OATH. Arabic yamīn (يمين‎), pl. yamināt, aimān. The teaching of the Qurʾān with reference to an oath, is expressed in the following verses:—

Sūrah ii. 225: “God will not punish you for an inconsiderate word in your oath, but he will punish you for that which your hearts have assented to.”

Sūrah v. 91: “God will not punish you for an inconsiderate word in your oaths, but he will punish you in regard to an oath taken seriously. Its expiation shall be to feed ten poor persons with such moderate food as ye feed your own families with, or to clothe them; or to set free a captive. But he who cannot find means shall fast three days.”

Sūrah xvi. 96: “Take not your oaths between you deceitfully.”

The following is the teaching of Muḥammad, as given in the Traditions:—

“Whoever swears to a thing and says, ‘If it please God,’ and acts contrary to his oath, it is no sin.”

“Swear not by idols or by your own fathers.”

“Swear not by God except it be to the truth.”

“Whoever swears by the prayers or by the fast, or by the pilgrimage, is not a Muslim.”

The Prophet used generally to swear in these words: “No, by the Turner of Hearts.”

According to the Hidāyah (Hamilton’s ed., vol. vi., pp. 1, 2), yamīn is constituted by the use of the name of Almighty God, or by any of those appellations by which the Deity is generally known or understood.

False oaths are of three kinds:—

(1) Al-Yamīnu ʾl-G͟hamūs (اليمين الغموس‎). An oath taken concerning a thing already past, in which is conveyed an intentional falsehood on the part of the swearer: such an oath is highly sinful, the Prophet having declared—“Whosoever sweareth falsely, the same shall be condemned to hell.”

(2) Al-Yamīnu ʾl-munʿaqid (اليمين المنعقد‎). An oath taken concerning a matter which is to come. Thus, a man swears that he will do such a thing, or he will not do such a thing, and where he fails in this, expiation is incumbent upon him, which expiation is established on the authority of the sacred writings.

(3) Yamīnu ʾl-Lag͟hw (يمين اللغو‎). An oath taken concerning an incident or transaction already past, where the swearer believes that the matter to which he thus bears testimony accords with what he swears, though it should happen to be actually otherwise; in which case it may be hoped from the divine mercy that the swearer will not be condemned for such an oath.

The expiation, or kaffārah, is of no avail for the Yamīnu ʾl-G͟hamūs, but it is necessary for the Yamīnu ʾl-munʿaqid. It consists of either feeding or clothing ten poor persons, or releasing a Muslim captive.

The Muslim law with regard to oaths is a modification of the Talmudic law, for from the Divine law the Jewish doctors deduced many special cases of perjury, which are thus classified:—

(1) Jus jurandum promissorium, a rash or inconsiderate oath for the future, or a false assertion respecting the past (Lev. v. 4).

(2) Vanum, an absurd contradictory assertion.

(3) Depositi, breach of contract denied (Lev. xix. 11).

(4) Testimonii, judicial perjury (Lev. v. 1). (H. W. P. in Smith’s Dict. of the Bible.)

The Mosaic law admitted expiation in the case of rash or forgotten oaths, vide Lev. v. 4, but the Yamīnu ʾl-munʿaqid of Muḥammadan law allows a much greater latitude, for it applies to all vows or oaths excepting those intentionally false made with regard to future events.

The teaching of Muḥammadan jurists on the subject of oaths and vows, exhibits that reservatio mentalis of Muḥammadan morality which is so similar to that of the Jewish Rabbis, and which was condemned by Jesus Christ in St. Matt. xxiii. 16.

Sunnī writers on jurisprudence say that an oath should be expressed by such attributes of the Deity as are commonly used in swearing, such as the power, or the glory, or the might of God, because an oath is usually expressed under one or other of those qualities; and the sense of yamīn, viz. “strength,” is by this means obtained, since as the swearer believes in the power, glory, and might, and other attributes of the Deity, it follows that the mention of these attributes only is sufficient to strengthen the resolution in the performance of the act vowed, or the avoidance thereof.

If a man swear “by the knowledge of God,” it does not constitute an oath, because an oath expressed by the knowledge of God is not in use; moreover, by “knowledge” is frequently implied merely that which is known; and in this sense the word knowledge is not expressive either of the name of God, of any of His attributes. In the same manner, should a person swear “by the wrath of God,” or “by the mercy of God,” it does not constitute an oath, because an oath is not commonly expressed by any of these attributes; moreover, by the word raḥmah is sometimes understood “rain,” and “heaven” is also occasionally expressed by that term; and by the word G͟haiz̤ is understood “punishment”; and none of these are either appellations or attributes of the Deity.

If a person swear by another name than that of God,—such as “the Prophet,” or “the Holy Temple,” this does not constitute an oath, as the Prophet has said, “if any man among you take an oath, he must swear by the name of God, or else his oath is void.” If a person swear by the Qurʾān, it does not constitute an oath, although the Qurʾān be the word of God, because men do not swear by the Qurʾān. The compiler of the Hidāyah observes that this is where the swearer only says, “by the Prophet,” or “by the Temple,” or “by the Qurʾān,” but if the swearer say, “If I act contrary to what I now say, may I be deprived ‘of the Prophet,’ ” or “of the temple,” or “of the Qurʾān,” this constitutes an oath, because such privation would reduce the swearer to the state of an infidel, and the suspension of infidelity upon a condition amounts to yamīn.

Abū Ḥanīfah alleges that if a man should swear “by the truth of God,” this does not constitute an oath, and in this Imām Muḥammad coincides. There are two opinions of Abū Yūsuf recorded on this point. According to one, it is not an oath; but according to the other it is an oath, because truth is one of the attributes of the Deity, signifying the certainty of the divine existence, and hence it is the same as if the swearer were to say, “by God, the truth!” and as oaths are common under this mode of expression, so an oath is hereby constituted. The argument of Imām Muḥammad and Abū Ḥanīfah is that the term “the truth,” as here expressed, relates merely to the identity of the godhead as the object of obedience, and hence an oath thus expressed appears to be taken by that which is neither an appellation nor an attribute of God. The learned jurists, however, say that if a person express himself thus, “by the truth I will do so and so,” this constitutes an oath, because the truth is one of the appellatives or proper names of God. But if a person were to say, “I will do this truly,” it does not amount to an oath, because the word truly can only be taken, in this case, as a corroboration or confirmation of the promise contained in the speech, being the same as if he were to say, “I shall do this indeed.” If a man say, “I swear,” or “I vow,” or “I testify,” whether the words “by God” be superadded or not, it constitutes an oath, because such words are commonly used in swearing; the use of them in the present tense is undisputed; and they are also sometimes used in the future tense, where the context admits of a construction in the present; and attestation amounts to an oath, as in that sense it occurs in the sacred writings. Now swearing “by the name of God” is both customary and conformable to the divine ordinances, but without the name of God it is forbidden. When it so occurs, therefore, it must be construed into a lawful oath; hence some say that intention is not requisite in it; others, however, allege that the intention is essential, because the words here recited bear the construction of a promise, that is, they admit of being received as applying to the future, and also of being taken as a vow without the name of God.

If a person, speaking in the Persian language, were to say, “I swear by God,” it amounts to an oath, because here the idiom confines the expression solely to the present; but if he were to say simply, “I swear,” some allege that this does not constitute an oath. If he were to say, “I swear by the divorce of my wife,” this is not an oath, as an oath is not so expressed in practice.

If a man in swearing say “by the age” or “the existence of God,” it constitutes an oath, because the age or existence of God signifies his eternity, which is one of his attributes.

If a person should say, “If I do this may I be a Jew, or a Christian, or an infidel,” it constitutes an oath; because, as the swearer has made the condition a sign of infidelity, it follows that he is conscious of his obligation to avoid the condition; and this obligation is possible, by making it an oath, in such a way as to render unlawful to himself that which is lawful. And if the oath relate to anything which he has done in the time past, as if he were to say, “If I have done so may I be a Jew or an infidel,” and so forth, this is yamīnu ʾl-G͟hamūs, or “perjury.” The swearer is not, however, in this case made a Jew or an infidel, because the words “may I be an infidel,” and so forth, relate to some future indefinite period. Some, on the contrary, have alleged that he becomes actually as an infidel, because the penalty which the swearer imprecates upon himself relates to the present instant of his testimony, being the same as if he were to say, “I am a Jew,” &c. But the majority of doctors say, the swearer does not become a Jew or infidel in either of the cases, either in that of a vow with respect to the future, or an oath regarding the past, provided he consider this merely as a form of swearing. But if he believe that by thus swearing he fully subjects himself to the penalty expressed, he suffers accordingly, in either instance, because he appears consenting to infidelity, on account of having ventured upon a thing by the commission of which he conceives that he may be rendered an infidel.

If a person say, “If I do this, may the anger of God fall upon me,” this does not constitute a vow, as not being a customary mode of expression for that purpose. And so also, if a person were to say, “May I be an adulterer or a drunkard or an usurer,” because these are not generally understood or received as forms of swearing.

The following are considered the most solemn and binding methods of taking an oath:—

1. Saying three times “by the Great God.”

2. Taking the Qurʾān and saying, “by what this contains of the word of God.”

3. By placing a sword on the Qurʾān.

4. By saying, “I impose upon myself divorcement.”

Muḥammad himself was rather given to swearing, and the Qurʾān is full of wild oaths, one of the most terrible of which, according to the Prophet’s own words, is to “swear by the setting stars.” (Sūrah lvi. 74.)

Burckhardt, in his notes on the Bedouin Arabs, says that these children of the desert often take hold of the middle of a tent pole and swear by the life of the tent and its owners.

As might be expected, from the example set them by their Prophet, Muḥammadans are commonly guilty of taking God’s name in vain by swearing upon every petty occasion. Like the μα Δία of the Greeks, the word is hardly ever out of their mouths.

[For further information on the subject of Oaths, see Hamilton’s Hidāyah, book vi.; the Durru ʾl-Muk͟htār, the Raddu ʾl-Muḥtār, and the Fatāwā-i-ʿĀlamgīrī, in loco, in which there are chapters devoted to the consideration of oaths and vows made under all circumstances of life, e.g. with respect to entering places of residence; with regard to actions; with respect to eating and drinking, speaking and conversing; of vows in manumission and divorce; with respect to buying and selling, marriage, clothing, wearing ornaments, striking, killing, the payment of money, &c. &c.]

OATH, The administration of an. An oath in a court of justice is not worthy of credit unless it be taken in the name of God, because Muḥammad said, “Whosoever takes an oath otherwise than in the name of God, is most certainly a polytheist.” It is incumbent upon the Qāẓī, or judge, to request the swearer to corroborate his oath by reciting some of the attributes of God. For example, “I swear by God, the Righteous, the Knower of Secrets,” &c. A defendant must not be required to swear by divorce or emancipation, as if he should say: “If it be true my wife is divorced, or my slave is free.”

If an oath be administered to a Jew, he should say, “I swear by God who revealed the Taurāt to Moses.”

If to a Christian, he should say, “I swear by God who revealed the Injīl to Jesus.”

If to a Majūsī or fire-worshipper, he should say, “I swear by God who created fire.”

An oath cannot be administered to an idolater otherwise than in the name of God, in accordance with this verse in the Qurʾān, “If ye ask of them who hath created you, verily they will say God Almighty.” (Sūrah xxxix. 39.)

An oath cannot be administered to infidels in their places of worship, because the Qāẓī is not allowed to enter such a place. This applies to the places of worship of the Jews and Christians as well as of idolaters. (Hidāyah, vol. ii. p. 77.)

Women are not in Muslim law (as in Jewish, Mishna Sheb. iv. 1), forbidden to bear witness on oath.

OBSEQUIES OF THE DEAD. [JANAZAH.]

OFFENCE AGAINST THE PERSON. [JINAYAH.]

OFFERINGS. The Arabic word naẕr (نذر‎) is often used for an offering, but in its strict theological meaning it expresses a vow. K͟hairāt (خيرات‎), pl. of K͟hair, is used for ordinary acts of charity. Ṣadaqah (صدقة‎) also expresses the same meaning. Niyāz (نياز‎) is an offering to a saint. Zakāt (زكوة‎), the legal alms.

[For an account of these offerings refer to the words.]

OHUD. [UHUD.]

OLD TESTAMENT. Al-ʿAhdu ʾl-ʿAtīq (العهد العتيق‎). Muḥammad, in his Qurʾān, professes to receive all the inspired books of the Old Testament. (See Sūrah ii. 130): “We believe in God, and what has been revealed to us, and what has been revealed to Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac, and Jacob, and the Tribes, and what was brought unto the Prophets from their Lord: and we will not distinguish between any of them, and unto Him are we resigned” (i.e. Muslims). But there is no evidence that Muḥammad had ever seen the Jewish Scriptures, as now received by both Jews and Christians. In the Qurʾān, he mentions the Taurāt of Moses, the Zabūr (Psalms) of David, and makes several references to the historical portions of the Old Testament; but Jonah is the only name amongst the writers of the prophetical books (either greater or minor), of the Old Testament scriptures, mentioned in the Qurʾān.

Muḥammadan writers say there have been 124,000 prophets, but only eight of these have been apostles to whom the Almighty has revealed books, and that only one hundred portions, or ṣuhuf, and four books, or kutub, have been given to mankind. Ten portions to Adam, the first of the prophets, fifty to Seth (not once mentioned in the Qurʾān), thirty to Idrīs or Enoch, and ten to Abraham. One book to Moses, another to David, another to Jesus, and the fourth to Muḥammad.

Six of the prophets are said to have brought in new laws which successively abrogated the preceding, namely Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muḥammad.

It is impossible to read the Qurʾān carefully without arriving at the conclusion that Muḥammad derived his knowledge of the events of Old Testament scriptures rather from the Rabbins and their Talmudic teaching, than from the inspired text itself. Mr. Emanuel Deutsch truly says: “Judaism forms the kernel of Muḥammadanism, both general and special. It seems as if he (Muḥammad) had breathed from his childhood almost the air of contemporary Judaism, such Judaism as is found by us crystallised in the Talmud, the Targum, and the Midras.” (Literary Remains, p. 89.)

The following Old Testament characters are mentioned by name in the Qurʾān:—

Aaron, Hārūn; Abel, Hābīl; Cain, Qābīl; Abraham, Ibrāhīm; Adam, Ādam; Terah, Āzar; David, Dāʾūd; Goliath, Jālūt; Enoch, Idrīs; Elias, Ilyās; Elijah, Alyasaʿ (al-Yasaʿ); Ezra, ʿUzair; Gabriel, Jibrīl; Gog, Yājūj; Magog, Mājūj; Isaac, Isḥāq; Ishmael, Ismāʿīl; Jacob, Yaʿqūb; Joseph, Yūsuf; Job, Aiyūb; Jonah, Yūnus; Joshua, Yūshaʿ; Korah, Qārūn; Lot, Lūt̤; Michael, Mikāʾīl; Moses, Mūsā; Noah, Nūḥ; Pharaoh, Firaun; Solomon, Sulaimān; Saul, T̤ālūt.

The following incidents of Old Testament history are related in the Qurʾān, with a strange want of accuracy and a large admixture of Talmudic fable:—

Aaron makes a calf. Sūrah xx. 90.

Cain and Abel. Sūrah v. 30.

Abraham visited by Angels. Sūrah xi. 72, xv. 51.

Abraham ready to sacrifice his son. Sūrah xxxvii. 101.

Adam, his fall. Sūrah vii. 18, ii. 34.

Korah and his company. Sūrah xxviii. 76, xxix. 38, xl. 25.

Creation of the world. Sūrah xvi. 3, xiii. 3, xxxv. 1, 12.

David’s praise of God. Sūrah xxxiv. 10.

Deluge. Sūrah liv. 9, lxix. 11, xi. 42.

Jacob goes to Egypt. Sūrah xii. 100.

Jonah and the fish. Sūrah vi. 86, x. 98, xxxvii. 139, lxviii. 48.

Joseph’s history. Sūrah vi. 84, xii. 1, xl. 36.

Manna and quails given. Sūrah vii. 160, xx. 82.

Moses strikes the rock. Sūrah vii. 160.

Noah’s ark. Sūrah xi. 40.

Pharaoh. Sūrah ii. 46, x. 76, xliii. 45, xl. 38.

Solomon’s judgment. Sūrah xxi. 78.

Queen of Sheba. Sūrah xxvii. 22.

The compiler of the Kashfu ʾz̤-Z̤unūn (ed. Flügel, vol. ii. p. 458, article, Taurāt) attempts an account of the Old Testament scriptures.

He divides the whole into four sections, and gives the names of the books as follows:—

[PROPHETS, TAURAT, ZABUR.]