15 Colonel James P. Major commanded the Second Cavalry Brigade, composed of mounted infantry, artillery and cavalry. His official report, dated June 30th, 1863, does not give the strength of his command, but enough is gleaned from it to know that he had regiments commanded by Colonels W. P. Lane, B. W. Stone, and Joseph Phillip, Colonel C. L. Pyron’s Second Texas Cavalry, and Captain O. J. Semmes’ battery.
Major captured Plaquemine June 18th, was at Bayou Goula at daylight on the nineteenth, at dark sent a force under Colonel Lane through a swamp direct to Thibodeaux, and at midnight followed with the rest of his men, arriving at 3.30 A.M. on the twenty-first. The rest of his report on this action does not agree with the facts.
The men lay around carelessly until afternoon, as it was extremely hot and nothing could be had to eat. Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney, when he left Brashear, did not apprehend any attack on that place for some days, and intended to return as soon as possible. Not hearing from Captain Blober, who had again been ordered to scout and cover the roads about Thibodeaux, about four o’clock he got ready to go back to Brashear upon the same train that brought him. An order was given Lieutenant Tinkham to remain at La-Fourche with his detachment, as a reënforcement to the post; Stickney remarked he did not dare to leave without doing so. Orders had also been received from New Orleans to return two companies infantry to Brashear.
As the men were about to board the cars up rode a cavalry-man in hot haste, with bare breath enough to say, “the rebs are coming, three divisions of them,” and told that they were already at Thibodeaux. Blober’s cavalry detachment came in shortly after, with a loss of two men in a close pursuit by the enemy. With no wish to weaken his force just then, but desirous to increase it, the train was hastily despatched to Terrebonne, three miles distant on the railroad, with orders for Captain Barber, Company K, One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York, posted with about sixty men and one piece of artillery in a stockade, to evacuate. The gun and detachment of gunners left for La-Fourche during the morning.
Throughout the morning crowds of colored people kept coming along the road, from the direction of Thibodeaux, with reports that the enemy were coming. Failing to obtain satisfactory news from these people Captain Barber rode to that town to find out the facts, arriving just as the cavalry scouts started for La-Fourche, and with them the captain went. This left young Lieutenant Phœbus W. Lyon, One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York, in command, without proper information of what to expect. When the Confederate troopers appeared they did not dare to attack the stockade, as they expected that the field-gun was there. They showed the convenient flag of truce. To the sergeant who was sent out to meet it a demand was made to see the commanding officer. Lieutenant Lyon, alone, went to meet them some three hundred yards from the stockade, and refused their demand for a surrender of the post, when the Confederate commander pulled out a revolver, placed it behind an ear of the lieutenant and demanded that he should go along with him. To the charge of violating a flag of truce by such a demand no attention was paid, and entirely at their mercy Lieutenant Lyon had to go with them, a prisoner of war. The enemy made a feint to charge upon the stockade, and then withdrew some distance. Without molestation the Federal troops embarked upon the train, which arrived shortly after all this occurred, and Lieutenant Lyon had to witness the evacuation, from the woods where he was held, with chagrin.
At Thibodeaux the Confederates captured all the infantry stationed there, also about one hundred men upon plantations in the vicinity (forty-seven men of the Twelfth Maine, with Lieutenants Freeman H. Chase and John W. Dana, convalescents sent by Stickney from Brashear; forty others, also convalescents from Brashear; about ten men Company D, One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York; and a few plantation guards). At Terrebonne Captain William H. May, Twenty-Third Connecticut, was taken prisoner.
When the cavalry-man had made his report all of the troops were ordered to “fall in,” and a line of battle was formed. The position taken is described by Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney in his official report as follows: “The levee of the Bayou La-Fourche is about twelve feet high; the railroad crosses the bayou over the top of the levee, nearly in a direction perpendicular to that of the bayou, and is about twelve feet above the level of the surrounding country. For five or six miles to the east of La-Fourche Crossing a carriage-road runs up and down the bayou on both sides close to the levee, passing under the railroad on both sides of the bayou. We were on the east side of the bayou and north of the railroad, our front being parallel with the railroad, extending about one hundred and fifty yards from the levee, and being about two hundred yards from the railroad. From the right of our front I had a line of defence running perpendicular to and resting upon the railroad. I was obliged to have my front farther from the railroad than it otherwise would have been, on account of trees standing, which could not be cut down. The country around was level, affording full play for the artillery, and was covered with tall grass, which I subsequently had cut down, as it concealed, in a measure, movements in our front.
“A detachment of about fifty men of the Twenty-Third Connecticut, under command of Major Miller, was posted in the tall grass on both sides of the road along the levee, lying down, about four hundred and fifty yards in advance of the battle line.
“The remainder of the infantry was drawn up in line, with the right flank in reverse, excepting the company of convalescent men, under Captain Fletcher, Twenty-Sixth Maine, who were posted at the railroad bridge.
“Captain Blober and his cavalry-men were posted so as to guard against the turning of the right flank, with the detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts in their front, and to the rear of the centre of the battle line.
“The artillery was posted as follows: a 12 Pr. gun upon the railroad bridge, near the left bank of the bayou; two 12 Pr. howitzers and one 6 Pr. gun on the battle line front, one of the howitzers being so placed upon the extreme right so that its fire could be directed to the front or right flank.”
These movements were the first indication of an action in which this detachment of the Forty-Second had seen an opportunity to participate. Not without reason Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney rode up to Lieutenant Tinkham and asked him what he thought about the behavior of his men under fire; the lieutenant answered, he did not know, but thought they would fight. Cavalry-Captain Blober, a plucky little German, was boiling over for a fight. He was just the man to put courage into any one a little weak in the knees. Later in the day this captain captured a Confederate bugler upon the road.
With nothing to eat since the evening before, a hot, dusty and tedious ride in the cars early that morning, lounging around all day in a hot sun, no wonder there were many anxious inquiries, at all hours of the day, for some stimulant. Those who had it in their possession kept still, and the welcome friend was hard to find. However, no sooner had position in line been taken to meet the expected enemy, when out came the secreted whiskey, and was passed around to those in need of it.
About five o’clock the enemy came marching down the bayou road, mounted, in column of fours, and as soon as the head of the column was in sight a shot was fired from the gun upon the bridge, causing them to halt and retire. They soon advanced about one hundred skirmishers, who drove in the Federal pickets and moved on until encountering the detachment Twenty-Third Connecticut, hid in tall grass, who, after an exchange of shots, fell back upon the right flank of the main line without loss.
The artillery gave them a few solid shot and shell, when the enemy retired towards Thibodeaux with their killed and wounded.
Even here, almost before a gun was fired, the malady which seemed to have attacked some officers on duty in this section was made manifest. Major Miller, Twenty-Third Connecticut, during the day had spoken to Major Morgans and Lieutenant Tinkham about a surrender to the enemy; said he was in favor of it, and that it was of no use to make a fight. He got an unfavorable response from these officers, but the major continued panic-struck, for, after the first fire by the enemy upon the Twenty-Third Connecticut in the grass, as Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney says in his official report: “I found Major Miller, some distance to the rear of his command, crouching in the high weeds on the levee. I ordered him under arrest, and put in command of this detachment the next senior officer, who faithfully executed my order.”
Soon after the enemy’s disappearance, instead of promptly throwing out his skirmishers to follow up their retrograde movement and ascertain what they were doing, Stickney sent a flag of truce to obtain permission to remove his hospital stores and sick from the hospital, which was in front of his lines and exposed to his fire. The truce party went two and one-half miles on the road before meeting the Confederate pickets. True to their own cowardly use of flags of truce, they refused to comply with Stickney’s request. This made no difference, however, as they could not interfere where they were, and the hospital contents were removed to the Federal rear, and, just before dark, the building was burned, to prevent interference with the range of fire. A building upon the other side of the bayou was also set on fire, to enable movements of the enemy to be seen, as it was feared they might come down on that side and attempt to cross the railroad bridge.
The position in line of battle was maintained all night, ready to repel at any moment an attack: the men rested upon the ground as best they could; pickets were thrown out about four hundred yards to the front; squads of cavalry kept scouting to the right and rear; everything upon this Johnson Plantation that could be used for fuel was torn down to keep fires going.
About eleven o’clock at night a train arrived from Algiers with five companies, three hundred and six men, Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sawtelle. Being the senior officer, Stickney tendered him the command, which Lieutenant-Colonel Sawtelle refused. The Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts went into line on the front. No demonstrations were made by the enemy during the night.
The next morning, Sunday, June 21st, Captain Grow with one section of the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery and thirty men arrived from Algiers. One gun went into position on the extreme left of the line to cover the bayou road, and one gun was held in reserve, where it could be moved to the front or upon the right flank, as occasion should require. Slight earthworks were thrown up, at no point over two feet high, but they extended only a few yards in either direction from the angle formed on the right flank by the two fronts.
During the morning Confederate mounted troops appeared in small bodies within range of the outposts, to reconnoitre the position. About four o’clock in the afternoon nearly one hundred and fifty Confederates, mounted and dismounted, attacked the outposts and pickets, but made no attempt to advance in force. A desultory fire was maintained for one hour and a half, when the enemy retired.
Shortly after noon a heavy rain commenced, and continued until about half-past six o’clock, drenching the men to the skin, who maintained a battle line the greater part of the day as they had during the night. Stickney claims this was necessary, as he could not depend on the men falling into position with sufficient alacrity at the least warning.
The Federal position at dusk was about the same as on the previous day, except that two companies of the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts were added to the front line, two companies on the right flank in reverse, and one company upon the railroad bridge in support of the gun placed there.
Between five and six o’clock Lieutenant Tinkham was ordered to advance on the road to a point about one-quarter of a mile in front, with his Forty-Second Massachusetts detachment and some fifty negroes, to take down a rail fence that somewhat obstructed the view. While engaged in this work the enemy could be seen about another quarter of a mile up the road, somewhat covered by the woods. Captain Blober tried his best to draw them on, by riding towards them and circling around as the ground would permit, without effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney rode up and wanted a volley fired at them, but Lieutenant Tinkham informed him it would do no good, as his men were armed with Springfield smooth-bore guns that would not reach the distance. Finally a volley was fired, without effect, when Stickney told the lieutenant to hold on and he would send out a field-gun, which was done.
It was shortly after this fence was levelled that the enemy, dismounted, with a yell, and opening fire at the same time, made a charge. The field-gun, after three discharges of canister shot, was abandoned by the Twenty-Fifth New York artillery-men, although Lieutenant Tinkham suggested to the gunner in command to fire in retreat. The gunner was either a coward or too frightened to listen to any orders or suggestions, and the gun was left. As the gunners retreated Lieutenant Tinkham, who had his men in line to the rear in support, upon one side of the road, wheeled the detachment into line across the bayou road and gave the enemy a volley from his smooth-bores, carrying a ball and three buckshot to each musket, almost point-blank in their faces. They were not over ten paces distant. This volley staggered them for a few minutes, as well it might, for an uglier weapon to face at close quarters than those Springfield smooth-bore muskets, even in the hands of raw troops, could not be found in the entire army at that time.
Promptly faced about, the detachment was double-quicked back to the battle line as fast as the mud and slippery condition of the road would allow, for the rain had caused the Louisiana soil of that region to assume the consistency of a sticky paste, so well known to all campaigners in the Gulf Department. With this uncertain footing, the close proximity of the enemy, fairly on their heels,16 yelling and firing, and the balance of the Federal force in line of battle also opening fire, placing the detachment between two lines of fire, it is remarkable that the casualties were so few at this time. Not a man was taken prisoner. Major Morgans did not expect the detachment would be able to get back, but reserved the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York fire as long as he dared, and then opened an oblique firing, to prevent any harm to the detachment, if possible.
16 One of the curious events of the action, which also proves the close proximity of the enemy, was that a Confederate lieutenant-colonel, mounted upon an iron-grey horse, who must have distanced his men in the charge they made, got around and ahead, by the flank, and led the Forty-Second detachment on its retreat to the main line. This officer came in contact with men of the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, who made him a prisoner, as related later on in this chapter.
The Forty-Second detachment was not out as skirmishers, and did not have that formation. It was on a special duty and had performed that duty. No orders were given the lieutenant except to support the field-gun. What had become of the pickets and outposts Lieutenant Tinkham did not know. The enemy were upon him almost without warning, for they had crept up in the tall grass on his front. In his official report Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney says: “The enemy advanced rapidly and soon compelled the pickets to fall back on the main line, which they reached in rather a straggling condition at our left wing.” This could not mean the detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts, for they did nothing of the kind. The detachment ran in, maintaining as good an alignment as the slippery soil would allow.
A ridiculous proceeding occurred just after the detachment reached the line. A second-lieutenant, an acting staff-officer, came up in an excited manner and ordered Lieutenant Tinkham to go back and retake the abandoned gun. Tinkham replied he would see him d—d first, and to go and get it himself. With the darkness, fire opened on the enemy in front, the bad condition of the ground and the uncertainty just where the gun was at that moment, made the undertaking foolhardy, without a chance for success; in reality giving the enemy a present of so many prisoners. It was another instance of that want of judgment in an inexperienced officer, of which many examples were furnished in the whole history of General “Dick” Taylor’s raid towards New Orleans.
After reaching the line the detachment was posted on the extreme left, resting on the bayou and covering the road. Firing was continuate until about eight o’clock. The artillery used canister; there not being any canister for the 6 Pr. gun, packages of musket ammunition were used instead. The infantry were ordered to fire by rank, and opened in that manner, soon substituting firing at will. The smoke became quite dense and would not lift readily, on account of the dampness of the atmosphere. Nothing could be seen in front, not even flashes of the enemy’s guns; nothing to be heard, except continued reports of artillery and musketry-firing.
When the order was given “cease firing,” pickets were thrown out, and the abandoned gun, near the rail fence, left by the enemy when they withdrew, was brought in to the Federal lines. The wounded within reach were carried to a field-hospital that had been established in a planter’s house, about one-quarter of a mile in the rear. The Federals rested upon their arms, remaining in line of battle all night, with what sleep they could obtain under the circumstances. Moans and cries of the wounded, well to the front, could be distinctly heard. Totally destitute of provisions, and hungry, having been without food of any consequence for forty-eight hours, worn out by loss of sleep and fatigue, nothing but the excitement could have held the men up so long and prevented them from breaking down completely.
That many of the Confederates were crazy drunk and in no condition to continue a steady fight seems to be fully established by the information obtained on Tuesday, when an advance to Thibodeaux was made. They were capable of making a bold dash, but no more; repulsed, they could not maintain a destructive fire. What firing came from their side was wild and high, as the total casualties to the entire Federal force engaged amply testifies.
Notwithstanding General “Dick” Taylor, in his book called “Destruction and Reconstruction,” says that Colonel Major had no artillery with him, they fired a few shots from one field-gun while Tinkham and his men were at the rail fence. Whether they ceased firing because their ammunition was bad or damaged by rain, or compelled to do so by shots from a gun of the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery that was placed in position upon the right to engage their gun, is not known. Prisoners stated that they had other guns in position, but the rain prevented their use.
There were many sensational stories told next day of what was done along the line. Some men of the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York claimed to have performed special feats of valor. A careful inspection of the ground in front soon put to flight all belief in these camp yarns. The enemy never got dangerously close, except in a few individual cases. An attempt made by them to gain the rear and turn the right flank caused the gunners of the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery to become panic stricken and abandon their gun, a 12 Pr. howitzer, posted at the angle made by the front and right flank thrown in reverse. This made two guns that the Twenty-Fifth New York artillery-men abandoned in this action, though only one came into possession of the enemy.
The actual Federal force in this action was eight hundred and thirty-eight men; about six hundred were engaged; the balance were posted upon the railroad bridge and to protect the right. The Federal loss in this action was: three killed, ten wounded, Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts Infantry; two killed, twelve wounded, One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York Infantry; one killed, three wounded, Forty-Second Massachusetts Infantry; two killed, sixteen wounded, Twenty-Third Connecticut Infantry.
Lieutenant Starr, Twenty-Third Connecticut, was the only commissioned officer injured in the action. He was wounded in the thigh, and afterwards died in consequence of amputation.
The force of Confederates engaged is estimated to have been six hundred men of the Second Texas Mounted Rangers, Colonel Pyron, claiming to be the oldest regiment in the Confederate service, and that they never before had been whipped in action.
As General Taylor has published that only two hundred men under Colonel Pyron made an attack on La-Fourche Crossing, the attack being repulsed with a loss to the Confederates of only fifty-five killed and wounded,17 the official report of Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney is again quoted: “The enemy were engaged during the night in carrying away their killed and wounded who were outside of our lines, and the following morning fifty-three of their dead were counted inside of our pickets. When we entered Thibodeaux, Tuesday morning, nearly sixty wounded were found in the hospitals, from which I conclude that their loss in killed and wounded must have been three hundred, taking fifty as the number of their killed, and reckoning the ratio of killed to wounded as one to four.”
17 General Taylor relies on the official report of Colonel Major for this statement. As a specimen of Confederate reports on their operations west of the Mississippi River during June and July, the following extract of Major’s report of this action is given:
“At Paincourtville received a despatch from Colonel Lane stating he had captured the town, taking one hundred and forty prisoners and a large amount of stores, also a small force at Terrebonne Station, and that there was a force in strong position, with artillery, at La-Fourche Crossing. I pushed on and arrived at Thibodeaux at 3.30 A.M., on the twenty-first. Pickets reported reënforcements from New Orleans during the night, and at sun-up reported the enemy advancing. I posted Pyron’s regiment, West’s battery and two squadrons cavalry on east bank La-Fourche, and moved them down towards the railroad bridge. Lane, Stone and Phillip were posted at Terrebonne Station, and they were moved forward to La-Fourche Crossing. The enemy fell back, and my pursuit was checked by one of the heaviest rains I ever saw fall. It rained until five P.M., and having only thirty rounds of ammunition to the man when I started, and not over one hundred cartridge boxes in the entire command, my ammunition was nearly all ruined, and I found myself with an enemy in front, rear, and on the flank, with only three rounds of ammunition to the man. I directed Pyron, as soon as it stopped raining, to strengthen his picket and feel the enemy, find his position, and test his strength, giving him some discretion in the matter. He advanced his picket, driving the enemy into his stronghold, and then charged his works, taking four guns and causing a great many of the Federals to surrender. But night had come on; it was very dark, the ammunition nearly all gone, and just at that moment a train with about three hundred fresh men arrived from New Orleans, and Pyron was forced to retire from a position won by a daring assault, unequalled, I think, in this war. Had I known his intention to assault the works I could have sent him such reënforcements as would have insured success. Pyron’s strength in the attack was two hundred and six. The enemy’s force, reported by themselves, was over one thousand.”
Some of these statements will cause a smile to spread o’er the face of men on the Federal side who were in this action.
Probably this is not an exaggeration, but many of the wounded must have been slightly so, not going into the hospitals, except for occasional treatment, else a larger number would have been captured. They left some badly wounded upon the field. One poor fellow was found bleeding to death from wounds, in a trench not over fifty feet in front of the line.
Whether Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney is correct or not, in regard to the Confederate dead, Lieutenant Cooke, Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, reports the following facts, viz.: “On the morning of the twenty-second, when a lookout, stationed upon a house, reported a flag of truce coming, I happened to be standing near Stickney, who immediately turned to me and said: ‘Meet them as far outside of our picket line as you possibly can, and I will despatch another officer immediately to act as messenger.’ I was upon my horse instantly, and galloped up the bayou road, running my sword-point through my handkerchief corners to make a flag of truce, meeting the party so far from our lines as to cause, I fancied, a shade of disappointment to pass over the face of an officer in charge, which quickly changed to a smile as we drew rein and saluted; he introduced himself as Captain Johnson, of Texas, and remarked that it was a singular coincidence that both sides should start out at the same time for a truce, and was much astonished when I said that I had come to meet him, having seen him approaching. He stated that he was sent by Colonel Major to ask permission to drive upon the battle field with their wagons and carry away their dead. The request was carried to Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney, who replied that it was impossible to grant it, but if they would send their wagons to the point of negotiation he would receive and return them to the same point loaded. This was a necessity, for the majority of their dead lay so near our battle line had they been permitted to come near they would have gained an accurate knowledge of our position and numbers. Colonel Major assented to this modification of his request, and wagons soon began to arrive and the work went on. After the transfer was made I inquired of those who were engaged in the work how many dead they found, and was told one hundred and sixty. These are the figures written in my diary at the time. I was also told that in one place fifteen bodies were found in such close proximity as to justify the statement that they were slain in a heap. At my interview with Captain Johnson, he complimented our forces in very flattering terms for the courage and steadiness with which they met and repelled the assault; that had it been known we had such a large and well-disciplined force their action would have been less hasty and impetuous.”
The ground was cut at regular intervals by irrigating ditches, a probable reason why the enemy made their attack dismounted. These ditches made the ground unfavorable for cavalry.
Two of the unwounded prisoners captured (sixteen in number) came in and surrendered to Lieutenant Tinkham, after the firing had ceased. They must have secreted themselves under the lee of the bayou bank.
The killed and wounded of the Forty-Second detachment were:
Private Reuben Dyson, Company E, wounded fatally in the abdomen and hip, and died in a short time after he was carried to the rear. When wounded he clasped both hands across his abdomen and exclaimed: “What have I done that they should hit me!”
Sergeant Edmand A. Jones, Company B, was slightly wounded in the left shoulder.
Private William Whiting, Company B, was wounded by a bullet in the back of his neck which passed out of his mouth, taking three teeth in its course.
Private Daniel S. Woodman, Company B, was wounded in the right hand, losing one finger and part of the thumb joint; also, shot in the right breast, the ball entering about two inches above the right nipple, passed through the upper part of his lung and came out through the shoulder blade.
Private Dyson was buried on the field at La-Fourche. Private Woodman, too dangerously wounded to be removed, was left in an abandoned planter’s house in care of an old planter. Woodman had lain upon the field all night; was carried to the hospital about noon next day, where his wounds were dressed by surgeons of the Twenty-Third Connecticut and Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts. His clothes were removed, as they were very bloody, and he lay naked almost a week, when a comrade procured some old, ragged clothing for him. He was brought from La-Fourche July 31st, and came home with the regiment.
Early on the morning of Monday, June 22d, the enemy were found to have retired near to Thibodeaux. Among the debris picked up upon the field was found some muskets that were identified as belonging to the three companies Forty-Second, captured at Galveston. The wounded were cared for and the Federal dead buried.
A Confederate flag of truce came with a request for permission to bury their dead and carry away their wounded. This was granted on condition that all of their wounded men outside the camp lines should be paroled, that none of their drivers should come within the outposts, and that all wounded within the camp should be retained. They agreed to these conditions, and men were engaged throughout the morning, with carts and wagons furnished by the enemy, in carrying their dead to Thibodeaux.
Very early in the morning there reached the crossing about six hundred men Fifteenth Maine Infantry, Colonel Isaac Dyer, a fresh regiment from Pensacola and Key West, under orders to reënforce the troops at Brashear City, and about eleven o’clock Colonel Cahill arrived from New Orleans with the Ninth Connecticut Infantry, two additional companies Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, and another section of the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery. Colonel Cahill assumed command of the forces at La-Fourche.
The men who comprised the detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts behaved admirably in this, their maiden action, with the exception of Sergeant Albert L. Clark and Private John Donnelly, both of Company B, who attempted to desert from their comrades, without leave, and board a train about to start for Algiers. They threw away their guns, and did not report to the detachment until Tuesday.
Lieutenant Clifford was not in this action, as he rejoined the detachment from leave of absence after the action was over.
Other men, attached to the several commands, showed the white feather, and the official report of Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney says: “Their wounded in our hands thought that our troops must be regulars, so steadily did they stand at their posts; but I regret to say that the train in waiting on the track left at the commencement of the fight, without orders, carrying away some cowardly soldiers, and that during the battle some few left their ranks and sought shelter near and behind the railroad.”
Among those who left by this train was the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts color-bearer with his flag. He was ordered back to his regiment in a peremptory manner by General Emory, commanding the Defences of New Orleans. A word of defence is due this color-bearer. A brave, honorable and worthy man; when the darkness came on he was ordered by his commanding officer to retire from the line and remain with his color at a house just to the rear. Those panic-stricken men who ran away from the ranks passed this house towards the railroad, shouting: “All is lost, the rebs are inside of our lines and gobbling up the whole force.” He supposed it to be true, and animated with a desire to save his flag also ran to the railroad, tearing his flag from the lance to secrete it upon his person. He felt the disgrace keenly, suffered mental agony, and died from the effect upon him in September following. None of his comrades thought him guilty of cowardice, rather a victim to circumstances, for he could not see the true situation.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney officially makes special mention of two officers and one private. He says: “Major Morgans, commanding the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York Regiment, through the action encouraged his men, and to him is due, in a great degree, the fine conduct that they showed. Captain Jenkins, commanding the Twenty-Third Connecticut, displayed the greatest bravery and coolness. A Confederate officer seized him by the throat, demanding a surrender. The assault was immediately returned in precisely the same manner, when one of Captain Jenkins’ men bayoneted the Confederate. I desire particularly to mention Sergeant John Allyn, Company A, Forty-Seventh Massachusetts Regiment, who has been with me since I was ordered to Brashear City, and has at all times rendered the most valuable service, going on dangerous scouts, once inside the enemy’s lines, and showing at all times the greatest courage and remarkable sound judgment. His thorough knowledge of the country and habit of reporting facts only were of the greatest assistance to me.”
Two companion incidents to the hand-to-hand scrape of Captain Jenkins are these: Lieutenant Cooke, acting adjutant Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, the action still in progress, was startled by the sudden appearance before him, inside of the battle line, of a Confederate lieutenant-colonel, who said: “Captain, I am badly wounded, will you be kind enough to take me to the rear.” The lieutenant informed him he would do so, when he felt justified in taking men from the ranks to act as a guard, and conducted the wounded officer to a tent, standing not more than twenty yards to the rear, and saw him comfortably stretched out upon the straw. After the action was over, with no prospect of its renewal, Lieutenant Cooke went to this tent for his prisoner, to find him gone, without a clew to be obtained of his whereabouts. On the reconnoissance to Thibodeaux, twenty-third, this wounded officer was found in hospital, and paroled. He stated that while lying in the tent it occurred to him that in the darkness he might walk out of our lines, and did so without difficulty.
Another case of foolhardy bravery was exhibited by a fiery Texan lieutenant, who rushed up to a field-gun, placing his hand upon it, in face of a dozen men, and demanded its surrender. Three men answered him; one with a bayonet, one with a musket ball, the other with the butt of his gun, to send him down to mother earth fatally wounded, and with curses upon his lips of the men who did their duty. He was carried to the hospital, and lived four hours.
No further hostile movement was made by either combatants on Monday, except at about dark the Confederates fired a few rounds from one field-gun. On Tuesday, June 23d, an advance was made to Thibodeaux by a part of the troops, now commanded by Colonel Cahill, to find the enemy had gone. Colonel Major with his Texans were well on their way towards the rear of Brashear City. At night the Fifteenth Maine Infantry was sent back to New Orleans.
Wednesday morning, June 24th, at eight o’clock, five companies Ninth Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgibbon, proceeded to Terrebonne Station as guard to a construction train, repairing the track for one mile beyond. Proceeding towards Chucahoula, twelve miles from Bayou Bœuff, the bridge, one mile from the station, was found to be on fire. This was extinguished, and the bridge repaired. Skirmishers were then deployed and advanced towards the station, where the enemy was found on the open land, behind buildings and fences, who at once commenced a sharp fire. Confined to the narrow track, a thickly-wooded swamp upon both sides, after engaging the enemy for one hour Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgibbon deemed it prudent to retire, also being recalled by a signal-gun fired at La-Fourche Crossing, nine miles distant, which the lieutenant-colonel says he heard. The Federal loss was three wounded, and two men taken prisoners by the enemy.
Port Hudson still holding out, with work enough in prospect to occupy the attention of all the available forces in the Department, the troops that composed the force under General Emory, charged with the defence of New Orleans, reduced to a low number, and Brashear City lost, with all of the troops on duty between that place and La-Fourche Crossing, there existed no further necessity for holding the railroad line to Brashear. The ill-luck experienced by General Emory in losing post after post, through cowardice and inefficiency of regimental officers, surrendering without firing a gun, was not assuring as to how far he could trust the balance of his force. Prudence dictated to withdraw his troops close to the city where protection of the navy could be given.
The Confederates pushed up from Brashear, bold and fearless, offering many opportunities to inflict some hard blows against their undisciplined troops if any equally bold officers had been with the Federal soldiers. This was not the case, and on June 26th the Federal force fell back to Boutee Station, twenty-four miles from Algiers, after they had spiked and abandoned three field-guns and some old iron guns; an absurd gift to the enemy, without any valid excuse.
With the energy displayed by the enemy, which the Federals did not meet with counter efforts, it was undoubtedly sound policy to allow them to dash against the fortified defences whenever they felt so disposed. They moved quickly from place to place, leaving stragglers and scouting squads occupying all of the roads in the region of country upon the left bank held by them, looting where they could. Many of them could easily have been bagged by small forces equally as bold; by so doing thrown them into much the same state of uncertainty where to look for a blow as existed among the Federal officers.
While at Boutee Station orders from Colonel Cahill directed the Forty-Second detachment to be temporarily attached to the Fifteenth Maine and to proceed to the Metairie race-course, in New Orleans, where a camp was formed, comprised of detachments One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York, Twenty-Third Connecticut and Fifteenth Maine, with Grow’s battery; Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney in command of the force. These orders were countermanded on the same day and the detachment ordered to rejoin the regiment, then in New Orleans, and did so June 29th, bringing under guard to the provost-marshal some sixty prisoners taken at La-Fourche and vicinity.
On the thirtieth June the Federal force drew back to Jefferson Station, eight miles from Algiers, where fortifications of a formidable character were thrown up by large gangs of negroes. This station was an outpost to the Defences of New Orleans for some weeks, with pickets upon the roads and railroad line back to Algiers, and the river patroled by gunboats between Company Canal and Donaldsonville.
While the Confederates under General Taylor raided on the various posts in the Parishes between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi Rivers, picking up all scattered troops found, to send them on parole to New Orleans, the garrison in the defences of the city was quite small. General Banks had drawn all the men he dared to take in front of Port Hudson, even bringing troops from Ship Island and Pensacola. To offset this General Emory had all troops in the garrison, on whatever duty, kept ready from the nineteenth June until all danger was over to move readily at any moment with two days cooked rations and one hundred rounds per man. The Second Brigade, Second Division, was concentrated as far as possible; all passes or leaves of absence were absolutely stopped; convalescent soldiers were got together and organized, and colored regiments, recruited from intelligent blacks of the city, were organized for sixty days service, under colored officers. In this manner were sufficient troops obtained to do the needed garrison duty, furnish required guards and patrol service, while the regular forces attended to the extreme outposts. The First Texas Cavalry, Colonel Davis, did all of the scouting service, under direct orders from General Emory.
This action at La-Fourche Crossing must not be confounded with the disastrous engagement of July 13th at Bayou La-Fourche, in which the Forty-Eighth, Forty-Ninth and Thirtieth Massachusetts Regiments formed a part of the Federal forces; Colonel Dudley in command.
New Orleans on a Sunday during the summer of 1863 would have shocked those staid old New Englanders who believed in a proper observance of the day. Army and navy officers, soldiers and sailors, who could obtain furloughs, did not hesitate to use the day for a grand spree. All the elements were there to have a merry time, and upon the Shell-road there was seen a cosmopolite crowd bent on enjoyment of the day. The colored population was always out in full force. Until one got so used to it that the novelty was gone, all this excitement, in endless variety, was not to be lost by those who could take part.
The Fourth of July was made a gala-day. Salutes were fired morning, noon and night. A street parade was made by the Forty-Second Massachusetts and a few small companies from the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York, Twenty-Third Connecticut Infantry and Twenty-Fifth New York Battery, with two squadrons cavalry, as an escort to a procession of citizens, mostly dark colored. Fireworks in front of the Custom House at night closed the jubilations of the day.
At the Custom House the regiment remained until July 14th, on provost duty and on guard over Confederate prisoners, confined in the best part of the building. The treatment of these prisoners was good; their food was the same furnished to the regiment on guard, and except deprivation of their liberty they had no reason to complain. It was a hot time the day these Confederate officers arrived from Port Hudson. A large crowd of sympathizers were on hand to welcome them, so boisterous in behavior the cavalry-men, who assisted the infantry guard, in a number of cases lost their temper and drove the people into stores and houses by backing their horses into the crowd; sabres were also used a few times. The crowd threatened at one time to make an attempt to seize some stacked arms in a street near the Custom House, after the prisoners were placed in quarters. In a day or two quiet was restored and all expressions of sympathy ceased.
While on duty in the city all drills were suspended; parades of ceremony, guard-mounting and dress parade, took place on the reserved ground in the centre of Canal Street. These parades were gone through with in an indifferent manner on account of hot weather and debility, which began to affect a great majority of the men. Not being acclimated the extreme hot weather told on their health in a marked degree; not exactly in a condition to be called sick, they did not feel well; what duty had to be done was made easy as possible. Guards for hospitals, men for patrol, funeral escorts, and regular sentry duty at quarters kept at work every man able to do duty. One funeral escort was furnished every day, always at six o’clock in the afternoon.
After several assaults had been made upon solitary unarmed soldiers by the rough element in the city, an order was issued July 11th for every officer and soldier to wear his side-arms whenever upon the street. Several men had been roughly handled, and reports were current of the assassination of two men in the suburbs, but of the truth of this report there is no definite knowledge. The night patrol had orders to prevent more than three persons assembling together and to arrest all officers and men of the army without side-arms. The patrol furnished by the Forty-Second consisted of one lieutenant and eighteen men, who covered all streets within the limits of—from St. Mary’s Market to Eliseum Field Street, to Dauphin Street, to Canal Street, to St. Charles Street, to Julia Street, to Tchoupitoulas Street, and to Custom House Street. These limits covered many questionable places of resort and afforded night patrols an opportunity to see very curious incidents. At reunions of the regiment these incidents form the basis of a large number of amusing anecdotes.
To while away care and to lighten the burden of duty a few officers and men conceived an idea of forming a mock Sons of Malta Lodge. Prominent in this amusement were Captain Leonard, Lieutenants Sanderson and Phillips, Sergeant-Major Bosson, Sergeants Nichols, Vialle, Attwell, and others. The first move was to secure a victim for an initiation ceremony. It was decided to try Sergeant John Binney, of Company A, a man well known to all on duty at the Custom House. After broaching the subject in a careful way to the sergeant, he was anxious to join such a lodge, which he was informed had already been formed, and thought it an excellent idea. He was kept in suspense a few days on the plea that his name would have to go before the lodge, and if not black-balled he would be admitted on a certain evening. Binney caught at the bait like a hungry fish.
When everything was ready the pseudo-lodge members assembled, masked, in a dimly-lighted room in the Custom House, prepared for fun. A bugle, trombone, bass-drum and cymbals were procured from the band, officers appointed, and the sergeant, blindfolded, was admitted after passing through certain mock forms at the door. All worked well; the questions and answers and chorus from lodge members were carried out with due decorum until the moment the embrace of fellowship was to be given.
There was attached to Company C, as cook, an immense large negro, a regular old plantation hand, tall, burly looking, black as coal, with an odor about him as bad as from a skunk. With some difficulty, and not without threats, this negro was got into the room and made to strip naked to the waist. As the arms of Binney were placed around this negro and his head laid upon the bare, black breast the whole ceremony came near being spoiled by those present bursting into a roar of laughter; fortunately this was stifled, and amid a crashing din, made by band instruments, gas was turned on and the bandage removed from the eyes of candidate Binney. For a moment dead silence reigned, while Binney stared around and then at the negro in such a manner those present can never forget. Suddenly he kicked him, and with an exclamation more forcible than polite he proceeded to kick him out of the room amid peals of laughter. The negro did not lose any time in escaping from Binney’s wrath, for the poor fellow had been almost frightened out of his wits during the initiation; large drops of sweat stood out upon his face and breast like moisture on a well-filled ice pitcher.
Binney was mad. It was some time before he was cooled down. Finally he saw the joke, took it good-naturedly, and had his revenge in assisting at the initiation of others. Quite a number were “put through,” but as the proceedings leaked out candidates became scarce, and the lodge adjourned sine die.
While at Bayou Gentilly there was much discussion among some officers and men about their time of enlistment, caused by a regimental order, issued May 19th, promulgating the time of service for the regiment to expire on July 14th. Opinions varied, and naturally the men inclined to believe that theory which made their time for discharge come early. Some company officers allowed themselves to display their ignorance by agreeing with the short-term men, and did all in their power to keep up that belief. Those who knew better did not try to stop this short-term theory by informing the men of the true facts in the case. By a decision of the War Department, promulgated at the time when nine months regiments were called for, and modified at various times so that it was at last expressly stated that companies could be mustered when full, the men to draw pay from time of enlistment, though it be a month or two before their company was mustered; that when ten companies were mustered and formed into a regiment, then the field and staff were to be mustered, and the time of the regiment would date from the time the tenth company was mustered into service. This should have been known by all officers. Men in the companies who did not have the correct information imparted to them had an idea their term expired from date of muster of each company, and thought they could be sent home by companies. These men seemed to think of nothing but to get home as soon as possible, and they did not show any pride in the duty of a soldier, nor any regard for the cause they were in service for.
A few company commanders sent in to Department headquarters a notification their time would be out on a certain date—which was required by regulations—and received for reply the information, in substance, as issued by the War Department. Notwithstanding this official information they still refused to believe such to be the case, and took no steps to quell a mutinous sentiment which prevailed to a great extent; men swearing they would rather be shot than do another day’s duty, and similar foolish remarks.
This feeling reached a climax on the morning of July 14th. In the morning orders had been received to have the companies in readiness to move at a moment’s notice, in light marching order. The men and a few officers declared the time of the regiment had expired, and refused to do further duty. It was necessary to notify General Emory. The day before it was with difficulty a detachment of seventy-three men was furnished Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgibbon, who ordered the detail.
The men on duty were assembled upon the top of the Custom House and addressed by Lieutenant-Colonel W. D. Smith, One Hundred and Tenth New York Volunteers, acting assistant-adjutant-general on the staff of the general commanding. The trouble was mortifying, besides interfering with plans of the general, and it is no wonder Lieutenant-Colonel Smith could not control his temper, and used threats, combined with entreaty, to bring the men to a proper sense of their duty. The state of affairs was told to them, with a warning of what to expect if a refusal to do duty was persisted in. One officer, Lieutenant Duncan, Company F, protested, claiming that his time had expired, and asked in the name of justice that he and his men be sent home. He was promptly placed in arrest and his sword taken from him. This summary action was well-timed, for Lieutenant Duncan was a special champion of the “want to go home” men. It was proof to the men to butt against the Government was not an easy matter. When the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts marched into the Custom House in the afternoon, to occupy their old quarters and relieve the Forty-Second, ordered to Algiers, the men thought and so expressed themselves that the commanding officer intended to coerce the regiment into doing duty, if it was found necessary. Fortunately, without further difficulty, the regiment went over to Algiers in the afternoon. Lieutenant Duncan was released from arrest and his sword returned, after an apology for his hasty, ill-timed behavior.
A history of the regiment would not be correct, and the truth not told, without recording these events, though it is unpleasant to do so. All true friends of the Forty-Second have every reason to be thankful nothing further took place to bring discredit on the regiment. This ebullition of sentiment about expiration of time of enlistment is the only act the enlisted men, as a body, have reason to feel ashamed about during their term of service.
From the fourteenth to the twenty-ninth the regiment was on picket duty upon the Opelousas and Gulf Railroad. Headquarters of troops on the west bank of the Mississippi River were at Company Canal, Brigadier-General McMillan in command (from July 21st, when he relieved Colonel Plumley) of all troops from Algiers to Des Allemands, and troops were pushed forward to La-Fourche Crossing, repairing the track and bridges to that point. The picket-detail usually consisted of from thirty to forty men, who were out on duty forty-eight hours, carrying rations for that time, their blankets and mosquito bars. The bars did not prove effective protection, and it was generally the case these men could not obtain any sleep, for they were obliged to keep awake and fight the terribly annoying insects. This was all of the fighting done on picket.
This picket duty extended to Jefferson Station, eight miles from Algiers, where two companies of Colonel Desanger’s regiment of sixty-day free colored troops and a battery of artillery were on duty. These colored troops were neatly dressed in the United States regulation uniform, and to all appearances were doing their duty well. Besides this picket-detail a guard was retained on duty, comprising nine men from Company A, eight men from Company B, nine men from Company C, five men from Company E, seven men from Company F, seven men from Company H, forty-five men in all, and acting Lieutenant George G. Nichols, Company G, under the command of Lieutenant White, Company C, who were sent to the Bellevue Iron Works in Algiers, July 13th, to relieve a guard from the Ninth Connecticut over Confederate prisoners of war confined there.
Another permanent guard was detailed for duty at Canal Street and French Market Ferries from New Orleans. Their duty was to prevent soldiers or citizens from crossing over without passes and to arrest suspicious persons.
Algiers and vicinity would not have pleased a tourist, with its dilapidated and uncared-for buildings, abandoned and neglected plantations and small population. All drills were stopped. Men not on duty could stroll where they pleased. A mixed contraband camp, not far away, was a favorite spot for many men to pass their spare hours. The men raided on all watermelon patches within a radius of several miles until complaints were made to the provost-marshal. In more than one case did these melons effect a cure of that scourge in armies—chronic diarrhœa. Singular as it may seem several men with this complaint, unable to get relief from the surgeons, were completely cured by eating these melons.
Quarters were taken in an old salt warehouse close to the river, with all the companies located in the building, space allotted each company, every man making himself comfortable upon the floor. Doors and windows torn out, there was no trouble about ventilation in the extreme hot weather that prevailed. The guard occupied tents on the opposite side of the road; the company cooks18 and kitchens were in tents upon the levee. A house situated within a fine orchard, not far from the men’s quarters, was used by the surgeons for a hospital, the grounds in front for the field and staff-officers’ tents.