;
pure pleasures admit of measure, 357;
directive sovereignty of measure, 391, 393;
pleasure not identical with
ἀλυπία, 353, 377;
theory of pleasure-haters, partly true, 354;
allusion in οἱ
δυσχερεῖς,
389 n.;
intense pleasures connected with bodily or mental distemper, 355, 391;
but more pleasure in health, 356;
intense pleasures not compatible with cognition, 362;
same view enforced by Hedonists, 378, 387 n.;
Aristotle on, 376
n.;
drama, feelings excited by —
φθόνος, 355 n.;
pleasure is generation, therefore not an End, nor the Good, 357;
Aristippus and Aristotle on, 378 n.;
pleasure is an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a means. 373, 377 n.;
Plato’s doctrine not defensible against pleasure-haters, 387, 390 n.;
Sokrates differs little from pleasure-haters, 389;
gods and kosmos free from pleasure and pain,
ib.;
comparison of man to kosmos unnecessary and confusing, 367;
forced conjunction of kosmology and ethics, 391;
difficulties about one and
many, 339;
natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340;
illustration from speech and music, 342;
explanation insufficient, 343;
classes between one and infinite many often overlooked, 341;
Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368;
but feebly applies, 369;
quadruple distribution of existences, 346;
varieties of intelligence, classified, 358;
dialectic the purest, 360;
classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions, 394;
difference from other dialogues, 395;
rhetoric superior in usefulness and celebrity, 360, 380;
arithmetic and geometry are two-fold, 359, 394;
unchangeable essences of the kosmos rarely studied, 361;
good a mixture,
ib.;
this good has not the unity of an idea, ii. 407 n.,
iii. 365;
all cognitions included, 362;
but only true, pure, and necessary pleasures,
ib.;
five graduated constituents of good, 364, 397;
Plato’s in part an eclectic doctrine, 366;
blends ontology with ethics,
ib.;
does not satisfy the tests himself lays down, 371;
compared with Euthydêmus, 374 n.;
Protagoras, 379,
391;
Gorgias,
379-81;
Phædrus, 398;
Symposion, 370 n.,
398;
Parmenidês, 97 n.,
340 n.,
343;
Sophistês, 369 n.;
Politikus, 263,
369 n.;
Republic, 370,
373 n.,
395;
Timæus, 397 n.;
Leges, iv. 301.
Philo,
etymologies, iii. 308
n.;
hypothetical propositions, i. 145 n.;
allegorical interpretation, iv. 157 n.
Φίλον, πρώτον, see Amabile primum.
Philosophers,
ancient, common claim to universal knowledge, iii. 219;
charged with pride, i. 153
n.;
secession from Athens, 111
n.;
contrast of philosopher with practical men, ii. 52, 145 n.,
iii. 183,
274, iv.
51-4;
uselessness in practical life due to not being called in by citizens, 54;
disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, ii. 224;
forced seclusion of, iv. 59;
require a community suitable, ib.;
philosophical aptitude perverted under misguiding public opinion, 54;
model city practicable if philosophy and political power united, 47;
divine men, iii. 187;
the fully qualified practitioner, ii. 114, 116, 119;
not wise, yet painfully feeling ignorance, 181;
value set by Sokrates and Plato on this attribute, 190;
dissenters, upheld, 375;
life, a struggle between soul and body, 386;
ascetic life, 388,
i. 158;
exempted from metempsychosis, ii. 387, 416, 425;
rewarded in Hades — mythe in Gorgias, 361;
stages of intellectual development, 391;
value of exposition, 398;
Eros the stimulus to improving philosophical communion, iii. 4, 6;
Sokrates as representative of Eros Philosophus, 15, 25;
distinguished from
ἰδιώτης, iv. 104 n.;
not distinguishable from sophists, ii. 210, 211 n.;
alone can teach, iii. 37,
40;
as expositors, teach minds unoccupied, as rhetoricians, minds
pre-occupied, 39;
realisable only under hypothesis of pre-existence and reminiscence, 52;
alone grasp Ideas in reasoning, 290 n.;
test of, the synoptic view, iv. 76;
compared with rhetors, iii. 178;
masters of debates, 179;
determine what forms admit of intercommunion, 208;
live in region of ens,
ib.;
contemplate unchangeable forms, iv. 48;
distinction of ordinary men and, illustrated by simile of Cave,
67-70;
distinctive marks of, 51;
no object in nature mean to, iii. 61.
Philosophia prima of Aristotle, i. 358 n., iii. 230 n., 382.
Philosophy,
is reasoned truth, i. vii-x;
Ferrier on scope and purpose of, viii
n.;
necessarily polemical, viii;
modern idea of, includes authoritative teaching, positive results,
direct proofs, 366;
usually positive systems advocated, iii. 70;
difference of ancient and modern problems, 52;
chief point of divergence of modern schools, ii. 409 n.;
its beginning, i. 375
n., 382, ii. 404, 407 n.;
free judgment the first condition for, i. 382, 395 n.,
ii. 368,
iii. 152 n.;
negative vein as necessary as affirmative for, i. 130;
preponderated in Plato’s age, 123;
early appearance of a few free thinkers in Greece, 384;
brought down from heaven by Sokrates, x;
Greek, in its purity, xiv;
Greek, characterised by multiplicity of individual authorities, 84, 90, 340 n.;
advantages, 90;
contrasted with uniform tradition of Jews and Christians, 384 n.;
early Christian view of, affected by Hebrew studies, xv
n.;
polytheism the first form of, 2;
Aristotle contrasts “human wisdom” with primitive
theology, 3
n.;
Indian, 378
n.;
compared with Pre-Sokratic, 107;
analogy of Greek with Indian, 160 n.,
162;
difficulties of early, iii. 184 n.;
opposition from prevalent views of Nature,
&c., i. 86;
common repugnance to its rationalistic element, 3,
59-60, 261
n.,
279 n.,
387 n.,
388, 437, 441, iv. 57;
encyclopædic character of Greek, iii. 219;
new epoch, by Plato’s establishment of a school, i. 266;
its march up to or down from principia, 403;
the protracted study necessary, an advantage,
ib.;
definition first sought for in Erastæ,
ii. 117;
the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, 112;
a province by itself, 119;
the supreme art, 120;
to be studied by itself exclusively, 229;
claim of locus standi for, 367;
relation to politics, 224,
227, 229, 230 n.;
comparative value of, and of practical (q.v.) life,
365 n.,
368 n.,
ib.,
iii. 182,
i. 204;
antithesis of rhetoric and, ii. 365;
issue unsatisfactorily put by Plato, 369;
ancient quarrel between poetry and, iv. 93, 152, 309;
Aristotle on blending mythe with, 255 n.;
gives a partial emancipation of soul, ii. 386;
analogy of Eros to, iii. 10,
11, 14;
Eros the stimulus to, 18;
different view, Phædon, Theætêtus,
Sophistês, Republic, ib.;
antithesis of emotion and science, 61;
ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68;
should be confined to discussion among select minds, i. 351;
should not be taught at a very early age, iv. 60, 76;
studies introductory to,
70-75;
difference in Leges, 275 n.;
Plato’s remarks on effect of, 207;
Republic contradicts other dialogues,
207-11;
Plato more a preacher than philosopher in Republic,
129, 131;
difference between theorist and preceptor,
ib.;
Plato’s altered tone in regard to, in later life, 273.